

EMPIRES OF THE FAR EAST

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A STUDY OF JAPAN
AND OF HER COLONIAL POSSESSIONS,
OF CHINA AND MANCHURIA AND
OF THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS
OF EASTERN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC

BY

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IN TWO VOLUMES

I

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PREFACE

THE aim of the author in writing this book has been to present an impartial account of the peoples of the Far East, their social and political problems, and their activities generally.

More space has been devoted to Japan than to any other nation for the reason that she is the first Oriental country within modern history to be accorded a place of front rank among the Powers of the world, a circumstance which, coupled with the great events that have attended her rise to prestige, has exercised a dominating influence in shaping destiny over regions ~~so vast~~ as to permit only of the broad designation Eastern Asia. Wherever desirable it has been my endeavour to attempt correction of the mistaken notions so widely held concerning the policy of Japan and the character of her people. Hitherto the critics of our allies have been met with the charge of failure to substantiate their statements. Consequently I have taken special pains to produce chapter and verse for all that is written, a course which has involved quoting from many eminent authorities on the country whose work is acknowledged in succeeding pages whenever occasion arises, and to whom I am naturally indebted.

The Russo-Japanese War did not arrest the rapid march of events in the Far East; it merely closed one page of eventful history to open another destined to be a record of transition and turmoil no less important than that which it succeeded. To illustrate the truth of this statement it is enough to say that since the title, "Empires of the Far East," was chosen, two ancient dynasties have tottered to their doom—that of Korea, abolished at the bidding of Japan; that of China, swept away by the forces of violent revolution. Moreover, in any consideration of subsequent

pages it must be borne in mind that since they were written another important development has taken place. The Washington Senate has rejected the proposed treaty of general arbitration between Great Britain and the United States ; hence the modifications introduced into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in anticipation of the acceptance of the treaty have no effect. In other words, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance with its irksome obligations remains unchanged. In approaching the problems of the Far East the reader should not lose sight of this highly significant circumstance. For the rest, it will be found that Russia, whose finances have fully recovered from the calamities of the years 1904-5, continues her steady advance Eastwards, and that Japan, with a firm foothold on the mainland, has lost no opportunity of expanding her influence.

Nor must it be imagined that, as in the past, the political situation is made up solely out of developments on the Asiatic Continent. Japan's attainment to naval supremacy in the Pacific has been watched with deep anxiety not only in America but also in Canada and Australasia. The aspirations of the Anglo-Saxon race in this region are opposed to the foreign policy of Great Britain as directed from Downing Street. Because of mutual interests the sympathy of our Colonies frankly leans towards America. To America, Japan has become what in Europe Germany has so long been to Great Britain. Bearing these facts in mind, it should be taken into account that the completion of the Panama Canal will enable America to rival Japan's sea-power in Eastern waters, and will bring European navies appreciably nearer to the Pacific.

Wherever, then, the student turns he finds events of a stupendous nature shaping themselves in the regions of the Far East. But from out this vast expanse of the earth's surface, over which are sweeping the irresistible forces of transition, there rises, as it were, the lofty summit of China's destiny wreathed in clouds of impenetrable mystery. Whatever the future may hold, it must be apparent to all clear-thinking minds that the national assertion of a country containing, so it is reputed, four hundred millions of people is an event of first magnitude in the world's history, an

event that cannot fail to influence, if it does not wholly determine, the world's future.

Apart from a long study of the situation on the spot, during which the author collected information from a variety of sources, involving the translation of Russian, Japanese, and Chinese documents, he has enjoyed the advantage of the continuous help and co-operation of Mr. H. Hobden, whose intimate knowledge of the Far East, gained throughout a residence extending over twelve years, has proved of incalculable value. The chapter dealing with the Law of Japan was contributed by Mr. V. St. Clair Mackenzie, Barrister-at-Law, the chapters describing the Religions of Japan, by Mr. Harold Edward Lawton.

Without in any way identifying themselves with the controversial opinions expressed in these pages many gentlemen have, from time to time, rendered great assistance in supplying information. In this connection the author wishes to place on record his indebtedness to the late Prince Itō ; to officials in the various departments of State in Russia and Japan ; the diplomatic and consular representatives of these countries and of the United States ; the Agents-General of the self-governing Colonies ; Baron Megata, late financial adviser to the Korean Government ; Baron Goto, late President of the South Manchuria Railway ; Mr. E. Yamaza, Councillor of the Japanese Embassy in London ; H.I.J.M. Consul-General and H.I.J.M. Financial Commissioner in London ; the Rev. G. Furness-Smith, M.A., Editorial Secretary of the Church Missionary Society, and the Rev. C. T. Warren, a Missionary of twenty-one years' residence in Japan (who were kind enough to read the proofs of the chapters dealing with the Religions of Japan) ; and Mr. E. J. Harrison, the author of "Peace or War, East of Baikal ?"

It only remains to be added that it has been the author's aim, even at the expense of some repetition, to make each section of the book as complete as possible in itself.

LANCELOT LAWTON.

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I

A PRELIMINARY REVIEW

IN no part of an ever-changing world, surveying a period of the last twenty years, has transition been so real and apparent as in the vast region of the Far East. Merely to enumerate the outstanding events of this time, brief in the life of nations, is to give some idea of the scope aimed at in succeeding chapters. First in historic importance must be placed the alliance of an Oriental nation, Japan, with Great Britain, and its admission to a place among the Powers of the world. When we reflect that little more than fifty years ago Japan was a hermit kingdom peopled with a race whose detestation of foreigners was deeply rooted, we may realise without effort the almost dramatic nature of the swift progress that has brought her into the van of world activity. But the period under review, unfortunately, has been distinguished not alone by peaceful advancement in the Far East. Wars and revolts involving incalculable expenditure of blood and treasure have succeeded each other with but short intervals of tranquillity ; thrones have tottered and fallen ; again and again the map has undergone striking changes, and not one but several peoples have been immersed in the horrors and turmoil of violent transition. In all this upheaval we have seen barbarism at its worst. Assassinations and massacres have not been infrequent. The nations of the East have fought among themselves and within themselves. And, lastly, the forces of Asia and of Europe have met each other, as it were, on the frontiers of civilisation and have entered into conflict on common battleground. Amid this strife the kingdom of Korea has been extinguished and her emperor dethroned.

At no time has China ceased to be the cause of world-wide anxiety. To-day the fate of this great country, whose inhabitants number one-third of the world's population, trembles in

the balance. Although the effete Manchu dynasty, which had ruled for two and a half centuries, has been swept away before the forces of revolution, so far no effective form of government has been set up to take its place. The period with which this work mainly deals may be said to have begun in 1894-5, when Japan defeated China and settled an issue long in doubt as to which of the two empires of the East was predominant. Three years later America advanced her outposts in the Pacific, taking the place of Spain in the Philippines. Both these events have exerted an immense influence upon the destinies of the Far East. To begin with, a cleavage which may last for decades was wrought between China and Japan, and the spectre of a Yellow Peril arising as a result of a militant alliance passed beyond the vision of the present generation. Without at this stage pronouncing upon the merits or otherwise of the issues in dispute, it may be stated as an historic fact that the war marked the beginning of a period of intermittent aggression upon China. Formosa, the valuable camphor-producing island of the south, was ceded to Japan, and Korea lost the protection, for what it was worth, of the Manchu dynasty. Nor, far reaching as these changes undoubtedly were, did they embrace all the developments traceable to the campaign. The events of the time paved the way for events still more memorable—the war between Russia and Japan, and its immense sequel, the reshaping of the Far East. In the terms of peace concluded between China and Japan, the Kwantung Peninsula, upon which stands the fortress of Port Arthur and the town of Dalny, was ceded to the victor. Thereupon France, Germany, and Russia protested against this encroachment upon the Chinese mainland, and Japan was compelled to evacuate the territory to which legitimate conquest had given her every right. Great Britain refused to join the three Powers in ejecting Japan, and doubtless her action on this occasion laid the foundation of that friendship which soon ripened into the Alliance. It was not long before the perfidy of France, Germany, and Russia was exposed. In September 1896, only one year later, Russia made the opening move in that grandiose scheme of aggression which was finally to culminate in war with Japan. An agreement was entered into between the Chinese Government and the Russo-Chinese

Bank, at that time a semi-official institution, whereby the latter formed the Chinese Eastern Railway Company for the purpose of developing railway enterprise in Manchuria under the control of the Russian Government. Then followed a series of events which seemed to presage the break up of China, and which threatened to involve the great Powers in a world struggle. On 31st October 1897 the Russian ensign was hoisted at Port Arthur, and the forts were occupied by the Tsar's troops; on November 14th a force from a German squadron landed at Kiao-chau and the Chinese troops were expelled; and on May 24th of the following year the British flag was hoisted at Wei-hai-wei. During 1898 Russia secured from China a lease of Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, Germany of Kiao-chau, Great Britain of Wei-hai-wei and of an extension of a strip of territory on the mainland opposite Hong Kong, while France acquired Kwang-chow-wan, a free port on the Li-chow Peninsula. Thus it will be seen that the three Powers, who in their pretended anxiety to preserve the integrity of China, had ousted Japan from the Kwantung Peninsula, themselves, three years later, encroached upon the mainland. In the case of Russia the inconsistency of her policy was all the more apparent because the territory she occupied was actually part of the region from which Japan had been excluded. The attitude of Great Britain was perfectly intelligible. Our occupation of Wei-hai-wei was merely designed to checkmate German and Russian aggression, and certainly would not have taken place had it not been for this aggression. In the circumstances, much as we desired to see the integrity of China maintained, we were bound to place our own interests in the forefront. During 1898, when at least four Powers secured territorial concessions in China, Japan remained content with Formosa and did not seek further advantages. Then came the Boxer campaign of 1900. The origin of this tragic episode has been attributed to an anti-foreign sentiment that swept the provinces of Northern China; but there can be no doubt that such a sentiment, whatever its primary cause, could never have grown to the proportions of a general rising against foreigners had not it been for the period of plunder inaugurated by the territorial aggression of 1897.

In this connection it is only necessary to quote from one

of the proclamations issued by a rebel leader, one Yü Tung Ch'ên, who wrote: "These foreigners, under pretext of trading and teaching Christianity, are in reality taking away the land, food, and clothing of the people; besides overturning the teaching of the sages, they are poisoning us with opium and ruining us with debauchery. Since the time of Tao Kuang, they have intimidated our Court and coerced our officials; they have seized our territory and cheated us out of our money; they have eaten our children as food and piled up the public debt as high as the hills; they have burnt our palaces and overthrown our tributary states, occupied Shanghai, devastated Formosa, forcibly opened Kiao-chau, and now wish to divide up China like a melon." The campaign, undertaken for the purpose of suppressing the Boxer rising, brought vividly to the notice of distinguished military officers who took part in the combined expedition to Peking the efficiency of Japanese troops in the field, thus confirming the high opinion formed of their conduct in the war with China.

At this time Japan stood alone and friendless in the world. Russian aggression, already extended to the southern shores of Manchuria, began to make itself felt in Korea. The Tōkyō Government realised that if the peninsula kingdom which outstretched to within twelve hours' steaming distance of Japan were to pass into the possession of Russia, then their dreams of a continental Empire would not only vanish for ever, but the existence of their own land would instantly be menaced. They were faced with two alternatives, either to cultivate friendly relations with Russia with a view to securing some territorial compensation as a price of their acquiescence in that country's bold designs, or else to seek among the Powers one who would support, and if necessary finance them in active opposition to the aims of Russia. Not unnaturally their inclinations leaned towards Great Britain who had refused to join in turning Japan out of the Kwantung Peninsula, and whose financial resources offered a tempting prospect in case of loans being required in the future. Moreover, Great Britain resented, as much as did Japan, the forward policy of Russia in the Far East, and, in addition, the circumstance that the interests of the two European Powers clashed in Central Asia rendered the moment peculiarly favourable for an alliance between

Japan and Great Britain. Nor did the statesmen of Japan blind themselves to the lessons of history. They knew that any arrangement with Russia would be tantamount to a recognition of her aggressive policy in the Far East, and that although in return they might secure some reward, nothing could be given them that would be adequate compensation for the sacrifices they would be called upon to make. An alliance with Russia was unlikely to be fruitful unless it clearly defined the interests of both countries. This procedure would have involved the setting up of limitations to the aggressive policies of both countries, and in such a bargain, Japan, weak and penniless as she then was, could not have insisted upon anything like equality of treatment. An alliance of this nature would simply have given Russia time in which to strengthen her military position so as to enable her to pursue her aims regardless of the susceptibilities of her island neighbour. Japan, therefore, in her search for an ally turned naturally towards Great Britain. At the same time, however, with true diplomatic subtlety, she coquetted with St. Petersburg. The late Prince Itō was responsible for certain overtures to the Russian Government; but meanwhile the Katsura Cabinet concluded a Treaty of Alliance with Great Britain, which Treaty was renewed in a more comprehensive form in 1905, and again, in a considerably modified form, last year. In Russia to-day it is vigorously asserted that the Japanese *pourparlers* were promptly rejected, but in view of the envy excited by subsequent events this statement has no importance.

No reference has yet been made to the "spheres of influence." The phrase, about which so much speculation prevailed at the time, originated early in the period under review, and in it was to be found the only prescription upon which the European concert could agree as likely to provide a palliative for China's then unhappy state. Broadly speaking, these "spheres of influence" were divided as follows: Great Britain in the Yangtze region, Russia in Manchuria and Mongolia, Germany in Shangtung, Japan in Fokien, and France in the territories bordering upon Indo-China. One is inclined to think that the vague term "spheres of influence" was not without a sinister meaning; that, in short, it was invented in order that the Powers should be able to convey to

each other location of territories, the cession of which was looked for in the break-up of China. Perhaps the phrase "spheres of aspirations" would more accurately have described conditions then existing. When, however, at the instigation of the late Mr. John Hay in 1900, all the leading Powers, including Japan, expressed their adherence to the doctrine of the Open Door in China, the term employed in the diplomatic correspondence as applying to leased territories and their neighbourhood, was "spheres of interest." Yet, in spite of these declarations of pious intention, one of the issues upon which Japan challenged Russia four years later arose out of her serious belief that the principle of equal treatment to all nations was set at defiance in Manchuria; and, again, notwithstanding that Japan, the self-appointed champion of down-trodden China, was victorious on the battlefield, that in the Treaty of Peace the two signatories once more expressed their adherence to the doctrine of the Open Door, and that at a still later date they, in common with other Powers, went to the pains of reaffirming this adherence, the situation as it exists in Manchuria to-day is, if anything, more deplorable than it was in the days that preceded the historic campaign. Nominally the door may be open, but together Japan and Russia monopolise all the accommodation within. In the circumstances it must be confessed that during the last twenty years the Powers have done nothing to help China in her sorry plight. Promises have been made in abundance; not one has been kept.

The Russo-Japanese war closed one era and opened another. Impartial authorities are in agreement that both this war and the Boxer rising were in a large measure the evil fruits of the calamitous aggression of 1897-8. To-day France, Germany, and Russia are witnesses of a state of affairs far worse than that which seventeen years ago they combined to prevent, namely, Japan not only established on the Kwantung Peninsula but dominant throughout Southern Manchuria. One cannot escape the reflection that had Russia refrained from seizing Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan in 1898, Kwantung would have remained under the Chinese flag.

Having briefly reviewed the outstanding events of the past it will be opportune to summarise the situation as it exists

to-day. Admittedly the result of the Russo-Japanese war has radically changed the whole trend of international policy in the Far East, and has exercised a not inconsiderable influence upon affairs in Europe. Let us consider the effect it has wrought upon China. To some extent the eyes of the Chinese people were opened by the loss of Formosa and the seizure of Port Arthur, Kiao-chau, and Wei-hai-wei. The Boxer rising that followed, though fanatical and therefore futile, was none the less evidence of the awakening of national spirit. On that occasion the Chinese were forced to recognise the superiority of foreign arms and of foreign methods. Valuable as this bitter lesson proved to them it could not in the nature of things be so enlightening as that conveyed by Japan's later triumphs over the armies and fleets of Russia. On her own territory and, as it were, before the eyes of her teeming millions, proof was forthcoming to China that with modern training and modern equipment, backed by the resources of clever diplomacy, an Asiatic race could hope to vanquish the strongest of Western races. It must be confessed, however, that the moral thus strikingly conveyed appealed more to the progressive or revolutionary elements in the land than it did to the effete Government that sought to prop up an already tottering dynasty. For, in the long series of diplomatic negotiations arising out of the new conditions created by the war, China, in her pitiable helplessness, was compelled meekly to do the bidding of Russia and Japan. The progressive party in the nation, to which I have alluded, did not fail in its campaign of revolution to make capital out of the surrender of Manchuria to these Powers. Thus, as in the case of the Boxer rising, foreign aggression has proved to be one of the principal factors in a violent ebullition of national spirit. Here all attempts to trace a resemblance between the two rebellions must cease. For the present struggle so far is entirely unaccompanied by anti-foreign feeling. It is not a rising of fanatics, but a well-organised revolution conducted under temperate leadership. Wisely the blame of China's plight is to-day laid by her people at the proper doors—the Throne and the Central Government—and contributory causes are rightly ignored. Whatever may be the outcome of the transition now in progress—and many competent authorities pre-

dict years of strife before China emerges as a strong nation—it is certain that the passing of the Manchu dynasty removed the one great obstacle that for generations barred the way to constructive reform. But, generally speaking, the situation, always obscure, is still obscure, and doubtless will remain so for some considerable time to come. The interests of the various Powers, as these have been affected by the events of the period under review, offer great scope for something in the nature of detailed explanation and decisive comment. Dark as have been the pages of Far Eastern history during the last twenty years, Europe may yet congratulate itself that events did not run an infinitely more disastrous course. The Russo-Japanese war, with all its vast consequences, was indirectly due to a gigantic effort of modern enterprise: the building of the great railway through Siberia, which afforded a highway for the rapid transit of Russian forces to the uttermost limits of Eastern Asia. Thus the West of its own accord went out to meet the East. Calamitous as was the sequel, the imagination can picture a state far worse, a state that assuredly would have been brought about had Russia not undertaken the magnificent task of constructing a railway terminating on the shores of the blue Pacific. In that event not only China but Siberia would have been at the mercy of Japan, and the "yellow" frontiers would have been advanced much nearer to Europe than they are at present. With truth it may be said that, alone, Russia bore the white man's burden. Though she did not shatter the armies of Japan, acting as does a breakwater against the surging tide she dispersed their force and held them in check. Experience has taught her that a single line of railway through a wild and sparsely populated country is a wholly inadequate provision for cultural development in time of peace or for the exigencies of war. Hence she is doubling the existing track, and is hastening the building of a new line, along the great Amur, which is to give her communication with the shores of the Pacific through territories exclusively Russian. Moreover, the State is doing all that lies within its power to people Siberia with sturdy pioneers, who in time of crisis will provide an army in strategic proximity to the scene of possible conflict. Japan, also, is creating a wide-spreading web of communications, and

is distributing settlers throughout her newly acquired territories. Thus when next the forces of East and West meet it will be upon a scale of even greater magnitude than was the case seven years ago, when it was computed that more than a million men were engaged, and the battle front extended over a hundred miles.

Having dealt with what might perhaps be termed the continental phase of the situation, we may now turn to review the problems of the Pacific, which, too, owe their origin largely to the Russo-Japanese war, but which affect ourselves and our kindred across the seas and in the United States more acutely than does any other phase. Her complete triumph placed Japan in a position of absolute predominance in Far Eastern waters. This circumstance in itself was sufficient to give pause for serious reflection. But the unfavourable attitude which our Colonies had adopted towards the Japanese, and which, to their credit, they never attempted to conceal, afforded grounds for speculation as to the likelihood of grave complications arising in the future. Openly they sided with America in her efforts to induce Japan to stem the tide of emigration to the Pacific States. The tension was relieved only because Japan wisely, and of her own accord, took measures to restrict the traffic; but no one could pretend that the question has been finally disposed of, or that one day it will not revive in an acute form. In the meantime Japan is expanding her navy, Australian and Canadian squadrons are in formation, New Zealand has contributed a *Dreadnought* to the Imperial navy, and all our Colonies having interest in the Pacific are fortifying their coasts and organising strong land forces. The strained feeling which at one time or another manifested itself in the relations between Japan and the United States led to considerable discussion as to whether in the event of war between these countries the obligations of the Alliance would compel Great Britain to take part as against the United States. The view prevailed generally that whatever stipulations treaties might contain it would be impossible to conceive any circumstances which would provoke hostilities between the two great families of the Anglo-Saxon race. The prospect last year of the early conclusion of a comprehensive treaty of arbitration between Great Britain

and the United States presented an opportunity for putting at rest all doubts on the subject. Japan was then persuaded to consent to a revision of the terms of the Alliance so as to render it inoperative against nations with whom either of the contracting parties had concluded arbitration treaties. This circumstance, coupled with the restraining influence which Great Britain has exerted upon Japan throughout the Chinese Revolution, has led several journals, in close touch with the Tōkyō Government, to voice the opinion that the Alliance as at present constituted is without advantage, and that, on the contrary, its obligations have become positively irksome.

Viewed in a broad sense the interests of Great Britain, the United States, and Russia, should be identical in the Far East, inasmuch as all three Powers are faced with the problems of Oriental immigration, and are not altogether free from the fear of Oriental aggression. Moreover, these three Powers control great highways linking the West with the East: Great Britain, the Suez Canal; America, the Panama Canal; and Russia, the Amur and Siberian Railways. In an article contributed to the *Century Magazine* of July last, Admiral Mahan, with customary ability, dwelt at length upon one important aspect of this question. It is not without significance that the construction of the Panama Canal should have been so accelerated as to allow of the opening ceremony being performed next year. This undertaking will prove itself to be not only a link between oceans but one between nations. Admiral Mahan points out that when it is available for traffic the British navy will be brought six thousand miles nearer the Pacific coast of Canada, and that whereas now not less than four months would be required for the American battle fleet to reach Pearl Harbour (where the defence of Hawaii is concentrated), with the Canal less than four weeks would be necessary. The following passage from his contribution is well worthy of quotation in full:—

“The great English-speaking colonies of Australia and New Zealand will be less immediately and directly affected as to populating by the Panama Canal; but its influence upon Pacific America, including Hawaii, cannot be a matter of small importance to communities which share with equal fervour the determination that their land shall be peopled by men of

European antecedents. This identity of feeling on the subject of Asiatic immigration between the North American Pacific and Australia, both inheritors of the same political tradition, is certain to create political sympathies, and may drag into a common action the nations of which each forms a part. This particular determination, in the midst of that recent prevalent unrest, which is called the Awakening of the East, is probably the very largest factor in the future of the Pacific, and one which eventually will draw in most of the West-European nations in support of their present possessions in the East. Immediately north of Australia, barricading it, as it were, from west to east, in a veritable Caribbean of European tropical possessions—Sumatra, Java, to New Guinea—distributed between Germany, Great Britain, and Holland; while immediately north of them again come the Philippines under American administration. It is needless to say that support to such distant dependencies means military Sea Power; but it is less obvious, until heeded, that the tendency will impart a common object which may go far toward composing present rivalries and jealousies in Europe. To none, however, can this interest be so vital as to Great Britain, because Australasia is not to her a dominion over alien races, as India is, and as are most European possessions in the East. The Australians and New Zealanders are her own flesh and blood, and should the question of support to them arise, the Panama Canal offers an alternative route not greatly longer to Eastern Australia, and shorter by over 1200 miles to New Zealand. It is, however, in the developed power of Pacific America that Australia in the future will find the great significance of the Panama Canal."

Up to the present consistent co-operation between Great Britain and the United States has been impossible of attainment. Unlike Great Britain, the United States has no European situation to face, and therefore she is at liberty to concentrate her attention largely upon the region of the Far East. So far she has done all that lies in her power, save resorting to the extreme course of war, to promote the doctrine of the Open Door. Yet here her impotence is immediately exposed. Japan and Russia, driven temporarily into each other's arms by the force of circumstances, aim deliberately at the ultimate absorption and division of Manchuria. Great

Britain has not found herself in a position to lend support to the laudable attitude of the United States, for the simple reason that the pivot of her foreign policy must of necessity rest in Europe. And the situation in Europe has demanded that the alliance with Japan should be maintained, permitting, as it does, of the reinforcement of our fleet in home waters with battleships withdrawn from the Pacific. Moreover, his Majesty's Government, who are in a better position than their critics to consider national needs, have regarded it as imperative that our system of international friendships, already including France, the ally of Russia, should be extended so as to embrace Russia, thus creating the Triple Entente to counter-balance the Triple Alliance. Before all this could be achieved Japan and Russia were induced to resume friendly relations, Russia promising to give her consent to the annexation of Korea, while an understanding was arrived at concerning Manchuria and its future. Such arrangements naturally involved sacrifices by Great Britain. The only alternative was the resumption on our part of perilous isolation. Those critics who have confined their investigations to the Far East are apt to forget that in dealing with developments in this region the British Government is compelled to pay due regard to the general trend of world politics. The security of the Empire as a whole, not necessarily the promotion of its interests in one particular quarter, must be of first concern. Here, at least, there is no room for inconsistency in policy. As time goes on circumstances may demand of us a more initiative and vigorous line of action in the Far East. I have already described some of the dangers to be feared. The state of China is in itself sufficient to give cause for constant anxiety. But there still remains the gloomy shadow of that stupendous issue arising from Oriental expansion as a whole, which, in spite of everything, may drive Great Britain, the United States, and Russia into the same camp.

BOOK I

JAPAN—GEOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL

II

• GEOGRAPHY AND STRATEGICAL ADVANTAGES

THE Empire of Japan occupies in the East a geographical position similar in many respects to that of Great Britain in the West. Japan is the only island nation east of Suez; Great Britain is the only island nation west of Suez. Japan is separated from the continent of Asia by the Tsushima Straits, which can be crossed in a few hours; Great Britain is separated from the continent of Europe by the English Channel, which can be crossed at its narrowest point within an hour, and at other points within a few hours. The coasts of Japan are washed by two seas—the Sea of Japan, which might be compared to the North Sea, and the Pacific Ocean, which bears very much the same relation to Japan as the Atlantic Ocean does to Great Britain. Japan looks across the Pacific towards the western shores of Canada and the United States; Great Britain, in the Atlantic, faces the eastern coasts of the same territories. Here, however, all geographical comparisons are at an end.

The Empire of Japan consists of nearly four thousand islands and islets. Of that total only one hundred and fifty-seven have an area in excess of four square *ri*; six hundred and forty-five are either inhabited or are looked upon as important sea-marks; while the remainder are merely barren rocks. The Japanese compare the shape of their country to the body of a dragon-fly. A glance at the map will show that the mainland, together with the island of Shikoku, bears a striking resemblance in outline to a heelless boot. The long chain of islands and islets stretches from Karafuto (Japanese Saghalien) and Kamchatka in the north, latitudes $50^{\circ} 00'$ and $51^{\circ} 00'$ respectively, to Taiwan (Formosa) in the south, latitude $21^{\circ} 48'$; and it extends from Hōkotō (Pescadores), the extreme west, longitude $119^{\circ} 20'$, to Chishima or the Kurile Islands; the extreme east, longitude $156^{\circ} 32'$. The principal islands are the mainland, which has no official

name, but which is generally called Hondo—Shikoku, Kyūshū, Hokkaidō, and Taiwan (Formosa). The united length of these is about 1200 miles, and the breadth of the mainland varies from 100 to 175 miles. Other islands of lesser importance include Sado, Oki, Awaji, Iki, Tsushima, and the four archipelagoes—Chishima or Kurile Islands (thirty-two islands), stretching some 600 miles in a north-easterly direction from Hokkaidō (Yezo) towards the coast of Kamchatka; Riūkiū or Loochoo Islands, extending some 500 miles in a south-westerly direction from Kyūshū to a little east of Formosa; Ogasawarajima or Bonin Islands (twenty islands), terminating some 500 miles to the south of Tōkyō Bay; and Hokōtō or the Pescadores. In addition, the southern half of Saghalien, which, from the fiftieth degree of north latitude, was ceded to Japan by Russia in the Portsmouth Treaty of 1905, is now included within the Japanese Empire. In this acquisition of territory, however, Japan only regained that which she had lost. As far back as 1875 a treaty was concluded at St. Petersburg by which the whole of Saghalien with its valuable resources became part of the dominions of Russia, and in exchange for her share Japan received the barren and useless Kurile Islands. Formosa also constitutes ceded territory. Following the successful war waged by Japan in 1894-5, a Treaty of Peace was concluded at Shimonoseki, by which China relinquished her sovereignty over Formosa. Thus, as a result of two victorious campaigns fought within the last fifteen years, Japan has extended her dominions both in the far north and the extreme south. As the area of Karafuto (Japanese Saghalien) is 2097 square *ri*, and that of Formosa 2253 square *ri*, this means that 4350 square *ri*, or 26,000 square miles, have been added to the Empire during the present reign. The Kwantung Peninsula, which is only leased for a period of years, and Korea, over which a protectorate is exercised, cannot be included in any geographical survey of the Japanese Empire.¹

Japan proper consists of all territory with the exception of that which was ceded as a result of the wars with China and

¹ Since the above was in the press Korea, containing an area of 83,650 square miles, has been annexed to the Japanese Empire.

is about 42 miles across. The northern coast of the mainland is divided from Hokkaidō by the Tsugaru Straits, which in the narrowest part are not 20 miles in width, and the northern point of Hokkaidō is separated from Southern Saghalien by the Soya Straits. Chishima, or the Kurile group, which stretches from the east coast of Hokkaidō to the southern point of Kamchatka, forms another effective barrier against hostile descent upon the shores of Japan. Finally, in the extreme north, the Gulf of Tartary divides Saghalien from the Siberian coast. It will be seen that there are four entrances to the Sea of Japan—the Straits of Korea, Tsugaru, Soya, and the Gulf of Tartary; but, providing Japan always possesses, as she does now, an adequate navy, none of these will ever be available for the purposes of a hostile Power. The Gulf of Tartary and the Soya Straits are ice-bound for a considerable part of the year, and there only remain the Korean Straits and the Tsugaru Straits, the channels of which are narrow and can be easily defended by the Japanese fleet. Convincing proof of this statement was provided on the occasion of the memorable battle of the Japan Sea on May 27 and 28, 1905, when the invulnerable nature of Japan's geographical situation was demonstrated in a striking manner. Admiral Rodjestvensky, the commander-in-chief of the Russian fleet, selected the Korean Straits as the best available route for reaching Vladivostock. Meanwhile, Admiral Togo with the Japanese fleet calmly awaited his arrival at an anchorage off the southern coast of Korea. Had Admiral Rodjestvensky chosen the Tsugaru route he would still have been anticipate by his enemy.

The Korean Straits are, as it were, the Dardanelles of the Far East. With Japan in command of these waters, no foreign navy could possibly run the gauntlet through one of the three narrow necks or channels which lead into the Sea of Japan. To make such an attempt would only be to court complete destruction as in the case of the Russian fleet. During a period of peace, however, there is nothing to prevent Russia assembling a vast fleet at Vladivostock in the extreme north so that in the event of hostilities recurring she could operate against Japan in the Sea of Japan. Nevertheless an overwhelming advantage due to circumstances beyond

human control would still remain with Japan. To begin with, Vladivostock is ice-bound for a considerable part of the year, and ice-breakers are at best an unsatisfactory and hazardous method of gaining access to a port. On the other hand, Japan possesses numerous naval bases both on the Korean and Japanese coasts, and she would be in a favourable position to blockade not only the port of Vladivostock but also the straits leading to the Sea of Japan. For all supplies, coal, and munitions, therefore, Russia would be speedily reduced to dependence upon the overland routes—that is, of course, always providing that she did not exterminate the enemy's fleet. Such a contingency as this latter is extremely improbable in the light of recent history. As a matter of fact, the possibility of Russia again becoming a great naval Power in the East is still too remote to merit serious consideration. She lost not only her ships but the personnel of her navy in the late war, and she must build the one and train the other before she can re-establish herself in the ranks of the great maritime nations. Meanwhile, Japan, by securing control over Korea, dominates strategically the western as well as the eastern shores of the Sea of Japan; and in view of this circumstance, and of the recent lesson of the Russian disaster at Tsushima, it is extremely improbable that Russia, or in fact any other Power, will be so foolish as lightly to challenge her supremacy in these waters.

The depth of the Japan Sea averages between 2000 and 3000 fathoms. The sea on the Pacific coast is of great depth, and not far from the eastern coast of Northern Japan is the Tuscarora depression of 4655 fathoms—the deepest seabed in the world. Within the shores of Kyūshū, Shikoku, and the mainland is situated the Inland Sea of Japan, famous for its magnificent scenery. This wonderful sheet of water has an area of 1325 square miles, a length of 240 miles, a coastline of 700 miles, and a maximum depth of 68 fathoms. It is approached from the outer seas through four narrow passages, the most noteworthy of which are the Shimonoseki Straits, less than three-quarters of a mile wide and heavily fortified, which lead from the Korean Straits past the northern point of Kyūshū and the southern extremity of the mainland. The other straits are the Hayatomo or Bungo Channel, about

7 miles wide—the south-western entrance—and the Yura Straits, about a third of a mile wide, and the Naratu Straits, about three-quarters of a mile wide—the eastern approaches.

Japan, generally speaking, is mountainous; it is, in fact, the crest of a submarine mountain range. Two chains of mountains, one of which originates in Saghalien and the other in China, converge in the centre of the mainland and produce the range of rugged mountains known to travellers as the Japanese Alps. The principal peaks are Fuji, 12,467 feet, Komage-take, 9840 feet, and Shirane, 8400 feet. For grace of outline and grandeur of position Fuji is incomparable. The Japanese have a tradition that it rose from the earth in a single night. Geologists assert that it is volcanic, its last recorded eruption having occurred two hundred years ago. Altogether there are three volcanic ranges in Japan—the Kurile, the Fuji, and the Kirishima range in Kyūshū. These systems include more than two hundred volcanoes, of which fifty-one have been active in recent years. Among the latter may be mentioned Asama (always active), Bandai (which erupted in 1888 with disastrous results), and Komage-take, all in the main island of Hondo; and Aso-yama (with the largest crater in the world) in Kyūshū. Nasu, on the mainland, Oshima, on a small island not far from Yokohama, and Kirishima-yama in Kyūshū, are always emitting smoke. There are more than two hundred lakes in Japan, the largest being Lake Biwa, with a coast-line of about 180 miles. The majority of them are small. Lake Chūzen-ji and Lake Hakone, situated among some of the most lovely mountain scenery in Japan, are both within easy reach of the capital.

Owing to the mountainous nature and narrow formation of the country, the rivers are short and rapid. The longest river is the Ishikari, in Hokkaidō, 200 miles long. On the mainland, the Shinano, about 180 miles, the Tonegawa, about 164 miles, the Kitakami, 158 miles, and, in Hokkaidō, the Teshiho, 150 miles, come next in order; all the other rivers are less than 150 miles long. The number of waterfalls is estimated at six hundred, the largest of which, that of Nachi in the province of Ki-i, south of Ōsaka, is 800 feet high and 100 feet broad. There are thirteen important plains

in Japan, the majority being found in Hokkaidō. Tōkyō, the capital, and the important cities of Yokohama, Kōbe, and Ōsaka are built upon extensive areas of flat land, and the valuable coal-fields of Kyūshū are known as the Tsukushi plain. On the whole, however, the country is rugged and mountainous, a condition which is the inevitable result of its volcanic origin. For this reason, if for no other, an invasion of Japan would be impossible. Assuming that the difficulties on sea were overcome by a hostile Power, an army might conceivably be landed, but it would be unable to advance far inland without entering the mountain fastnesses where assuredly it would be exterminated. In view of Japan's military and naval efficiency, it would seem absurd to discuss the possibility of invasion. Kuropatkin was credited with the observation that he would sign terms of peace in Tōkyō, but the reflection is forced upon one that had his army obtained victory over the Japanese in Manchuria and Korea, it would most certainly have met its doom upon attempting a landing in Japan. During the war between Russia and Japan there was some talk of a Russian invasion of Hokkaidō from Southern Saghalien. Something might have been accomplished by Russia in this direction as a means of creating a diversion. The opportunity, however, is not likely to occur again, for, by the Portsmouth Treaty of Peace, Japan herself secured sovereignty over Karafuto (Southern Saghalien). In the event of another war with Russia there would doubtless be fighting on the little frontier of Saghalien, and hostilities either with her or with any other Power might, though it is extremely unlikely, involve the invasion and loss of Taiwan (Formosa), which is situated some distance away from the islands known as Japan proper. But it is certain, if for no other reason than the strategical advantages resulting from geographical situation and characteristics, that no foreign invader will ever be able to obtain a substantial foothold on the soil of Japan—that is, the soil of ancient Japan as distinct from the possessions of modern Japan.

III

ORIGIN AND APPEARANCE

THE origin of the Japanese race is obscure. Learned students of the country have indulged in endless controversy on the subject without being able to arrive at any general agreement. The writer himself has conducted no personal investigations such as would justify him in presenting a definite opinion, and he is therefore compelled to fall back upon the researches of the several eminent authorities who have made the study of the origin of the Japanese their special charge. In his book, "The Mikado's Empire," Griffis writes: "Two distinctly marked types of features are found among the people of Japan. Among the upper classes, the fine, long, oval face, with prominent, well-chiselled features, deep-sunken eye-sockets, oblique eyes, long, drooping eyelids, elevated and arched eyebrows, high and narrow forehead, rounded nose, bud-like mouth, pointed chin, small hands and feet, contrast strikingly with the round, flattened face, less oblique eyes almost level with the face, and straight noses, expanded and upturned at the roots. The former type prevails among the higher classes—the nobility and gentry; the latter among the agricultural and labouring classes. The one is the southern or Yamato type, the other, the Ainu or northern type." Several of the earlier authorities advanced the theory that the two types of faces represented two distinct immigrations. The first of these, the Ainu, or aborigines of Japan, were said to have made their way in the north from the mainland of Siberia. As evidence that their advent was easy, attention is drawn to the fact that the separating channel which they crossed to the northern islands of Japan is only five miles wide, and that with the wind in certain quarters it is dry, while in winter it is frozen. The theory is advanced that the southern immigration to the islands of Kyūshū and Shikoku came in two ways—one

in boats drifting from the Malay Archipelago along that great equatorial current of the Pacific, the Kuro Shiwo or Black Stream which washes the southern shores of Japan, and the other through Korea, which is distant only a day's junk sail. The theory is then advanced that the southern immigrants conquered the northern, and that although a fusion of races took place which resulted in the present Japanese, two distinct types of faces were preserved. That the Ainu were the earliest inhabitants of Japan is a point upon which most authorities are in agreement. Some few, however, contend that a race of dwarfs existed prior to the Ainu. There is no doubt that the southern immigrants conquered the Ainu; but who were the southern races, and from whence come the Japanese of to-day? In the course of this chapter it will be shown that the Japanese race owes little in its composition to the Ainu, while evidence will also be set forth in favour of the theory that there existed a race or a number of races between the Yamato and the Ainu. The question therefore still remains—from whence come the Japanese of to-day? All that the writer will attempt in the way of an answer is a review of the latest investigations on the subject.

The discovery of a number of excavations in various parts of Japan, more especially in Hokkaidō and in Chishima, has given rise to a great deal of new discussion concerning the earliest inhabitants of the country. There is no doubt that the islands at one remote period were occupied by a race or races of cave-dwellers, but as to the exact identity of such race or races little satisfactory evidence is forthcoming. Ancient Japanese records declare that Jimmu, the first human Emperor of Japan, whose accession is given as 660 B.C., was descended from the Sun-Goddess. It is more probable, however, that if such a being ever existed he landed from the mainland and conquered the aborigines. In the *Kojiki*, or Record of Ancient Matters, it is stated that as Jimmu made his progress he reached the great cave of Ōsaka, where he found awaiting him "earth spiders with tails, namely, eighty braves." His method of disposing of them was perhaps the first recorded instance of the workings of that barbaric spirit which history has since shown to be peculiarly

associated with the Orient, and which is not altogether absent from the minds or the methods of the strange peoples who dwell in eastern lands to this day. "So then the august son of the heavenly deity," we read, "commanded that a banquet be bestowed on the eighty bravoës. Thereupon he set eighty butlers, one for each of the eighty bravoës, and girded each of them with a sword and instructed the butlers saying, 'When ye hear me sing, cut them down simultaneously.'" It is also mentioned in ancient history that Keikō, whose accession is dated 71 A.D., made war upon the "earth spiders." These references are quoted in support of the theory that the aborigines of Japan were a race or races of cave-dwellers. Mr. Henry von Siebold, who investigated some caves in Odawara and localities other than Hokkaidō, came to the conclusion from the pottery and other evidences they contained that these primitive inhabitants were of Korean origin.

Aston attaches no importance to the theory that pit-dwellings are evidence of identification of races, and adds: "It has been seen that Chinese, Japanese, and Koreans may all be pit-dwellers on occasions, and the practice is by no means confined to this part of the world." One native record, the *Nihongi*, distinctly states that "the most redoubtable of the barbarians were the Ainu." This has been taken as proof that more than one race formed the aborigines of the country, and at the same time it would seem to provide evidence that the Ainu were among its first inhabitants. The Ainu of pre-historic times were described as savages who dwelt in caves during winter and in huts in the summer. They are said to have drunk blood, to have flown up the mountains like birds, and to have rushed through the grass like wild animals. They never remembered favours, but always revenged injuries. It is clear that they once extended far south, but they are now limited to Hokkaidō, and their numbers have been reduced to sixteen thousand. It is believed that they were driven north across the water to Hokkaidō, and were eventually conquered by the real Japanese. Here the question must again arise, of what race or races were the real Japanese? There is overwhelming proof to support the view that the Ainu had practically no influence

upon the composition of the Japanese, and one must look elsewhere for evidences of the origin of the present inhabitants of the land. As will be seen from the chapter describing the Ainu race, their character, language, and appearance are those of an altogether separate people. As uncivilised to-day as ever they were, they have been wholly unaffected by the progress among the Japanese which has been going on around them. The fact that only one hundred years ago were they finally subdued would seem to indicate that they were once a fighting race, and that their present gentleness is the result of a long process of taming undertaken by the Japanese, a process, moreover, which must be largely responsible for their dwindled numbers. The Ainu are undoubtedly one of the lower orders of mankind marked out for extinction. It is remarkable that in a land where everything is moving rapidly with the times, the remnant of a race of people who are such an obvious link with the days of primitive savagery should still exist even in small numbers. They are hopelessly out of tune with the age and its spirit, and few will regret their disappearance from a stage which they cannot be said to adorn and to which, judging by their wretched conditions of existence and their reluctance to keep pace with progress, they have little right to belong. In their case, the law of the survival of the fittest will assuredly run its tragic course. Statistics prove that they are incapable of increasing their numbers among themselves, and that limited intermarriage with the Japanese has not tended to prolong their life as a race. As to their origin in the dim past, authorities differ as much as in the case of the Japanese. Their own traditions relate that they had a remote origin in the offspring of a man and a large white dog or wolf. All that seems clear amid the haze of antiquity is that they landed from the northern Asiatic continent in Saghalien and Japan, and penetrated south as far as the mainland where they met and entered into conflict with the Japanese, whoever these may have been, and were driven north again. Some investigators regard them as Mongolian, others declare that they are Polynesian, while Dr. Baelz, whose opinion demands consideration, connects them with the Caucasian races. It

has been noted that their features are more of European than of Oriental type. The question as to whether the Ainu were dwellers in the pits or excavations which have been discovered in Hokkaidō, or whether another race existed in Japan at the same time, or previously, is an interesting one. Batchelor, the well-known missionary, who is the greatest living authority on the Ainu race, some few years ago gave publicity to the theory that previously, and at the time of the advent of the Ainu, there existed a race of dwarfs in Hokkaidō. He based his theory largely upon stories told him by some Ainu who designated the so-called dwarfs as *Koropok-guru*, and who said that their forefathers on landing had fought and exterminated them. They were described as being only three or four feet high, of red colour, with arms very long and altogether out of proportion to their bodies. Several Ainu declared that they were only one inch in height. Indeed they were alleged to have been so small that when attacked they could easily stand and hide beneath a burdock leaf. Moreover, the Ainu alleged that the dwarfs used flint or stone knives, that they were acquainted with the art of making pottery, and that they lived in pits. At the same time the Ainu denied that their ancestors ever made pottery or dwelt in pits. The fact that at the time of Batchelor's early investigations there were people actually living in pits in the neighbouring Kurile Islands, people, moreover, who were shorter and more repulsive in appearance than the Ainu, was looked upon as lending colour to the native tales. The Ainu did not hesitate to point to these strange beings as the remnants of the *Koropok-guru*. In the *Geographical Journal* for 1885 there is an interesting description of the pits in the Kurile Islands. The writer, Mr. Snow, says they were "constructed by hollowing out a shallow pit, usually in sandy soil, planting posts around it and, if they could be got, making an inside lining of boards. Poles were laid across the top, forming a flat roof, and more poles laid again at an angle from the edge of the roof, so as to give the sides a sharp slope. The whole was covered with reeds or grass on which was placed earth or turf. The entrance was closed by a roughly made wooden door which opened into a small lobby and low narrow passage, with another

door opening into the main compartment. Around the sides of this, bunk-like recesses were constructed under the lean-to side walls. Sometimes these dwellings consisted of two or three rooms, each one being separated by a short low narrow passage with a door at each end." Excavations in Hokkaidō revealed potsherds and stone arrows, and it was argued that as the Ainu were unacquainted with the art of making pottery these were evidences of the existence in ancient times of another race. Subsequent research has proved that very little reliance can be placed upon the Ainu versions of their own origin. They never possessed a literature, and their statements at the best could only be regarded as legendary. Consequently it has been necessary to form new conclusions and seek for fresh data on the subject.

Professor Tsuboi, an eminent Japanese authority, identifies the primitive inhabitant with the Eskimo. Another Japanese authority, Mr. T. Kōno, has made a valuable contribution to the *Transactions* of the Sapporo Natural History Society, in which he contends that the Ainu in olden times were themselves pit-dwellers, and that, moreover, they once used stone implements and made pottery. He dismisses the theory that a race of dwarfs resided in Hokkaidō as entirely lacking proof. Batchelor, as recently as 1907, observes that Mr. Kōno's conclusions are proved in other ways, "Thus, for example, by Ainu traditions told by themselves as they sit round the fires upon the hearth in their huts of an evening; by their language; and by osteology; for Dr. Sekiba of Sapporo informs me that careful searching shows an entire lack of dwarf remains anywhere in Hokkaidō, while geographical nomenclature comes in as secondary or correlative evidence. . . . On first coming into contact with the Ainu, now more than thirty years ago, I was told of a race of people said to have lived in Yezo many years before the Ainu—a race of people whom the Ainu found living in pits, and whom they in time exterminated. Those who told me of these folk said they were so called because they were dwarfs who were so small that they could with ease walk beneath the petasites plants, or take shelter beneath them when it rained. They told me that *Koro* was short for *Korokoni*, which means petasites;

that *pok* meant beneath; and that *guru* stood for person. Being at that time altogether ignorant of the Ainu tongue, I accepted the name and derivation without question, and gave publicity to it in my writings both in English and Japanese. But a further acquaintance with the Ainu themselves and with their native traditions, with the idioms of their language, and the derivation of the words they use, have compelled me to see the necessity of revising my old beliefs and abandoning the former explanation. *Koropok* cannot possibly mean 'beneath the petasites.' The derivation of the word will not allow of it. To mean this the name would have to be *Korokoni-pok-un-guru*, or possibly *Korohampok-un-guru*, while, as a matter of fact, it is neither. The real name is *Koropok-un-guru*, i.e. 'Pit-dwellers,' and nothing else. The plant petasites does not appear in the name at all. *Koropok* is merely a variation still in use of *Choropok*, which means 'under,' 'below.' *Un* is a locative particle meaning 'residing,' and *guru* is the ordinary word for 'person' or 'people.'"

Thus Batchelor frankly abandons the theory of the existence of a race of dwarfs. He has convinced himself that the designation *Koropok-guru* means pit-dwellers, and that it cannot be held to imply a race whose stature enabled them to stand "beneath the petasites." Dr. Munro, who has produced an elaborate work on "Prehistoric Japan," and who is an able and careful investigator, frankly asserts that the theory of a race of dwarfs being among the early inhabitants of Japan, is "an inference myth like the pigmies and elves of Europe." With regard to the argument that the Ainu did not use pottery he observes that "the Ainu have merely forgotten a discarded culture, and that the occurrence of crude pottery with wares of wood and iron in the pits of Yezo suggests that they were formerly inhabited by the Ainu themselves." The weight of evidence as a result of research up to the present day is certainly in favour of the contention that the Ainu must be regarded as the earliest inhabitants of Japan. They were the pit-dwellers of olden times, and the making of pottery was one of the arts they practised. The theory of the existence of a race of dwarfs is utterly destroyed. The references in the *Nihongi* which suggest that more than one

race were the earliest inhabitants of Japan is far from positive. Moreover, the *Nihongi* is a notoriously inaccurate record.

As the Ainu have had practically no influence upon the composition of the Japanese, the question of the origin of the Japanese still remains unanswered. One authority declares that "the Japanese appear to be the true progenitors of the North American Indians and of the Mexicans and Californians, or, at all events, a branch of the same stock," and adds: "When Cortes arrived in Mexico he was received by Montezuma and his sages as a long-expected messenger from their ancestors in the far-distant West. Photographs of Colorado and Nebraska Indians have been taken by Japanese for those of their own countrymen. Some even affirmed that they were acquainted with the persons represented. There are said to be some remarkable correspondences in the Japanese and Red Indian languages, but this branch of inquiry has not yet been followed out. How would the Japanese reach North America? They would be drifted thither by the great current of the Black Stream. It flows up past Japan and the Kurile Islands to the coast of Alaska, and thence southwards towards California. This is not speculation. Forty-seven Japanese junks were wrecked or met with on American shores between 1782 and 1876, some of which had been eighteen months adrift. If this news be correct, tribes related to both Japanese and Ainu may be found in North America, and the likeness between the Ainu and Eskimo which some may have traced may prove to be a real one."

Captain Brinkley, the Tōkyō correspondent of *The Times* and late editor of the *Japan Mail*, in the course of his elaborate work, "Japan and China" (1904), says: "Kampfer persuaded himself that the primeval Japanese were a section of the builders of the Tower of Babel; Hyde-Clarke identified them with Turano Africans who travelled eastward through Egypt, China, and Japan; Macleod recognised in them one of the lost tribes of Israel. Several writers have regarded them as Malayan colonists. Griffis was content to think that they are modern Ainu, and recent scholars believe they are Tartar-Mongolian stock of Central Asia. . . . The theory which seems to fit the facts best is that the Japanese are com-

pounded of elements from Central and Southern Asia, and that they received their patrician type from the former, their plebeian from the latter." Max von Brandt, another distinguished authority, declares that "The attempt to solve the problem from the anthropological side and to consider the modern Japanese as a mixed people consisting of Ainu, Korean, Chinese, and Malayo-Chinese elements may be said to have been successful in so far as all these races have undoubtedly contributed to the formation of the nationality now inhabiting Japan; but no proof has been brought forward to show to which of these races the main body of those immigrants belonged who probably made their way into Japan long before the seventh century B.C." Griffis, in a recent book, arrived at the conclusion that the Japanese are made up of several races with a white race speaking an Aryan tongue as the basic stock. The theory that the Japanese have a white strain in their composition would be extremely interesting if it could be satisfactorily proved, but like all other views which have been advanced regarding their origin, it is not based upon conclusive evidence. Chamberlain writes the following: "The two greatest authorities on the subject, Baelz and Rein, say, purely and simply, that the Japanese are Mongols. We incline to follow Baelz in his hypothesis of two chief streams of immigration, both coming from Korea, and both gradually spreading eastward and northward. . . . The Ainu, who are not Mongols, are indeed joint occupiers of the soil of Japan with the Japanese, and intermarrying has gone on between the two peoples, and goes on still. It has, however, been pretty well proved that this mixed breed becomes unfruitful in the third or fourth generation, a fact which explains the rare traces of Ainu blood even in the population of the extreme north of the island."

Dr. Munro, however, has written the latest upon the subject of the origin of the Japanese. He traces the culture of Egypt and Western Asia through the east and with the Chinese immigration in the beginning of the eleventh century B.C. to Korea. He points out that to those who dwelt in the south of Korea, the island of Tsushima, visible from the shores, formed an alluring prospect, drawing them across the sea to Japan, the land of plenty. He urges that the incursion of the

Yamato or Imperial race did not necessarily take the shape of an extensive invasion, and adds: "We shall find reasons for the belief that this process occupied a considerable time, that the enemies were encountered in the shape of other aliens and aborigines, that small tracts of alluvial country were primarily held, and that it was by amalgamation and the slow process of generation, as much as by superior military conditions and reinforcement from the mainland, that the Yamato immigration achieved a national *status* in the land." It has been ascertained that certain customs practised in ancient Japan were similar to those of Northern Asia, Tartary, and China. Prominent among these were the funeral rites which involved the suicide or wholesale murder of the servants and retainers of a deceased person. When the Emperor Suinin's brother Yamato-hiko died, about the year B.C. 2, all his attendants were buried alive upright, with heads exposed, near the tomb. They lived for several days, weeping and wailing, until death ended their sufferings. Their bodies rotted and were eaten by the dogs and crows. Aston quotes ancient Chinese accounts of Japan which show that the practice of human sacrifices at the burial of Japanese sovereigns was followed as late as A.D. 247. It is recorded that when Queen Himeko died in that year one hundred of her male and female attendants "followed her in death." There is reason to believe that most of the events described in the available historical records of this period have been designedly antedated. Max von Brandt argues that as the earliest events of importance in Shinto mythology are laid in Izumo, Yamato, and Settsu and not in Kyūshū, there is thus some evidence of a migration from the north. "According to Chinese annalists," he continues, "Korea was conquered and civilised by a member of their Shan dynasty, Kit-size on the fall of that dynasty 1122 B.C. Therefore the migration from Korea to Japan must have taken place before that date, as the immigrants in question never came in contact with Chinese civilisation. It is, however, quite possible that this migration may have started from one of the Manchurian states (for example, Funu) lying to the north of Korea. According to Chinese sources of information the inhabitants of these districts seem to have had many ideas and customs corresponding to those

of old Japan." Other authorities urge that the Japanese race is of southern origin, either Malayan or Indonesian. Dr. Munro made many excavations recently and discovered specimens of pottery which cannot be identified with either the Yamato or the Ainu ware. "This," he concludes, "was a domestic pottery of the early Japanese," and expresses the opinion that "during the era following the primitive culture, it may have been made by native artisans to supply the wants of Yamato conquerors." He adds naively: "This probability is somewhat increased by the fact that primitive potters were usually females." Dr. Munro thus establishes the existence of a race or races between the Ainu race and the Yamato race, and this or these he calls the early Japanese, but here once more the inevitable question arises, who were the early Japanese? Perhaps they were of Malayan origin. Dr. Munro, however, leaves it a question as to whether the Malayan element was not formed *in situ* from coalescence of a primitive Negrito stock with Mongolian and other characters from the continent, and advises further research before any conclusion is arrived at. Generally speaking, he holds the opinion that the Japanese people are a mixture of several distinct stocks, and mentions that Negrito, Mongolian, Palasiatic, and Caucasian features more or less blended, sometimes nearly isolated, are met with everywhere, the Negrito being the least in evidence. The agricultural population, he adds, bear some superficial resemblance to the Igorrot of the Philippines, while judging from the Caucasian and often Semitic physiognomy seen in the aristocratic type of Japanese, the Yamato leaders were mainly of Caucasian, perhaps Iranian origin. Finally, he expresses the view that "the Japanese are not a race but a loose mixture of variously racial features which have in times past found their way to the *Ultima Thule* of Asia." Brinkley confesses that the student "must be content for the present to regard the annals of primeval Japan as an assemblage of heterogeneous fragments from the traditions of South Sea islanders, of Central Asian tribes, of Manchurian Tartars, and of Siberian savages, who reached her shores at various epochs, sometimes crossing by ice-built bridges, sometimes migrating by less fortuitous routes."

To sum up the knowledge so far obtained, it must be

admitted that the origin of the Japanese is obscure, and unless further research reveals some striking discoveries, it is extremely unlikely that it will ever be clearly defined. The evidence at present at the disposal of the student merely indicates that the Japanese race is composed of various Asiatic elements, and is therefore wholly Asiatic. If one could arrive at some conclusion as to which of these elements had gained the ascendancy, a definite line of research would instantly suggest itself, and progress might be made. Insufficient knowledge of the ancient Asian races prevents some identity being established between them and the relics of prehistoric Japan which are now being constantly unearthed. On this account students would perhaps achieve more success were they to transfer their investigations to the continent.

There were two main gates, as it were—the north and the south—through which the flood of immigration flowed to Japan in ancient times. It is tolerably clear that the Ainu came from the north and that two other invasions took place in the south, one *via* Korea, and the other, the composition of which is only a matter of speculation, *via* the Philippines. The limited researches so far undertaken establish the Ainu as the earliest inhabitants of the country. Subsequently the Yamato conquerors landed, and the Ainu were driven from pillar to post. Harassed in this way, it is conceivable that the Ainu lost the art of making pottery, and that they deserted their pit-dwellings. Apart from the Ainu and the Yamato, other races entered the country, but these, as in the case of the Yamato, entered through the south. In the fusion of races that followed, the Ainu, who had been conquered and who therefore from very earliest times were despised, played the least part. Sir Francis Adams has frankly expressed the opinion that the nobility and higher classes of to-day are the descendants of the conquerors of old, and that the lower peasants are the descendants of the aborigines. Whatever may be the case, one is certainly inclined to think that the Japanese have gained by the fact that they have drawn characteristics from many tribes and races, and that their present progress and adaptability is largely due to such circumstance. In the same way the British have derived benefit from the strains of the various races which have

invaded their shores, races which at different periods of the world's history have been leaders among mankind.

The most ardent admirers of the Japanese cannot conscientiously describe them as an imposing race. The women are gracious and gentle; few of the men are handsome or impressive in appearance. To the Western traveller arriving fresh in the country all Japanese look more or less alike, and prolonged observation is necessary before he can differentiate between the various types. The same inability to distinguish Western peoples is experienced by Japanese travellers on first arriving in Europe and the United States. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the Oriental regards the features of the Occidental face as exceedingly large, and, very often, as coarse and disproportionate. His view is naturally comparative with himself. The same to a large extent applies to the Occidental opinions on Eastern races. The average height of the Japanese men is only a little over five feet, and that of the women slightly more than four feet six inches. Were it not for the fact that the evidence to the contrary is so conclusive, this smallness of stature would seem more than any other circumstance to point to an origin in the race of dwarfs which the Ainu regard as their predecessors in the land. That the Japanese race can produce men of enormous size and bulk is proved by the formidable proportions of its wrestlers, who are quite the equal in measurement and strength of a similarly engaged class in Europe. What has been done in their case by a special course of dieting and training can be extended. Indeed, as a result of the lessons of the war with Russia the Japanese soldiers are being given meat rations. It was found that the men lacked the necessary staying power to overtake, or even to follow up with energy for several successive days, the forces of the enemy. This explanation affords at least one very good reason to account for the repeated retirements and escapes of the Russian army, and the inability of the Japanese to carry out enveloping movements, which was the subject of much comment among military critics at the time.

The physique of the Japanese has this peculiarity—that the legs are very short in comparison with the length of the body. This disproportion is due, doubtless, to the sitting

habits of the people, which more often than not involves kneeling down on the matting and resting back on the heels. The Japanese are a yellow people, and when exposed to the sunshine their skins turn to a shade of brown. It has often been urged that their skin is no deeper in colour than that of the peoples of Southern Europe. To my mind, however, there is this striking difference, that whereas the palest Japanese are distinctly yellow, purely white faces are frequently seen among the peoples of Southern Europe, and, moreover, the features of the peoples of Southern Europe are generally of a rich olive which directly suggests the effect of a long period of sun-burning. In Japan there is a plentiful sprinkling of people with prominent cheek-bones, flat noses with coarse, wide nostrils, and thick lips, whose presence is not lost upon the imagination of those travellers who have come in contact with the more frankly dark races. All Japanese have jet black hair which turns white later in life than is usual with Europeans. In the case of the men it is, without exception, straight and invariably coarse. So much is curly hair detested, that the few women who possess such adornment do not hesitate to use a device which renders it straight for the time being. Some of the men allow a narrow strip of hair to grow nearly half-way down either cheek, and they are not shy to express the opinion that in this way their personal appearances are considerably improved. Bald heads are rare in Japan, a circumstance attributed by the people generally to the national dietary, and by some of the women to the non-use of curling-tongs. The strong growth of hair may also be accounted for by the fact that the heads of infants are shaved.

For the most part the Japanese men are clean-shaved. Those, however, who have pretensions to Western ways, cultivate various styles of moustaches and beards, but the latter, owing to the wiry nature of Japanese hair, cannot be regarded as brilliant achievements. The Japanese women are endowed with lovely hair, which, in its profusion and ebon colour, is always the envy of lady visitors from the West. Unfortunately they arrange it in designs altogether too frigid, and the presence of elaborate and costly ornaments does not compensate for the lack of curls. As they walk about the streets, one gains the impression that their heads are surmounted by

a pair of raven's wings, and that, if such a thing could be conceived, they are wearing an eternal crown of mourning. In the matter of head-dress, the mistress of the household, the maidservant, and the geisha, have each a different style, and in like manner the young girl may be distinguished from the grown-up woman ; but it must be admitted that variety does not in any way diminish the degree of severity.

IV

THE AINU

THE Ainu people who, so far as Japan is concerned, are now limited to the northern island of Hokkaidō, are undoubtedly one of the most interesting races to be found in the whole world. Students of ethnography are largely dependent for their information about this strange race upon the valuable writings of the Rev. J. Batchelor, who, for considerably more than a quarter of a century, has lived and laboured among the Ainu with a zeal and self-sacrifice unsurpassed in any other part of the vast field of missionary enterprise. Not only has he done much to uplift a race that were the despised of the Japanese, but he has found time to write many learned contributions of exceptional interest to all who believe that the study of people is the most fascinating of all studies. At one remote period the Ainu spread far south, and historical records would seem to show that they were the principal, if not the only race occupying the islands. Then came the Japanese proper and the Ainu were conquered and driven north. At the present day there are only 16,000 of them left. The dwindling in their numbers seems to have been largely the result of the harsh treatment meted out to them by the Japanese. Little intermarriage has taken place between the two races, and the Ainu of to-day are as separate and distinct a people from the Japanese as they were in ancient times when they first encountered the Yamato invaders. The Japanese have never attempted assimilation, nor, as a matter of fact, until recent years, have they tried to impart any measure of civilisation to the Ainu. On the contrary, there is every evidence to show that early Japanese policy was directed towards grinding out the existence of the subject race. We are told that whenever the officials or members of the soldier class met Ainu they compelled them,

under threats of decapitation, to go down upon their hands and knees and to rub their heads upon the bare ground in front of them or to thrust their noses in the dust. It may be urged that they were a depraved people unworthy, and probably unappreciative, of gentle treatment, for, at the present day, it is estimated that 95 per cent. of the men are confirmed drunkards. For this unhappy condition of widespread depravity, however, the Japanese are largely responsible. If an Ainu did any work for the officials of his conquerors in feudal times he was usually remunerated in the form of *saké*. Consequently *saké* has become known among the Ainu as "official milk"—a title which, it must be admitted, has more than a flavour of delightful irony. As late as 1884, owing to the misrepresentations of certain Japanese wine-vendors, who feared that their trade with the Ainu would suffer through the introduction of Christianity, Mr. Batchelor was unable to obtain a passport, and consequently could not visit the Ainu districts. When, later in the year, the necessary formalities were complied with, the greatest caution was essential lest some technical difficulty should be raised to prevent him from remaining, and he was compelled to lodge in a Japanese inn. In later times the conduct of the Japanese towards the Ainu has been more considerate, and the Government has made some efforts to preserve and improve the race. One feels wholly unable to imagine by what chain of fortuitous circumstances the Ainu have been able—even in dwindled numbers—to survive the races of the Stone Age, races with which at one remote time they must have been contemporary. It has become clear, however, that, as a result of the process of steady diminution which has set in, they are destined to disappear from the world's stage. A race that does not progress cannot survive. The remnant which exists in Hokkaidō to-day is the same in many essential respects as the race of aborigines which once inhabited the land to the far south. The Ainu of old were eminently a virile race with a strong lust for shedding blood. The modern Ainu, having been tamed rather than civilised, present an exceedingly pathetic picture in their latter-day barbarism.

The Ainu have been described as the most hairy race in

the world. Batchelor, however, considers that they are not more hairy than "ordinary Europeans." He refers to the "fine beards, moppy hair, and sparkling eyes" of the men. The average height of the men is five feet four inches, and that of the women about two inches less. The complexion of the people is similar to that of the Japanese, but their features more closely resemble the European than the Oriental cast of countenance.

Ainu communities are scattered along the river-banks, and their dwelling-places are thatched huts with two holes serving as windows and a third aperture in place of a chimney. Foreigners who have stayed in Ainu huts declare that the thatched walls are far from wind-proof. Ainu beds consist of simple platforms sheltered by screens of mats. Each village elects a chief and independently governs itself. Ainu food includes fresh salmon, cod-fish, venison, bear's flesh, beans, millet, potatoes, and peas. In view of the *status* of the race such a diet strikes one as being luxurious, but the Ainu, who are indifferent cooks with a consistent fondness for stews—not ordinary stews but prolonged stews—fail to make the most of their resources. On first coming in contact with the Ainu the observer is incapable of detecting any single redeeming feature in the race. They are disgustingly filthy in their habits. They rarely wash themselves or their clothes, and they leave their cooking utensils uncleansed with the excuse that as these have only contained food they cannot possibly be dirty! Only 5 per cent. of the men can lay any claim to sobriety. The rest have but one pleasure or pastime beyond the hunt, and this consists in consuming *saké* until that stage of drunkenness which spells oblivion is reached. Their festivals are seized upon for the organising of fierce drinking-bouts; their dances are wildly bacchanalian; and, in fact, both in sorrow and in joy they resort to the solace and the stimulation of the *saké* cup. "The chief thing one has to contend against," says a missionary report in 1883, "is the supremely inveterate drunkenness of the Ainu race. The use of strong drink (Japanese *saké*, *i.e.* rice wine) forms part of all their religious worship: in all ceremonies, religious or profane, it is considered indispensable, and the state of drunkenness is

regarded by the Ainu as a state of supreme earthly joy. Offerings of wine are from time to time placed upon the graves of the dead. How God can be acceptably worshipped without wine is a puzzle to the poor Ainu, so intimately connected in his deluded mind are wine and worship. The Christian injunction against intemperance offends him, and I see, even now, the beginnings of a hard struggle between strong drink and religion." Batchelor, however, does not think that they are beyond redemption. In his efforts at reclamation he has not proceeded along hard and fast lines. His policy has been to alter the Ainu point of view; to make their aims higher and their thoughts purer. And so far he has been rewarded by this measure of success—and it is not a mean one—that many Ainu now look upon intoxication as a vice, whereas before they had not paid the least heed to its baneful effects. Unfortunately, other social problems of equally serious a nature as that consequent upon alcoholic excess beset this unhappy remnant of a race. It is proverbial that all eastern peoples are lacking in chivalry towards women in the sense in which that term is understood among Western nations. The lot of the Ainu women is undoubtedly the most pitiful of all the women of the Asiatic races. To any one acquainted with the conditions existing in China and Japan, such a comparison will prove instantly suggestive. In other Eastern countries women have little, if any, status, but in Ainuland they are not even permitted the possession of souls. The gods are worshipped by the men alone, and the women are looked upon as unfit to offer prayer. Many Ainu seriously believe that if the women prayed they would influence the gods against their husbands. The girls marry at the age of sixteen; but, unlike the custom of other Eastern races, they are permitted to exercise some choice in the selection of a husband. This would appear to be their sole privilege in life. Some Ainu despise women to such an extent that they calmly entertain the opinion that females have no future lives. The women are the toilers. The men rarely take to the farm or the fields, and if by any chance they should be seized with a desire to work in those spheres, it is distinctly understood that they are merely assisting the women and that such assistance is only of a temporary nature. Batchelor tells us that, as a rule, the women walk

two miles every day to their work, and that some toil all day without a bite of food. Women must not turn their backs upon men ; they must step out of the way whenever they see a man coming, and, most important of all, they must not answer back. Conditions such as those I have described have produced a hardy, though at the same time an exceedingly amiable race of women. In disposition they are very shy, and the principal features of their appearance are the moustaches which they tattoo upon their lips, and the curious patterns also tattooed on their foreheads and hands. To be childless is looked upon as a disgrace. Yet in spite of this circumstance the race is a dwindling one. The only little vanity in which the women are allowed to indulge is a fondness for cheap ornaments and baubles. Here the Japanese small traders have found a market for their wares, and dealings with a simple people have been characterised by more enterprise than honesty.

The Ainu have an elaborate system of etiquette. Batchelor gives an entertaining description of the rules to be observed on entering a house. According to this authority the first action is to give a low cough and gently clear the throat. If no one comes out to invite the visitor to enter he may walk to the centre of the hut by the right-hand side of the hearth, where he may sit down before the master bareheaded and cross-legged in an attitude similar to that assumed on occasions by tailors. After clearing his throat again he must stretch forward his hands. The person whom he is saluting will return the compliment in a similar fashion and at the same time assume an expression of attention and respect. The two parties will next proceed to rub their hands together gently "by drawing back first one hand and then the other in such a way as to allow the points of the fingers to rub the palms of each hand alternately." Meanwhile inquiries are made concerning each other's health, and blessings are invoked upon the respective households and upon each other's native places. The length of the salutation is regulated according to circumstances or to the amount of business which awaits transaction. The etiquette of the occasion, however, is by no means at an end. Each party subsequently strokes his own beard and emits a soft rumbling noise from his throat.

At this stage the visitor may narrate his business, but while doing so he must rub the palms of his hands. The palaver is very tedious and often lasts half-an-hour, during which the palm-rubbing is incessant. The business of the interview having been settled, more beard-stroking is indulged in and conversation becomes informal. When women meet by the wayside they fall upon each other's necks and weep for half-an-hour or more—a form of salutation which, it must be admitted, is not altogether out of keeping with their unhappy lot in life. The simple education which the Ainu impart to their children is indicative of the conditions which govern the race. The mothers teach the girls how to nurse children and to perform various duties, from weaving bark into cloth to thatching huts and cutting wood. Batchelor also mentions the following as included in their curriculum: to move out of the way of men, to cover the mouth with the hand when they meet them, to uncover the head in their presence and to leave the hut backwards, and not to enter with face turned towards the household. The men teach the boys hunting and fishing, and the shapes of mountains and courses of rivers. The Ainu have practically no letters or learning as understood among civilised races. They account for their illiteracy by saying that their Japanese conquerors in ancient times seized all their literature. Tradition has handed down to them a number of simple fables which are illustrative of nature and the wonders of nature. These, which may be compared to the fairy tales of the West, are recited by parents to their children, and form a part of the crude educational system in practice. The Ainu have no national music. The children play with a little instrument made of bamboo and likened by Batchelor to a Jew's-harp; the elders have a curious habit of composing impromptu accounts of their everyday life and experiences, and chanting these to themselves. The system of counting is not the least singular of the many singularities which are to be noted in connection with the Ainu race. According to Chamberlain, a man who wished to say he was thirty-nine years of age must express himself thus: I am nine, plus ten taken from two score; while Batchelor, who translated the Scriptures into the Ainu language, was compelled to render the phrase "forty days and

forty nights" as "day three days two score three days, black three days two score three days." The Ainu have no surnames. In childhood they are given names which denote any peculiar characteristic they may have developed. "Selfish one," "thunderer," "stutterer," "pot," and "kettle," are among the appellations to be met with. Batchelor mentions that if a man named "pot" marries a woman named "kettle," no change in names takes place. The Ainu girls do not surrender their names on marrying, and this circumstance, combined with the absence of surnames, accounts for other instances equally as quaint as that of the suggested union between "pot" and "kettle."

Although the Ainu men are generally idle and dissolute, they still retain a love of sport in the form of bear-hunting. There is no doubt that at one remote time they were a brave and warlike people. Historical records prove them to have been worthy foes of the conquering Japanese race. But the oppression to which they were subjected in feudal times has rendered them meek. They were, however, always keen and fearless huntsmen, for necessity compelled them to search the mountains and rivers for food. At the present time bear-hunting is the only manly attribute which can be ascribed to them. The bear-hunt is still the most important event of Ainu life. Before the hunters set out the gods are asked to bestow their blessing upon the day's sport. The exact position of a den is always located by the discolouring of the snow caused by the bear's breath. At first efforts are made to prod the beast out into the open by means of long sticks. Batchelor gives a graphic description of what follows in the event of the bear being so inconsiderate as not to respond to the invitation. A brave Ainu ties his head and face up, leaving only his eyes exposed. He hands his bow and arrow to his friends, and, armed only with his hunting-knife at his girdle, he enters the den. This bold intrusion has the desired effect of infuriating the animal, which promptly seizes the visitor with its paws and thrusts him behind its back. The hunter then draws his knife and pricks the beast from behind. This act is said to induce it to make a hasty departure. Outside other Ainu are awaiting its appearance, and a hail of poisoned arrows descends upon the doomed beast. As the principal event of Ainu life

is the bear-hunt, so the chief festival is the sacrifice of the bear. The best description of this ceremony was that written by Mr. J. J. Enslie, who was a former British Consul at Hakodate.

The savage denizen of the forest destined to be exalted to the position of a god is reared from a cub by the village chief, and the female most distinguished in rank and beauty enjoys the honour of being its wet-nurse. As soon as the bear is two years old, he is carried in a cage to an eminence (previously consecrated for the ceremony), amid shouts of joy and the most inharmonious concert of various noises ever heard; while, from time to time, the bereft nurse utters the most piercing and heartrending cries, expressive of her poignant grief. After this uproar has continued for some time, the chief of the village approaches the bear, and with an arrow gives him the first wound. The animal, previously maddened by the din around him, now becomes furious, the cage is opened, and he springs out into the midst of the assemblage. Then, at a signal given by the children of the nurse, everybody in the crowd wounds him with the various weapons they have brought with them, each one striving to inflict a wound, as all believe that he who fails to wound the bear has no claim to any favour from the new *Kamui*, or god. As soon as the poor animal falls down exhausted from the loss of blood, his head is cut off, and the arrows, spears, knives, sticks, in fact all the weapons by which he has been wounded, are solemnly presented to the headless trunk by the village patriarch, who requests the bear to avenge himself upon the weapons by which he has been insulted and slain. The severed head is then affixed to the trunk, and the dead bear is carried to the altar, where the sacrifice of the bear commences amid various solemnities, such as singing, music, and offerings consisting of everything the Ainu most esteem. The nurse, meanwhile, deals blows with the branch of a tree upon every one who has taken part in the bear's death. The flesh is then distributed among the people, and the head is placed upon a pole opposite the hut of the chief, where it is left to decay. Mr. Enslie added that the Ainu entertain great fear and profound respect for strength and courage; and this is the cause of their veneration for the bear—the strongest and fiercest

animal known to them. Their most energetic comparison is the bear. A man is "strong as a bear," "fierce as a bear," &c. The bear is the burden of their national songs, and, in a word, this animal is the symbol of everything they think worthy of respect. To compare an Ainu with a bear is the surest way of gaining his friendship; and it must be acknowledged that the merit the Ainu attach to the bear is more or less deserved, as the Yezo bear is the finest specimen of his species.

The religion of the Ainu consists of nature worship and is of a comprehensive character. Such objects as the sun, the sea, the wind, the ocean, the fire, the birds, and the beasts are deified. No temples are to be found in the land, and ritual is simply limited to offerings of whittled sticks. Grace is always said before meals, and the following form of invocation is used before wine is taken: "O God, our nourisher, I thank thee for this food; bless it to the service of my body." Batchelor has made many inquiries among the more intelligent Ainu with a view to gaining information of as definite a nature as possible concerning their beliefs, and the following may consequently be taken as a reliable summary of Ainu faith: The world is a vast round ocean, in the midst of which are many islands, worlds, or countries, each governed by a special set of gods. There is one god who reigns supreme. *Aiōina Kamui*, a man who became divine, is the Ainu ancestor, and superintends the Ainu race. There are three heavens—the high vaulty skies, the star-bearing skies, and the foggy heavens. The human spirit will have a home in a living body after death. Men and women will live in large communities in the next world, under conditions similar to those which exist in the present, but with these important exceptions, that they will know no sorrow, no pain, and no death. Families will be reunited. Should a man have married more than once, his first wife will take precedence by his side in heaven; it is uncertain what will become of the other wife or wives. Those who dwell in the realms supernal regard the inhabitants of this world as ghosts, and look upon themselves as the natural and substantial people. Interchanges of ghostly visits between two spheres can be made, but though able to see and hear what passes during his

sojourn, the visitor is unable to reveal his own presence. Animals have future lives, and their departed souls act as guardians to human beings. While the good will be rewarded, the bad will be punished in Hades. In the hour of judgment the Goddess of Fire will bear testimony either for or against the spirits of the departed. It is an altogether inexplicable phase of Ainu character that the men who have such a supreme contempt for women in this world are terror-stricken at the evil which may be wrought by the ghost of a dead female ancestor. Sickness is believed to be a punishment, but it is also attributed to the malicious influences of "an envious woman's ghost." In cases of illness it is customary to cast out the evil spirits from the person afflicted by means of the action of a convolvulus plant, the smell of which is supposed to be particularly repugnant to badly intentioned ghosts. One would have thought that, in view of the harm occasioned by the revengeful spirits of the women in the next world, the Ainu men would long ere this have considered it essential to adopt some means of propitiating them in the present. The Ainu have a positive dread of death. Their graves are hidden away in the mountains, and the sites are kept secret. Their funeral rites are simple, and consist of a humble petition to the Goddess of Fire "to take charge of the spirit and lead it safely to the Creator of the World and the Possessor of Heaven."

Despite the condition of utter and woebegone depravity to which the Ainu have sunk, Batchelor and others who have lived and worked among them, and who regard them sympathetically, will not admit that they are a race beyond redemption. They have been discovered to possess certain tender qualities, the qualities of kindness, gentleness, truthfulness, reverence towards the aged, and, on the whole, of chastity. Batchelor has studied their language, compiled a grammar, and drawn up a vocabulary of six thousand words. Moreover, he has translated the New Testament, the Psalms, and the Prayer Book into the Ainu language. He has built an Ainu Hospital Rest House, and in 1900 there were 1157 baptizable Christians in the district under his charge. In 1893, able to report that every woman in *Piratori*—the capital—accepted Christianity. The significant

wholesale conversion is evident when the fact is taken into consideration that women had not previously been allowed to indulge in any form of worship. In their work among the Ainu the missionaries have been compelled to combat a vicious set of social conditions rather than a firmly established heathen religion. The Ainu faith itself is not so much opposed to Christianity as is the Buddhism of the Japanese. It admits the almighty sway of a supreme god, and its idolatry is not of the things of wood and stone, but of the great wonders of the creation. Moreover, the people possess no literature to maintain their faith, no priests to preach their doctrines, and no elaborate rituals to fire their religious zeal. The spread of Christianity among them is rather a substitution of one faith for another than a conversion. The distinction is a subtle one, but for that none the less real. Christianity is teaching them to worship the Creator of nature, not nature itself—to honour, not adore, His works; and also that goodness consists not alone in worship but depends essentially upon cleanly and wholesome lives. The Ainu are destined to perish. Christianity stands by the side of a dying race, a race which has lived through centuries of darkness, and which now sees the light of true faith for the first time. The Ainu will pass away, not to the unknown, but to the known; but the eternal light will still shine forth to illumine the path of other remnants and other races.

V

MYTHOLOGY AND EARLY HISTORY

THE origin of the Japanese race being lost in obscurity, mythology has taken the place of history and has led to the development of some extraordinary theories which are not lacking in poetic and picturesque conception. According to one version, before the creation of Japan no world was in existence. About this time, however, in a realm supernal, there dwelt a number of illustrious gods and goddesses. From the heights of their celestial eminence, the last generation of these, in the form of a brother named Izanagi and a sister named Izanami, became the parents of Japan. No mention is made of any other part of the world having been created. The goddess, however, not only gave birth to a land but also to a number of additional gods and goddesses, some of whom, it is not unreasonable to suppose, might have been responsible for the creation of other countries. The birth of the God of Fire caused the death of Izanami. Chamberlain relates that "then the most striking event of the whole Japanese mythology ensues when her husband, Orpheus-like, visits her at the gate of the underworld to implore her to return to him. She would fain do so, and bids him wait while she takes counsel with the deities of the place. But he, impatient at her long tarrying, breaks off one of the teeth of the comb in his hair, lights it, and goes in, only to find her a hideous mass of putrefaction in the midst of which are seated the eight Gods of Thunder. . . . Returning to South-western Japan, Izanagi purifies himself by bathing in a stream, and as he does so fresh deities are born from each article of clothing that he throws down on the river-bank and from each part of his person. One of these deities was the Sun Goddess Ama-terasu, who was born from his left eye ; while the Moon God sprang from his right

eye, and the last born of all, Susa-no-o, whose name means 'the Impetuous Male,' was born from his nose. Between these three children their father divides the inheritance of the universe." The quaint story of Izanagi and Izanami with Japan as a Garden of Eden bears some vague resemblance to that of Adam and Eve. The Fall, as recorded in the Book of Genesis, might be compared with the birth of the God of Fire, whose mother, Izanami, we are told, passed away to the under-world, where she was seen by her husband as a hideous mass of putrefaction. Japanese mythology, however, like Japanese morality, is constructed upon a broad basis, and does not admit of any fall in the union of Izanagi and Izanami. Therefore the Japanese differ in this respect from Western races, that they are free in their own minds from all taint of original sin.

Another version is to be found in the *Nihongi*, an ancient record translated by Aston. In this work also some attempt is made to account for the origin of the world. "Of old," it is written, "Heaven and Earth were not yet separated, and the In and Yō (female and male principles) not yet divided. They formed a chaotic mass, like an egg, which was of obscurely defined limits and contained germs. The purer and clearer part was thinly drawn out, and formed Heaven, while the heavier and grosser element settled down and became Earth. The finer element easily became a united body, but the consolidation of the heavy and gross element was accomplished with difficulty. Heaven was therefore formed first, and Earth was established subsequently. Thereafter Divine Beings were produced between them. Hence it is said that when the world began to be created, the soil of which lands were composed floated about in a manner which might be compared to the floating of a fish sporting on the surface of the water." The first god was transformed from a reed shoot. It is noteworthy of mention that no attempt is made to account for the origin of the deities. The *Nihongi* simply records that they "came into being." Of Izanagi and Izanami it is said that they stood on the floating bridge of Heaven, and held counsel, saying, "Is there not a country beneath?" Thereupon they thrust down the jewel-spear of Heaven, and, groping about, found

the ocean. The brine which dripped from the point of the spear coagulated and became an island, which received the name of Ono-goro-jima. The god and goddess then descended and dwelt upon the new land. Subsequently they created other islands, and it is mentioned that Oki and Sado were born as twins. After the sea, the rivers, and the mountains, and the ancestors of the trees and herbs had been produced, they consulted, saying, "We have now produced the Great-eight-island country. Why should we not produce some one who will be lord of the universe?" Immediately the Sun-goddess named Oho-hiru-me no muchi (Ama-terasu) was brought into being. Her parents were so impressed with her brilliance that they sent her to Heaven by means of the Ladder of Heaven. Japanese historians probably anticipated that sceptics would discover improbabilities in their records, for we are assured by them that at the time of the ascent of the Sun-goddess heaven and earth were close together. The Moon-god was the second child of Izanagi and Izanami, and as he was next in radiance to the Sun-goddess he was sent to Heaven to be her consort. The third child, Sosa no wo no Mikoto, was a wicked god of vicious habits whose presence withered the green mountains. Eventually, as a punishment, he was relegated to the rule of the Nether-land. Izanami was burnt to death by one of her children, and buried in the village of Arima in Kumano. Of Izanagi it is written that "he built himself an abode of gloom in the island of Ahaji, where he dwelt for ever in silence and concealment." Another translation of Japanese mythology makes mention of three celestial spirits as having lived one hundred thousand millions of years each, and gives the following entertaining account of the meeting between Izanagi and Izanami: Izanami sang, "I am delighted to meet so handsome a youth." The male spirit replied in an injured tone, "I am a man. It is right therefore that I should speak first. How dost thou, a woman, dare to commence?" Thereupon they separated and continued their road in opposite directions. Meeting again at the point from which they started, the male spirit commenced to sing in these words: "I am very happy to find a young and

beautiful woman." And it was then the art of love was invented.

The aid of mythology has also been sought to account for the origin of the monarchy. For a long period the descendants of the Impetuous Male deity held sway, but eventually the Goddess of the Sun, becoming all-powerful, sent to earth as Ruler of Japan a child-god whose birth is as obscure as that of all Japanese gods and goddesses; and from the descendant of this child-god came the first admittedly human-formed Emperor of Japan—Jimmu Tennō, whose date corresponds with 660 B.C., contemporary with Manasseh, King of Judah, and Assurbanipal, King of Assyria. He is said to have descended from heaven in a boat, and is still worshipped as a god at thousands of shrines. On the traditional day of his accession salutes are fired in his honour from the Krupp and Armstrong guns of modern Japanese ironclads. The name Jimmu, meaning "divine valour," or the "spirit of war," is the posthumous or canonical name given to the first "human" Emperor of Japan. Tennō, which can be interpreted as the "heavenly sovereign," is now the official title. Until the eighth century the Emperors of Japan were without canonical names, and those of the preceding monarchs, from Jimmu, 660 B.C., to Kōnin, 781 A.D., were invented by a scholar and applied in accordance with the command of Emperor Kwammu.

Japanese mythology is, after all, not so very different in character from the mythology of the rest of the world—it has its Gods of Thunder, of the Ocean, of Fire, of the Moon, and last, but in this instance by no means least, its Goddess of the Sun, whose genial rays originated a divine race of monarchs. A still more striking similarity between Japanese mythology and that of other lands is to be found in the frequent allusions to Heaven and Hades, and also to other mysterious places to which erring gods and goddesses are banished. Curiosity arises as to whether the Japanese themselves regard the story of the ethereal creation of Japan as mythology. There is no doubt that until the country was opened to foreign commerce and residence, they accepted, in the absence of any reliable information as to their real origin, the fable that it was a heaven-sent land, and, more-

over, the only heaven-sent land in the universe. This circumstance probably accounted largely for their exclusiveness and for the overwhelming arrogance which they displayed towards other nationalities, whom they looked upon as barbarians. In Japanese mythology we are told that among descendants of the god and goddess who created Japan the inheritance of the universe was divided. Consequently it was to be assumed that Japanese gods and goddesses had been guiding the destinies not only of Japan but of the whole world throughout the ages. You will inquire of the enlightened Japanese of to-day the origin of his country, however, and he will answer, with a broad smile, "Oh, Japan is *supposed* to have come from heaven." He does not believe the fable himself—therefore he smiles. There are too many evidences of Japan's volcanic origin to enable him to do otherwise. Although many Japanese have rejected as opposed to common sense and elementary logic the theory of a heaven-sent land, the nation has not relinquished in the least the profound belief, which almost amounts to a religious creed, that the Emperor is divine. And this in spite of the proved fact that the foundation of the one is as mythological as that of the other. Material progress has modified the views of the Japanese in many directions; but while to some extent it has penetrated the precincts of the court, it has not been able to diminish the lustre of sanctity surrounding the Imperial Throne. The peculiar position occupied by the Emperor of Japan in the minds and hearts of his subjects will be adequately treated in other chapters.

So far no reliable and, at the same time, complete history of Japan has been written. With a view to the compilation of such a record, materials have been collected from various sources, and these are now being arranged chronologically, together with a number of illustrations, and printed. It is expected that the text will fill three hundred volumes of one thousand pages each, while, in addition, one hundred thousand documents will be reproduced in another two hundred volumes. The completion of the great work, which will in itself deservedly rank as an historical achievement, may be expected about the year 1915. It will not merely be confined to events of State importance, but will deal with the life and customs

of the people down to the minutest details. Various periods of Japanese history have been translated from the native records. Chamberlain has devoted his attention to the *Kojiki*, or "Record of Ancient Matters," while Aston, who has made Japanese literature his especial study, has rendered the *Nihongi*, or "Chronicles of Japan," accessible to Western students. To both these distinguished authorities the world of learning owes more than it can ever repay or even estimate. Their main inspiration has been a sheer love of a scholarly pursuit; but it can never be forgotten that they have modestly placed the splendid results of their labours at the disposal of those whose ignorance of the written language would otherwise have limited their researches. The names of other authorities also occur to me at the moment, authorities like Satow, whose contributions are indispensable to the student of Japanese history, and Brinkley, whose voluminous work on Japan occupies a place on the shelves of every well-selected library.

In order to impart some idea of the early history of Japan I have, for various reasons, drawn my information from Aston's translation of the *Nihongi* rather than from the *Kojiki*. In this respect it cannot be urged that I have been animated by the fact that one work is more reliable than the other, for I am confident that up to a certain period both are equally unreliable. The *Kojiki* ends with the close of the fifth century, while the *Nihongi* continues as far as the close of the seventh century. The first mention of the introduction of Chinese writing to Japan is connected with the appointment, in 405 A.D., of a Korean named Wani as tutor in Chinese to a Japanese Imperial prince. Some considerable time must have elapsed before the knowledge of Chinese writing spread to any extent, while the Japanese had no system of their own until five centuries later, when Katakana was invented. In spite of these circumstances, however, we find in the ancient histories elaborate accounts of the origin of the world, and of the centuries antecedent to the Christian era. The *Kojiki* was completed in the year 712 A.D., and the *Nihongi*, which consists of thirty books, was finished and laid before the Empress Gemmio eight years later. "So far as clear native documentary evidence reaches," writes Chamberlain,

"400 A.D. is approximately the highest limit of reliable Japanese history. In 552 Buddhism entered the country. Any facts relating to a period previous to this date can be separated only with difficulty from the fables of legendary record. The study of the sacred books of Buddhism which had been freely translated into Chinese promoted a knowledge of the Chinese language and, in due course, of the Chinese classics." Aston concludes that 500 A.D. must be regarded as the time when the *Nihongi* dates begin to be trustworthy, and observes "that the authors of the *Nihongi*, or more probably some of the works upon which it is based, thought it necessary, in imitation of their Chinese models, to provide a complete system of dates extending as far back as the middle of the seventh century B.C., and giving the exact years, months, and even days for events which are supposed to have happened in this remote period. When it is remembered that there was no official recognition of the art of writing in Japan until 405 A.D., and the first mention of a calendar belongs to 553 A.D., the historical value of such chronology may be readily estimated. . . . Even as late as the beginning of the fifth century, the chronology can be shown to be wrong in several cases by no less an interval than 120 years." As typical instances of the fictional character of the early pages of the *Nihongi*, it may be mentioned that they give the age of Jimmu, the first human Emperor of Japan, as 127 years; that details are next given of eight emperors covering 483 years, an average of over sixty years for each reign, and that ages attained by other sovereigns are supplied as follows: Kōshō, 114 years; Kōan, 137; Sujin, 120; Suinin, 140; Keikō, 136; Seimu, 107; Jingō, 100; Ōjin, 110; and Ingio, 110. The *Kojiki* is equally fabulous in regard to its details concerning the ages of the early emperors of Japan. In this record Jimmu is alleged to have lived 137 years, while Sujin is said to have prolonged his life to 168 years!

In many other respects the ancient writings of Japan are absurdly unreliable, and both native and foreign authorities decline to accept them as chronicles of the early times. There are long lapses in the records which cannot be satisfactorily accounted for. A period so remote may well have

beer? full of stirring events; but the student who bewails the missing links in the chain of early Japanese history must remember that, after all, the little that is left of the chain will not stand the strain of the test of reason. After the establishment of a first human emperor, one would imagine that the gods and goddesses in their desire not to be outshone would have retired from the field. On the contrary, however, the early writings of Japan contain numerous legends, in the course of which the deities are represented as having had considerable influence upon the throne. The most probable theory advanced concerning the advent of Jimmu, the first Emperor of Japan, is that he landed from the mainland and conquered the aborigines. The *Nihongi*, however, leads us to suppose that soon after assuming human form he led in person the Imperial princes and a naval force on an expedition against the East, where previously he had said, "There is a fair land encircled on all sides by blue mountains, doubtless the centre of the world." In 666 B.C. he entered the land of Kibi (the present provinces of Bizen, Bittchiu, and Bingo), where he built a palace and spent three years preparing to make war upon the aborigines. His operations had so far progressed that in 660 B.C. he assumed Imperial dignity. The date of his death is given as 585 B.C. The next Emperor of whom any details worthy of note are provided was Sūjin. A blank of four hundred years intervenes in the chronology during which no information is given except genealogies, the place where each sovereign dwelt, where he was buried, and the age to which he lived. Native historians represent Sūjin as having ascended the throne in 97 B.C. During his reign, which is said to have been an exceedingly active one, the building of ships was begun, a census of the people was taken, taxes were imposed called "men's bow end tax and the women's finger end tax," and ponds were made. The Emperor Suinin, who succeeded him in 29 B.C., was a merciful monarch. To him is ascribed the credit of having abolished human sacrifices at the graves of Japanese sovereigns. "Though it be an ancient custom, why follow it if it is bad?" was his wise dictum on that occasion. Aston points out, however, that Chinese accounts speak of human sacrifices at the burial of Japanese sovereigns

as late as 247 A.D. Suinin, like his predecessor, made ponds and promoted agriculture. The people enjoyed abundance, and the empire was at peace until his death in 70 A.D. The most interesting features of the reign of Keikō, whose accession took place in 71 A.D., is provided by statements contained in the *Nihongi* that he was the father of eighty children, and that there was endless civil war during his rule. Much is made of the warlike achievements of the Empress Jingō, whose name was not inappropriate to the character of her doings. She ascended the throne in the year 201 A.D., and is described as having been "intelligent, shrewd, and of blooming beauty." Her husband, disbelieving in the divine revelation of the land of Korea, angered the gods and suffered death as the penalty. The Empress, somewhat alarmed at the incident, sought the advice of her prime minister and of the gods, and as a result sailed with a large fleet for the coast of Korea. Before the expedition started she addressed her advisers in these words: "If the enterprise succeeds, all of you, my ministers, will have the credit, while if it be unsuccessful, I alone shall be to blame." According to the *Nihongi*, the great fishes of the ocean came to the surface and encompassed the ships. Presently a strong wind blew from a favourable quarter on the ships under sail, and following the waves without the labour of the oar or helm they arrived at Silla (Korea). The Emperor of Korea was panic-stricken, and thought that the gods were about to destroy his kingdom. "Scarce had he spoken," says Aston's translation of the native record, "when a warlike fleet overspread the sea. Their banners were resplendent in the sunlight. The drums and fifes raised up their voices, and the mountains and rivers all thrilled to the sound." It then dawned upon the king that he was being invaded by a "divine country named Nippon," and the legend relates that realising the futility of resistance he took a white flag, voluntarily surrendered, and, tying his hands behind his back, offered to act as "thy forage providers," and to send tribute. The Empress forbade slaughter, whereupon the king loaded and presented her with eighty vessels of gold and silver, silks, and other presents.

To this day the Japanese refer with great pride to what

they choose to call their ancient conquest of Korea. As the expedition took place somewhere about 202 A.D., this also might be relegated more appropriately, perhaps, to the airy realms of mythology. Moreover, Chinese and Korean accounts of the events of the same period mention that the Japanese were defeated in their attacks upon Korea. The Empress Jingō, whose castle had been hitherto located in Kyūshū, subsequently marched at the head of an army to Yamato, where she added more glory to her standard by defeating the native chiefs. When her son, the Emperor Ōjin, came to the throne, Chinese influences began to make themselves felt for the first time in the land. The provinces began to build ships, and the *Nihongi* records of the first craft constructed in Idzu that it was 10 feet in length, and that "as soon as it was completed it was launched on the sea for a trial. It floated lightly, and was as swift as a racer." The next sovereign, Nintoku, whose accession is given as 311 A.D., was known as the "Sage Emperor." The throne was destined for his younger brother, who, however, committed suicide rather than take a position which he regarded as justly belonging to another. One of the first acts of the new monarch was to issue a decree abolishing forced labour in his own service. He was economical in his regal tastes, and declined to take taxes for the repair of the palace, which accordingly fell into decay. The *Nihongi* records that for three autumns the people had plenty, the praises of his virtue filled the land, and "the smoke of cooking was also thick." It was during the reign of Nintoku that a man was supposed to have lived with two faces turned away from each other, and with two sets of hands and feet. The native chronicles gravely declare that he carried swords on the right and left sides, and used bows and arrows with four hands at once. He took pleasure in plundering the people, and was eventually executed by Imperial order. In the reign of the next Emperor, Richiu, we read that recorders were appointed for the first time to note down statements; while in the year 414 A.D., in the reign of Ingio, it is significant that the court was compelled to send an envoy to Korea to secure "a good physician." Of Muretsu, an Emperor whose accession is dated 499 A.D., the *Nihongi* says: "He dug a pond and made a park which he filled with

the children of free parents should belong to the father. In the case of a free man marrying a slave woman, the children should belong to the mother; in the event of a slave man marrying a free woman, then the ownership of the children should be invested in the father. Finally, when both father and mother were slaves, the children should belong to the mother. Another interesting decree read as follows: "At the present time the people are still few. And yet the powerful cut off portions of land and water, and converting them into private ground sell it to the people, demanding prices yearly. From this time forward the sale of land is not allowed." Kōtoku also exalted Buddhism to a high place. Ten learned professors were appointed to instruct the priests, and temple commissions were nominated. The Emperor offered financial assistance in the building and repair of temples. Towards the end of his reign envoys were sent to China, and they returned, bringing with them many books and valuable presents. The Empress Saimei, who succeeded, was possessed of a singular mania for constructing public works. The *Nihongi* states that she employed 30,000 men in digging a canal and 70,000 men in building a wall. Her great activities caused complaint to be made that "she loads barges with stones and transports them to build up into a hill." More envoys and priests were sent to China. The former answered inquiries at the Chinese Court concerning the Empress's health in the following terms: "Her virtue is in harmony with heaven and earth, and she therefore naturally enjoys good health." In the reign of Tenchi (662 A.D.), Chinese envoys again arrived in Japan. The entertainment accorded them resembled in many respects the form of welcome given to State guests at the present day. They attended a grand review and a sumptuous banquet, and were given rich presents. The succeeding reign, that of Temmu (673 A.D.), produced certain tendencies of a democratic nature. The *Nihongi* says that the Emperor allowed "even common people to hold office." A decree was issued to the effect that "If any one knows of any means of benefiting the State or of increasing the welfare of the people, let him appear in Court and make a statement in person. If what he says is reasonable, his ideas will be adopted and embodied in regulations." Another

decree stated that the deference paid by public functionaries to the palace officials was far too great, and announced that in future "offenders" in this respect would be punished. Yet another decree was issued providing that "when the facts of a crime are undeniable, and the accused falsely states that he is innocent and does not admit the justice of the charge and disputes with the prosecutor, let his original offence be superadded to this." So strictly was the law enforced that even princes of the blood under certain circumstances were liable to the imposition of fines. The clothing to be worn by the people was prescribed. "Women of forty years of age or upwards are allowed to tie up their hair or not, and to ride astride or side saddle just as they please" was one of the Imperial edicts issued about this time. Another custom initiated by the Emperor was that of putting a series of conundrums to the princes and the ministers. To the one who answered best he gave presents of wearing apparel and silks. Buddhism flourished more than ever, and, at the temples throughout the land, scores of people publicly renounced the world. Rest-houses for the aged and the sick were also established, and an amnesty declared. Archery seems to have been the principal national pastime. The *Nihongi* mentions that on one occasion "there was a great vegetarian feast, and repentance was made for sin." A Council of State was appointed, and the following Government departments organised: Judicial, Administrative, Treasury, War, Punishments, and Interior. The reign of Jitō (687 A.D.) is as far as the *Nihongi* proceeds. She was essentially a monarch of mercy. The orphans, the childless, the widowed, and the aged, she took under her especial care, and lavished many presents upon them. It was she who thought it necessary to issue the following decree: "Ministers, public functionaries, and all persons holding official rank should in future put on their Court costumes in their own houses." About this time, probably one of the first discoveries of mineral springs in the world's history is recorded. The spring was found in the province of Afumi, in the district of Yasu, and great numbers of sick were healed. Consequently the district was exempted from commuted taxation, the local authorities, from the chiefs down to the clerks, were advanced one grade, and those who

had made public the qualities of the spring received Imperial presents.

• It has been suggested that at one period of her history, probably sometime between the third and the fifth centuries, Japan was under the tutelage of China, a country whose influence was then admittedly dominant throughout the East. In the old records of neither China nor Japan can any evidence be found to substantiate this interesting theory. According to Parker, whose history of China is a standard work, the first definite tidings of Japan reached the continent at the time of the fall of the Ts'in dynasty, about 206 B.C. The strange people from across the water became known to the Chinese as the Wo or Wa tribes. The conquest of Korea by China in 108-107 B.C. led to the further discovery by land of the Japanese, who then occupied (whether as immigrants or as aborigines is not yet settled) the tip of the Korean peninsula, as well as the southern half of the Japanese islands. The next reference to Japan in Chinese history is the arrival of a Japanese mission in Korea in 608 A.D., during the period of China's attempt to conquer the country. This event would appear to have coincided with the first visit of a Chinese embassy to Japan, which, as already stated, is mentioned in the *Nihongi*, 608 A.D., when "an envoy arrived from the Land of Great Thang." The beginning of the seventh century must therefore be accepted as the period during which direct relations were established, when Japan began to absorb Chinese influences as a result of her own observation of China, and of her own acquaintance with the Chinese people. Aston points out that in the *Nihongi*, which was completed in 720 A.D., Chinese influences are noticeable, and adds that in one case the authors have gone so far as to attribute to the Emperor Yūriaku a dying speech of several pages, which is taken with hardly any alteration from a history of the Chinese Sui dynasty, where it is assigned to an emperor who died 125 years later. It cannot be contended that Japan did not receive Chinese influences in the early ages, but it is manifest that previous to the seventh century these were transmitted to her through the medium of the neighbouring kingdom of Korea. The Koreans—whose national status is at a far lower ebb to-day

than it was at that remote period—assimilated and passed on Chinese knowledge without mingling with it to any appreciable extent their own native characteristics or qualities. While Japan was compelled to seek Chinese learning through the medium of Korea, she was nevertheless sufficiently strong in the military sense constantly to exact tributes from the Korean kings.

On reading the seared pages of the history of the Empires of the Far East these facts undeniably stand out as the plain truth : that Korea has always been a mere pawn in the game of Eastern nations, and that China has always cast the generous sunshine and not the saddening shadow of its vast substance—the sunshine of civilisation, of education, and of justice—over lesser lands. Korea neglected then, as she did only recently, her national opportunities, and she has fallen into decay. Japan accepted and eventually improved upon the knowledge, and her awakening at that remote period of history—an awakening which, comparatively, was as startling as her modern progress—led her through the dim ages to her present proud position among the Powers of the world. And what of China? China has done her share of civilisation. She is the real spouse of culture in Eastern lands—she has a glorious past. And, moreover, she is destined to have a glorious future; but if she did no more than that which can be laid to her credit in the early ages, this would be no mean monument to raise over the ashes of a continent.

It is essential to show how Chinese influences led to a transition in Japan. Both Japanese and Chinese records agree that in ancient times Japan was peopled by a number of tribes of which the Emperor was the head. Max von Brandt thus describes the system which is believed to have been in operation : "Certain offices belonged to the tribe and were hereditary in it; the man followed the woman into her tribe, to which also the children belonged. The power of the head of the tribe over the members was very considerable, but on the other hand the relations of individual communities to the Imperial tribe seem to have been very loose. They consisted chiefly in the recognition of the Emperor as high-priest for the worship of the common ancestral goddess, as war lord, as the representative of the common interests

abroad, and as chief judge to decide disputes between the different tribes. The Emperor had no right over their land or property."

At the end of the sixth and during the seventh century, Japan underwent a change which, taking into consideration the spirit of the times, was almost as drastic as the reform so successfully inaugurated by her during the last fifty years. In respect of the agencies adopted and employed, there is indeed a striking similarity between the remote period of the seventh century and the present Meiji era. The arrival of Buddhist missionaries and the study of the Chinese language and literature had created an interest in the neighbouring empire of China. In the same way it might be urged that, at a much later date, the incoming of foreign missionaries with their different customs and tongues aroused a sentiment deeper than curiosity concerning the countries of the West. In the seventh century Japanese students crossed the Yellow Sea to study Chinese conditions on the spot; twelve centuries later Japanese students travelled to Western countries to acquire knowledge. The Japanese student of early times found the state of China very different from that prevailing to-day. The illustrious T'ang dynasty was at its zenith and the Japanese were impressed with its organisation and efficiency. In the same way, also, the Japanese students of the nineteenth century found civilisation in the West in an advanced stage of perfection and were impressed. The Japanese of the seventh century had only one system of government to emulate, the Chinese, while the Japanese of the Meiji era were able to pick and choose from the variety of constitutions and institutions which prevailed in the West. The Japanese students returned home filled with admiration for the T'ang dynasty, and instantly a movement was set on foot which lasted nearly half a century and became known as the Reform of the Taikwa period. Hitherto, owing to the frequent struggles among the tribes over the right of succession to the throne, the nation had been in a perpetual state of strife. The Emperor and his advisers seized eagerly upon the Chinese system of government as a way out of their difficulties. Henceforth the Mikado was to be all-powerful in the land, and the tribes and their properties were to come

under his absolute possession and rule. He realised, in short, that he was the Son of Heaven, and, as was the case with the Emperor of China, it was decreed that his celestial origin called for the sanctity of seclusion. Thus Japan, having taken a religion proffered by China, proceeded to construct a slavish imitation of a constitution from the same source. The Emperor remained in his palace, isolated from his subjects, and an elaborate system of court ranks and offices was introduced. The principal duty of the viceroys and staffs, appointed to govern the provinces, however, seems to have been the levying of the rice-tax and the forwarding of sums thus obtained to the capital. The high officials of State were chosen from the specially created nobility. In the comprehensive transition which took place, the tribes, having submitted to the supreme authority of the Emperor, gradually passed out of existence, and the family system of control began to flourish. "Before the end of the eighth century," writes Chamberlain, "the government had been entirely remodelled on the Chinese centralised bureaucratic plan, with a regular system of ministers responsible to the sovereign, who, as 'Son of Heaven,' was theoretically absolute."

Several great families, the members of which had become merged into tribes before the change in the constitution, not only maintained but increased their influence under the new *régime*, and succeeded in preserving their distinctive character among the peoples of the land. They were, in fact, the original clans of Japan. The new turn that events had taken simply meant that the host of weaker tribes, surrendering all their powers and privileges, went to the wall and became absorbed in a common race. The stronger tribes were reconstituted under the names of clans or families, and while they, too, formally gave up their powers and privileges, the voluntary action of the Emperor in seeking a seclusion which he regarded as the only appropriate means of upholding the dignity of his sacred origin, rendered their renunciation merely nominal, and left them the virtual rulers of the country. Thus was tribal demarcation, which rightly belonged to prehistoric times, abolished, the clan system inaugurated, and the sanctity which surrounded the person of the Emperor formulated into a doctrine of divinity. The transition that

took place about this time was, next to that of the Meiji era, clearly the most important turning-point in Japanese history; and while the system then adopted underwent in succeeding years so many radical changes as to place it almost beyond recognition, several of its main features have been preserved to this day, and its influence has always made itself felt in Japanese politics. The divinity of the Emperor is as much a solemn doctrine with the Japanese to-day as it ever was, and the Press of Japan at the present time frequently contains strong protests against what it regards as the clan influence in current politics.

In early times the clan which came next in precedence to the Emperor and his relatives was known as the Fujiwara family. They claimed an ancestry dating back to the first Mikado of Japan, and had, in fact, actual ties with the Imperial Throne, inasmuch as their daughters married successive emperors and thus propagated the royal race. The Fujiwara family held for nearly four centuries (670 to 1050) a power which was regal in all except name, and the Mikados, who were frequently children of tender years, were reduced to the status of mere puppets. Members of the family were appointed to all the high offices of State, the highest position being that of *kuambaku*, or regent. This office became hereditary in the Fujiwara family, and eventually arrogated to itself all power in the land. It is not easy to give an exact description of the early form of government which existed in Japan. Chamberlain, while denying that anything like the organised feudalism which prevailed from the twelfth century and down to 1868 obtained in ancient times, yet thinks it indisputable that "beyond the immediate limits of the Imperial domain the government *resembled* feudalism rather than centralisation." The court was eventually given over to pleasure and dissipation. Women of light virtue and luxury-loving priests infested the precincts of the palace in large numbers. Altogether, the so-called divinity of the Emperor seems to have been largely upheld upon incessant debauchery. The Japanese people eventually became complete strangers to their monarchs. The members of the Fujiwara family soon abandoned their principal, though mainly self-appointed, function, which was to govern; and

they joined heart and soul in the gay spirit of the times.

It is not altogether surprising that in the leisurely and luxurious period of the Fujiwara ascendancy, literature should have reached a high standard of merit. Before the introduction of the Chinese classics the minds of the Japanese had been more or less an intellectual blank as far as literary attainment was concerned. As soon as a knowledge of Chinese writing was acquired, literature and the arts were cultivated and industry was neglected. A period of decay—not without its parallel in the history of other nations—soon set in, where literature and the arts advanced to the exclusion of the more practical commerce. Chinese literature still maintains a far greater hold than Western literature upon the mind of intellectual Japan, and one of the reasons now urged against the romanisation of the Japanese language is that such a measure would render the Chinese classics less accessible to Japanese students.

Japanese scholars agree with foreign authorities that the wholesale and, in many respects, indiscriminate adoption, in the seventh century, of Chinese institutions as apart from Chinese learning was premature and excessive. The system which had succeeded in China under the brilliant T'ang dynasty was doomed to partial failure when tried in Japan. The country was not ripe for the change, accomplished as it was with ill-considered haste; and those who charged themselves with the administration were both incompetent and corrupt. It is a significant commentary upon the progress of the times that the Chinese, who supplied Japan with a form of government more than twelve centuries ago, have but lately searched the world to find a constitution for themselves, and that the Japanese system has been among those which have passed under their review. By sending students to the West in the Meiji era, as she did to China in the seventh century, Japan has led the way in the Orient in the matter of acquiring Western knowledge and experience; and should China adopt the Japanese constitution in preference to that of any other country, she will be merely borrowing from the borrower with the additional advantage that is to be derived from the circumstance of local adaptability. It can only

be concluded that the Japanese of the seventh and eighth centuries were less circumspect than the Chinese investigators of to-day.

The period, which was chiefly conspicuous for its effeminacy and literary attainment, saw the establishment of two military grades, one of which was the high military office of the Shōgunate, while the other was the warrior class of the Samurai. According to Chamberlain, the title of Shōgun, which means literally "generalissimo," and which was destined to play such a momentous part in Japanese history, seems to have been first used in A.D. 813, when one Watamaro was appointed Sei-i Tai-Shōgun—that is, "Barbarian-subduing Generalissimo"—to wage war against the Ainu in the north of the empire. Some authorities declare that the creation of a special military class, known as the Samurai, occurred in the eighth century, and was called forth as a set-off against the effeminacy of the age. Chamberlain writes on the subject that "in the early Middle Ages—say, before the twelfth century—the soldiers of the Mikado's palace were said to 'samurau,' that is, to 'be on guard' there. But when feudalism came in, the word Samurai was taken to denote the entire warrior class. 'Warriors,' 'the military class,' 'the gentry,' are perhaps the best English renderings of the word; for it was of the essence of Old Japan that all gentlemen must be soldiers and all soldiers gentlemen."

In a paper contributed to the Asiatic Society, Mr. John Carey Hall, I.S.O., the well-known Consul-General, mentions that among the consequences of the wholesale importation of Chinese institutions was an increasing divergence of interests between the nobility of the court and the great country families, who, for various reasons, were shut out from preferment at the capital. Upon the latter devolved the task of winning by the strong hand, from the Ainu aborigines on the eastern and north-eastern frontiers, the additional lands required by the increase of population of the Yamato conquerors. The members of the Fujiwara family, having given themselves over to the pursuit of luxury, were loth to don the armour themselves. At the same time they realised how essential it was that the Ainu "barbarians" should be

punished at the point of the sword. It occurred to the Fujiwara that the simplest way out of the difficulty would be to delegate warlike tasks to others, and so the Shōgūn or generalissimo was chosen from particular families, who consequently became known as the military class. At the end of the eighth century the rich peasants who were skilled in archery, horsemanship, and military exercises were called out, while the weak and feeble were ordered to apply themselves to agriculture. In this way the division was drawn between the agricultural and military classes. Sir Francis Adams explains that the military men of the wild northern provinces of Ōshiu and Dewa, and of the eight provinces subsequently designated the Kwantō, remained in their native districts and ruled over them. They neglected their duties as members of the permanent garrison of Kyōto, and their military superiors lost control over them. Thus a system of military rule spread over the country, and a class was formed of men who possessed armour and horses, and who assumed the dress and title of the warrior. Although at first desultory and sporadic, the struggle against the Ainu ultimately necessitated military organisation. The control of the army soon became an object of contention between the two most powerful families, the Taira and Minamoto, otherwise known as the Hei and the Gen, both of which traced their origin from Imperial sources. After their rivalry at court had continued for some generations, there came an open rupture in the middle of the twelfth century. The first serious disturbance in the Fujiwara *régime* took place in the year 939, when Taira no-Masakado was refused the appointment of Kebiishi, which was the equivalent of commissioner of police in the capital. He proclaimed himself promptly new Taira king in the Kwantō, and in the subsequent fighting was defeated and killed. Meanwhile, numerous court intrigues were set on foot, and the influence of the Taira and Minamoto families gradually increased. On the death of the Emperor Konoye, in 1155, a dispute arose regarding the succession to the throne, and the Minamoto and Taira families took opposite sides. In the series of battles that followed, a member of the Minamoto family, Minamoto no-Yoshitomo, fought with the men of Taira. The conflict, which lasted

several years, has been compared to the Wars of the Roses in English history ; the Minamoto fought under white, and the Taira under red colours. The Taira triumphed, secured for its nominee the succession to the throne, and obtained control of the army. Meanwhile the court viewed with alarm the struggle for supremacy. It longed for peace, and even went the length of issuing definite orders forbidding the warriors to enter into conflict. Because the military class did not belong to the rank of courtiers it was despised by the Fujiwara and looked upon as "the inferior class of soldiers." Nevertheless by the middle of the twelfth century the military class had become dominant in the land, and the power and influence of the Fujiwara family was completely broken. Sir Francis Adams interprets the relations existing between the Shōgun and the throne at this period in the following passage : "Still it must never be forgotten by the student of Japanese history that there was a prestige in the imperial person which nothing ever did or ever could abolish. No one permitted himself to doubt his Majesty's descent in an unbroken line from the gods who created and ruled over Japan. He was the fountain whence all rank and office flowed. The Shōgun, or general, owed his appointment to the Emperor, and even though he possessed the whole military power in the State, he found himself when at court, not even the first of his Majesty's subjects, nor could he, by reason of office alone, claim the right of gazing on the imperial countenance. Hence it was that, in their wars with each other, the military commanders were constantly endeavouring to secure the person of the sovereign, so as to clothe their acts with legality and to declare their opponents as rebels." The fact has been considerably commented upon that a division was not created as between classes of priests and warriors, but instead, as between court nobility and nobility of the sword. It has also been pointed out that the further development was entirely similar to that of the European, and most particularly of the German, middle ages. "The sword alone could create," says one writer in a convincing description of the age ; "the sword alone could preserve ; above all, highly honoured, but without any actual power, stood the Emperor, and oftentimes not one, but two—a situation which

occasioned the most obstinate wars, although each party were from the beginning agreed to obey the ruler appointed by themselves only so far as it suited them." Historians have declared that the fidelity of the vassals to the lords was the only estimable feature of the times. For the rest, the money-lender flourished both within and without the court, people plundered and were plundered, peasants turned soldiers, and priests rode at the head of armed men.

The passing of the rule from the Fujiwara to the military class saved Japan. Had this transition not occurred, the condition of the court and of the country would have gone from bad to worse, and, deprived of all means of defence, the empire would have lain at the mercy of any foreign invader who chose to land upon its shores. Happily for Japan, the Fujiwara had not sufficient foresight to see that they would be destroyed by the instrument of their own creation. In order to shirk the duty of protecting and extending the empire—a duty which rightly belonged to themselves as rulers of the State—they had called into being a military class. Having thus disposed of their responsibilities they were ungrateful, inasmuch as they did not hesitate to despise their defenders, whom they looked upon as mere soldiers unworthy of presence at court. The Fujiwara wished for peace, not for the sake of peace, but because war was distracting in an age essentially given over to the pursuit of pleasure. An analogy, with certain reservations, may be drawn between the twelfth century in Japan and the more recent eras in China. The Chinese governing classes, like the Fujiwara, devoted more attention to arts and to literature than to industry and the attainment of military efficiency. The Chinese administration has been notoriously corrupt for centuries. The people are essentially peace loving, and until yesterday, as it were, soldiers were looked down upon as idle fellows who followed a dubious calling. One need inquire no deeper to account for the decay of China. Japan would have met the same fate in the twelfth century had it not been for the fact that while the court despised the military class, the people—that is the people as represented by hosts of warriors who flocked to the standards of the Minamoto and the Taira—were eager to seek the glory of the battlefield. It was inevitable that dissensions should

arise among the military class, but there was never any doubt that whatever might be the result of the conflict between the two militant factions, the Fujiwara were destined to disappear from the scene. Their deposition was accomplished without bloodshed. The civil war which devastated the land was merely limited to the simple issue as to which party of the military class should take the place of the governing family. Once the Taira gained the ascendancy over the Minamoto it followed that the Fujiwara must surrender their position next the imperial throne. The military class possessed all the power—the men, the armour and the weapons. In face of forces such as these, forces which were originally designed to be bulwarks of empire and not elements of civil strife, the Fujiwara were defenceless. They placidly paid the fatal penalties of their own indulgence and of their own neglect, penalties rendered all the more severe inasmuch as they were inflicted by an instrument of their own creation. Impartial historians are compelled to admit that despite its errors and its misfortunes, Japan, on the whole, was the better for the Fujiwara era. It saw the introduction of Chinese culture and civilisation and the promotion of literature and the arts. Incidentally, out of the evil of the age there came much good. A military system was inaugurated—the Shōgunate and the warrior class—which lasted for many centuries, and which restored the fortunes of the Empire at a time when its very foundations, eaten with corruption and burdened with the edifice of a rotten court filled with luxury-loving and effeminate courtiers, were in danger of collapsing.

VI

EARLY FEUDALISM

IN 1153 Taira no-Kiyomori was nominated to a civil office at court. This was the first occasion in Japanese history that a military noble had been so honoured. He first occupied the position of Gon Dainagon, or acting councillor of State, and fourteen years later was promoted to the dignity of Daijō-Daijin, or chief minister of State. The power and influence of the Fujiwara family was completely broken. Kiyomori appointed the members of his family to all the high offices in the realm, including thirty viceregal posts in the provinces, and himself virtually assumed a dictatorship over the country. He directed the whole of the State affairs from his stronghold at Rokuhara, married his daughter to the Emperor, and raised her son to sovereignty when he was only three years of age. Other emperors whom he subsequently appointed to the throne were mere infants whose ages ranged from one to eight years. Against his old enemies the Minamoto family, now joined by his former ally Minamoto no-Yoshitomo, he waged a terrible war of extermination. In the end Yoshitomo was put to flight and eventually captured and killed. While retreating, his third son, Minamoto no-Yoritomo, fell into the hands of the enemy and was exiled to Idzu. For many years the country remained under the unchallenged control of the Taira family. Meanwhile, the Imperial family having become dissatisfied with the condition of affairs succeeded in communicating with Minamoto no-Yoritomo, who had been fortunate enough during his banishment to marry the lady Masa, daughter of Hōjō Tokimasa in whose charge he had been placed. Aided by the Hōjō clan, to which his wife belonged, he revolted in the Kwantō in the year 1180. In the same year Kiyomori removed the court from Kyōto to Fukuwara in Hyōgo. Acting

at the instigation of the Imperial family, Yoritomo attacked the Taira, but was repulsed. He escaped with one of his retainers by climbing a precipice, and sought refuge in the house of a Buddhist priest. Fearing assassination, he emerged from his hiding-place and embarked on a ship. On the voyage a vessel was met filled with men in armour who fortunately proved to be members of a friendly family called Miura. Yoritomo landed, issued proclamations, rallied his forces, and advanced against the Taira. His schemes received encouragement by the news of the death in 1182 of Kiyomori, who left instructions in the following terms: "After I die do not perform Buddhist rites for me; do not read the liturgies for me; but simply cut off Minamoto no-Yoritomo's head and hang it up before my tomb." After the loss of their great leader, the Taira retreated westward. Another member of the Minamoto family, known as Minamoto no-Yoshinaka, engaged the son Munémori, who, proving himself utterly incapable as a leader, fled from the ancient capital of Kyōto and took with him the infant Mikado.

One of the descendants of the Emperor Toba who had abdicated in the year 1123 became the new occupant of the throne, and Yoshinaka was appointed Shōgun. Yoritomo, who, until then, had taken the initiative in the fighting against the Taira family, did not long tolerate the usurpation of his relative. In 1184 he despatched his younger brothers against him. After a battle near Lake Biwa, Yoshinaka committed suicide. During the same year, Yoritomo made Kamakura his headquarters, and confirmed the feudal tie with the Kwantō vassals. In the following year the Taira, as a force in the land, were practically exterminated at the famous naval battle fought at Dan-no-ura at the entrance to the Shimonoseki Straits. This was undoubtedly one of the fiercest engagements in the world's history. Although the Taira offered a gallant resistance, the majority of them were either drowned or slain. The few survivors who escaped to the shores were pursued inland, and many of them were butchered. The widow of Kiyomori, the original leader of the family, who was present on the occasion taking care of the deposed Emperor Antoku, is said to have drowned herself together with her infant charge.

The Japanese of to-day will point out to foreign visitors the exact place near Shimonoseki where the naval battle was fought, and will tell the story of how a Mikado of their Empire once perished in the neighbouring waters. A Taira remnant made their home in Kyūshū and formed a separate and distinct community from the other inhabitants of the country. Their descendants also kept themselves apart, and this system of isolation has been maintained for over 700 years. To this day a little Taira colony exists in Kyūshū, consisting of people who live as it were in the past and who can easily be distinguished from the rest of the population. The extermination of the Taira family did not bring the much-needed peace to the land. Yoshitsuné, a half-brother of Yoritomo, fought many battles, and achieved an almost equal number of successes. His death seems to have been enshrouded in mystery. Some accounts declare that he was assassinated by order of his powerful relative, who was jealous of his military prowess; other versions give a circumstantial account of a domestic tragedy in the course of which, finding escape from his brother's troops impossible he is said to have slain his wife and family and committed *hara-kiri*. As evidence of his death, his head was severed from his body and taken to Kamakura, where it was shown to Yoritomo. In 1186 a new military tax was imposed, and *Shugo* (provincial guardians) and *Jito* (land-reeves) were appointed.

At this period, Yoritomo was all-supreme in the land. His personality constitutes one of the most picturesque and powerful figures in the history of Japan. It was indeed a sorry day for the fortunes of the Taira when Kiyomori spared his life. Emerging from exile, he was mainly responsible for the extermination of the Taira, and afterwards he was equally successful in the feuds of the Minamoto clan, of which he was the recognised head. In 1189 he attacked and defeated the semi-independent Fujiwara, ruler of the two great northern provinces of Mutsu and Dewa. The whole of the eastern part of Japan was thus brought under his control, and the two provinces named were for the first time in history submitted to an effective political administration. In the following year

he paid a visit to the Emperor in the ancient capital of Kyōto. Two years later he was appointed to the high office of Sei-i-Tai-Shōgun, or, in other words, the second rank of nobility was conferred upon him, and he became commander-in-chief, or generalissimo. Chamberlain explains that the title of Shōgun "had till then been applied in its proper meaning to those generals who were sent from time to time to subdue the Ainu or rebellious provincials, but which thenceforth took to itself a special sense somewhat as the word Imperator (also meaning originally 'general') did in Rome. The coincidence is striking. So is the contrast. For as Imperial Rome never ceased to be theoretically a republic, Japan contrariwise, though practically and indeed avowedly ruled by the Shōguns from 1190 to 1867, always retained the Mikado as theoretical head of the State, descendant of the Sun-goddess, fountain of all honour. There never were two emperors, acknowledged as such, one spiritual and one secular, as has often been asserted by European writers. There never was but one emperor—an emperor powerless, it is true, seen only by the women who attended him, often a mere infant in arms who was discarded on reaching adolescence for another infant in arms. Still he was the theoretical head of the State whose authority was only delegated to the Shōgun as, so to say, Mayor of the Palace." Yoritomo, however, was more than a Mayor of the Palace. While he has been regarded as the founder of feudalism in Japan, he was in reality a Dictator over the country. The power he wielded was far greater than that held by his illustrious predecessor, Kiyomori. He deprived the Mikado and his court at Kyōto of their last vestige of influence, and established the government at Kamakura. On the whole, the country derived much benefit under his *régime*. He appointed new governors in the provinces and instituted reforms in the administration. On realising the security of the position he had attained, ambitious men who desired some sphere for their usefulness, deserted the court at Kyōto and rallied around him. The best brains of the land were at his command. At no period of his brilliant career as Shōgun does it seem to have occurred to him to depose the Mikado and seize the throne for himself. It

might be argued that as he was head of the army, a *coup d'état* which would have made him Emperor of Japan might have been easily effected. But, on the other hand, the fact must not be overlooked that the doctrine of the divinity of the monarch was centuries old, and that as such it had never been disputed. The right of succession to the throne may have been contested, but it was never suggested that any one who was not a member of the Imperial family should become the occupant, or that the personality of the rightful Emperor was not sacred. Had Yoritomo been disposed to revolt—a circumstance in itself as extremely unlikely as it was unnecessary—the army would most probably have refused to join him. One decree issued by Yoritomo declared that “in all matters concerning the military classes the wishes of the cloistered Emperor shall be obeyed.” The reference to the cloistered Emperor is sufficiently explanatory of the position of the monarch at that time. The command contained in the decree also illustrates the policy of Yoritomo towards the throne. He was always careful to clothe his acts with legality by seeking the sanction of the throne, and this was never withheld. It is difficult to conceive what might have happened had the court at Kyōto chosen to reject his advice. Again, surprise might reasonably be expressed that the army and the country generally tolerated the relegation of their sovereign to the background and the usurpation of his power by Yoritomo. In this respect, however, the Shōgun was not acting without precedent. The Fujiwara family and Kiyomori before him had done exactly the same. Moreover, the isolated position of the Emperor was not altogether inconsistent with the doctrine of his divinity. As a sacred personality, the descendant of the Goddess of the Sun, it was not to be presumed that he could be worried with the cares of State, or harassed with the details of administration; it was sufficient that his holy spirit should permeate and inspire those who were at the head of his government.

The views of the Japanese, as represented by one of their well-known publicists, on the relationship of the Shōgunate to the throne, are instructive, if not altogether impartial. On this subject the writer says: “Probably one of the most remarkable

things in the history of the world is the unique place the Imperial House of Japan has occupied in the estimation of the people. Think for a moment of one royal family ruling over an energetic and progressive people from the very beginning of their history, for some twenty centuries. It is true, indeed, that during the large part of this long period the chief executive duties rested upon the heads of different powerful clans, and in some cases the emperors were compelled to abdicate or sent into exile. Yet never was the throne occupied by any but the members of the Imperial family. To the Mikado always belonged the right to confer ranks and to make appointments, and if in practice he was not always free to act as he chose, in theory at least his authority was never disputed. The principle of loyalty, however, as almost the sole foundation of all virtue, found its wider application after the establishment of feudalism—from the thirteenth century onward. For feudalism created so many grades of masters as the nearer and more tangible objects of loyal service, that it soon made this principle the all-pervading bond of social life. The Mikado had his immediate court officials and his vice-regent, the Shōgun; these had their own immediate retainers; these latter again, in turn, their own trusty servants, and so on. In a large number of cases the bond of attachment between a master and his servant was the heritage of many generations, and was even closer than blood-relationship. 'A faithful wife never seeks a second husband, a loyal servant never serves a second master.' A true retainer to a Daimyō (lord of a domain) never offered himself to the service of another suzerain, even in case he was expelled through no fault of his from his master's household, or where his master's house through some calamity came to extinction and he was left a homeless wanderer." The writer adds, "A servant became often so attached to a family that he remained all his life in the service of that family, sometimes serving three or four generations of masters. Such a servant was at times led to undergo martyrdom for the cause of his master's household in cases of emergency." The Japanese of to-day, who have accepted without question the doctrine of the divinity of the Emperor, originated and subscribed to by their forefathers, are reluctant to place any construction

upon historical facts which would tend to destroy or even weaken the theory that his Majesty has always been the supreme authority in the State. Mr. Carey Hall thus describes the working of the system which Yoritomo inaugurated in the twelfth century and which was perpetuated under the succeeding Hōjō régime:—

“We may now glance at the institutions through which the sway of the military chieftains at Kamakura was exercised. These were threefold in respect of situation and authority. First of all came the controlling organisation at the new capital, Kamakura. Next in importance came the delicate arrangements required at Kyoto for making the military yoke sit as easily as might be possible on the necks of the Imperial family and court nobility at the old capital, and lastly the subsisting authority of the Civil Governors in the provinces had to be treated with care in view of the large powers given to the recently established protectors and land-reeves, whose main function it was to maintain the efficiency of the feudal militia and its commissariat supplies; for the Hōjō rulers honestly intended that their military institutions should merely supplement and not, as eventually happened, supersede the Imperial authorities. At Kamakura there were three supreme boards of control. The Council of government, presided over by Oye no-Hiromoto, at first bore the unpretentious designation of *Kumonjo*, or Place of Public Documents, but in a few years' time this was boldly replaced by the name *Mandokoro*, which is a contraction of *Matsuri-dokoro*, or Place of Government, a title which the Fujiwara regents at Kyōto had not hesitated to bestow on their wives and mothers. After establishing the feudal relation with his followers and confirming the estates previously granted to or held by them, Yoritomo next established, under the name of *Samurai-dokoro*, or Place of Service, an office for the probation and selection of retainers of merit and talent, which had the control of official appointments and promotions; and last, but not least, he established an office called *Monjusho*, or Place of Enquiry and Comment, which was in essence a Court of Justice, dealing with disputes arising between the feudal retainers and with offences com-

mitted by them ; the Provincial Governors of the old Imperial *régime* being allowed to retain their normal jurisdiction over the rest of the people, that is, the common folk, farmers, artisans, and merchants. For extending the control of the central councils at Kamakura to the *Samurai* and clergy of the province, *Bugyo*, or Magistrates of various kinds, were appointed with powers to decide civil and criminal cases in first instance. This administrative organisation was applied to the eastern half of Japan, called the Kwanto, including, in its more extended sense, the whole of the country east of the Hakone barrier. But for the older half of the empire, lying west of that barrier and owning for centuries back the sole control of the court at Kyōto, a further special provision against reactionary movements was required. A strict watch had to be kept on the court and its discontented and intriguing nobles ; and the dignity of the position required that this spying duty should be done by an official of high rank, clothed with discretionary power to deal with emergencies. In short, a branch office of the Kamakura administration had to be established in the capital itself conveniently near to the palace. The Shōgun's representative accordingly fixed his residence in the south-east suburb of the city, then called Rokuhara, near the present Kiomidzu quarter."

An impartial student must incline to the opinion that whatever motive, of reverence or otherwise, may have animated Yoritomo in the twelfth century, his treatment of the throne appears on the surface and in the perspective of time to have been far from courtly. He shielded what was undoubtedly a dictatorship behind the useful doctrine of the divinity of the sovereign. In upholding him, the nation accepted the relegation of the Emperor to the Palace of Kyōto, a palace which came to be looked upon as a sacred tabernacle. The divinity of the Imperial person was by this time ostensibly a religious belief firmly implanted in the hearts of the people ; and one cannot escape the reflection that Yoritomo made wrongful use of it in his greed to grasp power and place. His conduct in governing the country from his self-appointed seat of Kamakura when the capital of the empire

was Kyōto obviously showed more contempt than respect for the court. There is much to support the hypothesis that the position of immense power which he had won for himself in the land, involving as it did nothing less drastic than the total extermination of his enemies, wisely decided the Imperial family against offering any active resistance to his authority. It is doubtful whether Yoritomo's loyalty would have stood the test of a genuine opposition to his policy from Kyōto. It must not be overlooked that he had obtained the Shōgunate in consequence of a campaign against the Taira undertaken by him at the instigation of the royal family, and if his rule was less tyrannical than that of the Taira towards the country, it was not dissimilar in respect of its arrogation of power. One cannot conceive that the Imperial family was so guileless as altogether to lack an appreciation of the ulterior uses to which its divinity was put. It must be admitted that a divinity that succumbs to *force majeure* is not convincing as such.

On the death of Yoritomo the same system of government was perpetuated, and the Emperor continued to remain in isolation. The Hōjō family, into which the great Yoritomo had married when in exile, immediately took up the reins of authority. Yori-iye, who was only a youth barely twenty years of age, succeeded to his father's possessions, but he was not permitted to take any active part in the government of the country. His mother, the lady Masa, organised a council of which her father, Hōjō Tokimasa, was appointed president. The members consisted of Oye no-Hiromoto, an ancestor of the feudal lords of Satsuma and one of the principal lieutenants of Yoritomo, and twelve of the chief vassals. The lady Masa appears to have arranged the affairs of empire with both wisdom and restraint, and her achievements in this respect, taken in conjunction with those of the illustrious and more warlike Empress Jingō, prove that at one period of history the status of women in Japan was much higher than it is at present. Yori-iye duly received the Shōgunate rendered vacant by the death of his father. He proved himself incapable of exercising governmental power, and in the year 1203 he was compelled by his grandfather, Hōjō Tokimasa, to abdicate. He was sent into exile

and was afterwards slain. At the time of his death he was only twenty-three years of age. His brother Sanetomo, a boy of eleven years of age, succeeded him, but after ruling sixteen years he, too, was assassinated at the instigation of Hōjō Yoshitoki, brother of the lady Masa. Thus perished the last of the main branch of the Minamoto line. The Hōjō family attained its ambition and was supreme in the land. It succeeded to the power which had formerly been wielded by the Fujiwara, the Taira, and the Minamoto families. With a restraint that must be considered remarkable in the light of subsequent events, the Hōjō did not seize upon the title of Shōgun for themselves. A grandson of the lady Masa, an infant only two years of age, who belonged to the Fujiwara clan, was appointed to that high office; while her brother, Hōjō Yoshitoki, who had been mainly responsible for the extermination of the Minamoto family, controlled the government of the country under the title of *Shikken*, which may be interpreted as "Power-holder," or Regent. While the members of the Hōjō family displayed some sensitiveness with regard to the assumption of the title of Shōgun, it cannot be said that in other respects they showed any lack of boldness. Indeed, all the available evidence indicates that their record of treatment towards the reigning family was as bad as, if not worse than, that of any of their predecessors. Not content with perpetuating the system of puppet emperors, they reduced the position of Shōgun, which, unlike the Imperial House, had not the least claim to divinity and therefore to spiritual isolation, to purely ornamental limitations. Within a period of less than twenty years they were responsible for the appointment of no fewer than six Shōguns, all of whom were either children, or, at the best, youths on the threshold of manhood. Not one of these died in office; all were deposed, and several were subsequently the victims of brutal assassinations. In the year 1221 the Imperial family, instigated by the ex-Emperor Gotaba, attempted to regain the governing power. At that time there were no fewer than three ex-Mikados in the country, all of whom joined issue with the reigning monarch, who was the son of one of them, against the Hōjō family. The country was divided into two distinct camps; the

warriors of the east arrayed themselves against the warriors of the west. The struggle that ensued was known in history as "the military disturbance of Shoku." It lasted but a short time, and resulted in the complete overthrow of the Imperialists, who were defeated by Yasutoki, son of Yoshitoki. The *Gwaishi* records that "Here-upon Yoshitoki deposed the Emperor (Juntoku) and set up a son of Prince Sadachika, a grandson of the Emperor Takakura, who became the Emperor Go Horikawa. He then forced the ex-Emperor Gotaba to shave off his hair and to retire to Oki. He removed the ex-Emperor Juntoku to Sado, and two princes of the blood to Tajim and Bizen." The ex-Emperor Tsuchimikado was subsequently banished. Some accounts declare that Yoshitoki then became Shōgun. The estates of all the adherents of the ex-emperors were confiscated, and the Hōjō family remained supreme. In view of the lamentable incidents which took place about this time, the doctrine of the divinity of the Emperor would not be worthy of serious discussion were it not for the undoubted fact that as late as to-day it is generally accepted as a belief in Japan. The presence of several ex-Mikados in the country at one and the same time, and the deposition of the reigning monarch, an act by no means without precedent, was clear proof that the sanctity of the Imperial person was not always upheld with that punctiliousness which one might reasonably expect from a race of people whose proud boast has ever been that of unflagging loyalty.

Japanese historians declare that the Hōjō family was inclined to peace, and that its rule was at the outset distinctly beneficent; that the priests stirred up the people to strife, and that the court at Kyōto was the aggressor. The *Gwaishi* more correctly sums up the conditions when it says that the Hōjō "secretly grasped and silently stole power whilst pretending never to have moved a hand." As I have pointed out before, when the Imperial family accepted the domination of Yoritomo, the first real head of the army, and his clique, its new position was not inconsistent with pretensions to divinity. In those days, the principle adhered to or at least accepted by the Imperial family, owing either to its incapability of appreciating the tendencies of the times

or to its lack of courage to combat them, seems to have been that the spirit of the Emperor ruled in the person of the Shōgun. The complete and, to a large extent, compulsory isolation of the monarch and his immediate relations from all that pertained to the welfare of the land and its people, and the greed with which power was grasped and held by others who had no pretensions to royal rank and therefore to royal prerogatives, must have rendered it apparent that sooner or later an attempt would be made to recover sovereignty in practice as well as in theory. Such an ambition was not unreasonable; on the contrary, it was eminently laudable.

The record of the Imperial family, which had frequently involved the accession of babies to the throne, ended with utter helplessness in the Hōjō *régime*. The clans or families had been allowed to raise and command military forces, and in the struggle that followed, these forces were for the most part loyal to their liege-lords and not to the crown that sought to assert itself. In other and plainer words, a considerable portion of the Japanese subjects of that day did not hesitate to offer resistance to the cause of a monarch whom Japanese historians must, if they wish to trace an unbroken ancestry down to the present-day Mikado and to sustain the theory of godly origin, designate as divine. Nominally, the supreme power was vested in the monarch, and any active opposition to an attempt on his part to exercise it, was—however much the Japanese may dislike the term—in the nature of a treasonable revolt and, therefore, essentially disloyal. That the Hōjō family was far better qualified than the Imperial family to govern the country, and that it was certainly to the advantage of the Japan of those times that at all costs and hazards it insisted upon doing so, is beside the question. All that can be said in favour of the Hōjō policy of making the Emperor an ornamental puppet is that it was by no means a new one, and that the people, having become accustomed to his isolation throughout so many centuries, had some grounds for resenting his attempt to bring about a drastic change such as would restore to him the governing power. At any rate the effect, whether deliberate or not, is to make it appear that in the period under review the position of the monarch as the

"fountain of all honour" was observed more in the abstract than it is to-day. One cannot possibly conceive a divinity that is not all-powerful, much less a divinity that can be deposed and sent into exile at the will of mere human beings. Mr. Carey Hall summarises the circumstances which led to the attainment of all authority in the land by the Hōjō family, in the following passage: "The foundations of the power had been laid when Hōjō Tokimasa, as his son-in-law Yoritomo's representative at Kyōto, after the destruction of the Taira, induced the Emperor in A.D. 1189 to sanction the appointment of *Shugo*, or protectors, in each of the provinces, of *Jito*, or land-reeves, in all the townships, and police in the villages, and the imposition of a tax of about a bushel of rice per acre to support this military administration alongside of the then existing civil officials holding their appointments from the Emperor. These protectors, in the course of time, supplanted the civil governors of provinces in much the same way as the intendants appointed by Richelieu in the provinces of France usurped by degrees the power formerly exercised by the great French nobles." In 1225 Hōjō Yasutoki succeeded his father as regent, and in the same year the death of the lady Masa and of Oye no-Hiromoto took place. Seven years later the first Code of Judicature was drafted and distributed.

The same authority, describing the character of the administration which existed after the Shoku disturbance in 1221, observes that "The first representative or Resident of the Kamakura Shōgunate was the author of this code, Hōjō Yasutoki, who was assisted in his onerous and multifarious duties by his uncle, Hōjō Toki-fusa; and they had at length to divide the work between them, each in a separate palace. Hence the Shōgun's authorities at Kyōto were sometimes referred to as the two Rokuharas. The duties required a very large staff of officials. There was a *Hyojoshu*, or Council of Government, a *Samurai Dokoro*, or Headquarters Staff Office, and a *Monjusho*, or Law Court, just as at Kamakura itself, but acting under the latter's directions in all important matters. The Rokuhara branch-office was also indispensable for another purpose. The Emperor, shorn as he was of all real authority, remained

nevertheless the sole fountain of honour. The scale of ranks and the titles of the old offices continued as before, and were as eagerly coveted by the feudal vassals as ever they had been by the court nobles themselves. To prevent ambitious applications and intrigues on the part of its greater vassals, and make the Kamakura authorities the sole avenue of access to Imperial favour, was an important branch of the duties of the Rokuhara lieutenancy. When Hōjō Yasutoki, the third of his line, succeeded in 1225 to his father's position as Power-holder for the puppet Shōgun, the society of the new military capital of Kamakura was in a state of not very stable equilibrium. No doubt the peasantry throughout the empire were content, for the taxes had been lightened. Formerly the farmer had to give up seven-tenths of the annual produce of his land in payment of taxes, Imperial and provincial; the Hōjō reduced the rate to one-half. But the situation of the governing military class was not settled as was that of the governed mass of the nation. Emancipated from the control of the Imperial court and from the jurisdiction of its provincial governors, the warriors had as yet no law but the will of their feudal superiors. For the settlement of disputes amongst them, and for the punishment of offences, recourse was often had to arbitrary decrees. It is told of the second Minamoto Shōgun, Yori-iye, that when a dispute respecting boundaries was brought before him for adjudication, he drew his pen through the middle of the plan, saying he had no time for inquiring into detail, and that in future such disputes must be settled in the same way; if the parties were dissatisfied with that mode of judicature, let them not have disputes. Far different was the spirit in which Hōjō Yasutoki exercised the power. The first fifteen days of every month were given up to judicature. He caused a bell to be hung at the gate of the Record Office, and when a suitor struck it his petition or complaint was at once attended to. Decisions were pronounced on the tenth, twentieth, and thirtieth days of the month, important and difficult cases being first discussed at meetings of the Council of Government. It was after some years' experience of this judicial work and of the legislative needs of his time that he drew up his code of judicature."

In the year 1253, when Nichiren, the great Buddhist evangelist, started to propagate his new faith, the Mongolian peril had begun to assail Asia. At the age of fifteen, Hōjō Tokimune became regent, and his name will for ever remain inscribed on the most glorious pages of Japanese history. In due course the expected Mongolian aggression reached the gates of Japan. The great Kublai Khan, fresh from his conquest of China, demanded the submission of Japan, but his ambassadors were beheaded by order of Tokimune. At last, in 1281, he sent a vast armada consisting of 3000 sail to the coasts of Kyūshū. Exactly how the attempted invasion was repelled is unknown. As in the case of the voyage of the Spanish Armada to England, a great storm is believed to have destroyed the Mongol fleet. The number of Mongols who lost their lives is given at various totals, the lowest of which is 100,000. Those who were not drowned were massacred by the Japanese, and only three are said to have escaped. Tokimune was only twenty-four years of age when he first repelled the Mongols, and only thirty-two when he completed his glorious work and destroyed the invaders. He is held up by present Japanese as a "glorious model of character-formation for the emulation of the modern youth."

As a result of a prolonged monopoly of power in the State, the Hōjō family gradually became less scrupulous in its methods of government, and the condition of the country reached a lamentably low ebb. On several distinct occasions, the Imperial family renewed its attempts to recover lost rights. In consequence, the Emperor Go-Daigo was deposed in 1327. The struggles to obtain freedom from the Hōjō oppression were destined to continue. Two families known as the Nitta and the Ashikaga, both founded by descendants of the illustrious Minamoto, started a revolt. The former, led by Nitta Yoshisada, attacked and captured the citadel of Kamakura, while the latter with Ashikaga Takauji at their head drove the Hōjōs from Kyōto and slaughtered them wholesale. In the year 1334 the new turn which events had taken enabled the ex-Emperor Go-Daigo to occupy the throne, while his son, Moriyoshi, became the Shōgun. The power of the Hōjō family was now completely broken,

and like the Fujiwara, the Taira, and the Minamoto families which preceded, they soon became a memory, and one, moreover, not cherished with any degree of affection in the minds of the people of Japan. Their achievements during a rule which lasted nearly one hundred and fifty years had been considerable. They had nominated and deposed Mikados and Shōguns at will; more than one Mikado of their own choice who had rebelled against their tyranny had been sent into exile; they had repelled the first and only serious attempt to invade the shores of Japan; and finally, after making many excellent laws and organising a form of administration, they succumbed to their own lust of power, and, falling into decay, perished on the battlefields. The Ashikaga family succeeded to a place in the land similar in many respects to, though hardly so influential as, that formerly occupied by the Hōjō. They were, however, not destined to remain quiescent for long.

As a son of the Emperor fulfilled the high functions of Shōgun, thus making it possible for that office to be brought within the scope of a properly exercised Imperial control, one might have imagined that an era of peace was assured to the feud-ridden land. It was not so. The conduct of the Emperor and his son, the Shōgun, in affairs of State, was, if anything, worse than the last days of the Hōjō rule. At length, after fighting among themselves for some time, the members of the Ashikaga family became reconciled, and made war upon Moriyoshi, who was eventually deposed in favour of Ashikaga Takauji. The Nitta family thereupon allied themselves with the Imperial family in an attempt to recover the Shōgunate; but they were defeated, and the Emperor fled from Kyōto. Takauji subsequently nominated Kogen, the son of a former monarch, Go-Fushimi, as Mikado, and himself assumed a position as Grand Shōgun at Kyōto and appointed his son as simple Shōgun. An agreement concluded providing that the throne should be occupied alternately by the descendants of Go-Fushimi and Go-Daigo for periods lasting ten years was doomed to failure. At that time Go-Daigo was divested of sovereignty and his opponent had only just begun his limited reign. The ex-Mikado was therefore only human when he exhibited an impatience which

soon developed a dispute. During the fourteenth century the heads of two branches of the Imperial family each claimed to be the rightful Mikado, and while the one reigned in the south, supported by the Nitta family, the other, whose cause was upheld by the Ashikagas, held court in the north. After nearly sixty years' strife the northern Mikado was acknowledged by all parties to be the rightful sovereign of the country. From 1338 until 1573 the Ashikaga family ruled Japan in the capacity of successive Shōguns. "Their court," writes Chamberlain, "was a centre of elegance at which painting flourished, and the lyric drama, and the tea ceremonies, and the highly intricate arts of gardening and flower arrangement. But they allowed themselves to sink into effeminacy and sloth, as the Mikados had done before them; and political authority, after being administered less by them than in their name, fell from them altogether in 1573, although the last representative of their line continued to bear the empty title of Shōgun till his death in 1597." At no time during the period of the Ashikaga control was there peace in the country. Various families scattered over the land were engaged in constant feuds, and devastation and poverty existed everywhere. The last Shōgun proper of the Ashikaga régime was deposed in 1574 by one of his former adherents, Ota Nobunaga, who, a descendant of the famous Taira family, was a man not only of considerable influence and following in the country, but also of vast hereditary possessions which included the capital. From this time till the Tokugawa dynasty no appointment was made to the office of Shōgun. During the declining years of the Ashikaga Shōgunate the first European made his appearance in Japan. In 1542 the vessel of a Portuguese named Mendez Pinto was driven thither by stress of weather. Japanese historians note that year as the date of the introduction of "foreigners, Christianity, and firearms." It may be of incidental interest to mention that Marco Polo, the great Venetian explorer, spent seventeen years (1275-92) at the court of Kublai Khan, the great chieftain who organised the ill-fated Mongol attempts to invade Japan. While there he heard of Japan, and in his book in 1298 he wrote: "Jipangu is an island towards the East in the high seas, 1500 miles distant from the Continent,

and a very great island it is. The people are white, civilised, and well-favoured. They are dependent on nobody, and I can tell you the quantity of gold they have is endless." The theory has been advanced that when, two hundred years later, Christopher Columbus, who was an ardent student of Marco Polo's work, sailed west, his object was to discover Japan. Eventually Japan was accidentally located by a ship that sailed round the Cape and not across the Atlantic—the ship of the Portuguese Mendez Pinto. Traders soon flocked to the country, and were, on the whole, hospitably received.

Although Nobunaga never assumed the position of Shōgun, he was afterwards ruler under a less imposing title until his death in 1582, which occurred as a result of treachery on the part of one of his generals. A feature of his administration was his persecution of the Buddhists and the tolerant treatment he extended to St. Francis Xavier and the monks who, following upon the discovery of the country, arrived at Kagoshima in the year 1549. Sir Francis Adams points out that while with all his talents he was never able completely to subdue the great chieftains, he broke the power of the Buddhist priesthood and favoured the Christian religion as a counterpoise to the extravagant pretensions of the native monasteries. As soon as Nobunaga had passed from the scene, his principal general, Hideyoshi the son of a humble peasant, who, having enlisted in his service had won distinction on the field of battle, immediately became all-powerful. After avenging his master's death, he took upon himself the task of pacifying the country, and fought several campaigns with the leading families, in all of which he was completely victorious. Among those whom he subdued was Shibata, the brother-in-law of his former lord, and Nobutaka, the youngest son of Nobunaga, who had formed a combination against him. Shibata and his army were eventually besieged at Fukui, where, rather than surrender, they resorted to the desperate measure of self-extinction. The women, who heroically refused to accept their liberty, were slaughtered first, together with their children; the men afterwards committed *hara-kiri* in the orthodox fashion; and the castle was set on fire, all the bodies being buried beneath the ruins.

After restoring peace at home, Hideyoshi turned his

attention to foreign affairs. His ambition, encouraged by many military successes at home, was now unbounded. He wished not only to conquer the neighbouring kingdom of Korea, but also to make war upon the Ming dynasty of China. Between the years 1582 and 1592 he formulated various demands upon Korea, the principal of which involved the resumption of tributary payments to Japan. Upon Korea refusing to become a vassal state, he landed a huge army upon its shores, marched northwards, captured Seoul, and practically became master of the whole country. He was on the point of invading China when the Chinese allied themselves with the Koreans, and after a long campaign, with success resting first on one side and then on the other, which was notable for the second defeat of the invading fleet, the Japanese were driven south to their base where, after being besieged, they were relieved eventually and withdrawn from the peninsula. Hideyoshi is perhaps the most striking figure in Japanese history. Although of peasant origin, he managed, by sheer force of ability and strength of will, to rise to a position of supreme power in a land where the feudal system was at its height. He was altogether an exception. He stood alone. His like had never been seen before in Japan, and one cannot record the existence of any personality since who can compare with him. He was certainly the ablest general of earlier times, and the memories of his brilliant victories in the field have done much to inspire the patriotism of modern Japan. After the long centuries of almost incessant strife he brought peace to the land, and his invasion of Korea gave Japan for the first time a genuine international status in Asia. Not only as a soldier but also as a statesman he won the highest distinction. After he had exacted respect from the nobility, his policy towards them was conciliatory even to the suggestion of weakness. He realised that his plebeian birth was a bar against his occupation of the office of Shōgun. In this respect, however, he was wise enough not to overreach himself; he was content to wield the solid power and to leave the glorious title to the Minamoto family, whose privilege for many generations it had been to provide the Shōguns for Japan. To remove some of the disabilities under which he laboured, he

secured adoption into a branch of the Fujiwara family. This advanced his rank sufficiently to enable him to become Kuam-baku, or regent. During his administration he instituted many new and wise laws, abolished corruption, and upheld justice. His persecution of the Christians was the outstanding blot upon his career. He further sought to lessen the social breach which existed between him and the higher nobility by marrying his child-son to a granddaughter of Iyeyasu Tokugawa, a member of the Minamoto family, who, like Hideyoshi himself, was once a retainer in the service of Nobunaga, and who ruled in the Kwantō, in a capital of his own building called Yedo, on the site of the present Tōkyō. In 1591 he resigned the regency, but not the power, and assumed the title of Taikō, which meant "great councillor," and was usually assigned to ex-regents. As, however, the designation has been rarely applied to any but Hideyoshi and his son, the great peasant-soldier has become known in history as "Taikō Sama." Hideyoshi has been termed the Napoleon of Japan. His outlook was certainly a large one. He was the first power-holder in Japan to look beyond his native shores; and his single aim was to stamp out the perpetual civil war which had been gnawing at the vitals of the country, and to maintain an era of peace and prosperity. It is recorded that in consequence of his extremely repulsive appearance he was nicknamed the "Crowned Ape." On his death, in 1598, the empire was nominally governed by five regents whom he had appointed in view of the extreme youth of Hideyori, his son. The mother of this infant assumed the real power, and conducted the affairs of State with an ability which entitled her to be ranked with the Empress Jingō and the lady Masa among the great women of the land. Iyeyasu, who, largely out of fear, had remained quiet during the time of Hideyoshi, soon challenged Hideyori for the supremacy of power. In the fighting that followed, the cause of Hideyori was completely defeated, and both the capital of Kyōto and the fortress of Ōsaka were reduced.

VII

THE TOKUGAWA SHŌGUNS

IN 1603 Iyeyasu became Shōgun, and founded a dynasty which lasted for 265 years and provided a line of fifteen Shōguns. Two years later he abdicated in favour of his third son, Hidétada. From that time, Yedo was constituted the capital of the Shōguns. While surrendering the position Iyeyasu retained and exercised the power, and his rule was rendered famous in Japanese history owing to his insistence that the various chieftains should acknowledge the authority of the Shōgun at Yedo (Tōkyō). Chamberlain describes Iyeyasu as an able general, unsurpassed as a diplomat and administrator, and in recording his achievements, writes: "He first quelled all the turbulent barons, then bestowed a considerable portion of their lands on his own kinsmen and dependents, and either broke or balanced, by a judicious distribution of other fiefs over different provinces of the empire, the might of those greater feudal lords such as Satsuma and Chōshū, whom it was impossible to put altogether out of the way. The court of Kyōto was treated by him respectfully, and investiture as Shōgun for himself and his heirs duly obtained from the Mikado. In order further to break the might of the Daimyōs, Ieyasu compelled them to pass every alternate year at Yedo, which he had chosen for his capital in 1590, and to establish their wives and families there as hostages."

Some idea of the conditions which governed society at this time is essential to an understanding of the peculiar relation borne by the Tokugawa Shōgunate to the State. There were two primary classes in the land. The first of these was the Kugé, consisting of 137 descendants of the younger sons of the emperors of ancient times, who remained at court and gathered round the person of the

Mikado. Next in precedence came the Buké or military class, at the head of which were the Daimyōs — a title meaning "great name"—or territorial lords, who owed their positions either to the favour of the Shōguns or to prowess displayed in the fields of battle, and who were compelled to provide cavalry in proportion to the extent of their revenues. In reality the Shōgun occupied the position of principal Daimyō. Sir Francis Adams explains that the country was divided among powerful chieftains, and that the feudal system was established by means of long hereditary occupation of lands by the same families. No grant was in theory valid without the sanction of the sovereign. "Whatever the theory, in point of fact," adds the same authority, "the *kokushiu* or principal Daimyōs were in some cases successors of Yoritomo's *shugo*, but most were merely successful adventurers who had snatched possession of the provinces they held, and had submitted to the superiority of a stronger and more able adventurer in the person of Iyeyasu, the founder of the Tokugawa dynasty." Next to the Daimyōs came the *hatamotos* or men under the flag, who were estimated to number altogether about eighty thousand. Each of these headed from three to thirty retainers, and in return for grants of land provided contingents of soldiers. They belonged exclusively to old families, and were given a share in the executive government. Upon them, subsequently, devolved the important duty of representing Japan in her relations with foreign powers. Next in precedence to the *hatamotos* were the *gokenin*, and together it is estimated that these two military classes numbered nearly half a million. They constituted the personal following of the Shōguns, and with their families and dependents were maintained out of the properties of their lords.

The Samurai were a class immediately below the *gokenin*. During the recent war between Japan and Russia much was written concerning the spirit of the old Samurai. We were told that they were men of scrupulous honour, ever ready to defend the weak and to fight with the strong, and who scorned a mean action. History has exaggerated their achievements and hidden their blemishes. It is certain that they were more picturesque than principled, and their chief rôle during the

Tokugawa *régime* seems to have been that of semi-official swashbucklers. In his history of Japan, written as far back as 1875, when two-sworded warriors still stalked the land, Sir Francis Adams gives an admirable and altogether impartial picture of the Samurai. He tells us that they received only a small sum of money, and for this they were compelled to keep watch at the castle, walk the streets in their lord's suite, and several times a year, and on particular occasions, show themselves in silk dresses of ceremony. They were reckless, idle fellows, who treated the classes below them with the utmost contempt and brutality. "It requires no proof," we are told, "to show what permanent harm was done to the country by this large, unproductive class, and how poor Japan remained in consequence." A native writer quoted by the same authority asserted that out of the whole number not more than twenty or thirty per cent. were even effective soldiers; the remaining seventy or eighty per cent. "merely turn up their eyes gratefully and eat." The devotion of the Samurai to their lords was the only redeeming feature of their character. No one could deny them the quality of bravery, but it was a bravery more often than not lacking nobility, and frequently debased to the level of brutality. They cared as little for their own lives as they did for those of others placed in less privileged circumstances than themselves. The so-called code of honour which governed their class forbade them engaging in honest toil. Consequently, during the peaceful Tokugawa era, when organised feuds were rare compared with former times, the Samurai, deprived of warlike occupation, infested the tea-houses, indulged in broils, and attacked and robbed defenceless passers-by. Sir Francis Adams declares that they were the willing instruments of every conspiracy, whether the object was revolution or assassination, and adds, "their lot might be even considered enviable if they ended their life in honourable fight or in a tavern broil, and not on the rack or by the sword of the executioner." Those Japanese living to-day who are old enough to remember the Samurai, and who do not belong to the Samurai class, cherish no kindly memories of the days of their youth. Many of them can show the scars of wounds inflicted by Samurai swords, wounds the only

answer to which could be a meek bowing of the head, and at the most a writhe and a scream. The Samurai have been upheld by their enthusiastic admirers as the equivalent of the knights-errant of old England. I would suggest, however, that if a comparison were needed Dick Turpin and his class would present a more appropriate illustration. It will be seen that the West has an altogether wrong conception of the Samurai, and in this, as in many other things appertaining to the Land of the Rising Sun, it must consent to a revision of its views. Next in order to the Samurai were the farmers, the artisans, and the merchants. There were two classes lower than tradespeople. One of these, engaged in handling raw hides, was called *eta*, or outcasts—the name probably having arisen from an ancient edict which had decreed that animals must not be used as articles of food, and which, doubtless, was inspired by Buddhist priests, whose creed prescribed only a vegetarian diet. The outcasts lived in separate communities, and were not allowed to intermarry. The lowest rung in the ladder of society was composed of beggars, who were designated *hinin*, a term meaning “not humans.”

Iyeyasu, in his rule, was more drastic towards the court and the Daimyōs than any of his predecessors had been. He relegated the Emperor and the Kugé to the solitude and inactivity of life within the walls of a palace, and reduced the territorial lords to complete submission. In a series of laws and regulations which he promulgated, he decreed that, “The ruling Emperor shall no longer leave his own palace, except when he betakes himself to visit in his palace the Emperor who has abdicated.” He also announced that all families and lords were subordinate to himself in the capacity of Shōgun, and recorded his right to act without the Emperor’s assent in all State matters. His own responsibilities were embodied in the following sentence: “If the country between the Four Seas is not at peace, then the Shōgun shall bear the blame.” In another clause he declared that: “With Minamoto no-Yoritomo the supremacy of Japan has passed into the hands of the Buké. As the Kugé carried on the government carelessly and were unable to maintain order in the country, all that could be done was for the Emperor to order the Buké to

take over the ancient government. But with inadequate revenues it is impossible to govern the country, to feed the people, and to perform the public services. Thus the Kugé would commit a great wrong should they seek to detract from the Buké." Iyeyasu, having reduced the revenue of the Emperor and the Kugé to a beggarly sum compared with his own and that of the Daimyōs, justified himself by pleading the demands and responsibilities of government. At the same time, he took every precaution to prevent intrigues and plots at court. Hitherto, the feudal lords had been able to gain access to the Emperor, and to solicit his influence for the purpose of promoting civil war. Iyeyasu not only forbade them all approach to the royal palace, but would not allow them to visit the capital without first obtaining his permission.

In the year 1600 Will Adams, the first Englishman to enter Japan, landed near Nagasaki. He was the pilot of a fleet of Dutch merchant ships, a portion of which had been blown by ill-winds to the shores of Japan. He was taken prisoner and brought before Iyeyasu, who not only invited him to remain in the country, but offered him various employments. He taught the Japanese of that day shipbuilding, and eventually rose to be the trusted adviser of the great Shōgun himself. He was used as a means of conducting negotiations with the Dutch and English traders who continued at intervals to reach Japan. Although he frequently expressed a desire to see his wife and children once again, he managed eventually to console himself in a large measure by the adoption of a Japanese wife. Will Adams died in an exile which was obviously not without its rich compensations to a man who at the best was but a humble sailor. His memory is cherished among the Japanese to this day. On the discovery of his grave in 1872 on an estate believed to have been granted to him by Iyeyasu at Hemi (now Yokosuka), a stone monument was erected over the spot. His Japanese wife is also buried in the vicinity, and the scene is one of the favourite pilgrimages of English tourists. There is a street in Tōkyō called Anjin Chō—"The Pilot's Street"—the residents of which hold an annual festival in honour of Will Adams.

Iyeyasu, the first of the fifteen Tokugawa Shōguns, died in

1616, and was buried amid the mountains of Nikko. The Mikado conferred upon him the posthumous honour of "Noble of the First Class, of the First Rank, Great Light of the East, Great Incarnation of Buddha." In the time of Iyeyasu there were many Roman Catholic monks in the country, and traders were allowed to come and go freely. Foreign commerce was an entirely new source of revenue, and the Government, anxious to secure the profits, gave it considerable encouragement. The income so derived, however, seems to have been applied for the purposes of the Shōgunate rather than for the general weal of the nation. After the death of Iyeyasu a violently anti-foreign policy was adopted, and a year later all the ports were closed to foreign commerce with the exception of Hirado and Nagasaki. In 1621 Japanese were forbidden to leave their country, and to make sure that this law was obeyed, all vessels except those which were very small and consequently unsuitable for long voyages were destroyed. When Iyemitsu, the grandson of Iyeyasu, and third of his line, succeeded to the position of Shōgun in 1623, he assumed the title of Taikun, or Great Lord, in his negotiations with other countries, and at home completed what Iyeyasu had left undone in the way of assuring the formal recognition of the unchallenged supremacy of the Shōgunate. In the following year all foreigners, with the exception of the Dutch and Chinese, were ordered to leave Japan. This decree of expulsion was not put into execution until many years afterwards. During the intervening period, there were many faults on both sides. The Japanese imposed indignities on the foreigners with the sole object of impressing them with a sense of racial inferiority. In 1640 a Portuguese mission from the city corporation of Macao was executed at Nagasaki. All Japanese concubines of the Dutch and English were banished, the carrying of arms was prohibited, and the employment of native servants limited to within doors. On the other hand, the foreigners, who were mostly of the adventurous seafaring type, in their efforts to curry favour and secure trade with the Japanese, often turned common informers upon each other. They began, also, to import natives as slaves, and it should be said to the lasting credit of the Government that it showed itself, even at that early

period, as enlightened as other nations in this respect—that it soon recognised the nefarious nature of the traffic and suppressed it. In the end the Japanese learned to despise the foreigners, and wholesale deportation followed. Within sixteen years, excepting only the small colony of Dutch and Chinese, there was not one foreigner left in the land. Before the decree of expulsion was issued all the English traders had left the country, and it is on record that they parted from the Japanese on perfectly amicable terms. Owing to the fact that the Dutch and the Chinese were favoured, it is assumed that Iyemitsu's action was largely aimed at the Roman Catholics, whom he suspected of ambitions towards political powers. The Dutchmen may even have earned something in the nature of gratitude for services rendered in the form of espionage upon the Jesuits. One of their vessels is said to have intercepted a letter from the Portuguese in Japan begging the King of Portugal to send troops to overthrow the Mikado. If this was so, no wonder Iyemitsu became alarmed and expelled foreigners whom he believed were a menace to the existence of the empire. The Dutch had always been very wily with the Japanese, and had thoroughly paved the way for preferential treatment. They did not wish to Christianise the Japanese, but only to trade with them. In other words, they were missionaries of commerce, not missionaries of gospel—ungodly merchants who had not the least longing for the glory of a martyr's crown. It is told of one of them that when taxed with his belief he replied, "I am not a Christian; I am a Dutchman."

The inherent suspicion of the Japanese concerning all foreigners, no matter of what race, was responsible for the imposition of humiliating restrictions upon the Dutch and Chinese, who were not allowed to roam wherever they willed over the islands. The movements of the Chinese were confined to Nagasaki. The Dutch were even less fortunate. They were deported to a small insular area in Nagasaki harbour, known as Deshima or "Exit Island." A small bridge that communicated with the mainland was strongly guarded by Japanese soldiers, and but once in four years was a Dutchman allowed to cross—even this privi-

leged individual, it should be explained, being merely a representative of the community on his way to Yedo with costly gifts to present as tributes to the Shōgun. Only one ship was allowed to visit the little island every six months, and it approached through water gates which were closed at all other times. There is every evidence that the Japanese were aware that the Dutch were Christians, but as they were loth to part altogether with the profits of foreign trade, and as the religion of the Dutch was not aggressive, their restricted presence was tolerated, though solely for the purposes of resultant gain.

Thus after a century of intercourse with foreigners Japan became a sealed country, and she remained closed against the outer world for two hundred and thirty years. "She had gained," according to one writer, "the knowledge of gunpowder and firearms, and of tobacco smoking; the enrichment of her language by a few foreign words; some additions to her familiar forms of disease; and an inveterate hatred of Christianity. Content with these acquirements, and desiring no more, she retired from public gaze. The curious cabinet which she had so suddenly opened and into the secret drawers of which the eyes of Portuguese, Spaniards, English, and Dutch had so eagerly pried, was as suddenly locked, and the key hid carefully away for upwards of two centuries." Iyemitsu must not be judged solely by his expulsion of the foreigners and his extermination of the last vestige of Christianity. He accomplished much good in the internal affairs of his native land. Among other things, he reformed the coinage and the weights and measures system, recorded the boundaries of the domains of the Daimyōs, reconstructed the State councils, beautified his capital of Yedo, and made his castle the strongest fortress within the empire. It may be of passing interest to mention that the walls and moats around the palace of the present Mikado were originally constructed by Iyemitsu. The walls are wonderful examples of the skill of the ancient builders. Cement was unknown in those days, and all the pieces of stone were shaped to fit each other. In the time of the Shōgunate these ramparts were considered impregnable. Now they have turned black with age, but

in appearance they are none the less grim; and although merely a relic of a bygone period, they do not fail to call for expressions of admiration not only from the antiquarian but also from the military enthusiast.

The Tokugawa Shōguns possessed most of the important trading centres and appropriated to their own personal use the proceeds of what little foreign commerce the empire enjoyed. Their desire for gain was, no doubt, one of the principal motives that prompted them to retain the Dutch and Chinese, who were essentially traders. In confining them to a restricted area, the Shōguns were able to keep exclusively in their own hands all revenue resulting from their commerce. Internal trade and agriculture increased in volume, and although the taxes were heavy, the people were able to support themselves in comfort, if not in luxury. Drastic efforts were made to produce a balance of trade in favour of Japan, or, to speak more correctly, to extract an adequate income for the Shōguns. The exportation of gold was prohibited absolutely, and that of silver and copper was strictly limited. From 1715 only two Dutch ships were allowed to visit Japan in any one year, and seventy-five years later that number was reduced to one. Chamberlain describes the Tokugawa period as "the old Japan of picturesque feudalism, of *hara-kiri*, of a society ranged in castes and officered by spies and censors, the old Japan of an ever-increasing skill in lacquer and porcelain, of aristocratic punctilio, of supremely exquisite taste;" while another writer says that during the Tokugawa period the race genius of Japan brought forth most of the *bric-à-brac* that to-day delights the eye of Western curio-hunters. The painter was left free to revel in his fairy pictures, the ivory carver in his exquisite grotesqueries. It was at that period that the arts assumed that inexpensive form which placed æsthetic gratification within reach of the common people. The vision was beautiful, and it was shared by all. In the remote towns of old Japan, artistic form, which is always a power for culture, began to display itself in every household utensil, until even the most trifling object was a sense of beauty and fitness, spreading everywhere into common life; until love of art became the national characteristic that it still is, and the spirit of

æstheticism pervaded every section of life. The possession and enjoyment of art ceased to be the right of the upper classes.

The decline of the Shōguns was brought about by a combination of circumstances. The nation became tired of despotic government—a despotic government, moreover, which had degenerated as a result of its long retention of power. The Daimyōs wished for freedom, and in turn the Samurai, deprived of real occupation and largely of revenue as fighting warriors owing to the abnormally long era of peace, had deteriorated and become depraved. Samurai without masters were known as *ronins*, or wanderers, and many of these, reduced to desperate circumstances, resorted to desperate careers. Iyeyasu, the first of the Tokugawa Shōguns, had unconsciously laid the train for the events that were to follow. He did more than any of his predecessors to encourage literature. His grandson, Mitsukuni, the second Prince of Mito, gathered around him a number of learned men, and with their assistance compiled numerous works, including 240 volumes relating the history of Japan from the time of the first human emperor to the year 1393, and also 510 volumes describing the ceremonies of the court of the Mikado. The result was the foundation of a definitely Japanese school of *literati*. The study of Confucianism which had been in progress for many years and which taught essential reverence towards the sovereign, paved the way for a movement that became primarily loyal and patriotic in its aims. The native religion of Shintō was revived as against the imported religion of Buddhism. An effort was made to encourage the reading and study of Japanese literature rather than of the Chinese classics. For the first time attention was seriously directed to Japanese history, and slowly the nation began to realise that it had slavishly borrowed both culture and belief from China without attempting to develop its own resources and attainments; in other words, that while ignoring its own accomplishments and ideals, an excess of attention had been shown to the teachings and examples of a foreign neighbour. In this mood the development of Japanese thought proceeded along fairly logical lines. The knowledge the Japanese had derived of the antiquity of

the Emperor and the outstanding incidents of history, induced them to regard the Shōguns as usurpers. At the outset the movement did not become a violently political one. The bureaucratic oppression of the Shōgunate age did not admit of freedom of speech or pen, and any infringements in this respect were visited with severe punishments. The great transition which ended in the Restoration came about like the dawn of light. The nation did not struggle and overthrow feudalism; rather did it emerge from such a state. Discontent with the autocratic government of the Shōguns, and the spread of historical studies which brought home to the Japanese people a knowledge that the Emperor had been at one time all-supreme in the land, were largely responsible for the Restoration.

Another factor in early stages of the transition was the growing foreign influence which, in spite of the closing of the country, managed to filter from without. In allowing the Dutch to remain, even under conditions of strict segregation, the Japanese had left one loophole which allowed of a glimpse of the outside world. A small circle of scholarly men continued to derive some general knowledge of Occidental affairs through Dutch sources. Dutch books were smuggled into the country and translated, an imperfect Dutch-Japanese dictionary was compiled, and Dutch medical science was surreptitiously studied. Whisperings of the deeds of Napoleon reached the country, and a quaintly illustrated book was written in the native language giving a grotesque account of his achievements. News of this character, together with that received later as a result of the bombardment of the Canton river forts by the British in 1842, only tended to convince the last rulers of the Tokugawa dynasty of their wisdom in opening the country. While, however, the policy of their predecessors had the effect of increasing the curiosity of a certain section of the Japanese concerning the rest of the world, it also accentuated the inquisitiveness of other nations regarding Japan. Several attempts were made by foreigners to enter the country, but all of them met with failure and many with positive disaster. Charles II. despatched a vessel to Japan, but the Dutch who, for their own

ends were always willing to play the part of spies and informers, told the Shōgun that Charles had married the daughter of the King of Portugal, and in consequence the English were compelled to leave Japanese waters. In 1695 a Chinese junk was ordered away from Nagasaki on account of a discovery on board of a description of a Roman Catholic cathedral at Peking. Fourteen years later an Italian priest, the Abbé Sidotti, having persuaded the captain of a ship to put him ashore in Japan, was taken prisoner and kept in confinement until his death. Russian officers who made an attempt to enter the country were similarly treated. Great Britain, Russia, France, and the United States, all sent warships to Japan at different periods with the view to establishing relations with the Government and securing the right of limited residence within the country for their subjects. None of these expeditions, until the famous visit of Commander Perry, met with success. The Russians caused serious alarm. Their squadrons repeatedly demonstrated off Yezo (Hokkaidō) and eventually they seized the Kurile Isles. This loss of territory merely confirmed the Shōguns in the opinions they had already formed that the foreigners only wished to come to Japan as the advance guards of invasions. An edict was issued in 1845 forbidding shipwrecked Japanese to return home unless conveyed in the ships of the privileged foreigners—the Dutch and the Chinese—and owing to the circumstance that many of the foreign expeditions had approached the coasts for the purpose of conducting surveys, all such work was strictly prohibited. A series of forts was erected in Shinagawa Bay near Yedo for the express purpose of keeping out the foreigners, who were contemptuously termed the “hairy barbarians.”

The United States was the most persistent of all the Powers in her attempts to break down the barrier of exclusion. On three separate occasions her warships had visited the coasts of Japan and had been refused all communication with the shore. In 1852 the Government, tired of repeated rebuffs, decided upon a firm policy. At that early date Russian aggression was making itself felt in the East, and America, having considerable interests in the Pacific, became anxious lest she should be forestalled. The gold rush to

California, which was of recent origin, had attracted many settlers to the Pacific slopes, and much curiosity was displayed concerning the mysterious land of Japan known to exist on the yonder shores. On July 5, 1853, an American squadron of four ships, commanded by Commodore Perry, anchored off Uraga, at the mouth of the Gulf of Yedo (Tōkyō Bay). The object of the naval demonstration was to secure the conclusion of a treaty providing for the protection of American seamen wrecked on the shores of Japan or driven thither by stress of weather; to obtain a coaling station on some uninhabited island; and the right of entry to one or more ports for the purpose of disposing of cargoes, by means either of "sale or barter." The Commodore conveyed a letter from Millard Fillimore, then President of the United States, addressed to "His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Japan," and including the following passage: "I have directed Commodore Perry to assure your Imperial Majesty that I entertain the kindest feelings towards your Majesty's person and Government, and that I have no other object in sending him to Japan but to propose that the United States and Japan should live in friendship, and have commercial intercourse with each other. . . . We know that the ancient laws of your Imperial Majesty's Government do not allow of foreign trade except with the Chinese and the Dutch; but as the state of the world changes and new governments are formed, it seems to be wise from time to time to make new laws. . . . The United States constitution and laws forbid all interference with the religious or political concerns of other nations. I have particularly charged Commodore Perry to abstain from every act which could possibly disturb the tranquillity of your Imperial Majesty's dominions." The appearance of the squadron created consternation at Yedo. A minor official visited the Commodore, and informed him that all communication was forbidden except through the port of Nagasaki. Perry firmly but courteously declined to depart until he had delivered his letter to properly qualified representatives of the Emperor, and eventually the Shōgun grudgingly appointed commissioners to receive the document. In order to afford sufficient time for a deliberate answer

to be drafted, the United States squadron left Japanese waters, and was absent for seven months. On returning, it was reinforced to the extent of ten ships. In the meantime, the Shōgun Iyeyoshi had died under very suspicious circumstances, and in place of his youthful successor a regent, named Ii Kamon no-Kami, Lord of Hikoné, was ruling. The nation, with the exception of the few students who had pursued Occidental studies through the medium of the Dutch, was against yielding. The opposition was led by the descendants of the founders of the Shintō revival, whose idea of patriotism was the supremacy of the Emperor and all things Japanese, and the rigid exclusion of the foreigners. It was represented to the Government that acceptance of the American demands would mean invasion for the first time in history, the rise of Christianity, and the aggression of all European Powers. The contention was also set forth that as the warlike qualities of the nation had suffered owing to the long era of peace, the occasion was opportune for an awakening, and it was pleaded, moreover, that the Samurai who had flocked to the capital in view of trouble should not be disappointed. The feudal lords who were consulted decided against the United States demands. The Prince of Mito, who headed the crusade against the foreigners, said, "At first they will give us philosophical instruments, machinery, and other curiosities, and will take ignorant people in; and trade being their chief object, they will manage bit by bit to impoverish the country, after which they will treat us as they like, perhaps behaving with the greatest rudeness, and end by swallowing up Japan." The regent and his supporters, however, urged that Japan could not possibly achieve a victory in a naval battle. Another reason advanced for maintaining peace and conceding the treaties was singularly illustrative of the mental attitude of the rulers of that day. It was urged that, even assuming Japan triumphed in a naval warfare, her ships would not be able to cross the seas to other countries, therefore there would be no lands with which to reward the victorious Samurai. The Emperor himself distinctly forbade all intercourse with the "foreign barbarians." He sent urgent messages to Yedo instructing the Government not to allow

"these people to pollute one inch of our territory." The regent, however, realising that war would be the inevitable outcome of a refusal, and that the Japanese would not be able to make an effective stand against the modern weapons of the Americans, wisely decided to re-open negotiations. The reinforcement of the squadron, and Commodore Perry's firm attitude, had not been lost upon him.

At first the Japanese wished to limit the Americans to Nagasaki, and it was only after much palaver that a treaty was concluded on March 31, 1854, under which two ports known as Shimoda, 100 miles south of Yedo, and Hakodate in Yezo (Hokkaidō) were opened to the trade of the United States. Shortly afterwards, Shimoda was destroyed by an earthquake, but a treaty was concluded in 1858 substituting Yokohama. As soon as the United States was successful in obtaining an entry into Japan, other nations hastened to renew their attempts to obtain similar privileges. In October of the same year, Great Britain negotiated a treaty at Nagasaki, which secured to her the opening of Nagasaki and Hakodate, and at the beginning of the following year Russia obtained equal privileges in respect of the ports of Shimoda and Hakodate. In all cases, treaties were literally wrung out of the Japanese, and the regent acted contrary to the imperial will. The French and Portuguese also sought to establish commercial relations, but as these nationalities were Roman Catholic, the fear existed that, following the example of the Jesuits, they might seek to influence an invasion, and so for a long time all hearing was denied them. Eventually, however, they succeeded in inducing the Japanese to place them on an equality with other countries. In 1856, the United States Government followed up Commodore Perry's action by sending as diplomatic agent to Japan Mr. Townsend Harris who, two years later, was able to conclude a formal Treaty of Commerce with the Shōgun Government. The first British treaty had never been ratified, and there was urgent need for placing the relations of the two countries upon a proper footing. In this respect Great Britain again followed the lead of the United States. In July 1858 Lord Elgin negotiated the Treaty of Tientsin with China. He was commissioned by her Majesty the Queen to proceed,

on his return, to Japan, and to present to the Emperor a small steam yacht. He made the most of the opportunity afforded by his complimentary mission, and six weeks later, on August 12, boldly steamed up the Gulf of Yedo. After passing Yokohama he saw at anchor a number of large vessels which the Japanese had purchased from the foreigners. To one of these vessels an interesting history was attached. When the Japanese received its delivery from the Americans they were loth to confess their ignorance by retaining a foreign crew. Accordingly they set the engines going themselves. Not knowing how to stop them, and being unwilling to run the ship on shore, they steered round and round the bay until all the steam was expended, and the vessel ceased moving of its own accord. The Gulf of Yedo at that time was unsurveyed, but Lord Elgin, perceiving that large ships were at anchor concluded that the channel was safe, whereupon nothing would deter him from his purpose. Japanese guard boats signalled to him to stop, and two sworded officials waved to him pathetically with their fans. Lord Elgin paid no heed but went on, passed Yokohama and other ports, and eventually his frigates, much to the consternation of the Japanese, dropped anchor opposite Yedo. A fortnight later he signed the Treaty of Yedo, the main clauses of which provided for the following important concessions: (1) The immediate opening of Hakodate, Yokohama, and Nagasaki, and the opening at a later date of Hyōgo (Kobe), Ōsaka Niigata; (2) Consuls to be stationed at all open ports; (3) A diplomatic agent to reside at Yedo, with liberty to travel in all parts of the empire. Anticipating the ratification of the treaties, a number of ships assembled at Shanghai in readiness to voyage to Japan with the first consignments of foreign goods. Captain Henry Holmes, with characteristic British enterprise and daring, decided to proceed in advance of his competitors and without waiting for news of ratification. Mr. William Keswick, a member of the firm of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Company, accompanied him in order to direct the movements of the ship, which contained a small cargo of only two hundred tons of sugar. The record of this expedition is interesting inasmuch as it tells of the first attempt to establish trade relations with the Japanese since

the closing of their country. "We were soon off the town of Nagasaki," says Captain Holmes in an account of his adventure, "and came to an anchor near the little island of Dezima, on which the Dutch flag was flying. . . . We soon arrived at the landing-place, and were met by several Dutch gentlemen and two or three Japanese interpreters who interviewed us as to whence we came and our business. I replied that we had come to trade, and that we had 200 tons of sugar on board. They took the name of the ship and my own. No doubt they reported to some high official, of which we saw none. We then had some conversation with the Dutchmen. We thought they looked upon us with suspicion, no doubt because they and one Chinese junk were the only people that visited the country. For that perhaps they had to submit to remain on the little island as prisoners. The island was, I should say, not larger than the land the Bank of England stands on, and was connected by a drawbridge over which they were not allowed to pass to enter the town." After a considerable amount of discussion Captain Holmes was allowed to land. Subsequently, all European Powers concluded treaties with the Japanese. Later, the ports stipulated in the British document were duly thrown open to international residence and commerce, foreigners were exempted from Japanese jurisdiction, and a low scale of import dues was arranged. In 1859, regular diplomatic relations were established between Great Britain and Japan when Mr. (afterwards Sir) Rutherford Alcock was appointed minister.

The gates of Japan have now been opened only for the brief period of fifty years. To the United States belongs primarily the credit of unlocking them. This was as it should be. The United States was the neighbour of Japan in the Pacific. Her friendly assurances to Japan, and the moderation she displayed in making use of the privileges she gained, no doubt paved the way for the treaties concluded by other nations. If the United States unlocked the gates, then it may be said that Great Britain flung them aside. The conduct of both these Powers was in striking contrast to that of Russia, who, even in these early times, adopted an avaricious policy towards Japan, and had actually annexed part of

her territories, the Kurile Isles. She would have seized the Island of Tsushima in the Korean Straits but for the timely intervention of Great Britain. Had not our diplomacy successfully checkmated her by insisting upon an open way, there is every reason to believe that Russia would have then become master of the situation. The armaments of Japan were certainly in too backward a state to admit of any effective resistance to Western encroachments, and it was indeed fortunate for her that peaceful rather than aggressive penetration was pursued.

It will be instructive to investigate the trend of opinion which was gradually shaping itself as a result of the events of this period. The intellectual and intensely loyal movement which began at the end of the seventeenth century had grown to enormous proportions. The study of the great history compiled by Mitsukuni and his disciples in 1715 was producing the desired effect, which was, in brief, to draw attention to the fact that the Shōguns had seized the reins of government, and were usurpers, and to circulate the theory that the power of the Emperor, derived from Heaven, should be supreme in the land. The revival of Shintō went on apace, and peeps into the old Shintō books merely revealed the reverence which had been shown in bygone days to the Mikado as the representative of the gods. Is it too much to suggest that this and no earlier period was responsible for the practical acceptance of the doctrine of the divinity of the Emperor? Otherwise how are we to account satisfactorily for the indifference formerly shown by the nation to the relegation of the Mikado to the background, and the frequent deposition of reigning monarchs? The fact that a member of the Imperial family has always occupied the throne, and that if one was compelled to vacate it another was appointed to take his place, is not a sufficient answer. The idea of awe or reverence is inconceivable in connection with the deposition or the exile of an enthroned divinity—and both these extraordinary events were of comparatively common occurrence in early Japanese history. In these circumstances, one is forced to the conclusion that the divinity of the Emperor was once a figure of legendary speech, and that only since the seventeenth

century did it become a matter of practical—or, to be more correct, of political—acceptance.

Commodore Perry arrived in 1853, at a time when the struggle was becoming acute between the Shōgunate and the Daimyōs and educated classes, led by the Mito family, which, since the days of Mitsukuni, had always been a thorn in the side of the Government. Iyeyoshi, the Shōgun of that day, and his youthful successor, both died under suspicious circumstances. The regent Ii Kamon no-Kami, who had negotiated the first treaties with the foreign Powers, was assassinated. A pistol-shot was fired into his palanquin and he was wounded in the back. On alighting he was killed, and his head was cut off, carried away, and subsequently exhibited on a pole with the inscription—"This is the head of a traitor who has violated the most sacred law of Japan." The outrage was committed by the retainers of Mito, who were also responsible for the murder of a number of other people of lesser importance, supporters of the Government. Thus the intellectual or literary movement, which dated back from the seventeenth century, developed not only an Imperialism but also a violent anti-foreignism. This result was to a large extent inevitable. The Emperor and his ancestors had been virtually prisoners in the capital of Kyōto, and the court had not unnaturally become timid of communication with the outside world. The new patriotism would have been an admirable sentiment worthy of every encouragement had it been limited to loyalty; but in propounding the theory that the soil of Japan was sacred and should not be defiled by the foreign barbarian it went to absurd lengths. Moreover, it was the Shōguns who had opened Japan, and as the movement was aimed mainly at their deposition, the occasion was readily seized upon as likely to work their undoing. Among other causes which contributed to the spread of an anti-foreign feeling were the conditions of the treaties, which were considered one-sided and humiliating; the presence of foreigners, who soon flocked to the country; the rise in exports, with a resultant increase in the cost of living; and the attempts at territorial aggression on the part of Russia. The people who felt the oppression of the Shōgun

Government joined the territorial lords in their opposition to the constituted authority. A consultation of the officials was held at which it was decided that "because the territorial lords have rebelled against the Shōgun Government and obeyed the sovereign, therefore the prestige of the court grows from day to day while the authority of the Bakufu declines." With a view to promoting better relations between the court and the Shōgunate a marriage was arranged between the Emperor's sister and the Shōgun. This alliance, however, failed to have the desired effect. Frequent outrages upon the foreign community were committed; and when representations were made, the Government blandly repudiated all responsibility on the ground that the culprits belonged to principalities or clans over whom they were not in a position to exercise effective control.

In 1861 Mr. Heusken, Interpreter and Secretary of the United States Legation, was assassinated, and a desperate attack was made upon the British Legation, some members of which were wounded. In the following year another attack was made upon the British Legation, and two marines were killed, while an Englishman, Mr. C. L. Richardson, was brutally murdered and two of his companions were wounded, because they neglected to pay deference to a feudal parade of the Lord of Satsuma. A year later some buildings newly erected for the British Minister, were blown up. In a few cases, after diplomatic pressure had been applied, the parties concerned in the outrages were punished and indemnities paid, but the Government invariably attempted to evade responsibility and to delay compensation. It was at fault inasmuch as it was incapable of enforcing the first principles of administration—control over its own people, and the protection of strangers resident in the land.

In 1862 the ex-Prince of Mito died. As leader of the opposition against the conclusion of the treaties, he had instigated the early attacks upon foreigners, and many years elapsed before the harmful movement which he had set on foot began to decline. In the same year Imperial envoys arrived from Kyōto, with a message from the Emperor, announcing his determined purpose to expel "the barbarians," whose conduct he characterised as insolent. The

Satsuma and Chōshū also made common cause in urging the Shōgun "to speedily perform the exploit of expelling the barbarians and restoring tranquillity to the Empire." In the same year the envoys of the Shōgun reached England. An initial mistake was made in selecting men for this important mission who were of inferior rank, and who, in consequence, could not be admitted to the presence of their own Emperor. In other ways the time chosen for the visit was inopportune. Queen Victoria was mourning the death of the Prince Consort, and on this ground alone the Shōgun's representatives were refused an audience. They were, however, received at the Foreign Office, where they pleaded that the opening of additional ports should be delayed, urging as their reasons that the costs of the necessities of life had already largely increased owing to the advent of export trade conducted by foreigners. Their wish was granted; but at the same time concessions were secured which removed some of the restrictions hitherto placed upon commercial and social intercourse between foreigners and the people of Japan. At the present time, when complaints are being made regarding the policy of the Japanese Government, it is interesting to recall some of the conditions which existed under the Tokugawa régime. The British merchants of that day vigorously protested against the interference of the Japanese Government, an interference which they termed "covert and concealed." The passion for monopolies which in later times was to develop to such an extraordinary extent was then beginning to make itself felt. The Government monopolised cargo-boats, boatmen, and coolies. No Japanese was allowed to trade with a foreigner unless he had first obtained the permission of a Government official, a process which opened the way for a good deal of corruption. Servants in the employ of foreigners were heavily taxed, the amount levied very often absorbing one half of their wages. The complaint which we hear made so bitterly and so frequently at the present time, concerning the lack of common honesty on the part of the Japanese merchant, was rife when European traders first came into contact with the country, for we read that the principal difficulty which beset commerce fifty years

ago was the disinclination of the Japanese merchants to fulfil their contracts.

The fact that the Shōguns gave way to the demands of the foreign Powers in contradiction to the sentiment of the nation has been repeatedly cited as the principal cause of their downfall. It would be more correct to say that the conclusion of the treaties sealed the fate of the Shōguns, a fate which it must be distinctly understood was already hanging in the balance. The time chosen for the forced opening of the country was inopportune in one respect. It was a time when general discontent with the Government prevailed, when internal anarchy had set in, and when it was but natural that any rod would be seized upon to beat the backs of discredited rulers. At least it must be conceded that the Shōguns, whatever their other faults might have been, were more far-seeing than the feudal lords, inasmuch as they recognised the inevitable and yielded with as little sacrifice as possible. Their belief in the wisdom of their action was confirmed by the experiences of missions which they despatched to Europe and the United States. Their ambassadors were received with the highest courtesy, and a request made by them that owing to the domestic situation the opening of more ports might be deferred was acceded to. The missions returned home convinced that the Japanese idea that all foreigners were barbarians was a mistaken one, and their admiration for the many sights they had been shown in the civilised West knew no bounds. The ordinary people—that is to say, the masses, without particular rank or influence—had not been deeply affected by the educational movement which led to the spread of a kind of anti-foreign Imperialism. They showed no animosity towards the incomers; on the contrary, there was every evidence that they wished to live on friendly terms with them, and to conduct an exchange of trade. To the swaggering Samurai whom the Government was utterly incompetent to check, must be attributed the series of savage attacks made upon foreigners during the period of Japan's early intercourse with the nations of the West—a period as recent as the latter half of the last century. The opposition of the Satsuma and the Chōshū towards the Shōgun had increased.

The decree compelling the Daimyōs to reside in Yedo was abolished. This, in the opinion of Sir Francis Adams, was the death-blow to the Shōgunate. The Western Daimyos assembled at the capital and supported the demands of the court for the expulsion of the foreigners. In 1863 Imperial envoys again arrived at Yedo, and, in the name of the Emperor, summoned the Shōgun to appear at Kyōto in the Spring in order to lead an army, consisting of all the clans, against the foreigners. The combined pressure of the court, the Daimyōs, and their retainers the Samurai, to say nothing of the belligerent attitude of the thousands of Rōnins who wandered about the land assassinating the supporters of the Government, began to produce some perceptible effect upon the ruling policy. The Shōgun consented to visit the capital, and in many other ways gave evidences of a desire to propitiate the Imperial will. On April 8, 1863, the Emperor issued a decree to the Shōgun which stated that "His Majesty therefore considers that you ought, in obedience to His wish of repelling the barbarians and in a spirit of resolute loyalty and courage, to perform the exploit of sweeping them away." The Shōgun reached Kyōto on April 21, 1863, and subsequently orders were sent by him to Yedo that the ports were to be closed and the barbarians driven out. These were only ignored by the Government in the face of a timely threat of hostilities on the part of the British representative, Lieut.-Col. Neale. Meanwhile the Prince of Chōshū, whose guns commanded the Shimonoseki Straits, committed a number of outrages upon the ships of foreign nations. On June 25, 1863, the American ship *Pembroke* was fired on by two Chōshū men-of-war. The United States took prompt measures of retaliation, and on July 16 engaged a Chōshū squadron, sinking one of its vessels.

The engagement, though brief, seems to have been fierce, for the official report states that the *Wyoming* ran into the midst of the enemy's ships and received and returned broadsides at pistol range. She was hulled eleven times and received twenty or thirty shots through her rigging and smoke-stack. On July 8 the French despatch-boat *Kienchang* was fired upon and hulled in seven places. She

was compelled to slip her cable and make for the Bungo Channel. As soon as this incident became known to the French Admiral, Jaurès, he despatched his flag-ship, the *Semiramis*, and the gun-boat *Tancrède* to the scene. The battery which had been responsible for the outrage was demolished, and a landing party had a successful skirmish with the Chōshū warriors. A number of Japanese translations of Dutch books on gunnery and fortifications were discovered on shore, and it is recorded that one of these was marked on the page giving instructions relating to attacks upon ships being carried away by currents, not an unlikely contingency in the Straits of Shimonoseki. The damage suffered by the French was limited to the *Tancrède*, which received three shots—one in the hull, another in the mizzen topmast, and a third which cut away her fore topmast.

The most disastrous of all these adventures was that experienced by the Dutch corvette *Medusa* (16 guns) with the Dutch consul-general on board. She was subjected to the concentrated fire of seven batteries for one hour and a half. Out of thirty-one shots, seventeen pierced her hull and the remainder passed through her rigging and funnel, while three 8-inch shells burst on board. The consul-general had a narrow escape, and four men were killed and a number wounded.

For the murder of Mr. Richardson the members of the Shōgun Government refused all reparation and disclaimed all responsibility. This incident was typical of the lack of any effective authority in the country. Shimada Saburō, who was acting as head of the Satsuma clan in place of his son, a minor, was the most powerful and the richest noble in the land. He was being carried in a litter when Mr. Richardson was killed, and as he refused subsequently to contribute to an indemnity and to hand over his guilty retainers for punishment, it was to be assumed that he endorsed the committal of the outrage. The amount demanded by the British Government was £100,000, together with adequate compensation for the members of Mr. Richardson's family. There could be no doubt about the justice of the claim. Extreme Japo-phile writers have endeavoured to show that the incident was the result of provocation, and facts have

been distorted in support of their statements. It is indicative of the extraordinary fetich that exists in certain quarters that circumstances must be invented, and placed on record as history, in order to maintain the altogether fantastic theory that hospitality and kindness are inherent qualities of the Japanese race. It has been said that Mr. Richardson acted in a churlish manner in neglecting to join a throng of serfs who bowed the knee in slavish obeisance to the passing procession of semi-barbaric feudalism. It is well that strangers who dwell in far off lands should endeavour to conform to local custom. But when this involves dismounting from a horse and prostration before a dignitary who has not even a claim to royal rank some considerations of national as well as of individual self-respect must be observed. It is on record that Mr. Richardson moved his horse to one side in order to allow the procession to pass. To suggest that the occasion required more of him is altogether ludicrous. To attempt to justify his brutal murder on the ground that he was churlish is extravagant. As a matter of fact the Japanese nation of to-day is ashamed of the incident and it is looked upon as a black page in history. The occasion was not by any means the first upon which the head of the Satsuma clan set the Shōgun Government at defiance. He had always acted with an independence that made him virtually ruler of a separate domain. The answer of the Shōgun Government to the British representations was to the effect that as the murderers belonged to the Satsuma clan they were powerless to give the demanded satisfaction. The British Government promptly took measures on its own account to obtain redress. A squadron under Admiral Sir Augustus Kuper proceeded to the southern coast of Kyūshū and demanded that the persons guilty of the murder of Mr. Richardson should be executed in the presence of one or more naval officers, and that the sum of £25,000 should be paid to the relatives of the murdered man and to his companions who had escaped. All attempts to negotiate a peaceful settlement ended in failure, and on August 15, 1863, the large and principal Satsuma town of Kagoshima was bombarded and reduced to ashes. The official report of the incident stated that "many guns were observed to be dis-

mounted, the batteries were several times cleared, and the explosion of various magazines gave evidence of the destructive effect of our shell." The Shōgun Government paid an indemnity of £100,000 and offered an apology. Subsequently the agents of the Satsuma clan called at the British Legation and handed over the sum required for the compensation of the relatives of Mr. Richardson and those who were associated with him on the fatal day, and at the same time they made the significant request that the British representative should furnish them with a written promise to the effect that he would use his influence to enable them to purchase a warship in England.

The punishment administered to the Satsuma clan did not serve as a check upon the fanaticism of other anti-foreign elements in the country. On October 14, 1863, Lieut. de Camus of the Chasseurs d'Afrique was murdered. Meanwhile the dispute between the Shōgunate and the belligerent Chōshū became more acute. It was evident that the latter clan wished to bring about a drastic change in the government of the country and to substitute themselves for the Shōgunate as the ruling power next to the sovereign. They were suspected of a plot to seize the person of the Emperor when he was on a visit to the Yamato shrines, and to conduct him to their own territory. As a result they were banished from the capital and Satsuma troops were selected to take their place. This measure, however, related purely to the internal conditions of the country. The Chōshū and the Satsuma clans alike were opposed to the presence of the foreigners. Moreover the court encouraged them in their policy; and there is some reason to believe that the outrages upon foreign shipping were committed at the instigation of the Emperor. An Imperial rebuke was administered to the Regent for not having expelled "the barbarians," and in this document the Emperor announced his intention of "taking the field Ourselves." The Shōgun was summoned to Kyōto for a second time, and on February 28, 1864, he was received in audience by his Majesty, who delivered a speech to him, in the course of which he referred to the evidence of desolation and ruin in the land and said, "We are exposed to the

insults of five great continents of haughty barbarians, and the calamity of being swallowed up by them threatens Us at every moment. The subjugation of the ugly barbarians is the fundamental law of Our polity, and We must set an army on foot in order to strike awe into them and chastise them. But We like not in truth a reckless attack upon the barbarians." The Shōgun in reply promised to put an end to the contemptuous treatment received from the foreigners and to prepare vessels of war with which he declared he would destroy "the fierceness of the proud barbarians." He also assured his Majesty that as soon as he obtained an adequate fleet he would restore the fallen fortunes of the Empire and incidentally protect the lives of the people and "tranquillise the Imperial bosom."

The Satsuma clan had been taught a sharp lesson, but the men of Chōshū continued as arrogant as ever, and the passage to the Inland Sea was closed by their guns. In the Autumn of 1863 a steamer having on board the Shōgun's aide, Makino Sakon, together with two other officials, had been fired upon and detained by the Chōshū. One would imagine that this outrage upon the Shōgunate itself would have stirred the Government to severe acts of retribution; but the authorities were helpless, and, moreover, were candid in their confession of helplessness.

They put forward the same excuses as in the case of the Satsuma outrages, and strenuously denied all responsibility for the misdeeds of the rebellious Chōshū. Meanwhile the Shōgun remained in Kyōto, and the foreign representatives, deprived of all access to him, were unable to obtain any satisfaction. There was every evidence that the presence of the foreigner in the country was only being permitted on sufferance, and that as soon as the Government was strong enough to undertake hostilities all treaty rights would be ignored. The defences at Yedo were strengthened and additional batteries constructed. Matters were brought to a crisis by the expression of a wish on the part of the Shōgunate that Yokohama should be closed on the ground that such a measure was the only one likely "to diminish the prevailing excitement, and to prevent a general rebellion of the people who hate foreigners." The Governments of Great

Britain, France, and the United States acted throughout in harmony. It was agreed by them that the time had arrived for the adoption of a strong exemplary policy towards the Shōgunate. Furthermore, the Concert decided that the best means of impressing the Government would be to undertake punitive measures against the Chōshū, who were mainly responsible for the anti-foreign spirit in the country, and whose example in setting not only its own Government but the Governments of foreign nations at defiance was producing a widespread and growing influence for evil throughout the land. The Shōgun, in proposing to close the port of Yokohama, merely wished to propitiate the Emperor, with whom he had been formerly in conflict owing to his policy of toleration towards the foreigners. In many other ways he endeavoured to obtain the goodwill of the sovereign, and in his conciliation went so far as to promise that in the future, successive Shōguns and all Daimyōs should proceed to Kyōto for investiture. This concession marked an important stage in the relations between the Emperor and the Shōgunate. Slight though it was, it gave some indication of the events that were soon to follow in the direction of the restoration of the Imperial power. It was significant that henceforth the guardianship of the nine gates of the palace was to be entrusted to the vassals of the Shōgun.

The Shōgun returned to Yedo on June 23, 1864. About two months later a combined squadron consisting of nine British warships carrying a battalion of marines, three French warships, four Dutch warships, and a chartered American steamer with officers and men, left for Shimonoseki. Pourparlers with the rebellious Chōshū having ended in failure, the port was bombarded on September 5, 1864. Numerous batteries were silenced, and on the following morning a landing party, after a successful skirmish with the clan warriors, spiked all their guns and exploded the magazines. Altogether ten batteries were seized and rendered useless by the allies. In order to secure peace the Shōgunate agreed to pay an indemnity of three million dollars.

It is interesting to recall that at the time when the Powers were discussing the measures to be taken against the Chōshū, two of the most distinguished figures of modern Japan, the

late Prince Itō and the Marquis Inouye, both members of the clan, were students in London. Hearing of the impending trouble, and having, during their travels, realised the might and advancement of Western civilisation, they hastened to Japan and warned their less enlightened countrymen of the danger of opposing the combined Powers. Their reception was distinctly chilly. They were looked upon as impressionable youths, and their advice was unheeded. Prince Itō wrote an account of his own experiences during this remarkable crisis in the history of Japan. It is rendered all the more authoritative by the circumstance that the writer, then a humble clansman, was destined to take a great, if not the principal share in uplifting his country to rank and recognition among the Powers of the world, and that he eventually became the most trusted servant of the Emperor.

"It was in the year 1863 of Bunkyū era," says a translation of Prince Itō's narrative rendered into English by a Japanese editor, "that I sailed on a foreign tour. Before this I was in Kyōto, having left Yedo (the present Imperial capital). I remember that the debates and discussions then excited the whole nation; they were much louder than the debates held in the present Diet, or the discussions engaged in by the politicians of to-day. There were two parties of politicians at that time. The object of one was to carry out the principle of seclusion, while that of the other was to open up the country to trade. The former was stronger than the latter, and those who belonged to the former party cried out, 'Expel the barbarians,' and the plan for successfully carrying out their ends was simply to defend the country with guns, laying the same along the whole sea-coast of Japan, as the material for these guns was to be obtained from the hanging bells of all the temples of Japan." Although Prince Itō belonged to the anti-foreign party he was eager to go abroad, and at this juncture he found four friends who had already received an express command from their clan superiors to proceed to Europe. He himself, however, was urged against seeking the consent of his Daimyō to such a project, on the ground that as the internal unrest demanded the presence of all the clansmen in the country, this would most certainly be withheld. But what made the expedition most hazardous

was that the laws of the Tokugawa Regency forbade Japanese going abroad. Itō, however, disregarded all commands, and persuaded a steamship company known among the Japanese as "English number one firm," to facilitate the passage of himself and of his companions. They were compelled to disguise themselves as merchants and to discard the two swords which it was customary for the Samurai to wear at his side. They attired themselves in second-hand European clothes and wore boots twice too large for them. To render the disguise still more effective they cut their hair in European style, and Itō remarked that "although our physicians at that time had their queue cut off I may safely say that we set the first example to the nation of dressing the hair in European style." On arriving in England Itō lodged with a Dr. Williamson, a professor of London University, in Gower Street. One day a member of the family asked him the whereabouts of his native place. He replied "Chōshū." A further inquiry was made as to whether "Chōshū" was the same as "Shimonoseki," where a foreign ship had been fired upon by the natives. This aroused Itō's curiosity and he borrowed a paper, from which he learnt for the first time that Parliament was considering the advisability of sending a punitive expedition to Japan to chastise the Chōshū clan. Having already realised the greatness and power of England, he saw clearly that anything in the nature of resistance on the part of his countrymen would be utter folly, and he decided there and then to return to Japan and endeavour to dissuade them from following so suicidal a policy. Consequently he and Inouye abandoned their studies and left England, arriving at Shanghai at the beginning of the following year (1864). When they reached Yedo they were told that the Chōshū clan were all banished. They next proceeded to Yokohama, where they remained at a foreign hotel for some time in fear of their lives. If the fact that they had just landed from a foreign ship had become known to the Government authorities they would have been arrested and severely punished. So great was their danger that they were obliged to represent themselves as Portuguese. They soon learned that a fleet of eighteen ships, comprising squadrons of the various Powers, was sailing for Shimonoseki, and they at once visited the

British Legation and intimated to the Minister that in their opinion a compromise was not out of the question. "Sir," they said, "we were sent to Europe by our prince, but on hearing that a war was going to break out between the Powers and Japan we have come back in order to try to bring the conflict to an amicable settlement. Would you be good enough to escort us to the Chōshū clan?" They had great difficulty in persuading the British representative to believe that they were men of sufficient standing to intervene in the matter, and for some time their request was refused. They continued to represent, however, that they could easily prevail on the clan to desist from their absurd attempt to expel the foreigners. Eventually the Minister said he would consult the representatives of France, the United States, and Holland. They were instructed to attend the meeting to be held for this purpose. "At the meeting we were told," writes Itō, "that we should be safely escorted by men-of-war, and were asked where our destination was, to which question we replied that we desired to be taken to Himeji (Himéshima Island) in Bungo province, because it was very dangerous to get near the coast of Chōshū province, owing to the apprehension that the natives there would attack our ships." It was agreed that a definite reply as a result of their conference with the clan should be handed to the foreign ministers within twelve days. Arriving at Himéshima, Itō and his companion left the warships and hired a fishing-boat to take them to Totomi, a landing-place in Suwo province near Mitajiri. "On landing there," continues Itō, "we were surprised to see great excitement prevailing throughout our clan, the purpose of expelling foreigners having reached its focus, so that women as well as men were ready to fight at any moment, being powerfully armed with long lances, and dressed in a way to make their movements easy, and having white cloth bandages round their heads, with their sleeves crisped up to their shoulders by strings called *tasuki* in Japanese." These brave young men then changed their foreign garb for the dress of the "Samurai," and buckled on their two swords.

They proceeded to Yamaguchi, where they were received by the Chōshū Daimyō and his ministers. A long consulta-

tion ensued, during which they used all their eloquence in an earnest appeal for an amicable settlement with the foreigners, and pointed out the futility of offering armed resistance to the combined fleets of four Western Powers. Moreover, they urged the necessity for peaceful relations with the outside world in order that the undivided efforts of the country might be concentrated in an endeavour to restore the Imperial power, and thus by creating a united Japan to render her in time capable of withstanding all outside aggression. In spite of this heroic and patriotic appeal, however, the Chōshū clan could not be brought to reason, and as their reply to the demands of the foreign representatives was wholly unsatisfactory and evasive, the allied squadrons, one month later, opened fire on the shore batteries.

The action of the Chōshū clan in opposing the foreign Powers had been animated merely by a mistaken idea of loyalty. It was, in fact, the beginning of the active campaign which ultimately led to the restoration of the Mikado and the abolition of the Shōgunate. As I have already mentioned, there was every reason to believe that the Imperial court was secretly in sympathy with the Chōshū clan, and that the firing upon foreign ships was the direct result of its instigation. The Emperor, in the seclusion of his palace, was disinclined to believe rumours which told of the might of foreign ships and guns, and he regarded the policy of the Shōgun Government as timid and altogether "un-Japanese." Meanwhile, other important factors were at work paving the way for the great transition which was about to follow. It will be remembered that in 1863 the men of Chōshū were suspected of a plot to seize the person of the monarch, and it was believed that they induced seven court nobles, or Kugé, to become co-conspirators with them. The plot failed and the men of Chōshū, together with their seven noble friends, retired to their own province. Had they succeeded it is altogether an open question as to whether they would have been content to restore the power to the Throne. It is more conceivable in the light of historical precedent that they would have endeavoured to substitute, probably by force of arms, a rule of their own for that of the Shōgunate. There was no doubt that the Emperor was in sympathy with their

aims in so far as these related to the expulsion of the foreigner, probably even to the extent of the abolition of the Shōgunate if such an issue were of necessity to be involved. Thus it came about, as previously stated, that the Shōgun, realising that his position in the country was being weakened owing to the opposition of the Imperialists, made strenuous efforts to improve his relations with the Throne, and on his visit to Kyōto promised to undertake the expulsion of the barbarians on his Majesty's behalf. It was on that occasion that the vassals of the Shōgun were appointed to guard the palace, and for a time it seemed as if the Tokugawa *régime* was in the ascendancy. Previous to the bombardment of Shimonoseki, 400 men of the Chōshū clan marched towards Kyōto, and while encamped at Yamazaki, sent a petition to the Imperial palace expressing the hope that "his Majesty would announce the renewal of his determination of expelling the barbarians," and adding that with this object in view "the clansmen and the servants of the seven nobles had ventured to come and make their tearful prayer." The advisers of the Emperor were divided into two parties. On the one hand it was urged that peaceful relations should be cultivated with the Chōshū clan, while others contended that the attempt to intimidate the court should be punished and rebellion stamped out. After much discussion a militant policy was adopted. The Chōshū band, reinforced by many Rōnins, anticipated the action of the Imperialists and advanced on Kyōto. Before moving, however, they issued a document expressing their regret at the necessity of making war so near the Imperial palace, and praying that his Majesty would be pleased to forgive them. The palace and its surroundings were defended by the Shōgun forces consisting of the clans of the east and north. Eventually these were joined by the men of the Satsuma clan, who, although opposed to the Shōgun *régime*, detested even more the Chōshū with whom they had long been at feud. Desperate fighting took place within sight of the very walls of the Imperial palace, and blood flowed in streams through the streets of the sacred city. The Chōshū were completely outnumbered and utterly defeated; hundreds were slaughtered, and those composing the shattered remnant were taken prisoners. A

picturesque native account of the battle, quoted by Sir Francis Adams, declares that when the first shot was fired, walls crumbled, tiles were loosened, and the appellation of "Enemy of the Court," which during several centuries had ceased to exist, came again into being. Many myriads of habitations were destroyed; millions of people were plunged into a fiery pit; and, though it might be called the inevitable course of events, it was none the less a lamentable case. The roads were filled with headless corpses and a Chōshū detachment actually forced its way into the palace precincts. It is also written in the native accounts that "a captain of the Chōshū men, Raijima Matabei, being hit in the armpit by a bullet from one of the Satsuma guns, fell from his horse. Imperial forces rushed to take his head, but he, wounded, exclaimed, 'No disgrace can exceed that of letting my head fall into the enemy's hands. Off with it quickly, and depart to the country.' As there was no one to cut off his head he shouted, 'Unworthy, useless fellows,' and, stabbing himself with his own sword, fell dead. Then his nephew in the bustle of the fight cut off his head and departed with it." Mention is made of the fact that several bullets had already found their way into the Mikado's courtyard, and the thunder of musketry was so loud as to make them fear for his Majesty's safety. Finally, seeing that further resistance was useless, several of the Chōshū officers committed *hara-kiri*, and, to prevent their heads falling into the enemy's hands, they threw themselves, dying, into the burning buildings. As the remnant retreated they received news of the bombardment of Shimonoseki. The Emperor and the Shōgun promptly issued proclamations calling upon all the Daimyōs to punish the Chōshū clan. One description says that though the people were provided with gold and silver there was no food to be purchased, and they died of starvation; that robbers looted the ruins, and that 811 streets were destroyed, besides a village. "As it was the latter end of the summer," adds the native record, "and still terribly hot, the mosquitoes raised a hum and came on in crowds till the poor wretches fancied that the enemy had come to attack them. The cries of the townspeople were heard loud and far, even above the hum of the mosquitoes. The sky was lighted up

by the flames as if it were broad daylight, and the roar of the cannon never ceased. So must it be when a forest a thousand leagues in extent is burnt. The report of the big guns re-echoed among the hills and over the open country, while the earth was hidden by the smoke. Palaces of the great and dwellings of the common people were tumbling down with a sound of general ruin like the falling of hundreds and thousands of thunderbolts. Heaven and earth trembled and quaked until the end of the world seemed to be at hand."

It is advisable at this stage to endeavour to render some lucid explanation of the curiously complex conditions which dominated the internal affairs of Japan. The Emperor, the Shōgun, and the Chōshū were in equal agreement as to the desirability of expelling the foreigner. The Chōshū, however, made such desirability a cloak for an attack upon the Shōgunate with a view to a restoration of the power of the Emperor. The court having only recently made peace with the Shōgun, and having accepted his influence, construed the Chōshū hostility as an act of rebellion. On their side the clansmen distinctly denied any intention to offend the majesty of the Emperor.

The bombardment of Shimonoseki had the immediate effect of bringing about a trade revival, but it did not lead to an early extinction of the anti-foreign tendencies which prevailed from end to end of the unhappy land. The British Minister considered it necessary to inform the authorities that if the Mikado continued to desire the abrogation of the treaties he must also desire war. Major Baldwin and Lieutenant Bird of the British Army were murdered at Kamakura, and their bodies were found horribly mutilated. It was significant of the changing times that the culprit, a Samurai, was not allowed to commit *hara-kiri*, as had been customary in the case of warriors of his class who had been convicted of a capital offence. He was executed as a common criminal, and in a last speech lamented that, "It is a bitter day for Japan that a man of noble birth must die because he has killed a foreigner."

The Samurai had not become accustomed to the presence of foreigners, and outrages upon all nationalities continued to be of frequent occurrence. In 1864—the year in which

the Chōshū attacked the Imperial forces at Kyōto—the British took the lead in landing and stationing a detachment of troops in the foreign settlement at Yokohama. The French afterwards followed their example. These acts filled to overflowing the cup of the sorrowing Samurai. Hitherto the soil of Japan had never been defiled for any length of time by the presence of the armed “barbarians.” True, the Powers had landed forces at the time of the Chōshū outrages, but these had been speedily withdrawn. It was recalled that the only attempt at invasion—that of the Mongols—had been repelled, and the Samurai could not understand why the landing of armed British and French forces was not actively opposed. Nevertheless, the streets of Yokohama were rendered all the safer, and the Samurai was less of a bully when he saw that the foreign residents were protected by rifles and bayonets. The fight at Kyōto proved the turning-point in the history of Japanese feudalism. The Chōshū prisoners on this occasion had been handed over to the custody of the Satsuma who, realising the ultimate futility of internal dissension in the face of foreign aggression, allowed them to go free with all the honours of war. The two clans were thus brought closely into touch with each other; views were exchanged; and eventually, as will be shown, not only did the Satsuma decline to join the Shōgun Iyemochi in his ill-fated attempt to punish the rebellious Chōshū, but their great leader, the famous Saigō, concluded a treaty with them, which virtually amounted to an offensive alliance against the Shōgunate. Sir Francis Adams, in describing the early trend of the movement towards unification, records that the wiser statesmen reflected that it was bad policy for the Japanese to wrangle among themselves, and that it would be better for the government of the country to be conducted from one centre and for the nation to be united in defence of the Empire.

In 1865, Sir Harry Parkes succeeded Sir Rutherford Alcock as British Minister. He was essentially a strong man, whose policy, usually backed by the guns of the Far Eastern Squadron, admitted of no procrastination. His methods were not those of the modern diplomatist who more often than not seeks to smooth his own way

by cultivating an inordinate affection for the nation to which he is attached, to the detriment of the genuine interests of his own countrymen. The times demanded a British representative who knew not only his own mind but that of his own Government. Sir Harry Parkes was the best appointment that could have been made in the circumstances; he was essentially the right man in the right place. He did more during his term of office to obtain equity for the foreign community generally, and to raise British prestige in particular, than any Minister has been able to accomplish since. His name will ever be remembered both by foreigners and Japanese; by the foreigners with affection, and by the Japanese with something akin to awe. When Sir Harry Parkes reached Japan he realised, as Sir Rutherford Alcock had but recently discovered, that the treaties concluded with the Shōgun were invalid, for the simple reason that they had not been ratified by the sovereign. Owing to the isolation of the Emperor at Kyōto, the belief had prevailed that the Shōguns were the real rulers of the country, who, consequently, were fully empowered to use their own discretion in entering into foreign relations. As I have shown, however, in opening the country the Shōguns had acted entirely on their own authority, and in direct contradiction to the wishes of the Imperial court which was distinctly anti-foreign in its tendencies.

In October, 1865, Sir Harry Parkes was instructed by the Home Government that two-thirds of the Shimonoseki indemnity would be remitted in the event of the following terms being accepted: The early opening of Hiōgo and Ōsaka; the adoption of a 5 per cent. basis for the tariff; and the Imperial ratification of the treaties. In the meantime, however, the Shōgun had proceeded to Kyōto; an army had set out to punish the rebellious Chōshū clan; and the diplomatic representatives, as on the former occasion, were unable to make progress with the negotiations owing to the absence of the constituted head of the Government. Consequently it was deemed necessary to make a naval demonstration in order to hasten the legalisation of the treaties. An international squadron, consisting of five English and three French vessels, and one Dutch vessel, proceeded to Hiogo. The Ministers

of the three Powers represented accompanied the expedition. The presence of foreign warships so near the capital created alarm. The Shōgun is said to have submitted to his Majesty "that if I, Iyemochi, cannot manage to get these things done, they will themselves go to your Majesty's palace and demand them of you personally." The Emperor yielded; but when his decision became known, the court nobles and the Daimyōs of Kyōto protested with such vigour that he changed his mind. The Shōgun continued to urge acceptance of the demands of the combined Powers, and eventually a compromise was reached. The opening of the ports was postponed, and the Emperor issued the following laconic decree: "The Imperial consent is given to the Treaties, and you will therefore undertake the necessary arrangements therewith." In 1866 the Shōgun adopted active punitive measures against the Chōshū. The Satsuma clan openly refused to take part in the operations, and even went the length of protesting to the Emperor against the injustice of the expedition. The attitude of the Satsuma on this occasion, though it did not develop an actual hostility in the field, was indicative of the powerful forces which were gradually gathering in the recognition of a common enemy in the form of the Shōgunate, and which were destined to be the leading instruments in bringing about its downfall. The punitive expedition against the Chōshū ended in complete disaster. Thus the very foundations of the Shōgunate—its military strength—were weakened; and the fabric—a form of government which had lasted for more than two and a half centuries—trembled with the first ominous signs of collapse. After their terrible reverse at Kyōto, the Chōshū had thoroughly reorganised and strengthened their forces. The practical experience of Western military prowess had taught them a lesson of which they were not slow to take advantage. When they met the Samurai of the Shōgun on the second occasion, they successfully imitated Western tactics and used Western arms. Their enemies fought as they had done in the ancient days, encased in armour, and with a flourish of steel. It is singular that the army of the Shōgun—he who had actually opened the country to foreigners—should have been so ill-equipped compared with the Chōshū, who deliberately fought under the banner of anti-foreignism.

"In this campaign," records the *Kinsé Shiriaku*, "the Eastern troops wore armour and surcoats, and their weapons were swords and spears; while the Chōshū men, clad in light short-sleeved garments, and dispensing with their swords, were chiefly armed with muskets. Their drill, too, was excellent." On September 19, 1866, the Shōgun Iyemochi died, and like many of his predecessors, under very suspicious circumstances. A month later the Emperor appointed Hitotsubashi head of the Tokugawa family. He then became known as Tokugawa Yoshinobu, or Kéiki, and his principal claim to importance in the history of his country lies in the fact that he was the last of the Shōguns. From the very outset his rule was conducted under circumstances of misfortune. He succeeded to a sceptre that was loosely held, and he had no means of enforcing the authority with which he was nominally invested. The exchequers of the country were empty. The territorial lords, led by the Satsuma and the Chōshū clans, had grown weary of the governmental tyranny; and whereas their rule had hitherto been restricted to the administration of their own feudal lands, they now longed to take a part in guiding the destinies of the Empire. And the main inspiration of this movement was a belief which gradually spread among all classes of the people that the Emperor should be restored to power, and that his divinity should be accepted as a doctrine of real national guidance and supreme control rather than as an ineffable influence emanating from the tabernacle at Kyōto. It was evident that the Shōgunate was hastening towards a natural end. The new head of the Tokugawa Government soon adopted a policy towards the foreigners more liberal than that of his predecessor who had always vacillated in his conduct of international affairs, and who with ill results had tried to please two parties that were essentially irreconcilable—the court clique on the one hand, the Powers on the other. On June 25, 1866, a convention of twelve articles and a revised tariff was signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the representatives of Great Britain, the United States, France, and the Netherlands. In this document various restrictions upon foreign trade were removed. Japanese of all classes were permitted to trade and to hold social intercourse

with foreigners at the open ports, without official interference. It was also stipulated that they should be allowed to employ foreign shipping and to accept employment on foreign ships; and they were granted leave to go abroad for the purposes either of study or trade. Afterwards Sir Harry Parkes visited Kagoshima and spent four days as the guest of the Lord of the Satsuma. This eminently diplomatic visit tended largely to diminish any feeling of resentment which might have lingered in the minds of the warlike clan as the result of the British bombardment of 1863. The time was approaching for the opening of Hiogo and Ōsaka. The Emperor, owing to the proximity of these places to Kyōto, strenuously opposed the carrying out of this provision of the treaty; and the Shōgun, animated by a sense of loyalty, upheld his Imperial master's objections. On the other hand, the combined clans advocated the strict adherence to treaty obligations. In view of the fact that they had always been so bitterly anti-foreign, their sudden change of front might have been looked upon as an amazing development were it not, as Sir Francis Adams explains, that they desired to embarrass the Shōgun. Hiōgo and Ōsaka being so near the palace, the clans were of opinion that the opening of these places would be the first step towards promoting intercourse between the Emperor and the foreign representatives, and thus the power of the Shōgun would be weakened. On January 20, 1867, the Emperor Komei, after reigning twenty years, died of smallpox. He lived the life of sacrosanct seclusion consistent with the tradition of his line. His rule was notable in the one respect that it marked the first period of Japan's regular intercourse with foreigners. It cannot be said, however, that the Monarchy was responsible for this great measure of reform. To the end the Emperor detested the foreigners. The Shōgun Government at Yedo acted entirely on its own authority in opening the country. It realised what the Emperor had yet to learn—that the foreign Powers were in a position to insist upon compliance with their demands. At a later date the same motives animated the sovereign who, in face of the naval demonstration at the nearest ports to his capital, reluctantly consented to a ratification of the treaties. When he imagined that his own Imperial dignity might be assailed and

possibly his throne endangered, he did not hesitate to adopt the policy he had hitherto condemned. It is significant that his divinity was not equal to evolving any other way out of the difficulty. And here let it be remarked that the doctrine of the divinity of the Japanese Monarchy has never in history stood the test of overwhelming odds. Both the Court and the Shōgunate were the unwilling instruments of progress. The Japanese, even as late as to-day, complain of the treatment of the Powers in bygone times, treatment which they are ready to designate as overbearing. But these people who have only just emerged from centuries of seclusion are not competent to pass an impartial judgment upon their own history. Japan owes everything to the Powers, owes the fact that she is an independent nation and not a petty State in tutelage. Had the Powers chosen to subdue her in the reign of the Emperor Komei they could easily have done so; the sword of the Samurai would have been no match for the musket of "the barbarian."

The savage outrages committed from time to time upon foreigners constituted ample justification for the conclusion that Japan was unfit to take her place in civilisation. Similar outrages on the part of other countries have resulted in measures of reprisal far severer than those visited upon Japan. Moreover, the Japanese, in constituting themselves, as it were, a hermit kingdom, had deliberately set up barriers against the world's progress. Their action, however, was not inspired by the humility of the monastic recluse. It was the outcome of a petty and primal arrogance which dictated a savage hatred of other peoples and an ignorant contempt for their ways. On such a basis it could be argued that Japan deserved little consideration at the hands of the Powers. Her preservation could alone be ascribed to the wisdom of foreign rulers, who, realising the singular complexity of her internal conditions, forgave her much. They treated her as a child among the nations; punished her as a mother would a wayward child; and often overlooked with true parental forbearance her peevish fits of infantile irritability and anger. In short, they not only let her live, but taught her how to live. Whatever the views of the Japanese

may be regarding this attitude, they cannot deny their obligations to the Powers who indisputably played an important part in the restoration of the Monarchy and in the establishment of a government of centralisation. In recognising that the treaties concluded with the Shōgun were illegal, and by insisting that they should receive the ratification of the sovereign, the Western world unmistakably demonstrated that the dual *régime* was neither acceptable nor practicable, and declared that while the Shōgunate might be regarded as the Government of the country, the Emperor must be looked upon as the one supreme power in the land, whose ultimate assent was necessary in all dealings of an international nature.

VIII

THE PRESENT REIGN

THE present Mikado, Mutsuhito, succeeded his father, the Emperor Komei. He was born on November 3, 1852, and his coronation took place on October 13, 1868. His name is rarely mentioned in Japan, where to the great mass of the people he is simply known as "the Emperor." The name Mutsuhito is derived from *mutsumajiki*, meaning "affectionate," and *hito*, "humane." The title of Mikado is used in Japan only on special occasions, and in the composition of poetry. There are several explanations of the etymology of the word. One of these declares that *mi* means "honourable," and *kado*, "gate." Sir Ernest Satow, who is undeniably one of the greatest living authorities on the Japanese language, says that *mika* means "great," and that *to*, which, according to the rules of the language, means *do*, is a root meaning "place." The significance of the title *Mikado* lies in the implied recognition of the fact that it is disrespectful to speak of the sovereign as an ordinary individual, and therefore he is designated as "honourable gate" or "great place." Chamberlain quotes the Sublime Porte as an analogy in this respect, and mentions that the Japanese themselves have acquired the habit of calling their ruler by such alien Chinese titles as *Tenshi*, "the Son of Heaven"; *Ten-ō*, or *Tennō*, "the Heavenly Emperor"; *Shujō*, "the Supreme Master."

The present Mikado is the one hundred and twenty-third representative of his line, calculating from the assumption of sovereignty by the first human emperor Jimmu. That his Majesty subscribes to the mythological theories of his divine origin is evident from a decree issued by him in 1872, wherein he says: "We, by the grace of Heaven, having succeeded to the Imperial Throne occupied by one line for ten thousand

years." The Japanese proudly boast that their dynasty is the oldest in the world, and that its line has been unbroken. One is compelled to agree with Sir Francis Adams when he points out that such a line has not been difficult to preserve in a country where the principle of adoption exists on the widest basis, and where the son of a concubine can legitimately succeed to his father's inheritance. It should be added that adoption in Japan is necessary in order to maintain the national practice of ancestral worship.

The boy of fifteen years who became Emperor of Japan did not assume active direction of State affairs until he attained his majority. Meanwhile a regent, Sadaijin Nijō Nariaki, was appointed. With the opening years of the new reign an era of genuine reform began. Since that time Japan has never retraced her steps. She has marched steadily along the path of progress, and her single ambition has been to gain a position abreast the civilised Powers of the West. How far she has attained that position will be shown in succeeding chapters.

In 1867 French influences were predominant. In that year a party of military experts from France was engaged to drill the troops of the Shōgun, the head of the mission being granted a salary of 36,000 francs per annum. At the Shōgun's request Commander Tracy of the British navy undertook the reorganisation of his fleet, which consisted of a singular collection of ships, including a steam-yacht and a paddle-boat. The conclusion of a convention at St. Petersburg by the representatives of Russia and Japan permitting of the joint occupation of the island of Saghalien was an indication that the Government was beginning to realise the necessity for reciprocal arrangements with foreign countries. The meeting between the foreign Ministers and the Shōgun in April was also a striking illustration of the turn which events were taking in the affairs of the nation. Formerly, it is true, the representatives of the Powers had on such occasions been received with consideration. This time, however, they were treated with something akin to cordial hospitality, the usages of foreign courts were fully complied with, and the custom of placing a stipulated number of mats between the Shōgun and the diplomatists which, with its

derogatory implication, etiquette had hitherto prescribed, was finally dispensed with. The one advanced close to the other, and the Shōgun remained standing while the Minister spoke. Sir Harry Parkes addressed the Shōgun as "Your Highness," and Queen Victoria was referred to in terms which placed her on a position of equality with the Emperor. On returning to Yokohama the Ministers were greeted with a salute from the forts. On July 1, 1867, a proclamation was issued announcing the intention of the Government to open to international trade the port of Hiōgo and the city of Ōsaka. Many other incidents occurred which tended to show that Japan's relations with the outside world were improving. An official of the British Legation dined with certain Commissioners of Foreign Affairs at Yedo, and a friendly discussion on the political situation was freely indulged in. Foreigners were also entertained in a Daimyō's castle. This was the first occasion in history upon which so signal an honour had been extended to strangers from other lands.

The movement in favour of the restoration of the Monarchy was already beginning to assume definite proportions. The ex-Prince of Tosa petitioned the Shōgun to abandon in favour of the Emperor his pretensions to power, "and so lay the foundations on which Japan may take its stand as the equal of all other countries." On November 9, 1867, the Shōgun issued the following remarkable manifesto :—

"A retrospect of the various changes through which the Empire has passed shows us that after the deadness of the monarchical authority, power passed into the hands of the Minister of State; that by the wars of 1156 to 1159 the governmental power came into the hands of the military class. My ancestor received greater marks of confidence than any before him, and his descendants have succeeded him for more than two hundred years.

"Though I perform the same duties, the objects of government and of the penal laws have been missed, and it is with feelings of the greatest humiliation that I find myself obliged to acknowledge my own want of virtue as the cause of the present state of things.

"Moreover, our intercourse with foreign countries becomes daily more extensive, and consequently our national policy

cannot be pursued unless directed by the whole power of the State.

"If, therefore, the old *régime* be changed, and the governmental authority be restored to the Imperial Court; if the counsels of the whole Empire be collected, and the wise decisions received; and if we unite with all our heart and all our strength to protect and maintain the Empire, it will be able to range itself with the nations of the earth. This comprises our whole duty towards our country.

"However, if you (the Daimyōs) have any particular ideas on the subject, you may state them without reserve."

Thus the Shōgun formally surrendered a power which had been held by his line for 264 years, and so terminated a system of dual government which had been in existence for nearly seven centuries. The Emperor accepted the situation. The Daimyōs were ordered to proceed to the capital, and the Shōgun meanwhile was directed to continue his control of foreign affairs. There were many ominous signs that startling developments were about to take place. The Daimyōs were escorted to Kyōto by large bodies of armed men, and these were reinforced at their destination by hundreds of warriors drawn principally from the Satsuma clan, who, on hearing that the Shōgunate had fallen, secretly congregated in the vicinity of the palace. Although a day was actually fixed for the assembly of a grand council of Daimyōs at which the future of the Empire was to be discussed, the conditions that prevailed compelled an abandonment of the meeting. In his description of the events immediately following, Sir Francis Adams explains that the general command of the nine gates of the palace at Kyōto had been held by the Prince of Aidzu, a staunch adherent of the House of Tokugawa. Suddenly, on January 3, 1868, the Satsuma, Tosa, Geishiu, Owari, and Echizen clans took possession of these gates, forbade the Kugé (nobles of the court), who had previously enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor, to approach the palace, and surrounded his Majesty with other Kugé whose views were identical with those of the opposing five clans. Subsequently they met and obtained an Imperial decree abolishing finally the Government of the Shōguns. "It is the Emperor's decree," said this memor-

able document, "that all things be in accordance with the constitution created by Jimmu Tennō, that the nobles of the court and the military class, without distinction of rank, shall discuss matters fairly and in a fitting manner, and that his Majesty and the Empire may enjoy peace and tranquillity." The Shōgun resigned the last remnant of his power on January 4, and was in future styled Tokugawa Naifu, or Naidaijin. While his action in restoring authority to the Emperor was instigated by the representations of the ex-Prince of Tosa, it was nevertheless of a purely voluntary nature and in its essence displayed a timely recognition of the inevitable trend of events. It was not to be expected, however, that the Shōgun would willingly subscribe to the high-handed policy pursued by the clans, and he promptly informed the court that he wished to adhere to his original scheme of abiding by a decision of all the Daimyōs in council. He mustered his adherents at Ōsaka, where, although urged by his belligerent supporters to adopt military measures in order to gain the realisation of his wishes, he calmly awaited the decision of the sovereign. The Emperor was effectually under the influence of the western clans, and these proceeded, with the Imperial sanction, to draw up a constitution. They provided for the creation of three classes. At the head of affairs was to be a Supreme Administrator. Next came the Kugé and Daimyōs, who were to decide all important matters of State; while lastly, subordinate officers were to be selected from Kugé, Daimyōs, and retainers nominated by the Mikado. The eight departments of State were preserved and provision was made for a deliberative assembly of 312 clansmen selected by their princes. An event of importance was the publication of an Official Gazette at Kyōto in the spring of 1868. In the hour of crisis the ex-Shōgun proved himself to be an altogether weak personality. Instead of adapting himself to the new conditions and attempting to make peace with the clans he appeared to regret his surrender of power, and allowed himself to be swayed by that large section of his followers which advocated war to the bitter end. Professor Iyenaga, in observing that the advent of foreigners was largely responsible for the events which led up to the Restoration, significantly points

out that had there been a Taikō or an Iyeyasu the extinction of the Shōgunate would have been long delayed.

The cause of the ex-Shōgun was utterly defeated. Native historians declare that he had at his disposal 10,000 men, while his enemy, the Satsuma and Chōshū clans, numbered only 1500. It may be mentioned incidentally that the clans had succeeded in healing the breach between the Chōshū and the court and thus had gained additional support in the ensuing struggle. The ex-Shōgun was compelled to take refuge on an American warship, and was afterwards transferred to his own steam corvette, on which he returned to Yedo. His fortunes were indeed so low that one of the principal members of his clan urged him to commit *hara-kiri*, and upon his refusing to do so put an end to his own life. When the Emperor's majority was celebrated an amnesty was granted to all prisoners with the exception of rebels. At the same time a formal declaration of war was made against the ex-Shōgun. Meanwhile a large section of the Samurai whose incomes had declined as the result of the new era of peace, were still imbued with a bitter hatred of the foreigners whom they regarded as the cause of all their misfortunes. On February 4, 1868, at Kobe, some of the Bizen retainers fired on a number of foreigners, including the British Minister. As there was no established government in the city, 600 English, American, and French seamen were landed and the warriors of Bizen fled precipitately to the surrounding country. Subsequently the officer who gave the order to fire was ordered to commit *hara-kiri* in the presence of seven foreign witnesses who were chosen for the purpose by the Diplomatic Body. On February 7, 1868, an Imperial envoy conveyed to the foreign representatives a rescript signed by the Emperor announcing the passing of the power from the Shōgun to the sovereign, and adding, "the title of Emperor should be substituted for that of Taikun which has hitherto been employed in the Treaties. Officers are being appointed by Us to conduct foreign affairs. It is desirable that the Representatives of all the Treaty Powers should recognise this announcement." Nine days later Dr. Willis, who was accompanied by a friend, proceeded to the capital in response to a summons to attend a wounded

man. This was the first occasion on which foreigners had made a lengthy stay in the sacred city; and the fact that they were hospitably received was looked upon at that day as an encouraging indication of the growth of a spirit of friendliness in a quarter that had hitherto been a hotbed of fanatical hatred.

Another instance which showed that the leading men in the country were serious in their desire to establish an era of genuine reform was the presentation of a memorial to the Government signed by the ex-Princes of Echizen and Tosa and the Princes of Satsuma, Chōshū, Geishiu, and Higo. In this document it was admitted that a mistake had been made in the past in closing the country, and in the following terms a new policy was advocated: "Let the foolish argument which has hitherto styled foreigners, dogs and goats and barbarians, be abandoned. Let the court ceremonies hitherto initiated from the Chinese be reformed, and the foreigners' representatives be invited to court in the manner prescribed by the rules current among all nations, and let this be publicly notified throughout the country, so that the countless people may be taught what is the light in which they are to regard this subject." The policy of the leaders in the country failed to have an immediate effect upon the swashbuckling Samurai, who were convinced that, in respect of the friendship it showed towards the foreigners, the new *régime* was no better than the old. On March 8, 1868, one officer and ten sailors from a French warship were deliberately massacred at Sakai. On this occasion the Government showed a readiness to afford satisfaction—a readiness which, it must be admitted, was certainly lacking in former days. An indemnity of 150,000 dollars was paid. Moreover, twenty men adjudged to be guilty were ordered to commit *hara-kiri*. It is related that eleven of them boldly carried out the sentence upon themselves, and their heads were subsequently severed from their bodies. The French official who was present sickened at the sight, and pleaded that the lives of the others might be spared. He was told that his wishes could only be granted on the receipt of a written request signed by the French Minister. The executions were delayed while communication was established with a warship on which was the French

Minister, who promptly formulated the necessary plea for clemency.

An invitation extended to the foreign Representatives to proceed to the court at Kyōto was regarded as one of the most momentous events in the early days of the Restoration. It was the first occasion on which they were to be permitted to approach the sacred presence of the Emperor, and for this reason was welcomed as establishing direct intercourse between the Powers and the Throne. Unfortunately the visit was marred by the committal of an outrage which, in point of audacity, had never been equalled in the long series of savage attacks upon foreigners that had taken place since the opening of the country. The British Minister, Sir H. Parkes, left his residence at the appointed hour on March 23, 1868. His escort consisted of eleven ex-constables of the London Police, under an Inspector Peacock (who until his recent death remained a well-known figure at the British Embassy in Tōkyō), and forty-eight men of the 9th Foot. As the escort turned the corner, two Japanese suddenly attacked them, and slashing right and left with their long swords succeeded in wounding nine out of the eleven police, one soldier, a Japanese groom, and five horses. A Japanese official of the Foreign Department named Gotō Shojiro, and an officer named Nakai Kōzō, attacked one of the assailants and, after a severe fight in the course of which the officer was wounded, cut him down and beheaded him. The other assailant was wounded by the escort and taken prisoner. The court nobles subsequently presented apologies to the British Minister, and the surviving assassin had the unenviable distinction of being the first Samurai to be degraded previous to being executed as a common criminal. He was deprived of his sword, his name was erased from the list of warriors, and his severed head was exposed for three days. Mr. Diosy explains that the assailants were the members of a newly raised force of red-hot Imperialists, the Shim-pei or "new troops," a corps intended to act as an Imperial body-guard, formed principally of yeomen, landed gentry holding small estates and independent of any feudal lord, with a considerable admixture of Rōnin and other adventurers, ex-Buddhist priests, and the like. Three men who were implicated

in the outrage were banished for life. The British Government, in recognition of the gallant defence made by the Japanese officers accompanying the procession, presented each of them with a sword of honour. Five days after the outrage upon Sir H. Parkes the Emperor issued a decree, in the course of which the following striking passage occurred: "All persons in future guilty of murdering foreigners, or of committing any acts of violence towards them, will be not only acting in opposition to his Majesty's express orders, and be the cause of national misfortune, but will also be committing the heinous offence of causing the national dignity and good faith to suffer in the eyes of the Treaty Powers with whom his Majesty has declared himself bound by relations of amity. Such offenders shall be punished in proportion to the gravity of the offence, their names, if they be Samurai, being erased from the roll. And it is hereby rigidly decreed that all persons shall obey this Imperial order and abstain from all such acts of violence." From all sides material evidence was forthcoming of the restoration to power of the Imperial Throne. The Throne was now the centre of the Government, and the spirit of toleration which was manifested in high quarters began to produce a perceptible influence upon all classes of the people. This was the period of the dawn of freedom in Japan, a period which was to see the serf raised to an equality with the Samurai, and to herald the admission of Japan to the comity of nations and the establishment of constitutional government in the land. On April 6, 1868, in the presence of an impressive gathering of court nobles and Daimyōs, the Emperor solemnly took a charter oath of five articles promising that a deliberative assembly should be formed and all measures decided by public opinion; that the principles of social and political economics should be diligently studied by both superior and inferior classes; that every one in the community should be assisted to persevere in carrying out the Emperor's will for all good purposes; that all the absurd usages of former times should be disregarded, and impartiality and justice in the workings of nature should be adopted as a basis of action; and that wisdom and ability should be sought after in all quarters of the world for the purpose of firmly establishing the foundations of the Empire.

The Mikado finally emerged from the seclusion of his palace, a seclusion which for centuries long had caused the sovereign to be looked upon by the masses of his people as an almost mythological personage. He reviewed some warships in the roads at Ōsaka, and on landing inspected a small body of troops. The ex-Shōgun retired into a monastery, and forbade his retainers offering further resistance to the Imperial forces. On April 25, 1868, envoys of the Mikado entered Yedo, the former capital of the Shōguns, and, demanding the evacuation of the castle and the surrender of warships and firearms, promised to spare the lives of the rebels on condition that they would accompany their lord into retirement. The Tokugawa retained the municipal control of the city, while the Imperialists assumed military government. The followers of the ex-Shōgun were reluctant to surrender their last tithe of power. For a time anarchy reigned in the capital. Samurai lurked in the highways and byways, springing out upon unsuspecting Imperialists at all hours of the day and night, and assassinations and bloody encounters were of common occurrence. At last what hitherto could only be described as a feud developed into open revolt. The supporters of the Tokugawa assembled at Uyeno—a district now famous for its beautiful park—and their avowed purpose was to set up another Mikado. With this object in view, they gained possession of the person of the Imperial Prince, Rinnōji no-Miya, who, in the event of the success of the rebel cause, would have become the Shōgun's nominee for the throne. This incident in history is conveniently overlooked by the Japanese, who are ever boasting that their race has been unswerving in its loyalty to the reigning Emperor. The court wisely adopted a conciliatory policy towards the fallen Tokugawa. Complete submission followed, and the Imperialists assuming municipal control, law and order was restored in Yedo. A punitive expedition against the rebellious clans in the north was successful, and peace reigned throughout the length and breadth of the country.

All prospect of a resumption of the old form of government had now vanished. The ex-Shōgun was in monastic retirement, and so effectual had been the measures of repres-

sion that there existed no one in the land sufficiently courageous to proclaim his cause. The fighting in Ōsaka and at Uyeno had been but a feeble death-struggle. The passing of the last of the Shōguns was an event singularly pathetic in its absence of heroic circumstance. The late Prince Itō wrote perhaps the best epitaph on the tomb of the Shōgunate, when he said that its end "was the result of three hundred years of tranquillity in a dream of eternal peace." The same writer pointed out that consequent upon the "years of tranquillity" the Samurai lost all their vigour and power, and the Shōgun, deprived of military support, was compelled to surrender the supreme authority. Here perhaps it may be observed that it is as well for Japan that events took this course; for it is quite certain that had the Samurai continued to be as vigorous in their opposition to the foreigners as they were in the olden days, the Powers would have stepped in, and the independence of Japan would have been endangered. That the change came at an opportune moment is evident, for Siebold points out that "the despotism exercised under the Shōgunate had reduced the political consciousness of the people to such a low state that their language even lacked proper expressions for the conceptions of right and freedom." No better case for the abdication of the Shōgun could be advanced than that presented by himself, when, during an interview with the British Minister, Sir Harry Parkes, at a time when his fortunes were rapidly declining, he was reported to have said: "I became convinced last Autumn that the country could no longer be governed successfully while the power was divided between the Emperor and myself. The country had two centres, from which orders of an opposite nature proceeded. . . . As to who is the sovereign of Japan, it is a question on which no one in Japan can entertain a doubt. The Emperor is the sovereign. My object from the first has been to take the will of the nation as to the future government." On the other hand, the case for the Restoration was set forth by Ichizo Okubo, one of the leading men of the times, in a memorial to the Emperor which incidentally led to the change of the capital from Kyōto to Tōkyō. "Hitherto the person," wrote the petitioner, "whom we designate the sovereign, has lived behind

a screen, and, as if he were different from other human beings, has not been seen by more than a very limited number of Kugé; and as his Heaven-conferred office of father to his people has been unfulfilled, it is necessary that his office shall be ascertained in accordance with this fundamental principle, and then the laws governing internal affairs may be established." The declarations just quoted afford the best index to the trend of political thought which led to the uneventful extinction of the Shōgunate.

In November 1868, the birthday of the Emperor was celebrated as a national fête, and the chronological period was changed to that of Meiji.

On November 26 the Emperor, having journeyed overland from Kyōto, arrived at Yedo. Here the seat of the Government had been recently established, and the name of the city was known henceforth as Tōkyō. In the night of October 4 the citizens of the capital were alarmed by the news that the fleet of the ex-Shōgun, which had been lying at anchor in the bay, had suddenly set sail. The tidings proved to be correct. The fleet consisted of eight warships and steam transports, including the yacht presented by Queen Victoria to the Shōgun, and a large paddle-steamer, with a total personnel of 3000 men. The commander of this strange expedition was Enomoto Kamajirō, a naval captain who had studied navigation in Holland for five years. Several French officers, acting entirely on their own responsibility, joined the adventure. After recruiting men on the coast of Sendai the fleet proceeded to Yezo (Hokkaidō), where an army was landed. The Government officials at Hakodate fled precipitately, and the town was left unprotected. Enomoto was promptly promoted "admiral" by his followers, and a civil governor was chosen. Sir Francis Adams, who was sent at this time on an official mission to report to the British Legation, in an amusing description of the conditions which prevailed, says that the streets were full of soldiers in every variety of costume, that little fellows were dressed in baggy trousers, that some wore cherry-coloured trousers, and that others were attired in Japanese dress covered with red and-green blankets. Enomoto was explicit in his explanation that he intended no disloyalty towards the Throne, but that he merely wished to colonise

Hokkaidō. He proceeded to draw up a scheme for the establishment of a truly Gilbertian republic. He was to become governor-general, and was to be the supreme authority acting on behalf of the Emperor in the new colony. A president was to be elected, but the essence of the constitution was not so democratic as it appeared on the surface, for only Samurai were to be given the privilege of voting. It was April 21, four months after Enomoto and his gallants had landed in Hokkaidō, before the Imperial Government was able to gather together a fleet consisting of odds and ends of vessels. Meanwhile the republic had not proved a conspicuous success. The problem of food supplies presented great difficulties, and the task of maintaining law and order among so motley a band did not improve as conditions became worse. When the Imperial forces arrived the rebels had little heart for fighting. In a series of miniature engagements they were defeated both on land and sea, and a wholesale surrender followed. They were treated with exceptional consideration, and many little courtesies were exchanged between the conquerors and the conquered. It is recorded that when Enomoto realised that further resistance was futile, he sent the commander of the Imperial army a present of two volumes consisting of "The Complete Digest of the Maritime Laws of Nations," a work which had formed one of his principal studies when in Holland. The French officers surrendered to a warship belonging to their own country, and were sent as prisoners to Saigon. The Emperor again showed leniency in his treatment of rebels. The leaders were only sentenced to terms of imprisonment, and were afterwards pardoned. Enomoto lived to become a viscount and a vice-admiral, and on several occasions held Cabinet rank.

The Emperor, having decided to reside alternately in Tōkyō and Kyōto, visited the ancient capital early in January 1869. On February 9 he married the Princess Haruko of the House of Ichijō.

The change in the character of the Government had not been effected without an upheaval in the economic conditions of the country. The State was in urgent need of funds, and the fact that a strong central Government had not yet been established rendered the administration of the

country's finances a matter of extreme difficulty. It was evident that before any serious reforms could be undertaken the abolition of the feudal system must be accomplished. The Daimyōs, to all intents and purposes, ruled over petty principalities, and enjoyed special privileges which were fatal to the progress of the nation as a whole. Furthermore, the fact could not be overlooked that the most powerful clans in the land had brought about the restoration of the Emperor, and were presumably responsible for the dictation of the Imperial policy. As soon as the court recognised that friendliness towards foreigners must be the national policy, it followed, as a logical sequence, that the Empire must progress. Such recognition, it must be distinctly remembered, was not deliberate, but rather was it inspired by the clans who opposed the Shōgunate, and who wished not only to establish direct intercourse between the foreigners and the sovereign as a means of undermining the then existing Government of the Shōgun, but to gain some share in the foreign trade which had hitherto been monopolised by the Shōgunate. Subsequently these clans seem to have become sincere in their desire to establish correct relations with the outside world; and as advisers to the supreme authority in the person of the sovereign they were responsible for the era of reform which immediately followed the Restoration. This era of reform, however, had its limitations—limitations of feudalism; and moreover there existed no authority in the land competent, and, as it seemed at that time, even willing to remove such limitations. The situation was briefly this: The Samurai were in the pay of the feudal lords, and the feudal lords, or at least that section of them which was powerful by reason of the fact that it had swept away the Tokugawa *régime* and its supporters, surrounded the Throne. Power had been restored to the Emperor, but he was unable to wield it. Assuming that he himself realised that the shadow of feudalism (feudalism which in Western lands had not survived the Middle Ages) hung heavily over the land, he must at the same time have been aware that he was utterly impotent in the face of the conditions which prevailed. Nominally he was all-powerful, but as a matter of fact he was as dependent upon circumstances as were those of his illustrious predecessors who had

been mere puppets in the hands of the Shōguns. There was a danger that he would become, as of old, merely a spiritual influence in the affairs of the nation, and that the clans in their relations to him would merely take the place of the old and worn-out *régime*. The command of the army was in the hands of others, and without the instrumentality of the army, so it seemed, feudalism could not be abolished. The progress of the nation was thus arrested. A crisis, far greater than any through which it had passed, was at hand. The Powers of the world stood, as it were, upon the threshold anxiously watching the course that events were about to take. At this moment there occurred what was undoubtedly the most amazing and the most unexpected, if not the most dramatic change that has ever affected the destiny of any nation. It was always suspected that the feudal lords had been more desirous of destroying the Shōgunate than of restoring the Monarchy, and that as the one could not be accomplished without the other, so the Emperor had come once more to reign over his dominions. Subsequently the feudal lords were animated by a far higher motive than that of merely substituting themselves for the Shōgun; and when, owing to the inevitable drift of circumstances they had been brought more closely in contact with the foreigners, they were no doubt earnestly desirous of helping forward the progress of the nation on the lines of Western civilisation. The clans, who in the days gone by had strenuously opposed the forces of the Powers, ultimately blessed them for their insistence in knocking at the closed portals of the land.

The literary movement which began in the seventeenth century, and the agitation in favour of uplifting the native Shintō religion as against the imported Buddhist faith, were mainly responsible for the transformation in the thought of the nation. The *Dai Nihonshi*, or history of Japan, was completed by the Prince of Mito and his assistants in the year 1715, but it was not printed until the year 1851. Of this work Professor Iyenaga says: "It was copied from hand to hand by eager students, like the Bible by the medieval monks, or the works of Plato and Aristotle." Sir Ernest Satow says of its composer that he was the real author of the movement which culminated in 1868. Another celebrated

scholar, Rai Sanyo, who lived in the period between 1780–1833, outlined in his *Nihon Gwaishi* (a work which has been quoted in preceding chapters) the rise and fall of the Shōguns, and referred to their lawlessness in assuming a power which was essentially Imperial. The essence of Shintō faith is the doctrine that Japan is a holy land, and that it was made by the gods, whose lineal descendant is the Emperor. Hence the Emperor must be worshipped as a god. The spread of literature and the revival of Shintō prepared the nation for the fall of the Shōgunate. Discontent with the Government, which had long since outlived its vitality, and the advent of the foreigners were the determining agents. But the rise of Shintō and the dissemination of literature did more than lead to the restoration of the Monarchy. These were the factors which created a wonderful and lasting spirit of loyalty—a spirit which found generous interpretation in March 1869 in the form of a memorial to the Throne signed by the princes of the four leading clans of Satsuma, Chōshū, Tosa, and Hizen, containing the following memorable passage:—

“The place where we live is the Emperor’s land, and the food which we eat is grown by the Emperor’s men. How can we make it our own? We now reverently offer up the list of our possessions and men, with the prayer that the Emperor will take good measures for rewarding those to whom reward is due, and for taking from those to whom punishment is due. Let the Imperial orders be issued for altering and remodeling the territories of the various clans. Let the civil and the penal codes, the military laws, down to the rules for uniform and the construction of engines of war, all proceed from the Emperor. Let all the affairs of the Empire, great and small, be referred to him. After this, when the internal relations of the country shall be on a true footing, the Empire will be able to take its place side by side with the other countries of the world. This is now the most urgent duty of the Emperor, as it is that of his servants and children. Hence it is that we, in spite of our own folly and vileness, daring to offer up our humble expression of loyalty, upon which we pray that the brilliance of the Heavenly Sun may shine, with fear and reverence bow the head and do homage, ready to lay down our lives in proof of our faith.”

Two hundred and forty-one lords tendered similar memorials, and eventually only seventeen remained outside the movement. The Throne accepted the offers, and meanwhile appointed the Daimyōs governors of their territories until such time as new dispositions of lands could be made. The Emperor assumed control of their armed retainers and their warships. Von Siebold compares the voluntary action of the Daimyōs to the famous sitting of the National Assembly of France in the first revolution of August 4, 1789, when the French nobles made voluntary sacrifice of their privileges. "But in Japan," he adds, "it was a question of giving up more than private privileges. It was the spontaneous surrender of a position carrying with it almost all the powers of autonomy and of territorial sovereignty, as well as considerable State and private revenues." The same writer, however, becomes somewhat extravagant when, after referring to the surrender of privileges by the Daimyōs as the grandest phenomenon in the history of Japan, he writes of it as "an event which throws into the shade the achievements of Peter the Great, the reforms of Joseph II., and even the French Revolution itself," and makes the statement that "Japan had overleaped centuries of European development." As a matter of fact the motive which inspired the Daimyōs was a desire to see the abolition of the Shōgunate; and as this could not be accomplished without revolution itself by means other than the restoration of the Monarchy, it followed that their petty principalities should become merged in the Empire under an Emperor whose rule, if it were to prove effective, must become more comprehensive than that of the old *régime*.

As the principal clansmen were the immediate advisers of the Throne, and as they hoped to obtain some active share in a new Government under the restored Monarchy—a share which had been denied them by the autocratic Shōgunate—they had every reason to believe that some adequate compensation would be granted them for the privileges that they had, seemingly, so lightly surrendered. In short, the clansmen were to become the power behind the Throne, whereas in the past the Shōgunate had been the power which had obscured the Throne. For this much and no more the clansmen deserved credit; but they had the wisdom to foresee

that if they were to destroy the Shōgunate—the fount of feudalism—it was essential that, having for centuries followed its example in a lesser degree and a smaller sphere, they should themselves relinquish their feudal rights.

In April a parliament consisting of 276 members was opened. A message from the Throne was delivered urging the members “to take the laws of Our Ancestors as basis, and adapt yourselves to the feelings of men and to the spirit of the times.” The Assembly, chiefly composed of Samurai nominated by the clans, was not by any means representative of the voice of the nation. The Daimyōs were reluctant to take upon themselves responsibilities which involved anything in the nature of personal inconvenience, and consequently they delegated their duties to their retainers.

The history of Japan shows that the Daimyōs as a class were not men of conspicuous initiative or industry. They lived amid an atmosphere of luxuriousness surrounded by courtesans and all the indulgences of licentious ages. Their political actions were largely the result of influence brought to bear upon them by the more powerful of their clansmen. Indeed, one of the many causes which contributed to the Restoration was the legitimate ambition of these clansmen to secure some outlet for their energies and abilities in the government of the country, an ambition which could only be realised by the abolition of the Shōgunate to which the breaking down of the feudal system was a logical sequence. In the new *régime* under the Monarchy the clansmen found their opportunities for distinction. Incidentally, attention may be drawn to the fact that the main features in the history of Japan consist of a remarkable series of instances either of the delegation or the surrender of the administrative authority. The Emperor gave way to the Shōgun; the rule of the Shōgun was frequently broken by the ascendancy of regencies; and finally the Daimyōs entrusted their national obligations to the leading clansmen, who were responsible for restoring power to the dynasty, and indirectly, probably unconsciously, for destroying the fabric of feudalism. The limited form of representative government ended in failure. The country was obviously not ripe for such a startling innovation; nevertheless it is significant that a debate was held

on a proposal to abolish *hara-kiri*, and although it was a foregone conclusion that this would be rejected, the mere fact that it was ever discussed was a substantial indication of the tendency of the times.

Professor Iyenaga says that the Assembly bore the aspect of a political club meeting, but that it was a quiet, peaceful, obedient, debating society, and undoubtedly represented a step forward in the direction of constitutional government. It must not be imagined from all these favourable signs that the last trace of anti-foreign feeling had disappeared. There existed a number of followers of the old Emperor who could in no circumstances adapt themselves to the new conditions. In addition, a vast majority of the fire-eating Samurai still regarded the foreigners in the light of intruders. For them an era of peace meant diminished incomes, and their pocket as well as their pride being affected, it was evident that a considerable period must elapse before they could become reconciled. The change of the capital from Kyōto to Tōkyō had particularly offended these malcontents. When the Emperor was about to leave Kyōto a second time for Tōkyō he was surrounded by a number of warriors who begged him to remain in the ancient capital; but he insisted on making the journey, and was accompanied by them in his progress. The advent of carriages particularly annoyed the Samurai. The streets of the cities were narrow, and although the Europeans drove only at a slow pace accidents sometimes happened. Moreover, several foreigners were compelled to alight while processions of Daimyōs were passing, and on one occasion several of them were roughly handled. The diplomatic representatives acting together discontinued relations with the Government until an apology was made and instructions issued that in future foreigners must not be required to leave their carriages. On July 25, 1869, the titles of *Kugé* and *Daimyō* were abolished, and the one designation, *Kazoku*, meaning men of noble family, was substituted. Despite this and other reforms affecting the administration of the country the anti-foreign spirit still lingered. On October 8, 1869, Ōmura Masujirō, a Vice-Minister of the War Department, was murdered, and on the body of one of the assailants was found a document declaring that the

victim had been assassinated because he had steadily conformed to foreign customs, "and has disgraced the national character of this divine country." Of all Western innovations the Japanese took least kindly to Christianity. In 1868—the same year as that in which the Japanese celebrated the birthday of Queen Victoria—the new Government issued a decree that the little community of 4000 native Christians at Nagasaki were to be divided into thirty-four parties, and that each party was to be entrusted to a Daimyō whose business it was to see that they lived and laboured in lonely places and that they held no communication with their friends. It was also stipulated that if in the course of time they did not recant they were to be put to death. This decree was only applied to a very small community. It is an altogether astounding and inexplicable circumstance in Japanese history that, in view of the progress in other directions, this law of persecution should have been rendered fully operative as recently as the year 1870. It was then laid to the charge of the Christians that they were a danger to the State, that they incited rebellion, and that they showed contempt for the Emperor.

Sir Francis Adams describes how, when the Christians were dispersed throughout the country, some of them were placed in buildings by themselves, where they lived without employment, and with scanty fare. Rumours of their ill-treatment began to reach Yokohama. In the province of Kaga husbands were separated from their wives, and children from their parents; while in some instances iron rings attached to the floor were fastened round the necks of men and women who would not recant. Then, as at the present time, the Japanese wished to progress along the lines of Western civilisation, but they ignored the great truth that the Christian Faith had been its foundation.

Perhaps in their attitude towards Christianity the Japanese were influenced by their experience during that period contemporary with the T'ang dynasty in China, when they accepted not only Chinese civilisation, but also Chinese Buddhism. Then it was that the native faith of Shintō, a faith which in its essence upheld the Monarchy, began to decline, thus preparing the mind of the nation for the

Shōgunate usurpation. And it will be recalled that it was not until the revival of Shintō that there came the revival of the Imperial power. In the year 1870, diplomatic intervention was made on behalf of the native Christians on the ground that, having accepted a Western faith, it became the duty of the West to protect them from persecution. In response, the Government promised to be more considerate in their treatment of the converts.

The same year as that which witnessed the attempt to exterminate Christianity was one particularly notable for the inauguration of many reforms. In May the Emperor rode a distance of five miles to review his troops. "All along the line of route," says Sir Francis Adams, "his well-conducted subjects were silently awaiting his arrival, and thousands of the two-sworded class and of the common people were permitted to gaze for the first time upon the Son of Heaven."

The Samurai began to wear European dress. Two royal princes were sent abroad to study, one to England and the other to the United States. Their example was followed by many members of the upper classes, and the whole nation showed an eagerness to study foreign ways. A telegraph system was in operation between Tōkyō and Yokohama; a contract had been signed for the construction of a railway between the same places; and lighthouses were erected around the coast. In the following year (1871) the last outrage upon foreigners during the period of the Restoration took place. Two English teachers were wounded; and in contrast to the tardy administration of justice in former times, their assailants were speedily punished. On April 4, a new Mint was opened at Ōsaka, and the next event of interest was the establishment of a newspaper called the *Shimbun Zasshi*. Japanese students continued to flock to the centres of learning in Europe and America. They were handicapped from the outset by their ignorance of foreign languages and their lack of elementary education. When some of them returned to Japan it was realised that the experiment had been a failure, and that a rudimentary groundwork was essential before the full benefits of Western learning could be assimilated. On August 29, the Han, or clans, were abolished, and the country was divided into Ken, or prefectures, under

governors appointed by the Imperial authorities. Each territorial lord was allowed to retain only one residence in Tōkyō. Professor Iyenaga translates the laconic decree, which finally removed the feudal system, in the following terms: "The clans are abolished, and prefectures are established in their places." According to Sir Francis Adams the ex-Daimyōs were in reality better off than formerly. They ceased to have a crowd of useless retainers to maintain, and thus the one-tenth of the old assessments of their territories, which henceforth they were to be allowed as income, formed a better provision for themselves and their families than their previous nominal revenue. The Emperor no longer limited his audiences to the members of the Diplomatic Corps, but consented to receive foreigners of eminence. On October 1 the following proclamation was circulated: "His Majesty having declared His intention of visiting His Palace on the seashore, He will pass through the streets in the simplest possible style, so as not to cause any trouble or inconvenience to the lower classes along His road. The townspeople will therefore conduct themselves as on ordinary days. Of course the road must be properly swept, and a lantern suspended from the eave of the lower storey of each house after nightfall, in accordance with the orders heretofore given, and special care must be taken to prevent any accidents from fires or lights." As the Emperor passed in a carriage drawn by four horses the people remained standing, whereas on former occasions they had been compelled to kneel down and lower their heads to the ground.

On December 28, 1872, an Imperial Proclamation introduced universal conscription. In 1873 Commander Douglas, R.N., now Admiral Sir Archibald Douglas, was appointed to undertake the work of organising the navy. In the same year a proposal was made to the Samurai, under which they could commute their hereditary incomes for a sum equivalent to six years' income, half in cash and half in bonds, bearing 8 per cent. interest; while those having life pensions were invited to accept four years' income, half in cash and half in bonds, bearing 8 per cent. interest. It would seem that the scheme was not entirely acceptable to the Samurai, for in 1876 it was found necessary to render its adoption obligatory.

Such a circumstance conclusively proves that the knights of old Japan were not so indifferent to their own pecuniary interests as some writers would have us believe. With the introduction of conscription their life's occupation as retained fighters had gone. They were now compelled to take their places in the army of the Emperor, shoulder to shoulder with the common people, not excepting the class once known as non-humans. No longer were they to earn their livelihood by their sword, and while many of them became officers in the naval and military forces and civil servants, others sought agricultural pursuits, and some, sinking deep into poverty, became ordinary labourers. Meanwhile hundreds of the warriors readily took advantage of a proclamation permitting them to discard their swords; and it is related that the shops of Tōkyō were filled with these weapons, symbols of an age that had passed. Other reforms which crowned the great work of the Restoration followed in quick succession. The nobles were granted permission to marry outside their rank, and a decree allowing Japanese to take their families abroad made the following frank admission: "In consequence of the want of a system of female education in our country many women are deficient in intelligence." The lower classes, which numbered more than a million human beings, and included a section known as *Hinin*, or non-humans, were accorded the privileges of citizenship.

In 1874 the newly created army first saw active service in stamping out an incipient rebellion in the province of Saga. In the same year, in consequence of the inability of China to afford satisfaction for the massacre of some Japanese fishermen by aborigines in Formosa, Japan took the international law into her own hands and sent a punitive expedition to that island. The operations, which were extremely hazardous owing to the hilly nature of the country and the density of the forests, were crowned with success, and China agreed to pay half a million taels in order to regain her sovereignty over the occupied territory. In the meantime an element of discontent with the new order of things still smouldered in Japan. For several years past Korea had adopted a bellicose attitude in her relations with the island empire, insolently threatening invasion and inviting attack. Consequently a considerable

section of the nation, led by the Satsuma clan, clamoured loudly for war. In 1875 a Japanese ship was attacked in a Korean port. An expedition under General Kuroda was despatched to the peninsula kingdom, but meanwhile the outstanding issues between the two countries were settled by the conclusion of a treaty of amity. Apart from the discontent with the conduct of foreign relations, there were many who imagined that the internal affairs of the country were being administered on too liberal a scale. Shimazu Saburo, the hereditary chieftain of the Satsuma clan, actually went the length of addressing a letter to the Throne expressing his fear that the Empire was in danger of embracing republicanism. The court tried to conciliate the discordant faction within the nation, but its efforts did not meet with success. The Satsuma clan became gradually menacing in its attitude towards the Government of the day, and in 1877 openly rebelled. The leader of this insurrection was General Saigō Takamori, who had taken a leading part in the great movement which had brought about the downfall of the Shōgunate, and who had acted as Councillor of State and as Commander-in-chief of the army. This latter post he relinquished owing to his dissatisfaction with the peaceful policy adopted by the Government towards Korea. He thereupon left the capital and retired to Kagoshima, where he drilled a large army. Many reasons have been advanced to account for his subsequent acts of revolt. Among other things, it has been stated that he was not only opposed to the Government's foreign policy, but that he and his followers believed that they had not obtained their proper share in the various offices which controlled the administration of the country. There was no doubt that the Satsuma clan represented the old-fashioned school in the nation, and that while they had done much to restore the Monarchy they were not altogether prepared for the startling reforms which followed. That Saigō's conception of loyalty was sincere there could be no question. He himself believed that his actions were the outcome of the highest form of patriotism, and was explicit in his declarations that he made war not against the Emperor but against the Cabinet. His line of action was similar to that which had been adopted on many occasions by the warriors of old Japan. He wished

to seize the person of the Emperor, not from any motives of disloyalty, but because he believed that his Majesty was surrounded by ill-advisers. In short, he forgot that in the process of restoration the monarch had become a ruler as well as a sovereign. On a New Year's eve he marched out from his stronghold, Kagoshima, the Satsuma capital, at the head of an army of 12,000 men. His progress was arrested at the castle of Kumamoto, the garrison of which refused to surrender at his bidding. The siege that followed gave the Government opportunity to assemble a large army under the command of Prince Arisugawa, the uncle of the Emperor. In the desperate fighting that followed between the rebels and the Imperial forces, the garrison, which had suffered terribly during the siege, was relieved. Saigō and his army sustained a series of defeats, and were eventually driven back in the direction of Kagoshima. Meanwhile an army had been landed in their rear, and retreat being hopelessly cut off, wholesale surrenders took place. For a time, however, Saigō and several hundred of his men succeeded in making an escape. Proceeding to the hill known as Shiroyama, overlooking Kagoshima, a last stand was made. Saigō, wounded in the thigh, committed *hara-kiri* in a cave, and his lieutenant, Hemmi, in accordance with his previously expressed wishes, cut off his head. The survivors followed the example of their leader, and also committed *hara-kiri*. The remains of the little band were reverently interred by the Imperialist forces. By one of those painful coincidences which are the frequent accompaniment of tragic circumstance, the head of the leader was discovered by his fellow-clansman, Admiral Kawamura, who washed it with his own hands and gave it burial. History—that is, history as interpreted by the mind of the Japanese—has passed a generous judgment upon the actions of Saigō. In 1894 a monument was erected to his memory in Tōkyō. Previously his honours were posthumously restored, and to this day the Emperor pays tribute to his name. To the youth of the nation he is held up as a great knight and a brave soldier. By the people of all classes he is regarded as one of the inspiring spirits of modern Japan. The Japanese, who possess no saints or martyrs, canonise their warriors, and in the illustrious gallery of these stands Saigō, hallowed and adored.

In 1879, as the result of diplomatic negotiations with China, the question of the suzerainty over the Loochow Islands which had long been in dispute between the two Empires was settled in favour of Japan.

With the abolition of feudalism and the introduction of foreign manners and customs a period notable for its reform along the lines of Western progress immediately set in. Railways, posts, and telegraphs were inaugurated; an army and navy were organised on modern lines; forced labour was abolished; schools and other seats of learning were founded; codes of law were drawn up; steamship companies were formed; an Imperial Mint was opened; and in Tōkyō a Bourse and a Chamber of Commerce were established. Officials were ordered to wear European clothes, and the queue as a national head-dress was abandoned. Von Siebold points out that between the years 1868 and 1874 farmers were permitted to become absolute owners of the soil, the oppression of the nobility was swept away, and land taxes were organised. He explains that hitherto the supreme landlord had been the Emperor, who either conferred certain districts and villages as fiefs on the nobles or assigned them a certain share of the rents. In an interesting description of the central administration he states that at the head of the Government there was placed a Council of State, with an Imperial Chancellor and two Vice-Chancellors. Under them were the central authorities or Ministries, which again were subdivided into several sections. The Imperial Chancellor and his first substitute belonged to the court nobility. The second Vice-Chancellorship was, for the time being, given to the old Prince of Satsuma, who, however, only regarded his post as an honorary one. The chief factor was the Council of State, in which the reform party was represented by its ablest members, who at the same time also comprised representatives of the old feudal septs, such as Saigō of the Satsuma clan, Kido for that of Chōshū, Itagaki for that of Tosa, and Okuma for the Hizen clan; while Prince Sanjō, who was for many years Imperial Chancellor, and Iwakura, Vice-Chancellor, represented the old Imperial court nobility. The various departments of the central administration—the Household Ministry and those of Public Worship (abolished 1876), Home

and Foreign Affairs, Finance, War, Navy, Education, Public Works, Justice, Agriculture and Commerce, and a temporary office for Colonial Affairs—were gradually organised on the European pattern. At first there was a distinction between the Council of State and the Council of Ministers, or departmental chiefs, but later on this difference came to be rejected as unpractical, and each State Councillor became at the same time head of the Ministry. This system lasted until the creation of a Parliament, and Japan has to thank it for her greatest achievements. "Most notable," writes Chamberlain, "next to 1873, were 1885-7, the years of the great 'foreign fever,' when Japanese society was literally submerged in a flood of European influence, such things as foreign dress for ladies, dancing, athletics, card-playing, etc. etc., coming in with a rush, while what is still remembered as the *Ō-jishin*, or 'great Earthquake,' shook the political world. Then were administrative methods reformed, the hitherto excessive number of officials reduced, and new men, such as Itō and Inoue . . . assumed the highest posts."

It was not to be expected that the nation could adopt Western manners and customs while ignoring the forms of Government under which those manners and customs had thrived. The evidences of material progress which were to be seen on all sides aroused curiosity among the masses as to the conditions under which these things had been originated in other lands. The introduction of education, the travels of students, and the increased facilities of communication tended to destroy the communalistic principle which had hitherto strictly governed the country. The individual began to think and act for himself, his mind was enlarged, and he realised that he was no longer bound to hearken with bowed head to the whim or word of some swaggering two-sworded superior. And as he came to believe that he had a share in the making of his own destiny, so in the course of time did he realise that he was entitled to some share in the making of the destiny of the nation. The logical sequence to the abolition of feudalism was the dawn of freedom. The concession of the State in raising a large section of the population once known as non-humans to the status of human beings; the deposition of the overbearing Samurai; the formation of an

army in which all people, even those formerly known as non-humans, were permitted to serve—an army which had proved itself more than a match against the trained and picked Samurai of Saigō in the Satsuma rebellion—these were the principal factors which awakened the national self-consciousness. The passing of the clans was a death-blow to communalism. Formerly the nation was split up into factions, and as the door of the country was closed against the foreigner, internal feuds provided the only outlet for the martial spirit of the times. As soon as the light of progress penetrated the darkness of ages; as soon as it was realised that other nations existed in the world far more powerful even than Japan herself; as soon as it was recognised that conceivably the greatest enemies of Japan might be without and not within her borders, internal differences ceased, and by a process of rapid evolution one great community was formed out of many small communities, animated primarily by a desire for self-preservation, and, as a result of education and learning, imbued with an ambition to become a nation respected among the Powers of the world. Hitherto Japan in her vain seclusion had despised the foreigners and imagined herself impregnable. Bitter experience had lowered her arrogance, and she was in haste to make up for lost ground lest in the meantime, unarmed and unprepared as she was, some disaster from the outside might befall her. Prince Itō, commenting upon the Restoration, said “that the harmony between the ruler and the ruled was urgently desired by the whole nation in the hope that she might cope with the European Powers on the same footing. It is obvious that both the heavy tasks of the restoration of the Imperial power, and of abolishing all the clans, and putting into force provincial systems instead, resulted from the people’s earnest thirst for the betterment of the country.” Admirers of Japan have given her far too much credit for the events which happened during this period. Indeed, if we were to believe the annals of the Japanese themselves concerning the life of their own land, we would be forced to the conclusion that in comparison the nations of the West are mere infants in arms. Yet, at the time of which I am writing, the Japanese had originated nothing.

A review of their achievements during the centuries dating back from the dim time of the Yamato invasion will place their latter-day progress in a proper perspective. In the time of the T'ang dynasty they had borrowed from China manners and customs in the same way as centuries later they were destined to borrow manners and customs from the West. Their original constitution they owed to China, and in any amendments which they made from time to time it cannot be said that their rulers displayed remarkable wisdom. They borrowed an art and a culture from China largely through the medium of Korea, and moreover they adapted a religion, Buddhism, which the Chinese, having acquired from India, had spread by means of their missionaries throughout other Eastern lands. Japan, then, as in the present Meiji era, showed little creative power, and the most that could be laid to her credit was that she endeavoured in a crude way to adapt to her own circumstances that civilisation and culture which others had imparted to her. It may be urged that since the beginning of the world all nations have been dependent on each other for the interchange of knowledge; but from the time contemporary with the T'ang dynasty to the present day it cannot reasonably be set forth that Japan has given anything material to the world in the form of art, literature, or mechanical invention in proportion to the vast amount of knowledge which other lands have so generously given to her. If her present efficiency—and the degree of efficiency she has obtained is certainly open to argument—has impressed the world, the significant circumstance must not be overlooked that while in the time of the T'ang dynasty she had only one example, China, to emulate, in the nineteenth century she was able to reap the benefits which years of civilisation and toil had brought to the nations of the West. She was in a position to take that which was best from the constitutions and conditions of not one but a dozen nations, and therefore it can truly be said that if ever an opportunity was afforded statesmen to create a modern Utopia, it was presented to the great men who controlled the destinies of Japan in the dawn of the Meiji era. How far success has been attained is a matter which will be made evident in this work.

Although in past ages the adoption of Chinese institutions had involved the seclusion of the Emperor and had been largely if not entirely responsible for the isolation of the country, the attendant introduction of Chinese literature and learning had the wholly progressive effect of inspiring the higher classes of the people with an ambition to see Japan emerge as a nation having a literature and learning of her own. The tyranny of Buddhism, the despotism of the Shōgunate, and the general discontent arising from perpetual civil strife, were the factors which tended to bring about the great change. As soon as the people were able to read and to write, the doctrine spread that the Emperor should be all powerful, and the revival of the native Shintō faith which upheld this doctrine was the elementary stage of that national self-consciousness which, a century and a half later, was to find such a lively expression in the Meiji era. While the Japanese adopted Western civilisation in a large measure, it must not be imagined that they were able wholly to discard Chinese influences which, by this time, had made a deep impression upon the mind of the masses ; and although the manifestation of these same influences will, no doubt, from time to time undergo various changes in the light of later culture imparted by other nations, it is evident that they will always play a prominent part both in the formation of the character of the individual Japanese and in maintaining the national ideals. The doors of the country, behind which lurked bitter anti-foreignism, were not opened voluntarily by the Japanese. For relinquishing their policy of isolation they deserve little credit. As soon as the flood of Western light fell upon the country, and as soon as it was realised that there were other and stronger lands than Japan, their curiosity, which led to wholesale imitation, was not indicative of that extraordinary ability which has so often been attributed to them. They had seen steamships and warships, and were by this time well acquainted with the superiority of Western armaments. It is recorded that Commodore Perry amused them with the model of a train. One might almost compare them to a man who, having been born blind, is restored to sight in the prime of life, and who with all the wisdom of mature years gazes on the world for the first time. Let us take another example.

Assuming that a wall built round one of the English counties for hundreds of years was suddenly demolished, one would not be surprised if the people, kept in a restricted area for so long, should overrun the neighbouring territories, securing for themselves comforts which had hitherto been denied them, and adopting means of protection which were essential in view of their contact with people more progressive than themselves. As a result of centuries of isolation the minds of the Japanese were warped. They were incapable of invention, and any initiative which they possessed was the outcome of circumstances beyond their control. They adopted Western reforms because it became the fashion to adopt Western reforms. They clamoured for a Constitution from the year 1874, and when the Constitution was granted in 1889, it was a document, as will be seen by a subsequent chapter dealing with the subject, meaningless to the masses, a document which, while it gratified the vanity of the nation, satisfied its craving for representative government. Political parties sprang into being, but these were merely instruments in the hands of powerful leaders who, in the extent of the authority they wielded in the land and the influence which they exercised over the Throne, had virtually taken the place of the feudal clans of old.

It followed in the process of national awakening that there would be a demand for a revision of the treaties with the Powers, mainly with a view to the abolition of consular jurisdiction over foreigners. The agitation which resulted was of a violent nature, and to some extent the old hatred of foreigners revived. The Powers, however, were not to be intimidated, and they held their hands until such time as Japan had, in their opinion, sufficiently advanced to warrant such an important concession. The revised treaties did not come into force until 1899, and it must be admitted that the subsequent administration of the law in cases affecting foreigners has not fulfilled the sanguine expectations entertained at that time. A more detailed account of the diplomatic negotiations which led to this result will be found elsewhere.

The granting of the Constitution was not accomplished without bitter opposition from the military leaders of the country—an opposition which, in its relation to all move-

ments having for their object the extension of popular privileges, survives at the present day. The nation was clearly passing through a crisis, and the Government, deprived of the support of many of the leading men in the land, was placed in a position of some embarrassment. Meanwhile the negotiations with China in regard to Korea were assuming a serious aspect, and while it could not be said that the responsible advisers of the Emperor deliberately wished for war abroad in order to gain peace at home, they were not slow to realise the advantages that would be derived in the event of the diversion of military activity to another quarter. Moreover a large army had been created, and there was a restlessness among the soldier class as the result of a not unnatural desire to put the huge machinery of warfare to its first great test. The lower classes, who had been placed on an equality with the Samurai in the matter of bearing arms, were anxious to prove themselves equal in prowess to their former overlords in a conflict with a foreign foe. The spirit that had produced a Constitution and brought about a revision of the treaties was only following its normal course when, in 1894, war was declared against China. It is difficult to understand how the military leaders, who opposed the granting of Constitutional government, ever hoped to lead an army to victory in the field, when, if they had had their own way, the men composing that army would have been denied the least share in the government of the country which they sought to defend. As events proved, the combination of conditions was almost ideal. The leaders were eager to contribute something material to the upbuilding of an empire the progress of which had hitherto been mainly in the hands of statesmen; and the men were enthusiastic to demonstrate to the Emperor and the world that in this, the first great fight in the history of the united nation, they were as hardy and as ready to die as the veterans of the war-tried nations of the West. The primary cause of the conflict was the feeling of irritation between China and Japan over the question of Korea. Regrettable incidents frequently happened, and at these times indignation had more than once reached a point at which war seemed inevitable. The Japanese maintained that as they themselves had made considerably more progress

than China they were entitled to undertake the reform of Korea. An official statement of their case, compiled by the Imperial General Staff and translated by Major Jikemura and the Rev. Arthur Lloyd, contained the following extracts:—

“In May of the twenty-seventh year of Meiji (1894) the Tonghak insurrection broke out in the southern districts of Korea, and spread so widely that the Korean Government was powerless to suppress it. Application was therefore made to China to send troops to quell the riots, and the Japanese Government decided to send a mixed brigade for the protection of the legation, consulates, and Japanese residents. The commandant of the brigade was instructed that in addition to the protection of his own co-nationals he might also give protection to the King of Korea, to Korean high officials, and even, in case of imminent danger, to the officials of any country resident there; nay, if required to do so by his Minister, he might offer protection to private persons of any country and even to Koreans. The Japanese Government at that time hoped that it would be possible, according to the Treaty of Tientsin, to send Chinese and Japanese contingents to reinforce the Korean punitive expedition, at the request of the Korean Government.

“On the 7th of June, Wang-Fêng-Tsao, the Chinese Minister in Tōkyō, informed the Japanese Government that China, at the request of the Korean Government, was going to despatch troops to Korea for the suppression of the rebellion, at the same time adding that she did it for the sake of helping a tributary State. To this Japan replied that China was welcome to send troops to Korea for the suppression of the rebellion, but that Japan could not recognise Korea as a tributary of China's. Further, the Japanese Government added that, as the rebellion seemed to be a very serious one, and as the safety of Japanese subjects and their property was involved, she likewise proposed to send troops to Korea. To this China replied (June 9) that she was charged with the suppression of the rebellion within the boundaries of her own tributary, that the Japanese force need not be a large one, as it would only be required for

the protection of Japanese subjects, and that it would not be allowed to go into the interior of Korea.

"The Japanese Government had long since recognised the independence of Korea, and the Treaty of Chemulpo having given her the right of sending troops to Korea, her notification to China was only made in order to observe the stipulations of the Treaty of Tientsin. There was no need, therefore, for her to wait for a reply from China, and as she was in no sense bound to respect the wishes of that Power in this matter, she replied that she could not accept the Chinese terms.

"While these negotiations were pending, Keisuke Otori, the Japanese Minister to Seoul, who had been at home on furlough, returned to Korea on board H.I.J.M.S. *Yaeyama*, and on the 10th of June entered Seoul with an escort of marines. The first detachment of the mixed brigade left Ujina on the day on which the answer came from the Chinese Government, and proceeded to Jinsen, where they arrived on the 12th of June; and in the meantime detachments of Chinese troops were continually leaving their own country, and some of them had already landed at Asan. . . .

"But the Japanese Government was in possession of very accurate information, and saw too clearly into the future to be satisfied with any temporary makeshifts. Therefore, though her proposals of co-operation in reform had unfortunately been rejected by China, she could not, either as a friend to Korea or with an eye to her own interests, consent to remain an idle spectator of Korea's sorrows. It would not have been right for her to withdraw her troops until she had sufficient guarantees of the future prosperity of Korea, and the non-withdrawal was not only in accordance with the provisions of the Tientsin Treaty, but was the best means of safeguarding the truest interests of Korea. Japan therefore notified China that she could not withdraw her troops; at the same time she instructed her Minister Otori to urge upon the Korean Government the necessity of reform (June 23). . . .

"Japan thereupon warned China that she could not possibly submit for discussion any reform which she had already carried out single-handed. At the same time if

China were willing to accept what had already been accomplished, and would honestly submit proposals for further reform within five days, Japan would be glad to receive them for consideration. Should China, however, at this juncture, despatch further detachments of troops to Korea, Japan could not but regard it as a menace (July 19). To this China made no reply. Not only so, but she eagerly made her arrangements for the commencement of war and prepared to send large reinforcements to Korea (Reports of Military and Naval Attachés in China, dated July 20, 21, and 22). It seemed that China was determined upon hostilities, and was forcing Japan to abandon her peaceful intentions.

"From the outset the Chinese Government had not only rejected the Japanese proposal of co-operation, but was all the while secretly instigating the Korean Government to break the promises it had made to Japan but hesitated to perform. The Koreans were influenced in this not only by the military strength of China which restrained their freedom of action, but also by the blind feeling of veneration which they, in their ignorance, cherished for China, whose plans and aims coincided exactly with their own feeling of repugnance to making the exertion necessary for carrying out a great scheme of national reform.

"Minister Otori now became cognisant of the fact that the first thing to be done was to break off the intimacy existing between China and Korea, and that this could only be done by demonstrating that Japan was powerful enough not only to carry out her schemes of Korean reform, but also to secure the independence and autonomy of the Korean kingdom. He accordingly advised the Korean Government to abrogate all the treaties which were in any sense injurious to Korea's position as an independent State, to expel from Korea all the Chinese troops stationed there under the pretext of protecting a State tributary to China, and to make it quite clear that Korea was an independent country according to the terms of the reciprocal treaty already existing between Japan and Korea (July 22).

"This advice the hesitating Korean Government was unable to adopt readily, and the Japanese Minister, fearing a lengthy postponement of their action, gave orders, at dawn

on July 23, for a portion of the mixed brigade which was at that time stationed in the environs of Yong-san to advance to Seoul and occupy a post among the hills to the north of the royal palace. This was only intended as a precautionary measure; but as the Japanese troops were passing along the eastern side of the royal palace, they were unexpectedly fired upon by the Royal Guards and other Korean soldiery, and compelled to defend themselves. The Japanese and Koreans were thus brought into conflict for the first time. The result of the fighting was that the Japanese troops beat off the Koreans, made a successful defence of the royal palace, and, to prevent further violence, expelled all the irregular Korean troops from the capital. The King, who understood the whole gravity of the situation, now commissioned Tai-Wôn-Kun to make suitable arrangements for the conduct of the public business, and invited Minister Otori to act as Tai-Wôn-Kun's adviser. The following day, therefore, Tai-Wôn-Kun changed the whole of the Korean Cabinet, and on the 25th confronted Tang Shao-yi, the Chinese *chargé d'affaires*, with a declaration of Korea's independence, and charged the Japanese Minister with the task of procuring the withdrawal of the Chinese troops stationed at Asan.

"According, however, to intelligence which reached the Japanese Minister at Peking, China was eager to send more troops to Korea, and not only to Asan; and large forces were being concentrated in the north. On the day (July 19) on which the Japanese Government sent its ultimatum to China through the hands of the British Minister, the commander of the mixed brigade received instructions to the effect that, in the event of China's despatching further reinforcements, he might exercise his own discretion as to further action. Two days later (July 21) the Japanese Government received intelligence that detachments of Chinese troops had sailed, the I-tsu troops July 18, the Shêng-tsu troops July 20, both for the north of Korea. This news was at once wired to the commandant of the mixed brigade, who took immediate action. On the 29th, before the north was threatened, the Chinese troops at Syōng-hoan were defeated, and the Chinese headquarters at Asan broken up."

It would seem that whatever may be said to the contrary,

both nations had reached the limit of their patience, and were ready to resort to the arbitrament of war. Of the two, however, the Japanese attitude was the more provocative. At the outset the Chinese troops, finding that the rebellion had collapsed, returned home, with the exception of 500 men, who remained in Seoul to act as guard to the King. The Japanese reply in despatching 5000 men with guns and full expeditionary equipment, and stationing 1500 of these—three times the number of the Chinese garrison—in the capital was not likely to make for peace. On July 31 the Chinese Government, in communicating to the foreign Powers the reasons for hostilities, set forth the following circumstances: "The *Wojên* (Japanese), without any cause whatever, sent their troops to Korea, and entered Seoul, the capital of Korea, reinforcing them constantly until they have come to exceed 10,000 men. In the meantime the Japanese have forced the Korean king to change his system of government, in every way showing a disposition to intimidate the Koreans. It was found a difficult matter to reason with the *Wojên*. Although we have been in the habit of assisting our tributaries we have never interfered with their internal government. Japan's treaty with Korea was like that of one independent country with another; there is no law for sending large armies to intimidate a country in this way, and compel it to change its system of government. The various Powers are united in condemning the conduct of the Japanese, and can give no reasonable name to the army she now has in Korea. Nor has Japan been amenable to reason, nor would she listen to our exhortation to withdraw her troops and confer amicably upon what should be done in Korea. On the contrary, Japan has shown herself bellicose without regard to appearances, and has been increasing her forces there. Her conduct alarmed the people of Korea as well as our merchants in that country, and so we sent more troops over to protect them. Judge of our surprise then when, half-way to Korea, a number of the *Wojên* ships suddenly appeared, and, taking advantage of our unpreparedness, opened fire upon our transports at a spot on the sea-coast near Asan, and damaged them, thus causing us to suffer from treacherous conduct which we could not have foretold."

Although war was not formally declared until August 1, the Japanese opened hostilities a week previously. An English steamer named the *Kowshing*, commanded by Captain T. R. Galsworthy, and owned by the Indo-China Steam Navigation Company, was chartered by the Chinese Government to convey 1100 troops from Taku to Korea. When in the vicinity of Shopaioul Island she was sighted by the Japanese cruiser *Naniwa*, commanded by Captain Tōgō, whose name is now world-famous as that of the admiral who commanded the combined squadrons during the recent war. The *Naniwa* signalled to the *Kowshing* to weigh anchor and follow. The captain of the transport represented to the Chinese officers that he was not in a position to disobey the orders of the warship. The Chinese thereupon assumed a very threatening attitude, and, placing armed sentries over the captain, mates, and engineers, they declared that they would murder every European on board if they attempted to carry out the orders of the *Naniwa*. The cruiser signalled to the *Kowshing* requesting the English members of the crew to leave the ship, but compliance was impossible. The *Naniwa* then ineffectually launched a torpedo, and immediately afterwards fired a shell which made a hole in the boiler and raised a cloud of steam and smoke. Many of the soldiers and members of the crew of the transport jumped overboard. Others who could not swim remained on the ship and opened a vigorous rifle fire upon the Japanese cruiser. Within five minutes the *Kowshing* sank by the stern in deep water two miles to the south of Shopaioul Island. Subsequently her captain and first mate, both Englishmen, were rescued by the boats of the *Naniwa*. All the Chinese were drowned, with the exception of about 160 who succeeded in reaching the island, where they were taken on board by a German man-of-war. On September 15 the Chinese land forces in Korea were utterly routed at Pingyang, and lost 6000 men, together with enormous supplies of arms and ammunition, and practically the whole of their commissariat. Two days later the Chinese fleet, consisting of eleven warships and six torpedo-boats, encountered the Japanese fleet, which, although numerically equal in the matter of large ships, possessed no torpedo-boats. In speed, armament, and equipment the

Japanese were infinitely superior, while the cleverness of their strategy and the accuracy of their shooting more than made up for the presence of the enemy's torpedo-boats. After an engagement lasting for six hours five Chinese war-ships were sunk, and a sixth was destroyed by fire. None of the Japanese ships were damaged beyond repair. The reverses on land and sea had a disastrous effect upon the morale of the Chinese forces. Within a month the army was flying in all directions before the Japanese advance in Manchuria, the ancestral home of the reigning dynasty. On October 24, Count Oyama—who was later to become known to the world as the result of his direction of the Manchurian campaign in the Russo-Japanese war—with an army of 30,000 men, arrived at Kinchow, thirty-five miles to the north of Port Arthur. Meanwhile the Japanese army in Korea crossed the Yalu and advanced into Manchuria without serious opposition. On November 21 the Japanese stormed Port Arthur, and within a few hours captured the fortress with the loss of only several hundred men. The Chinese deserted the guns and the forts and fled to the town. On making their entry the Japanese discovered the mutilated remains of some of their soldiers who had been captured by the enemy. The leaders were no longer able to control the infuriated troops, whose subsequent conduct showed that the recent civilising influences were at the best but a veneer laid upon a surface hardened by centuries of barbaric feudal strife. Hundreds of innocent inhabitants were cruelly massacred in a spirit of savage revenge; and in the application of ingenious methods of butchery the Japanese showed themselves in no better light than their enemies, the Chinese, who have ever been notorious for their revolting originality in the torture-chamber and upon the execution-ground. And in this connection it must be clearly understood that in their claim for the sympathy of Europe in the war, the Japanese boasted loudly of the fact that they were leaders of civilisation in the East, and were thus entitled to undertake the reform of Korea. The Massacre of Port Arthur, one of the bloodiest events in the world's history, and many subsequent happenings, of which the reprehensible murder of the Queen of Korea stands out most prominently, showed that they had much headway to

make towards the acquisition of the qualities of restraint and mercy. Precedents may and doubtless will be cited—as instance the measures of repression taken in Western revolutions—to excuse the conduct of the Japanese on this occasion. Those acquainted with the sickening circumstances of the Port Arthur massacre declare that to find any exact parallel to the hideous atrocities of the Japanese on that occasion it is necessary to go back to the period of the Middle Ages. Bad, admittedly, as the provocation may have been, it would be altogether fallacious to allow the Japanese plea of justification. Their case was not improved by the fact that they wrought their revenge upon inhabitants who were guiltless. The conflict was the result of a formally declared war between two recognised nations, and a violation of the conventions which governed such hostilities on the one side, in no way excused greater violations in the form of wicked reprisals on the other.

The Japanese subsequently gained more victories in the field, and the Chinese giving way to despair adopted the singular measure of sending Mr. Detring, a foreign adviser of the Government, to Japan in order to ascertain terms of peace. On the grounds that he was a foreigner, and not a properly accredited plenipotentiary, the Japanese rightly refused to treat with him. Meanwhile the Manchurian campaign was continued in a winter of great severity, and the Japanese arms were everywhere victorious. Moreover, the plan of campaign was extended to Shantung. An army of 25,000 men advanced upon Wei-hai-wei, where a Chinese fleet was sheltered. The Chinese resistance in this part of the field was no better than it had been elsewhere. They abandoned forts and guns, and the Japanese, entering into possession, began a deadly bombardment upon the fleet within the harbour. At the same time a Japanese fleet effectually blockaded the entrance. The gallant endurance of the sailors under Admiral Ting constituted, from the Chinese point of view, the one glorious feature of the campaign. It was an endurance which would have been glorious in the history of any nation, and the fact that it was possible under the circumstances described seems to prove that, given the example of brave leadership, the Chinese are by no means destitute of that fighting spirit which

both wins and loses battles heroically. Battered by heavy guns from the forts in the rear, incapable of effective reply, with all escape by sea cut off, the Chinese warships for several days received with something akin to stoicism the destructive salute of the Japanese to the flag of the Yellow Dragon which proudly flew from the mastheads. And when they had done all that could humanly be expected of them they surrendered. The Japanese, whose chivalrous instincts had evidently developed as a consequence of the severe censure passed upon them by the civilised nations for their conduct in the Port Arthur massacre, decided to grant the honours of war to their prisoners. On entering into possession of the flagship they found that as far as Admiral Ting was concerned he had deprived them of the opportunity of paying this tribute. He was found lying dead in his cabin, and it was ascertained that he had committed suicide. It is clear that Ting was the inspiring spirit of the resistance at Wei-hai-wei. During the siege another squadron, having sought refuge in the Yangtze, refused to emerge to the relief of the northern port, on the ground that it was dangerous for them to proceed beyond their station. Similar dissension to that which had existed on the sea was evident among the Chinese land forces. Two large armies, one of 40,000 and the other of 30,000 men, faced the Japanese at Newchwang, and as the generals in command refused to co-operate, they were beaten separately by the Japanese. These engagements ended the war, for the Chinese realised that they were not in a position to prevent an advance to Peking, and Li Hung-chang, as Chinese plenipotentiary, opened negotiations with Marquis (afterwards Prince) Itō. The pourparlers, which took place in a tea-house at Shimonoseki, were interrupted by a regrettable incident. Li Hung-chang was shot in the face by a Japanese, who, needless to say, was a fanatic. On the recovery of the great statesman the negotiations were resumed, and on April 17, 1895, a treaty was signed, the principal clauses of which were :—

- (1) Recognition of the independence of Korea.
- (2) The cession to Japan of the Kwantung peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadore Islands.

- (3) The payment of an indemnity by China to Japan of 200,000,000 Kuping taels.
- (4) The opening to foreign trade of four ports.

A protest from Russia, Germany, and France (the consequences of which are related in the opening chapter of this book) compelled Japan to restore the Kwantung peninsula to China. As compensation she received an additional 30,000,000 taels.

As a result of the removal of Chinese influences from Korea a struggle began between Japanese and Russian diplomatists to gain ascendancy on behalf of their respective countries in the peninsula kingdom. The period of intrigue which followed and which was one of the primary causes of the Russo-Japanese war is fully described in the chapters of this book dealing with Korea. Outstanding events were the assassination of the Queen of Korea by the Japanese on October 8, 1895; the subsequent flight of the intimidated Emperor to the Russian Legation at Seoul, where he sought sanctuary for a year; and the conclusion of agreements in May 1896 at Seoul, and in July of the same year at St. Petersburg, placing on record the recognition of the independence of Korea by Russia and Japan, and limiting the number of troops to be maintained in the capital by each Power to 1000 men. In 1897 Japan introduced the gold standard, and laws were passed giving additional privileges both to people and press. In May 1900 the Crown Prince married the Princess Sada-ko, daughter of Prince Kujō. In the same year a Japanese contingent of troops took its place in the column, representative of the armies of the Powers of the world, which relieved Peking and suppressed the Boxer rising. On that occasion the exemplary conduct of the Japanese and the efficiency of their organisation favourably impressed the foreign officers who were their comrades. The causes of the war with Russia and some side-lights on the campaign, together with the progress Japan has made in various directions during later years, will be dealt with separately elsewhere.

BOOK II

JAPAN—THE CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW

IX

THE CONSTITUTION

BEFORE describing the popular movement which led to the granting of representative government, it will be of interest to recall the character and composition of some of the deliberative assemblies previously brought into existence. In the days when the Shōgun was in power councils of Kugé and Daimyōs were summoned at intervals. From 1864—a period when the events which led up to the Restoration were beginning to shape themselves—a council of Daimyōs was held every year. It was the custom of the Samurai attached to the various territorial lords to meet and discuss their own affairs. In 1868, when the Shōgun had made formal surrender of his authority, a Constitution was formulated providing for the appointment of supreme administrators, one of whom, it was stipulated, must be a prince of the blood, and a nomination of Kugé and Daimyōs who were to decide important matters of state. The subordinate officers were to consist of Kugé and Daimyōs, together with a certain number of retainers selected by the Emperor. On April 18, 1869, as the result of a solemn oath taken by the sovereign, a deliberative assembly consisting of 276 members, all two-sworded men nominated by the Daimyōs, was called into existence. This singular parliament, which had no power to make laws, was dissolved a year later, and it is recorded that the members were “sent to their homes.” The mere fact, however, that during its existence it had initiated a debate as to whether *hara-kiri* should be abolished or not was, no doubt, sufficient to cause alarm in the minds of its lords and masters, the Daimyōs. The spread of education and the introduction of Western learning soon led to the formulation of a popular demand for constitutional government. The writings of Fukuzawa Yukichi, known as the Sage of Mita, who between

1860 and 1893 produced fifty works which had a sale of three and a half million copies, tended in a large measure to create a public opinion. He possessed a courage the like of which had hitherto been singularly lacking in the writings of the Japanese publicists of the day. For the first time in its history the nation learned from his pen the theory that the Government existed for the people and not the people for the Government. Among other striking things, he said that death was a democrat, and boldly added that the Samurai who died fighting for his country and the servant who was slain while caught stealing from his master were alike dead and useless. In 1873 Count Itagaki, who held a ministerial position, presented a petition to the Government praying that the charter oath taken by his Majesty on April 6, 1868, promising that all measures should be decided by public opinion, might be fulfilled. As he received no satisfactory reply he, together with several of the more advanced among his colleagues, resigned his position in the Cabinet and took the lead in a vigorous agitation for a Constitution. The statesmen who were in power were of opinion that the time was not ripe for representative government. Highly placed military officers who had considerable influence in the affairs of the land were strenuously opposed to the granting of a Constitution at any time. Prominent among these was General (now Prince) Yamagata, who to this day has never become reconciled to the principle of representative government. The country was divided into two great camps. The reactionaries and the reformers frequently came into conflict, and political outrages were of common occurrence. Itagaki himself nearly succumbed to a thrust of the assassin's knife. The authorities resorted to repressive measures, but while for a time they stayed, they were wholly unable to stem the tide which led to constitutional liberty. They were fully occupied in suppressing the Satsuma rebellion, a rebellion, one of the principal causes of which, it must be remembered, was the dissatisfaction of a school of conservatives already alarmed with the reforms instituted by the Government, and who were shocked beyond expression by the mere suggestion of a Constitution. The persistence of Itagaki and his little band was destined to produce a pressure of public opinion which the Government could not withstand.

An outlet for popular sentiment was found in 1880 when local assemblies were established. It was stipulated that the members must be males who had attained the age of twenty-five years, that they must pay ten dollars land-tax, and that they must reside three years in the district where they sought election. The Government endeavoured to soothe agitation by urging that their motive in creating these councils was to prepare the way for the concession of the larger measure of constitutional privileges. The Japanese nation, however, clamoured for a Constitution, and nothing save a Constitution would meet their desires. In 1881 Itagaki and his colleagues organised a Liberal party, and in the same year Count Ōkuma resigned his position as Minister of the Treasury because his representations in favour of the introduction of constitutional government had been rejected. Towards the end of the year the Government found itself no longer able to resist public opinion without taking some definite line of action, and on October 12 the following proclamation was issued declaring that "We shall in the twenty-third year of Meiji (1890) establish a parliament in order to carry into full effect the determination We have announced; and We charge Our faithful subjects bearing Our commissions to make, in the meantime, all necessary preparations to that end." At the same time Itō was ordered to proceed to Europe, and there to investigate the Constitutions of other nations. "We have strongly determined," said an Imperial message to him on the eve of his departure, "to make the new form of government complete and perfect, and We have already made due preparations. Yet it is very important for Us to take the forms of the European Powers into Our consideration before We adopt the one which We consider best suited to Our needs." A year later Count Ōkuma organised the Progressive party. After two years' absence, during which he visited the various capitals of Europe, Itō returned to Japan. In 1884 he began to draft the proposed Constitution, and his great work was not completed until four years later. In the meantime a Privy Council was inaugurated for the purpose of discussing questions regarding the Constitution and the provisions of the Imperial House Law. The Emperor was constantly present at the deliberations of this assembly, and in no small

measure influenced its decisions. "And as often as I was received in audience," wrote Itō, "his Majesty asked questions concerning the Constitution while holding the draft in his hand. Thus our Constitution was formulated under the strict supervision of the Emperor." On February 11, 1889, the Constitution was promulgated in the following terms: "Having, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favoured with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors; and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support, We hereby promulgate, in pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript of the 14th day of the 10th month of the 14th year of Meiji, a fundamental law of State, to exhibit the principles, by which We are to be guided in Our conduct, and to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform.

"The rights of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in future fail to wield them in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby granted.

"We now declare to respect and protect the security of the rights and of the property of Our people, and to secure to them the complete enjoyment of the same, within the extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and of the law.

"The Imperial Diet shall first be convoked for the twenty-third year of Meiji, and the time of its opening shall be the date when the present Constitution comes into force.

"When in the future it may become necessary to amend any of the provisions of the present Constitution, We or Our successors shall assume the initiative right, and submit a project for the same to the Imperial Diet. The Imperial Diet shall pass its vote upon it, according to the conditions imposed by the present Constitution, and in no otherwise shall Our descendants or Our subjects be permitted to attempt any alteration thereof

"Our Ministers of State, on Our behalf, shall be held responsible for the carrying out of the present Constitution, and Our present and future subjects shall forever assume the duty of allegiance to the present Constitution."

— The following Imperial speech was delivered on the occasion of the promulgation of the Constitution :—

"Whereas, We make it the joy and glory of Our heart to behold the prosperity of Our country, and the welfare of Our subjects, We do hereby, in virtue of the supreme power We inherit from Our Imperial Ancestors, promulgate the present immutable fundamental law, for the sake of Our present subjects and their descendants.

"The Imperial Founder of Our House and Our other Imperial Ancestors, by the help and support of the forefathers of Our subjects, laid the foundation of Our Empire upon a basis which is to last forever. That this brilliant achievement embellishes the annals of Our country, is due to the glorious virtues of Our Sacred Imperial Ancestors, and to the loyalty and bravery of Our subjects, their love of their country, and their public spirit. Considering that Our subjects are the descendants of the loyal and good subjects of Our Imperial Ancestors, We doubt not but that Our subjects will be guided by Our views, and will sympathise with all Our endeavours, and that, harmoniously co-operating together, they will share with Us Our hope of making manifest the glory of Our country, both at home and abroad, and of securing forever the stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our Imperial Ancestors."

The Japanese Constitution is a rigid one. Prince Itō, who framed it, has fully explained, in elaborate commentaries, the objects which he desired to attain and the motives which inspired him in drawing up the various provisions. His greatest difficulty was to maintain the doctrine of the sanctity of the Emperor—a doctrine which, in his opinion, would be endangered were the supremacy of the monarchical power to be lessened in the smallest degree—and at the same time make some concession to the popular demand for representative government. How far he succeeded is evident from a study of the Constitution itself—a document so ingeniously framed that it contains no single clause which could be inter-

puted as diminishing the power that had been vested in the Throne for centuries. Itō frankly says that he endeavoured to adopt a monarchical Constitution for Japan in spite of his recognition of the fact that a popular Constitution was best fitted to the conditions that shaped the destinies of Western nations. In short, he wished to bring about what he termed a governmental compromise likely to harmonise with the history of the country. It was not to be wondered at that, while realising that the United States Constitution which provided for a republican government over a vast continental federation was a splendid achievement, he found that it was useless as a source of study in his search for an ideal Constitution for Japan. The British Constitution was altogether too flexible to find favour as a model. The French Constitution was the result of the complete destruction of the monarchical power, and on that ground alone was unsuited to the requirements of Japan. The Prussian Constitution, with its limitations of popular privileges, was more in accord with the conditions in Japan than any other Constitution to be found in the West. To this, therefore, more than to any other source Prince Itō looked for guidance. He contended, however, that the Constitution eventually adopted for Japan was different in essential details from the Constitutions of any other country. The latter, he pointed out, generally resulted from a collision between the ruler and the ruled, while the former was made with one accord between the Emperor and the people in order to protect and to promote the national interest and welfare in combination with all the existing Powers. Prince Itō, however, seems to have overlooked the circumstance that the ruler of Japan had never exercised power to the same extent as Western monarchs, and that the Restoration which led to the demand for constitutional government was the outcome of conflict with the actual ruler, the Shōgun, a conflict which, if it was not conducted by the masses, was undertaken by the majority of clansmen who virtually supplied the place that should have been occupied by the masses.

Article III. of the Constitution reads, "The Emperor is sacred and inviolable," and Itō's comment upon this is a striking revelation of the reverence in which the Japanese

hold their monarch. "The sacred Throne was established at a time when the heavens and the earth became separated' [*Kojiki*]. The Emperor is Heaven-descended, divine and sacred; He is pre-eminent above all His subjects. He must be revered, and is inviolable. He has indeed to pay due respect to the law, but the law has no power to hold Him accountable to it. Not only shall there be no irreverence for the Emperor's person, but also shall He not be made a topic of derogatory comment nor one of discussion."

Article V. stipulates that "the Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet." Itō wished it to be clearly understood that the Emperor was not only the centre of the executive, but was also the source and fountain-head of the legislative power. He did not hold with the tendency in Europe to regard laws as contracts between governing and governed in the enactment of which both sovereign and people had equal share. "The use of the Diet," he commented, "is to enable the Head of the State to perform his functions . . . while the duty of the Diet is to give advice and consent."

Under Article VI. a bill passed by the Diet must be sanctioned by the Emperor before it can become law, and, moreover, a discretionary power rests with the sovereign as to the date upon which it shall be enforced. In this connection Itō explains that laws must necessarily emanate at the command of the Emperor, and hence it is his sanction that makes the law. Article VIII. gives the Emperor authority "in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities," to issue, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial Ordinances in the place of law. "Such Imperial Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future." It is thus competent for his Majesty to dissolve the Diet and to carry on the government of the country by Imperial Ordinance until such time as he may deem it necessary to convoke it again. It may be urged that such a procedure would be altogether out of place in a constitutional country; but it must be remembered, as Prince Itō has told us, that the Constitution of Japan is unlike that

of any other nation. On reassembling, the Diet can annul Imperial Ordinances, but it has no power to take action in respect of their application in the past. No matter what discontent may be felt with regard to the conduct of affairs during a period of dissolution, it is extremely doubtful whether, owing to the doctrine of the divinity of the Emperor held by all classes in the nation, any member of parliament would have the temerity to rise in his place and censure the temporary enactments which had been issued by his Majesty. Other articles relating to the powers of the sovereign declare that he has the supreme command of the army and navy; that he determines the organisation and peace standing of the Imperial forces; that he declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties; that he confers titles of nobility, rank, orders, and other marks of honour; and that he orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments, and rehabilitation. The rights and duties of subjects are clearly defined in fifteen articles, the most important of which (Article XXVIII.) provides that "Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief." Article XIX., which admits all Japanese subjects, irrespective of class, to employment as civil or military officers and in other public positions, was looked upon by the nation as one of the most liberal concessions in the Constitution, because it finally abolished the system of hereditary employment which had hitherto proved an insuperable obstacle to the advancement of the lower orders of society. Article XXIII., stipulating that no Japanese subject should be arrested, detained, tried, or punished unless according to law, was also popular, inasmuch as it defined the duties of the police authorities, who previously had not hesitated on occasions to resort to methods of persecution and, sometimes, even of torture.

There are twenty-two Articles dealing with the Imperial Diet, the functions of which are defined by Itō as follows: To deliberate upon laws, but not to determine them; to receive petitions, to address the Emperor, to put questions to the Government and demand explanations. Representations to the Government which are rejected cannot be made again during the same session. Ministers of the State and the dele-

gates of the Government may at any time take seats and speak in either House. In view of the controversy raised in Great Britain in connection with the House of Lords, it is interesting to recall some of the reasons which animated Itō in his recommendation that a second chamber should be established in Japan. "The establishment of two Houses," he wrote, "has long been followed in European countries, and the good results of the system are testified to by history, which has also proved that countries having but a single chamber have not been free from the evil effects of such a system. (French Constitutions of 1791 and of 1848, and Spanish Constitution of 1812.) In the very country that may be regarded as the mother country of the system of two chambers, some writers have of late declared this system to be an obstacle to the development of the community . . . Still it must be remarked that the object of the establishment of the House of Peers is not limited either to making it a bulwark for the Imperial House or to the preserving of conservative elements. Its establishment is demanded by the necessity of maintaining the organic existence of the State . . . Now, when all the political forces are united in a single House, and are left to the influence of excited passions and abandoned to one-sided movements, with no restraining and equalising power over them, that House may, in the intemperance of biassed excitement, overstep the limits of propriety, and as a consequence, bring about the despotism of the majority, which may in turn lead to anarchy. Evils would be far greater in such a state of things, than they were in the days when there was no representative system at all. If no representative government is instituted, well and good. If, however, there is one, it can never be free from the evil of partiality, without the provision of two chambers." Itō considered that the attack in England on the House of Lords "might be valuable as a stricture upon the temporary evils of the moment, but has no weight in the consideration of the permanent policy of the country."

In another passage Itō declared that if the House of Peers fulfilled its functions it would serve in a remarkable degree to preserve an equilibrium between political powers; to restrain the undue influences of political parties; to check the evil

tendencies of irresponsible discussions; to secure the stability of the Constitution; to be an instrument for maintaining harmony between the governing and the governed; and permanently to sustain the prosperity of the country and the happiness of the people. Furthermore, he explained that the object in having a House of Peers was not merely the admittance of the higher class to some share in the deliberations upon legislative matters, but also representation of the prudence, experience, and perseverance of the people, by assembling together men who had rendered signal service to the State, men of erudition, and men of great wealth. It should be added that the House of Peers in Japan is essentially a bulwark of the Throne, for the monarch selects not only the president and the vice-president, but nominates one-third of the members, who, together with the orders of nobility, command an overwhelming majority. Article LV. provides that "the respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor and be responsible for it." In framing this clause Itō intended that the Ministers should be directly responsible to the Emperor and indirectly so to the people, and that the degree of responsibility of the Minister for such advice should be decided by the sovereign, in virtue of his supreme power over the land. For the Minister-President and other Ministers of State, he commented, being alike personally appointed by the Emperor, the proceedings of each one of them are, in every respect, controlled by the will of the Emperor, and the Minister-President himself has no power of control over the posts occupied by other Ministers, while the latter ought not to be dependent upon the former. He deprecated the Ministry being regarded as a corporate body, on the ground "that the evil of such a system is that the power of party combination will ultimately overrule the supreme power of the sovereign." Financial matters are dealt with in eleven articles, most interesting perhaps of which is Article LXX., which provides that when the Diet cannot be convoked, owing to the external or internal conditions of the country, the Government may take all necessary financial measures by means of an Imperial Ordinance. The next article makes provision against refusal to vote estimates, or the rejection of budgets, by declaring that in such contingencies it shall be competent for the Govern-

ment to carry out the budget of the preceding year. Of the four supplementary rules, the most important is that providing that "when it has become necessary to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project to that effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order." This clause was inserted in order that the principle should be laid down that the right of making amendments must belong to the Emperor himself, as he is regarded as the sole author of the Constitution.

It will be seen that the Constitution of Japan was framed in strict accordance with the national belief in what can only be termed the infallibility of the sovereign. It was assumed that in the event of political supremacy resting on the side of the people it would imply that the sovereign reigned only at their will. An adjustment of the relations between the monarch and his people on these lines would have tended to diminish and eventually destroy the sanctity which from time immemorial had surrounded the Throne. The statesmen who were responsible for the Constitution, while making some concession to the popular demand for representative government, were determined to do nothing that would weaken the fundamental belief of the nation in the doctrine that the supreme power of the Emperor was heaven-conferred and indivisible. For the time being they convinced the great masses of the people that while constitutional government did not involve the surrender of the least tithe of monarchical authority, it nevertheless gave the people a genuine share in the government of the country. "From the nature of the original polity of this country," said Itō, "it follows that there ought to be one, and only one, source of sovereign power of State, just as there is one dominant will that calls into motion each and every distinct part of the human body. The use of the Diet is to enable the head of the State to perform his functions and to keep the will of the State in a well-disciplined, strong, and healthy condition." It might have been expected that the provisions of the Constitution would have satisfied the most exacting loyalist. There were, however, a number of scholars of the Chinese classics in the country who wished to reject not only Western philosophy and learning, but also any system of government which bore resemblance to Western

forms. They thought as their ancestors had thought in the remote ages when the Constitution of the T'ang dynasty found favour in Japan. In their opinion nothing but the perpetuation of a monarchical absolutism would save the nation from decline. It is no exaggeration to say that they firmly believed that every inch of land throughout the Empire and every creature that dwelt upon it belonged wholly to the Emperor. To their objections Itō replied that a legislature was established for the purpose of allowing the people to take part in enacting law; or, in other words, of giving them an opportunity of employing the supreme power of the Throne, and that, moreover, the Emperor, in any negotiations which might proceed with foreign countries, manifested, rather than represented Japan. It does not seem to have seriously occurred to the statesmen of the day that the Emperor who had granted privileges under the Constitution, might conceivably delegate the operation of those privileges to Ministers of doubtful capacity. The people were told that the monarch was the fountain-head of wisdom, and that therefore the "spirit of his illustrious virtue" would animate all who served him. "If the Emperor appoints this or that man to the highest office," said Itō, "it is not for the people to gainsay it." While, as the result of the Constitution, the Japanese received much in the form of religious freedom and social advancement, it must be admitted that the system of representative government granted to them was far from satisfactory. The advisers of the Throne were probably well aware that the nation having just emerged from the throes of feudalism, was unfitted to assume any great degree of responsibility in the matter of legislation. When the masses demanded a constitution they did so under the belief that they were as competent to share in the government as were the masses of the Western nations whose customs and manners they had imported with so much feverish haste. The statesmen of the day, however, were not deceived by superficial evidences of advancement. What they gave with one hand they dexterously took away with the other. In maintaining the supremacy of the Emperor they no doubt realised that they were serving a useful political end. This policy left the valuable asset of the doctrine of divinity wholly unimpaired. Thus the

men who fought in the campaigns against China and Russia were as much imbued with the belief that they were fighting for a god-Emperor as were the Samurai who battled in the days of old; and, in official despatches, the victories attained on land and sea were not attributed to bravery, but were humbly set down to the Illustrious Virtue of his Majesty. The policy of the supremacy of the Emperor, however, will not always serve a useful political end. Already signs are not wanting that the people are beginning to realise the limitations of their so-called representative government.

It is admitted that the Emperor, in exercising his supreme power, seeks the advice of his Ministers; and moreover it is assumed that he frequently accepts such advice. Party cabinets have been a failure in Japan. Hitherto the Throne has largely depended for its guidance upon that small group of Elder Statesmen who began their careers at the time of the Restoration and who are now grown old in years, the liberalism of their youth having given way to the conservatism of age. Meanwhile on all sides there are evidences that the nation has not stood still. There may be some doubt as to whether the advancement which it has made in some directions constitutes real progress, but that is altogether too abstract a problem to be discussed within the limits of this chapter. Labour troubles are of constant occurrence; public meetings at which the popular voice is loudly heard are frequently organised; newspapers freely criticise what they term "clan-government"; the emancipation of women has begun, and a little band of ardent socialists is already spreading its propaganda throughout the land. The answer of the Government to these popular movements takes the form of repression. Leaders are thrown into prison, crowds are dispersed by police armed with swords, strikers are arrested, and newspapers are suppressed and their editors either fined or sent to gaol. Whenever the will of the people, as expressed in the House of Representatives, is in serious conflict with the Government, an Imperial Ordinance of dissolution is issued. On these occasions the Ministers justify the advice which they give to their Emperor by asserting that it is constitutional, that it has been accepted by him, and that it is the manifestation of his supreme power. It will be clear to the student of history that

such a condition of affairs cannot continue. Although it may be patent to some of her leading statesmen that Japan is outgrowing her strength, and that she is adopting some of the worst features of Western life, unless they are prepared to make concessions they will be powerless to allay popular indignation. The people will not always accept the assurance that ministerial measures are the manifestation of the supreme power of the Emperor.

The Elder Statesmen are dwindling in numbers, and when they have passed away altogether it may be that their influence will die with them. The only prospect for internal peace lies in the hope that a younger school of statesmen will succeed them, and that these will have the wisdom to realise that constitutional privileges must be extended. The present advisers of the Emperor are not true believers in party politics, and the awe in which they hold the monarch would make them hesitate before suggesting to him that he should relinquish any of his constitutional power.

The rising generation of Japanese may not be so deeply affected by traditional influences, and perhaps among them there may be one sufficiently daring to represent to his Majesty that he should amend the Constitution and surrender some of his rights to the people. It is difficult to imagine a proposal for the extension of popular privileges coming from the Throne itself. Although the Emperor goes among his people on special occasions, his life is one of comparative seclusion. He is surrounded by statesmen who are courtiers, and who are opposed to any further concession to the people which would be at the expense of the monarchical supremacy; and beyond the statements which they make to him he has no satisfactory way of ascertaining the trend of public opinion. It cannot be denied that the nation is beginning to realise the iron-bound limitations of its Constitution, and before long will formulate an irresistible demand for revision. When that time arrives there will assuredly be conflict if concessions are not forthcoming—a conflict which, as in the days of the Shōgunate and the Satsuma rebellion, will be directed against the Government of the day, but will in no way affect the stability of the Throne.

X

THE LAW

THE great source of law in Japan, as in most other countries, was the early religion of the people. Custom, no doubt, played a modifying part, but it was so inspired by moral motives arising from religious conceptions that it is difficult to give it a distinct originaive value. Nothing emerges more clearly from a remote past which depends for its memories mainly upon legend than the conclusion that man's every act or omission, which revealed any kind of communal foresight, was suggested by faith rather than by reason. The notions of right and wrong, the ideas of property and duty, binding together a heterogeneous community, had no sanction but that of a supposed supernatural fiat. Religion was the broad basis of all administrative procedure, and it was only by its power that the natural principles of humanity were restrained and that a rude system of justice was gradually developed and elaborated into a code of law by the process of adjudication and legislation. Japan was not peculiar in this respect. The empires of the Occident passed through analogous phases. In all of them theocracy had its day. The Greeks believed in law as "the discovery and the gift of God," and, although the influence of the priestly colleges in Rome may be overestimated by de Courlanges and some historians with similar leanings, it left an abiding impression upon the statutes of this period. In England—by an exaggeration with a nucleus of truth—it was said in the reign of Henry VI. that *Scripture est commun ley sur quel tout manieres de leis sont fondés*. But the spiritual sanction for the legal system of Japan was stronger than that of any Western law.

The feudal systems of East and West have often challenged comparison, but it is seldom that due emphasis is laid upon the disparate features of the two institutions. Moreover, it is

hardly ever pointed out that both in England and Japan at the present day the class distinctions and the uncontrolled rights of wealth represent what might be called the biological struggle of the feudal sentiment to maintain existence in a changed environment. Feudalism is dead in neither country. Its outward visible signs have passed away in nearly every direction, but its inward invisible grace survives. Its spirit strengthened many a failing arm on the slopes around Port Arthur and prompted many a husky cheer on the heights of Spion Kop. Yet the society that thrived in Japan during the Middle Ages had no parallel in Western civilisation. The tenure of land and the terms of military service had some points of similitude, but they were marked for ever by an important distinction. After the Norman conquest of England the *dominium directum* was established—no such thing as the *allodium*, or entire ownership existed—and all the land in the kingdom was vested in the Crown. The military organisation, too, with its ideals of loyalty, honour and chivalry, may have had its likeness to that of Japan, but in England the feudal lordship carried with it none of the attributes of divinity, and the sovereign claimed no pontifical dominion. It was otherwise in Japan. A vast assemblage of ill-matched clans was united loosely under a duarchy. The honours of kingship were divided, generally unequally, between the Church and the Army, and the story of the laws is the story of the conflicts between the religious and military powers of the State. These were engaged throughout the ages in those struggles which have had the result among all nations either of disastrous fanaticism or triumphant democracy.

Once in Japan the Mikado lived in a mud hut, wore hempen robes, and mingled freely with his subjects, relying upon the spiritual aspects of his sovereignty for safety and respect. But the star of a new civilisation rose above the horizon of Honshū. It was the ominous precursor of an era of Chinese culture in which a monarch in sackcloth was doomed to make way for a pontiff in silk. The emperors, with no inherited desire to exalt themselves, were disinclined at first to accept imported grandeur; but there were far-seeing nobles in their *entourage*—politicians, kingmakers, even social philosophers. These men saw that there was a tide in the affairs of Japan

which, taken at the flood, must lead to fortune, and they coaxed the Emperor into reluctant ostentation. They bowed him into perfumed chambers against his will; they fawned upon him and flattered him to the top of his bent; they became learned in the theology of the sun descent; they protested that Incarnate God should be no common highway vision, and they insisted that the Son of Heaven should not soil his hands with law and politics. Incarnate deity saw reason in the argument and retired to a cushion, leaving the Kugé family of the famous Fujiwara tribe masters of the situation. If these members of the Japanese aristocracy were not of divine ancestry, as they themselves contended, they were blessed throughout five centuries with an inspiration which the gods withheld from their celestial chief. They anticipated the teaching of Hegel that the rise of law indicated the evolution of the Deity, and they taught that the evolution of the Deity meant the perfection of his earthly vicegerent. The Imperial Palace became as the Ark of the Covenant, and when courtiers made obeisance at the sight of it, the populace were stricken with awe. Success has its perils, and whatever indulgence the Fujiwara deserved as the reward of their statesmanship, these potent nobles were slowly overpowered by the very culture which had been their making. Ease followed triumph and licence followed ease until, at last, a set of listless Sybarites found themselves compelled to acknowledge their own incapacity and to hand over the control of civil and military affairs to the Buké. Thus ended the Fujiwara sway, and a religious aristocracy was superseded by a military supremacy under which the Court was thrust into the background. The long period of the Minamoto regents, or Shōgun rulers, had begun. Yet, even when the military power preponderated there was always a spiritual hand pressing down the scale. Above and beyond all still was the Emperor, stripped of prerogative it might be, but withal an object of worship, a fearsome spectre of religious might, an Inca descended from the sun. "About his sacred person," Lafcadio Hearn wrote, "we see the tribes ranged in obeisance—each tribe maintaining its own ancestral cult, and the clans forming these tribes, and the communities forming these clans, and the households forming these communities, have

all their separate cults, and out of the mass of these cults have been derived the laws and customs." A rigorous legal system existed in the earliest times—more than six hundred years before Christ. The offices of the Government were filled by the heads of the clans, and most of these dignitaries discharged pontifical functions. The extent of the religious influence is well indicated by the criminal code of the period, which was confined mainly to offences against ecclesiastical rule. Part of the Chinese legal system had been introduced in A.D. 645, and the constitution which was then set up under Kōtoku Tennō was adapted intermittently to the needs of the Empire until forty years ago. Under the new *régime* the country was divided into prefectural districts and villages, and each division and sub-division had an officer, whose duty it was to watch over the priestly ceremonies and to administer the area committed to his charge. Conscription was introduced, the land was nationalised, every subject receiving the life tenancy of a plot with reversion to the Crown, and the criminal and civil laws were codified. Yet the country was not prepared for the revolutionary changes that had their origin in the vague velleities of an advanced section rather than in the striving of a whole people after a necessary development. The land system broke down, the military organisation was rent assunder by the turbulence of warring dynasties, and many an imported law of China became a dead letter. Amid the bickerings and hostilities of military leaders the Shōgun rule developed apace. A powerful generalissimo with a multitude of vassals, having once proved himself capable of subduing a province, had little difficulty in obtaining the imprimatur of authority from the sovereign, and he delegated the administrative functions to favourite retainers or to chosen military captains. In this way the central government was weakened and an administration with the name of Bakufu was established. Under this the Shōgun had almost limitless powers. He was required, it is true, to own fealty to his sovereign lord the Emperor, and to submit decrees to the Crown on definite matters of urgent public importance, but his references were few and his reverence was formal. All the while the spirit of change brooded persistently over Japan, and when Hōjō Yasutoki came to codify the law in 1232, his

work gave eternal testimony to the wisdom of his predecessors. How far the admixture of old and new, of tradition, superstition and jurisprudence, was due to the astuteness of man and how far it was the product of an unconscious expansion of the social organism, may never be fully ascertained, but it is certain that there was a statesmanship in the laws as codified by Yasutoki which recalls in its diplomacy the tactful concessions made to the Saxons during the Roman colonisation of England. The code gave unstinted recognition to the ancient ecclesiastical rights, and to the mass of custom which had grown into a common law. The entire system of land tenure, for which the period is memorable, could never have been attended by the smallest degree of success had it not been built upon that broad morality which had become the *consuetudo*, and therefore the law, as administered by the magistracy. In the Hōjō code the three elements of ecclesiasticism, usage, or custom, and feudalism are ingeniously interwoven. The very first sections of the law decreed that the Shintō shrines and the Buddhist temples should not be suffered to fall into disrepair, that the religious ceremonial should be sedulously performed, and that the festivals of the faith should be observed. The eighth section in itself formed a sort of Settled Land Act by forbidding any one to challenge the title of him who held a fief for twenty years, or to disturb the holding of a tenure which became akin to that of the Indian ryot or to the Roman emphyteusis. Protectors of provinces were not to interfere with the civil authorities, such as the lords of the manors, but were to confine themselves to their military and police duties, and the manorial jurisdiction was to be continued without let or hindrance. However, if the codified law bore a resemblance in many respects to that of the Romans, it is clear from several of the sections that women were not subjected to the disabilities which characterised their position *propter animi levitatem* in the time of Gaius. The code established privity of motive in offences implying premeditation between husband and wife, but it declared, on the other hand, that when a husband made his wife or concubine the grantee of a fief, she was entitled to retain possession after divorce unless she had been guilty of misconduct. Moreover, the privilege, first granted to women

by Yoritomo, of adopting children with rights of heritage was confirmed. Many sections dealt with the succession to fiefs, their distribution and confirmation, and the code then refers to the prevalence of brigandage and depredation by bandits and "gangs of evil-minded persons" in terms that are worthy of the pompous morality and mediæval recriminations of a Georgian preamble. It demands rhetorically of the people whether *gōtō*, or robbery with violence, and *settō*, or covert thieving, could possibly be punished better than by death, and it invokes the high principles of abstract justice rather than any concrete expediency to excuse the outlawry of incendiaries. The offences mentioned in most of the other sections afford evidence of the immutable characteristics of human nature, whether in the East or in the West. False pretences, champerty, forgery, malicious prosecutions, and other abuses of the legal process come under the veto of a system which, rude as it was in many respects, gave remarkable proof of that natural adaptability which has since responded to still greater change.

It was under the Tokugawa Shōgunate that feudalism attained its highest efficiency. The One Hundred Articles were manifestly compiled by jurists of comprehensive vision and extraordinary perspicacity; and their work served as a solid foundation for the criminal code of the present day. These articles have been elaborated in terms, but they remain largely unaltered in principle. The two prominent features of the Tokugawa legislation were the restriction of foreign intercourse—Christianity was banned from the same motives that dictated the English *præmunire*—and the division of the community into sharply defined classes. The conservative notion of society that every man should rest content with the position in life to which it had pleased the gods to call him was solemnly embodied in the law, and that the law might be carried out the more easily the *heimin*, or common people, were not permitted to gratify their ambitions to enter the military and civil professions. But the great climacteric was at hand. Civilisation with its breed of merchant venturers had linked up the uttermost parts of the earth, and had established commercial intercourse, and it was not to be expected that the nation which did not despise, at one period of its existence, the culture of China could long remain impervious to

all that was valuable in the experience of the Occident. Public opinion was stirring more strongly towards progress than it had ever stirred in the history of Japan. The people, as a mass, suddenly became conscious that their continued existence, without the bondage of an alien race, depended upon the attainment of the dignity of nationhood in the eyes of the Western Powers; the Tokugawa regency was swept away and an Imperial *régime* was established. The first act after the Restoration was the issue of an Imperial rescript which did not conceal its homage to the democracies of the West. It convoked conferences all over the country for the public discussion of affairs, and, although the law, after the manner of the Code Napoleon, continued to recognise the family, not the individual, as the social unit, there was a genuine attempt to beget in every member of the community a spirit of patriotism and citizenship which carried with it a Western independence. It is hard for Europeans to realise the import of the *coup d'état*. No more abrupt change had been brought about in the destinies of any nation, and the East was the last direction in which Powers who were engaged in perplexed speculations upon spheres of influence looked for so wonderful a transformation. The Tokugawa administration was regarded as having attained the pinnacle of juridical wisdom, and nobody dreamed that Oriental statesmanship could have gone further. It had placed to its insular credit a decree against the building of vessels large enough to cross the ocean; it had contemned the foreigner as a swaggering upstart; it had mimicked the legislation of the Medes. All this, too, it had done with success. Within fourteen years of the fall of feudalism Japan owned but three ships with more than one mast, designed upon the European model; the days of chivalry were not forgotten, and the common people were in a state of vassalage. Not much earlier in the West, the doctrines of individualism, which had emanated from the French *Économistes*, were revising the statute-book beyond recognition and were shaking the thrones of kings. The fierce pæans to abstract liberty, and the wild incantations to the goddess of Reason, were unheard, or, at all events, were unheeded in the far-flung islands of the East. Yet Europe was legislating for Japan. The experience that the

one had to buy with blood the other was to assimilate in peace. The time was not distant when, in spite of the Little Japan party, the English, French, and German laws were to be adapted, as best they could, to the needs of a people who had slain the feudal lord and had denied him the complimentary ceremony of a state funeral. The country took the medicine for its sickly weal with only a futile murmuring. In 1871 a Right-House and a Left-House were established—though it was nearly twenty years later when the first Imperial Diet was held—and in the same year the Tōkyō court of justice was opened. During the next four years one supreme court and four courts of appeal, besides a number of lower courts, were instituted. The revision of the criminal, civil, and commercial codes was begun, and laws were promulgated for the organisation of the central government. The present judicial system is divided into four sections—the supreme court, appeal courts, local courts, and district courts—to each of which public procurators are attached. Although the number of judges is variable, as it is in most countries, according to the needs of litigation, recent statistics give a fair idea of the system :—

Courts.	Judges.	Procurators.
Supreme (<i>Cour de Cassation</i>) 1	28	7
Appeal 7	141	36
First Instance 49	702	144
Local 310	494	296
Courts of Taiwan 8	23	9

Down to 1872 the judicial department was a law court and an executive office combined; but in that year the functions were separated, and the courts were founded upon the French model. The procedure of France, because it was inquisitorial, was better suited to the Japanese than that of any other country, with the possible exception of Germany, which had introduced the *Constitutio Criminalis Carolina*. At one time it was not permissible under Japanese law to convict unless the accused had made a confession of his guilt, and this led to the infliction of tortures which

equalled, if they did not surpass, in intensity those practised in England during the Middle Ages. At present the judge himself conducts the trial. Except through him counsel cannot put questions to a witness, and the admissions of a lawyer are considered to be the admissions of his client. The judiciary is composed mainly of graduates of the Law College of the Imperial University and of the eight private law schools in the Empire. The judicial system, however, is open to grave criticism. The judges are so poorly paid that it is not many years since they went out on strike. Their salaries vary from £60 to £400 a year, and it is only the questionable dignity associated with the office, and the practical experience of the law which a seat on the bench may provide, that induce members of the Bar to undertake the duties temporarily. The cleverest lawyers cannot afford to retain judicial office, and they invariably resign to take up private practice.

It would be idle to pretend that Japan could attain at once, merely by a change of Constitution and the adoption of European laws, a sound system of justice. It is obvious to any one who reads even the latest penal code (1908) that its articles represent not empirical laws but borrowed principles, expressed loosely in terms which are foreign in their connotation to the Oriental mind. The code recognises a European morality which must be impracticable for many years among an Eastern people with Eastern traditions, an Eastern temperament, and an Eastern faith; and it embodies ideals for which English political parties with conscientious scruples have fought for long but have never yet attained. It may be regarded as prescient rather than practical, but nothing could indicate more distinctly the difficulties which Japan has undertaken to surmount that she may preserve her position in an altered age. It is beyond the power of statesmanship to mould a people to a new social life merely by altering the laws of the land, and the impossibility of doing so is becoming more apparent daily in Japan. While the legislature seized eagerly upon the improvements that European experience had achieved, the executive departments, which are closely in touch with the people, were comparatively neglected. The police force in the cities, for example, long

remained inadequate, and the result was that the officers of the law, high and low, went in fear of the criminal classes. At best, they could not be expected to risk life and limb for the miserable salaries that they received. Moreover, the police have little modern training. Besides the police there is a further safeguard which, it is to be presumed, is preserved as a relic of antiquity rather than as an office of utility. Watchmen go their rounds by night, not wearing india-rubber shoes to steal a march on evil-doers, but provided with two pieces of hard wood which they clap together to make sure that their own devotion to duty and the criminal's success in crime cannot be attributed, in any event, to somnambulism. The failure of the whole system of administration of the criminal law has become flagrantly clear since the termination of the Russo-Japanese war. The thousands of coolies, who acted as *calones* to the Japanese troops during the Manchurian campaign, were permitted to plunder and devastate the villages through which they passed, and it is not surprising that, upon the cessation of hostilities, they should prefer to exist as freebooters rather than live as honest labourers. Thus crimes of theft and robbery with violence have increased rapidly since the war. Drunkenness has become prevalent, and assaults arising from debauchery—assaults which result invariably in maiming, if not in murder—have multiplied at an alarming rate.

The Penal Code classifies offences as acts against the Imperial family, against the internal, or the external safety of the State, against international intercourse, and against the disturbance of public business, prison-breaking, riot, arson, inundation of property, destruction of means of communication, intrusion into dwellings without lawful cause, the sale of opium, the poisoning of water sources, counterfeiting the coinage, forgery of documents, perjury, indecency, gambling, desecration of temples and graves, abuse of public authority, homicide, infliction of bodily harm, abandonment of children, unlawful arrest, intimidation, abduction and seduction, libel and slander, larceny, and fraud and embezzlement. The inflammable materials of which the houses are built may be responsible for a firm attitude towards incendiarism. Article 108 declares that a person who burns a structure, or a train,

or an electric car, or a mine-pit, in which any other person happens to be at the time of the act, shall be punished with death or with penal servitude for a term of more than two years. Capital punishment may also be inflicted upon any person who removes the dam of a river or a reservoir, or in any way causes water to inundate, or submerge a steam-engine, an electric car, or a mine-pit, should his act involve the loss of life. The unlawful entry into and the refusal to leave any dwelling, structure, or vessel, the Imperial Palace or grounds, the Imperial shrine or the Imperial burial-place, render the offender liable to penal servitude not exceeding three years, or to a fine of not less than 50 yen. The demoralisation wrought by the opium habit has led to the promulgation of a special Article which makes the opium smoker or opium eater liable to penal servitude for any period under three years, and still heavier penalties may be imposed upon persons who import, manufacture, or offer for sale opium or any form of the drug, persons who have in their possession any plant or apparatus for its manufacture, or persons who furnish rooms for the convenience of opium smokers or opium eaters. The poisoner of any drinking fountain, aqueduct, or reservoir, or of the source of any water supply for human consumption, may be sent into penal servitude for a period varying from six months to five years; or for life should his act have brought about the death of any person. The making of base coin is punished, not by death as it was once in European countries, but by penal servitude for life, or for any shorter term. It is necessary in every case to prove the *mens rea*. Article 152 declares that if a person, having received any coin, paper money, or bank note, puts it into circulation, well knowing it to be false, he shall be liable to a fine of three times the nominal value, but in no case less than one yen. A person who forges a document or a map relating to some contractual right or obligation, or who forges a name-stamp or a signature with intent to defraud, may be sent to penal servitude lasting from three months to five years. The maximum penalty is extended to ten years in the case of the forgery or falsification of Government loan bonds, public bonds, share certificates of commercial companies, or "any other paper of value." The same penalty may be imposed

upon a witness who makes a false statement on oath, but if he "denounces his offence to the proper authorities" before the conclusion of the case in which the false evidence has been given, or before the judgment of the court has become binding, the penalty may be reduced or entirely remitted. The same law applies to false interpretation or translation upon oath in a court of law.

The clauses dealing with gaming and lotteries are vague—perhaps designedly so—and, in the absence of a record of case-made law, it would be impossible to interpret them. For example, it is declared that if any person, taking the chances of gain or loss, makes a bet or a wager, he shall be liable to a fine of not less than 1000 yen, but "that betting or wagering for mere pleasure" shall not come within the rule. Habitual play for money, or habitual wagering, is punishable by penal servitude, and those who aid and abet others in the violation of the law, either by keeping gambling dens or by selling lottery tickets, are liable, for the former offence, to five years' penal servitude, and, for the latter, to heavy fines. The law of murder, as it is laid down in the Code, appears to be capable of an extraordinary latitude of interpretation. It is baldly stated that "a man who kills another person shall be punished with death, or with penal servitude for life, or for more than ten years." There is no reference to malice prepense, and there is no authority for the infliction of capital punishment upon the offender where the death of another follows the infliction of intentional bodily harm. Again, different penalties are tabulated for those who inflict bodily harm on others through negligence, but there is no attempt at a definition of negligence, and it does not seem that he who causes the death of another while committing a felony—if we except inundation, incendiarism, and robbery with violence—can be arraigned upon the capital charge. These matters must rest upon judicial dicta based upon a form of common law, but it is well known that the rulings of the Japanese Bench are inadequately recorded and are not always followed. Thus, the discretion left to a judge, who is not bound by precedent and is not restrained by statute, is without those limitations which constitute in other countries some of the strongest safeguards of human liberty.

Threats against the life, liberty, property, or reputation are punishable with penal servitude for less than one year, or by a fine of less than 100 yen. Article 230 deals particularly with offences against the reputation, but its terms are diffuse, and they must depend for their construction upon the practice of the courts. It is not clear under this Article whether it is necessary to prove damage. The next chapter of the Code imposes penal servitude for less than three years, or a fine of less than 1000 yen, upon those who circulate a false rumour, or use dishonest means in order to injure the credit of others or to bring damage to their occupation. The penalty for robbery with violence or by intimidation is penal servitude for any term more than five years, but if the offender has inflicted bodily harm upon his victim he may receive a life sentence. Ten years' penal servitude is the maximum penalty for taking advantage of the inexperience of a minor, or of the imbecility of any person, and appropriating his property. Embezzlement and the receiving of stolen goods are punishable by penal servitude or by fines according to the gravity of the offence, and the destruction of public documents, or deeds conferring contractual rights or obligations, may also be severely punished. The last Article of the Code reads: "A person who abstracts, or suppresses, a letter belonging to another, shall be punished with penal servitude or imprisonment for less than six months, or with a fine or minor fine of less than 50 yen." Failure to pay a fine involves committal, not to prison, but to a workhouse. Probational suspension of a penalty in cases where the convict has been sentenced to penal servitude or imprisonment for less than two years may be allowed by the judge for a period varying from one to five years.

A mass of law is to be found in the Commercial Code, which presents a contrast with that of the Criminal Code. There are here definitions and explanations which constitute well-marked boundaries for the guidance of the Bench and for the instruction of the trader. The invention of the corporation aggregate, which has been said by a high authority in England to have contributed more than any other human device to civilisation and freedom, has received complete recognition. Commercial companies formed under the pro-

visions of the Code are known generally as *kwaisha*, and each of the four compounds of the word denotes a distinct legal entity. The *gōmei-kwaisha*, the *gōshi-kwaisha*, and the *kabushikigōshi-kwaisha* are respectively ordinary, limited, and joint-stock partnerships, and the *kabushiki-kwaisha* represents the joint-stock limited liability company. The *kabushiki-kwaisha* is an artificial or juristic person, analogous to the English corporation, with neither a soul to be damned nor a body to be kicked. The *gōmei-kwaisha*, or ordinary partnership, must be formed under a written contract which specifies (1) the object of the partnership, (2) its trade title, (3) the name and domicile of each partner, (4) the address of the chief office and the branch offices, and (5) the amount of the contribution of each partner, and the method employed in estimating his interest in the partnership. Section 63 of the Code—the admirable translation by Dr. L. Lönholm is used—corresponds with Section 9 of the English Partnership Act, 1890, including its reference to Scotland. It makes the partners jointly and severally liable when the obligations of the firm cannot be wholly satisfied out of the partnership property. Registration must be made within two weeks of the completion of the partnership contract at the principal office and at each branch office, and the following facts must be set forth : (1) the purpose with which the partnership has been formed ; (2) its trade title ; (3) the name and address of each member ; (4) the principal and each branch office ; (5) the date of formation ; (6) the term of duration and causes for ultimate dissolution, if any ; (7) the nature of the contribution of each partner and the money value of any contribution that takes the form of property ; (8) the arrangements made for the representation of the partnership and the names of those partners who are authorised to act on behalf of the others should such an agreement then exist. A partner is not permitted to do any act or to embark on any enterprise which conflicts with the interests of the partnership. For instance, he may not undertake commercial transactions which are concerned with the kind of business that is carried on by the partnership, and he may not become a partner with unlimited liability in another partnership that has been formed for similar purposes. In this respect the law re-

semples that in England (Section 30, Partnership Act, 1890). Lord Lindley laid it down in 1891 (*Aas v. Benham*, 2 Ch. 244) that every partner must account to the firm for every benefit derived by him without the consent of his co-partners for any transaction concerning the partnership. . . . "It is equally clear," he added, "that if a partner, without the consent of his co-partners, carries on business of the same nature as, and competing with, that of the firm, he must account for and pay over to the firm all profits made by him in the business." The Japanese Code, however, decrees that if the partner undertakes such a commercial transaction for his own account, it is for the other partners to decide by a majority whether that transaction is to be considered as having been done on account of the partnership. Article 67, which declares that "the partnership must not distribute any profits until all losses have been made good," embodies a principle which can hardly receive less practical recognition in Japan than it does in England, although it has always had the support of judicial authority. It has been held that a dividend presupposes a profit, and yet it is well known that a distribution of capital frequently takes place in spite of the prohibitions enacted. When the duration of the partnership is not fixed by the contract made by its members, or when its duration is fixed for the lifetime of a partner, any partner may withdraw at the end of the business year upon giving six months' notice. In this connection there is a vague proviso which permits a partner to withdraw "if an unavoidable necessity exists for doing so." Here the paucity of reported cases makes it impossible to offer any guidance, but although it might be expected that a wide discretion would be left to the judge in the interpretation of the clause, the conditions of the administration in Japan do not permit the equitable consideration of special circumstances. The membership of a partner may also be terminated (1) by any cause set forth in the contract; (2) by the consent of the other parties; (3) by bankruptcy; (4) by death; (5) by the partner's being adjudged incompetent; and (6) by expulsion. A partner may be expelled by the unanimous resolution of the other partners (1) when he fails to make his contribution, or withholds it for an unreasonable time after he has been asked to

make it; (2) when he shows disloyalty to the partnership by undertaking transactions in a rival business, or by becoming a partner with unlimited liability in another partnership carrying on the same kind of business; (3) when he commits a dishonest act towards the partnership either by his conduct as its representative or by fraudulent mismanagement of its affairs; (4) when he interferes with the management of the partnership business without being entitled to do so; and (5) when he neglects to perform an essential duty as a partner. The liability of a partner incurred before the conclusion of his membership continues until his withdrawal has been registered at the principal office. This liability, however, is extinguished by prescription after two years from the time of registration. The causes of dissolution are those generally recognised under European law, namely, effluxion of time, termination or completion of the venture, consent of the partners, consolidation or amalgamation' with another business, bankruptcy, and the order of the court.

The *gōshi-kwaisha*, or limited partnership, consists of one or more partners with limited liability and one or more partners with unlimited liability. In addition to the matters to be registered upon the formation of an ordinary partnership it is necessary in this case to specify whether the liability of each partner is limited or unlimited. The contribution of a partner with limited liability must be made in money or other property, not in services or credit. The management of the partnership business must be conducted by the partners with unlimited liability, and the "special" partners have no share in their rights or duties. The partner with limited liability, however, is at liberty to undertake commercial transactions in the kind of business that is carried on by the partnership, and he may become a member with unlimited liability in another commercial company carrying on the same kind of business. On the other hand, it is only the partners with unlimited liability who are entitled to represent the partnership, and if a partner with limited liability does an act which is calculated to produce the belief that he is a partner with unlimited liability, he is liable to third persons who have dealt with him in good faith. The *gōshi-kwaisha* is necessarily dissolved when the membership either of all

the partners with unlimited liability, or of all the partners with limited liability is terminated.

The *kabushiki-kwaisha* corresponds with the joint-stock limited company, and, after the conditions in the fourth chapter of the Code have been complied with, its status as a legal "person" is precisely that of a company incorporated in England under the Companies Acts. In an ordinary partnership each member is personally responsible for the debts contracted by the firm, but in the joint-stock limited company the liability of the members to its creditors ceases when they have paid all the calls properly made upon them by the directors or by the liquidator. Moreover, the shares in the joint-stock company are transferable at the will of a holder without the consent of the other members. The company contract, or, as it is known in England, the memorandum of association, must state: (1) The object for which the company is formed; (2) its trade name; (3) the full amount of its capital; (4) the value of each share; (5) the share qualification of the directors; (6) the address of the principal and each branch office; (7) the manner in which the public notifications of the company are to be made; and (8) the names and domiciles of the promoters, of whom there must be seven at least. It is imperative that this information shall appear in the contract, but it is permissible, without rendering the contract void, to postpone the statement of the directors' share qualifications, the address of the principal and branch offices, and the manner in which public announcements of the company are to be made, until the general meeting for organisation or a general meeting of shareholders agrees upon them. A resolution passed at such a general meeting must have "the vote of a majority in value of those present, who must represent at least one-half in number and value of all the shareholders." If the quorum necessary to pass the resolution under these conditions is not present, those who have attended may pass a provisional resolution by vote of a majority in value. The contents of the resolution must be communicated to every shareholder, and, if certificates to bearer are issued, must be published. Another meeting of shareholders must then be summoned within a period of not less than one month to

decide by a vote of a majority of those present whether the provisional resolution shall be adhered to, or not. Any decision that may have been reached by the promoters upon the following matters can be validly carried into effect only if it is inserted in the company contract : (1) The duration of the company or the causes of its dissolution ; (2) the issue of shares above par ; (3) special benefits to be conferred upon promoters, together with the names of the beneficiaries ; (4) the names of those persons whose contributions consist in property (not money), the nature and value of such property, and the number of shares given in exchange ; (5) the expenses of formation to be borne by the company, and the amount of any compensation to be paid to the promoters. The wording of Article 122 of the Code as regards these matters is worth attention. It appears that unless a decision has been reached by the promoters there is no need for their inclusion in the company contract. If all the shares have been taken by the promoters, the company comes into existence. In this case the promoters must not delay in making the first payment, "which shall not be less than one quarter of the whole amount to be paid in," and they must appoint the directors and "inspectors" or auditors. The next step is to be taken by the directors. They must make written application to the court at once for the appointment of examiners to inquire whether the first payment has been made, and to investigate any statement in the company contract upon the benefits to promoters, the contributions in property other than money, the expenses of formation, and the compensation to promoters. The court may then order any alterations to be made after it has heard the case for the promoters and directors, but the decision is always subject to appeal. The company must next register, at its principal and at each branch office, its object, its trade name, its capital, the value of each share, the manner of public announcements, its official addresses, the date of formation, its duration and causes of dissolution, the amount paid on each share, the rate of interest, if it has been resolved to pay interest from the beginning of the business, and the names and domiciles of the directors and auditors. The capital must be divided into equal shares, and no shares must be

issued at less than par. The value of a share cannot be less than 50 yen, unless in cases where the whole amount is paid up at once, when the share may be reduced to a value not lower than 20 yen. Notice of a call upon shares must be issued at least two weeks before the money is to be paid, and if, after a second notice, the call remains unpaid, the Code, unlike the English Company Acts, declares that the shareholder shall forfeit his rights. A clause to this effect is generally inserted in the articles of association of English companies, but in the absence of such a provision the law does not sanction forfeiture or surrender without the sanction of the courts. The form of application, or instrument of subscription, used in Japan is designed on the pattern of that demanded in the German commercial code, and it offers a protection to the shareholder against misrepresentation by the promoters of the company that is not afforded under English law. A verbal application, or an informal letter, is not allowed. An intending shareholder must fill in a form which gives the date of the formation of the company, its addresses, its objects, its total capital, the value of each share, the amount of the first call, its methods of giving public notices, the period of its duration, the number of shares taken by the directors, and the names and domiciles of the promoters and the number of shares taken by each. If the shares are issued at a premium, the value for which the shares are taken must be inserted by the subscriber in his application, which must be sent to the company in duplicate. The provisions for the general meeting of organisation, known in England as the statutory meeting, and for the discussion of the company's affairs by the shareholders at fixed intervals resemble those in this country. When subscriptions are invited from the public, the directors—at least three—must be elected by the general meeting of organisation. No director is to be appointed for longer than three years, though he is eligible for re-election upon the expiration of that period. A director may be removed from office at any time by a resolution passed by the shareholders in general meeting, but should he be removed without reasonable cause he may sue the company for any damages that he may have suffered. The Board is bound to keep at the

principal and at each branch office a copy of the company contract and records of all resolutions passed at the general meetings, and at the principal office a list of share and debenture holders, and any shareholder or creditor may demand an inspection of these documents at any time during the business hours of the company. The directors must submit to the auditors of the company the following documents one week before the day appointed for an ordinary general meeting: (1) An inventory, (2) a balance-sheet, (3) a report on the company's business, (4) an account of the profits and losses, and (5) proposals as regards the institution of a reserve fund and the distribution of profits and interest. The auditors must then make a written report, and this, together with the documents submitted to the auditors by the directors, must be open to the inspection of the shareholders at the principal office of the company on the day before the general meeting. Should the shareholders approve of these documents at their meeting they absolve both directors and auditors from further responsibility in respect to the matters contained in the documents, unless it can be proved afterwards that any of these officials have acted dishonestly. After the approval of the shareholders has been given, it is the duty of the directors to publish the balance-sheet. Companies formed in Japan, unlike those in England, must appropriate a part of the profits—one-twentieth—to a reserve fund until that fund amounts to one-fourth of the capital. It is true that in England nearly every company provides for the creation of a reserve fund out of profits, but Section 74, Table A, of the Companies Act, 1862, which represents the legislation on the point, is purely permissive. Nothing is said in the Code about the investment of the reserve fund, and although the mandatory effect of the clause in question may prevent, up to a certain point, the representation of reserves in the balance-sheet merely by the overvaluation of assets, it is well known that some joint-stock companies in Japan are not more scrupulous in their accountancy than many of those in England. The law declares that a reserve must be created, but it makes no stipulation as to the way in which the fund shall be invested. Accordingly, just as in England, the policy of investing the

reserve fund in the business carried on by the company has become popular and the consequences are equally disastrous. The reserve is intended by the Code to be a fund set aside to meet contingent liabilities of the company; that is to say, it is supposed to be a fund constituted by cash, or that for which cash may be readily obtained—a fund which is represented on the credit side of the balance-sheet by investments that are not subject to the dangers which may beset the capital of the company. No such ideal is approached in practice: the usual course is to make a reservation of profits, as required by the law, and to distribute these profits in the balance-sheet to stop the holes in capital account. A reserve of this kind is wholly illusory. Moreover, the Japanese company is not permitted to make any distribution of profits until all losses have been made good and until the stipulated amount of the reserve fund has been reached. Clause 196 of the Code may be contrasted with Section 9 of the Companies Act, 1907, which gives a company power to pay interest out of capital in certain cases. The Japanese clause, translated by Dr. Lönholm, reads: "If it appears that according to the nature of the business for the carrying on of which the company is formed, operations cannot be commenced within two years or longer from the day when the registration . . . has been made at the place of the principal office, it may be provided in the company's contract that a fixed interest shall be paid to the shareholders until the commencement of the business operations, but the rate of such interest shall not exceed the legal rate of interest." For such provision the permission of the court must be obtained. There is no reference to the question of fixed and circulating capital from which such a mass of English case-law has arisen; and it is probable that the clause in the Commercial Code dealing with the payment of dividends and the creation of reserves would be more literally construed by the Japanese courts than similar enactments are ever likely to be in England. Should the shareholders be discontented with the conduct of the company's affairs, one-tenth of their number may apply to the court for the appointment of examiners to make the necessary investigations. The inspectors appointed to watch over the

interests of shareholders in a Japanese company fill the place of the auditors in England. They are not professional chartered accountants, however, but merely members of the company, holding no managerial position, who are elected by the shareholders. They are appointed in general meeting, and their duties are to supervise the policy of the directors and to scrutinise the finances of the company. They may demand information about the conduct of the company from the directors at any time, and they are given power to call a general meeting of shareholders whenever they think fit in order to insist upon a modification of the directors' policy, if necessary, by resolution of the shareholders. They must conduct an investigation of the company's accounts, and they must examine the balance-sheets. Only the larger juristic persons, the *kabushikigōshi-kwaisha* and the *kabushiki-kwaisha*, are permitted specifically by the Code to issue debentures, and, as in England, these charges upon the property of the company must be registered. The total value of the debentures issued must not exceed the amount paid upon the shares, and if the actual property of the company, as shown by its latest balance-sheet, is of less value than the sum paid upon shares, then the value of the debentures must not exceed that of the company's assets. The special law, No. 52 of the thirty-eighth year of Meiji (1905), governs the issue of secured debentures by a trust company, and it declares that the only securities that may be attached to debentures in the way of a charge imposed upon property, are: (a) pledges of movable properties, (b) pledges of rights with documentary evidence, (c) mortgages of immovable property, (d) mortgages of ships, (e) mortgages of railways, (f) mortgages of factories, and (g) mortgages of mines. A trust company must obtain a charter, and, in any event, it must not carry on any additional business other than banking. The whole amount of the capital, or the money contributions of such a company, must not be less than 1,000,000 yen, and no trust company is permitted to begin business until 500,000 yen has been paid up in capital. The capital of a company cannot be increased until the total amount has been paid up on the shares, and it is only when the capital is to be increased that the issue of preference shares is admissible.

When a joint-stock limited company goes into liquidation, or is dissolved in any circumstances but those of amalgamation or bankruptcy, the directors become the liquidators, unless it has been otherwise provided by the company contract, or unless other persons are appointed by the general meeting of shareholders. The duties and responsibilities of the liquidators are similar to those enforced by English law.

The *kabushikigōshi-kwaisha* comprises partners with unlimited liability and shareholders whose liability is limited by their share contributions. The provisions of the code governing limited partnerships apply to this form of company as regards (1) the relations between partners of unlimited liability; (2) the relations between partners with unlimited liability on the one hand, and shareholders and third parties on the other; and (3) the termination of the membership of a partner with unlimited liability. The formation of this joint-stock limited partnership is conducted in a different way from that of the joint-stock limited company. In the case of the latter, the signature of seven promoters to the contract is necessary; in the case of the former the unlimited partners are the promoters, and it is their signatures that are required. The partners with unlimited liability must invite subscriptions for shares, and the following matters must be set forth in the instrument of subscription: (1) The duration of the company and the causes of dissolution; (2) the issue of shares above par; (3) the names of the promoters who are to receive any special benefits, and the nature of those benefits; (4) the names of those persons who contribute property other than cash, the cash value of such property, and the number of shares given in exchange; (5) the amount of the expenses of the partnership that are to fall upon the company, and the amount of the compensation to be given to the promoters; (6) the date of the making of the partnership contract; (7) the object with which the company is formed; (8) the trade name; (9) the total capital; (10) the value of each share; (11) the qualifying shares of the managing partners; (12) the address of the principal and branch offices; (13) the medium through which the public announcements of the partnership are to be made; (14) the names

and addresses of the promoters; (15) the number of shares taken by each promoter; (16) the amount of the first payment; (17) the description and the value of any contribution, other than cash in payment for shares, made by the partners with unlimited liability, and the method of computation by which that contribution was valued; and (18) if partners with unlimited liability have taken shares, the number which each has taken. The methods of summoning the general meeting for organisation and the questions to be discussed and decided upon are identical with those referred to in the case of the *kabushiki-kwaisha*, or joint-stock limited company.

A foreign commercial company or partnership, which opens a branch office in Japan, must defer to the law of the country. For instance, it must find out what corporate body under Japanese law corresponds with it in construction and in legal aspect, and it must then comply with the law governing that Japanese body as regards registration and public announcements. It must, moreover, appoint a representative residing in Japan, and it must register his name and address together with the address of the branch office. The representative of the company is then entitled to do all the acts in or out of court relating to the business of the company. Should a commercial company open a principal office in Japan, or, with a branch office, make the doing of business in Japan its chief object, it must comply with the provisions regulating a company formed in Japan, even though the company in question was formed in another country (Article 258). Under the Civil Code a foreign commercial company may be compelled to make good any damage done to other persons by its representative while in pursuance of his official duties; and when the representative, acting in connection with the affairs of the company, commits an act contrary to morals, to public policy, or against the law, the Court, upon the application of the public prosecutor, or of its own initiative, may order the branch office of the company, controlled by that representative, to be discontinued. When a foreign company applies for registration in Japan it must file documents proving the existence of the principal office, certifying the integrity of

its representative, and giving a fair idea of the nature of the company. These documents must be signed by reputable authorities in the country to which the company belongs, or by the consul of that country who is resident in Japan. Certificates of shares must not be issued until the branch office has been registered. The conduct of banking, trust, and insurance companies in Japan must not be undertaken by foreigners without reference to the special laws and, in more cases, without the special sanction of the Japanese authorities.

Merchants who have been in the habit of trading with firms on the Continent will find little difficulty in understanding the Japanese law of contract. It is embodied both in the Civil and the Commercial Codes, and it is, in no sense, a production of the Oriental mind, though, no doubt, it is frequently subjected to distinctly Oriental interpretations. The Civil Code was drawn up originally by M. Boissonade de Fontarabie on the basis of the French law, but the draft never received the State sanction, and the present Code is the work of a German jurist, whose devotion to the precedents of the Fatherland cannot be called in question, so far as his work is concerned. Article 521 decrees that an offer to make a contract in which a time for acceptance is specified cannot be withdrawn, and that the offerer is entitled to treat an acceptance, which arrives too late, as an original offer proceeding from the person to whom the first offer was made. If no time for acceptance has been fixed, the offer becomes inoperative, unless the person to whom it has been made has sent an acceptance within a reasonable time. What is "a reasonable time" must be left to the interpretation of the Court, but it may be pointed out that the German Commercial Code, which might not be inaptly quoted in such circumstances, keeps an offer, made to a party at a distance, open only till an answer to it could have been received in due course ("*Handelsgesetzbuch*," Article 319). The communication of withdrawals or acceptances has formed a difficult chapter not only in English, but in French and German law. The tendency seems to be that the posting of a letter of acceptance is a conclusion of the contract. If the notice of the withdrawal of an offer

arrives after notice of acceptance has been sent, but it is apparent that the withdrawal was sent at such time that, in the ordinary course, it ought to have arrived earlier, the acceptor must immediately give notice to the offerer of the delayed arrival of his communication. If the acceptor fails in this respect, there is no contract in existence (Civil Code, Article 527). *Inter præsentes*, an offer to make a contract becomes inoperative unless the person to whom it had been made accepts it at once (Commercial Code, Article 269). The acceptance, in all cases, must correspond unconditionally with the offer. Should there be imposed in the acceptance conditions which alter the nature of the contract contemplated by the offerer, the acceptance is construed as a refusal of the offer and, at the same time, as a new offer. If an offer to make a contract pertaining to the branch of business carried on by him is made to a trader by a person with whom he is accustomed regularly to transact business, acceptance or rejection must be made without delay. Omission to do this is interpreted as acceptance (Commercial Code, Article 271). It must be remembered by Europeans who are engaged in business with Japan, that the law recognises no difference between real and personal property, and that there has never been any attempt to distinguish between law and equity. These omissions relieve the Oriental mind of the difficulty of applying legal principles to definite cases, and permit the judges to enforce the letter rather than the spirit of the law. There is an article of the Commercial Code which, if interpreted literally, must cause considerable inconvenience, and possibly embarrassment, to an innocent trader. It declares that where an offer is made to the trader to enter into a contract with reference to some matter which comes directly within the scope of his business and, together with the offer, goods are forwarded to him, he is held to be the bailee of those goods, even though he declines to accept the offer. He is made responsible for the safe custody of the offerer's property, but he is entitled to recover the cost of storage—a provision which holds out but little consolation in a country where equity ranks among the impossible beliefs. The trader, however, has received a little consideration, and he is not

bound to store the goods if their value is not adequate security for the cost of their keeping, or "if their keeping would be detrimental to him." Where a trader lends money to another, he is entitled to the legal rate of interest—6 per cent. per annum. Generally speaking, an obligation incurred in the course of commerce is prescribed, or "statute barred," if no act of recognition has been done for a period of five years. When a trader hands over goods to a carrier he is bound to supply with them an invoice, containing the following particulars : (1) The nature, weight and bulk of the goods, and the number of packages, with a description of their markings; (2) the place of destination; (3) the full name of the consignee; (4) the address at which the invoice has been made and the date; (5) the signature of the sender. On the other hand, the carrier must, upon request, provide the sender with a bill of lading, containing (1) particulars 1-3; (2) the name, or the trade-name of the sender; (3) the freight; (4) the address at which the bill of lading was made out and the date of its making; (5) the signature of the carrier. The transfer of this bill of lading by endorsement will have the same effect as the transfer of the goods to which it refers. The carrier cannot demand his freight where the goods are destroyed by *vis major*, and in such an event he must return the money.

After dealing with the warehousing of goods, and the various forms of insurance, the Commercial Code contains a number of clauses which refer to those obligations which are known in law as being fully assignable, namely, negotiable instruments, or paper to bearer, such as bills of exchange, promissory notes, and cheques. The essential principle of transferability by endorsement is adopted, and if the drawee fails to meet the liability, the holder has the right of recourse against the drawer and against all preceding holders. However, in order to retain the right, the holder must present the bill to the drawee with the demand for payment, and if payment should be refused, he must have the bill protested either on the date of its maturity or within the two following days. He must also communicate within a day to the party against whom he intends to claim the fact that the protest has been made. Otherwise the holder loses his rights under the bill

against previous parties. The drawer of a bill of exchange is always entitled to forbid its transferability by endorsement. Similar provisions are made in the case of promissory notes. The holder of a cheque must not delay presenting it for payment beyond one week from its date. The practice of crossing cheques does not differ from that in England. Two parallel lines may be drawn across the face of a cheque and between them may be written the word *ginkō*, or the words "and Co.," with the result that payment can be received only through a bank. Fines of from 5 to 1000 yen may be imposed upon persons who draw cheques either without having a deposit at the bank or without having the necessary credit, or against persons who insert a false date upon the cheque.

The Civil Code makes the usual distinction between the normal and the abnormal status of persons, and follows the principle of the Roman law in decreeing that weak-minded, or deaf, or blind persons may be considered quasi-competent, and may be placed under the control of a curator. Such persons must have the consent of their curator to do any of the following acts: (1) To receive or employ capital; (2) to contract a loan or provide security; (3) to obtain the rights of partnership; (4) to take any part in a lawsuit; (5) to enter into any compromise or submit a question to arbitration; (6) to take any action as regards the acceptance or refusal of a succession; (7) to decline a gift or a legacy, or accept either when it is subject to any charge or encumbrance; (8) to enter into a building contract; (9) to hire or let woodland or mountain property for a longer period than ten years for the purpose of planting or cutting trees, or to hire or let any other land for more than five years. A wife must obtain the consent of her husband if she desires to do any of the acts mentioned in sections 1 to 6. In the absence of a special law or treaty, foreign corporations formed for educational, scientific, charitable, religious, or literary purposes have no legal status in Japan (Civil Code, Article 36); and where they have been permitted to exist under a treaty, they have often been shown little mercy by the Courts the moment that the treaty has been revised or abrogated. Here again the Bench, having no equitable authority, has to fall back upon the strict enforcement of a law

which is recognised as unjust and even as injurious to the international reputation of the country.

A number of special laws are promulgated from time to time, and it is advisable that any stranger in Japan should make inquiries whether any measures are in force which have a more specific bearing than the clauses of the Codes upon the particular enterprise in which he contemplates embarking. Law 45 of the thirty-eighth year of Meiji, for instance, makes important provisions as regards the ownership and the working of mines in Japanese territory. It decrees that none but a Japanese subject or a company, formed in compliance with the laws of the Empire, is entitled to acquire mining rights. If a number of persons desire jointly to carry on the business of mining, they must select one of themselves as a representative, and must communicate his name and address to the chief of the Mine Inspection Office. If they fail to do this, that official will himself designate a representative, and the creation of the mining rights is recorded in the Mining Register. Persons who desire to prospect must seek the permission of the chief of the Mine Inspection Office, and before they begin to work a mine they must apply to the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce in writing, sending him at the same time a map of the area over which their operations are to be extended. The Minister of Agriculture may cancel a mining right if, without good cause, the person holding that right does not begin operations within one year from the date of the registration in the Mining Register, or if he has suspended operations for more than one year. When the land has been used for a period exceeding three years, or the shape or the nature of the land is altered, the proprietor may insist upon the purchase of the land; and the landowner has a similar right where, owing to the purchase of a part of his property, the remaining part becomes unfit for use in the manner in which it was used in the past. The landowner may also call upon persons entitled to mining rights to give such security as may guarantee that he shall have proper compensation in the event of damage to his property through the mining operations. When the land is no longer used for mining, the person who held the mining rights must either restore it to its original state or give adequate compensation

to the landowner. Mining taxes may be imposed upon those who are entitled to mining rights, but no tax is imposed upon the production of gold, silver, lead, and iron ores. Various particulars of the labour to be employed, and the wages to be given, must be communicated to the Mine Inspection Office; and it is always necessary to obtain copies of any Orders that may have been issued for the enforcement of the Mining Law by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce. Another special law, passed by the Diet in 1905, regulates the conditions on which railway property may be subjected to a mortgage. It permits a railway company to form "a railroad estate" by setting apart the whole or some portion of the property on which to raise a mortgage. The amount of the loan for which this railroad estate is mortgaged must not exceed in any circumstances the total sum of money paid up on the railway company's shares plus the amount of any debentures that may have been issued. If, however, the company institutes the mortgage with a view to paying off debts of long standing, which have become a menace to the success of the enterprise, it is not necessary to calculate the amount of those debts when computing the paid-up share capital. Permission must be obtained from the courts to create the mortgage, and, in order that the rights of creditors or previous mortgagees may not be violated, it is necessary to announce in the *Official Gazette* that the railroad estate mortgage is about to be contracted, and that creditors are requested to take proper steps to safeguard their own interests. Section 20 of the law decrees that when a company intends to convey away, lease, mortgage, or entrust to others the management of its railroad estate, or any portion of it, the mortgagee shall be informed, and if he has any objection to the course, he must raise it within two months if he be within the Japanese Empire, or within four months if he be domiciled in a foreign land. The mortgagee may exercise his right of foreclosure either by compulsory sale by auction or by compulsory administration, and he must take care in this respect to follow the legal procedure prescribed in the Act.

It will be seen from this limited outline of the legal system of Japan, which was initiated since the Restoration, that the efforts which have been made up to the present time have

brought about nothing more than a striking formal approximation to the models of the West. To say this is not to level any serious charge at the people themselves. It has been impossible in the course of scarcely forty years to Europeanise the minds as well as the institutions of the country. It is no small achievement that a people which did not undergo a natural transition from the principles of feudalism, but, on the contrary, cast it suddenly aside to suit an expedient of State, should have succeeded in imitating, to any extent, the institutions of countries that are alien in thought, in laws, in social customs, and in religions. How far the objective mind of the East will be able to adapt itself to the new conditions has afforded matter for endless speculation, but it has been explained already in these pages that equity, which in England at all events is a subtle mingling of the Western ideas of honour and the Western conception of justice, has failed, so far, to receive that homage in the East which a perfect understanding of ancient civilisations of Europe should beget. Whether the minds of the Japanese will be fitted within an appreciable time to comprehend those abstract principles which are necessary to the successful administration of the new laws, and whether the sentiments and the sympathies of the Japanese are capable of expansion until they come into a workable relationship with the new form of reasoning which they have so recently borrowed, are questions difficult of solution. No European is anxious to discourage the unparalleled endeavours of the Japanese to make up for lost time, but it must remain long in doubt whether these institutions which have grown up in Europe with the evolution of national characteristics, and which have been developed step by step amid centuries of vicissitude and strife, can soon be harmonised with the inherited modes of thought and temperament of the Japanese. Western writers have not shrunk from presage; and it has been suggested more than once that the ecclesiastical influence in Europe which played so great a part in the making of the laws must render them largely inoperative in the East until its people have learned to accept the Christian ideals of life. Such an heroic measure is not inconceivable. The thirst for knowledge that contact with the West has raised already leads to reading of

all that is best in European literature, and it may yet be possible for Japan to adopt the beliefs which are essential to the moral understanding of the European laws. Yet here again speculation will have its charm. Even if fifty years of Europe's law should be found to be better than "a cycle of Cathay," it cannot be said to follow that the hurried embracing of these modern products of the Christian faith which have harassed other peoples into the higher criticism, rational doubt and a sublimated form of pantheism, can add to the ultimate comfort and development of Japan without creating in the meantime a mental disturbance in the community that will threaten the very existence of the nation. Nor is it in this direction only that Japan will have difficulties to face. The entire social outlook of the people must be altered before it will be possible to administer the laws borrowed from Europe in that spirit upon which the dispensation of justice depends.

BOOK III

THE WAR OF 1904-5; AND THE PROBLEMS
OF THE PACIFIC

XI

SIDELIGHTS ON THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: THE CAUSES OF THE WAR AND THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE AND KOREAN PEOPLES

IN view of the many excellent works which have been published dealing at length with the Russo-Japanese War, it is not my intention to chronicle in detail the events of the great campaign. It is sufficient for the purpose of the present book to introduce some of the more interesting of the sidelights which marked the outbreak, the progress, and the conclusion of hostilities. In this connection I would venture to suggest that I am justified in laying claim to some special qualification to discuss the subject, for during the whole period of the war, and for some considerable time afterwards, I represented the *Daily Telegraph* in the Far East, and was thus brought into close touch with the Japanese Government on the one hand and the representatives of the Russian Government on the other. Furthermore, during a period when the passions of the two peoples within the theatre of the war were deeply stirred, it was my constant endeavour to maintain an impartial mind. I was affected by none of the bitter hatred of Russia which, until recently, has afflicted so many of my countrymen; nor was I influenced by the blind adulation which, among Englishmen the world over, found expression in an enthusiastic approval of the Japanese cause. Many reasons existed at this time to account for British friendliness towards Japan. Her opponent, Russia, was our traditional enemy, and she was gradually elbowing not only Japan but also ourselves out of those legitimate spheres of activity in which we were engaged in Eastern Asia. Moreover, to speak frankly, we realised that her defeat on the battlefields of Manchuria would remove, at least for a con-

siderable period, the uneasiness felt in regard to the Indian Frontier.

The masses of the British people, paying small heed to the far-reaching consequences of foreign policy, were largely inspired by sentimental motives, their exaggerated admiration for the Japanese being due to a not unnatural sympathy with a little nation engaged in a Titanic struggle. The Government in Tōkyō were not slow to take full advantage of the kindly feelings entertained in England. Before hostilities commenced they declared over and over again, and with an emphasis that could not be mistaken, that their object in taking up the sword was to expel Russia from Manchuria ; to restore the lost provinces of that region to down-trodden China ; to maintain the Open Door through which all nations could trade on terms of equality ; and to preserve the independence of Korea. Through the mediums of an inspired press at home and their emissaries abroad, assisted by the representatives of news agencies and of the leading foreign newspapers, resident in Japan—some of whom were natives while others were Europeans having close business associations with the country—they succeeded not only in presenting their case forcibly to Great Britain, but also in having it “taken as read” by the great majority of the British people. In short, Japan, who in 1895 had exacted a large indemnity from China, and had dispossessed her of the valuable camphor-producing island of Formosa, sought ten years later to pose as the champion of her former enemy, and, incidentally, of the interests of the whole world in the Far East. Surely no nation ever went to war with motives loftier than these ! It is nevertheless significant that while the plausible statements of Japan were accepted in the United States and Great Britain, certain misgivings regarding her sincerity were entertained on the Continent. It has been said that in the years preceding the outbreak of war, Japan made no special preparations for attacking Russia. I distinctly remember reading in *The Times* a despatch from its Tōkyō correspondent, when clouds were beginning to gather over the political horizon, setting forth explicitly that Japan had not the slightest intention of breaking the peace of the Far East ; and again and again I have seen, in certain sections

of the foreign press in Japan, indignant denials of the suggestion that in organising a vast army and navy the Island Empire was aiming at her great continental neighbour, Russia. To these statements I attached little importance, for very often the press is the mouthpiece of diplomacy, and diplomacy cannot always speak the truth. As a matter of fact one would have had very little regard for the wisdom and foresight of the rulers of Japan if they had neglected to take precautions to preserve the existence of their country, an existence which was undoubtedly menaced by the Russian advance from the North. In the light of subsequent events, however, one cannot help drawing conclusions from the hypocritical protestations which the Japanese Government thought fit to issue from time to time concerning the lofty motives animating their policy.

Ever since the conclusion of the war with China, when Russia had taken the lead in dispossessing her of Port Arthur, Japan had with every justification been preparing for hostilities. In the years that elapsed between the two campaigns she had seen the Siberian railway extend to the Manchurian border ; had viewed with alarm the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria to its southernmost limits ; had witnessed, as it were in a night, the rise of pretentious Russian towns and the establishment of Russian emigrants in that vast region ; had stood by while the mineral resources and commercial advantages of one of the richest territories in China passed into the hands of Russia ; had observed the conversion of Vladivostock and Port Arthur into modern fortresses, the increase in the number of Russian warships until they constituted the most imposing fleet of any nation represented in Pacific waters, the arrival of arms, ammunition and men in large numbers—these last conveyed by ships of the Volunteer Fleet, which as soon as they emerged from the Dardanelles became converted cruisers ; and finally Japan had smarted under the triumph of Russian diplomacy in Korea, diplomacy which seemed to have for its object penetration to the southern shores of the peninsula, and which would extend Russian influence and perhaps bring all Russian army to within a few miles of the coast of Japan. Circumstances such as these justified the Japanese in prepar-

ing for war and in taking the initiative in opening hostilities. In pleading that their only aim in so doing was the maintenance of the Open Door and the independence of Korea, they were animated by a desire to secure the financial no less than the moral support of the Anglo-Saxon nations. Their historical record was to some extent an index to their real motives.

From early times Korea had been a source of contention between China and Japan, and the war that took place between these two countries, long before Japan entertained serious ambitions with regard to Manchuria, was brought about by her insistence that China should accord her equal rights in the peninsula kingdom. One of the results of the conflict was the recognition of the independence of Korea, an independence for which Japan subsequently showed little regard. It may be that she felt herself compelled to imitate the aggressive policy of Russia, but in the process, though certainly more vigorous, she was less successful than her rival. The Koreans never forgot the dastardly murder of their Queen, an outrage instigated by the Japanese. At the same time they were profoundly grateful to the Russians, who subsequently gave their terror-stricken King asylum in the legation. Japan has annexed Korea; but, apart from this, it is conclusively shown that long before her war with Russia she was not altogether as disinterested in that country as she would have the world believe. We cannot, therefore, accept the assurance that one of her motives in opening hostilities was the preservation of the independence of Korea. With regard to her other motive, the maintenance of the integrity of China, with its sequent of the policy of the Open Door, it must not be overlooked that although this was the result of legitimate victory, she had set the example of dispossessing China of territory by acquiring Formosa, and by seeking to occupy, before Russia, the fortress of Port Arthur. To-day Japan holds in Southern Manchuria practically the same position as that held by Russia before the war and in days when complaints of Russian aggression were loud in England.

It is clear then, not only from her previous but from her present policy, that Japan's object in waging war upon Russia was, not to maintain the integrity of China but to secure pre-

dominance in Manchuria; not to preserve the independence of Korea but to gain a protectorate over, if not the possession of, the country. She wished merely to substitute herself for Russia on the Asiatic continent; to hold the Chinese Eastern Railway, or at least a portion of it; to occupy the Kwantung Peninsula; and elsewhere in Southern Manchuria and in Korea to control postal, telegraphic, and other communications; to monopolise mines, and to retain for herself, by according preferential treatment to her own people, the trade and commerce of these territories. In other words, while proclaiming, she wished to preclude the policy of the Open Door, and to what extent she has succeeded in this direction will be seen from the chapters dealing specifically with Manchuria and Korea.

Her object, then, in waging war was not only self-protection but also the desire to found a colonial empire. For centuries the Far East had lagged behind in the progress of the world, and Japan, awakening late in life to national self-consciousness, realised that she had been fortunate in escaping the fate that had overtaken the races on the African and American continents—races whose proximity to the powerful and enlightened nations of Europe had rendered them an easy prey to the legitimate ambitions of the empire-makers of the West. She was fortunate inasmuch as on her own awakening she found that vast sub-continent, her immediate neighbour, China, still deep in the slumber of ages. Here at her own doorway, as it were, lay an almost illimitable field rich beyond measure in undeveloped resources. Here in territories, not barren deserts but fertile lands, thickly populated with four hundred millions of people whom the comforts of modern civilisation had as yet not reached, was a market of infinite possibilities. The prospect was alluring, if not irresistible. It is therefore clearly established that one of the objects of Japan, if not the principal object, in waging war upon Russia, was to found for herself a colonial empire. Against this it could not be urged that the resources of her own country were inadequate to the needs of a growing population, for at least a large percentage of the arable land of Japan is still uncultivated. There is, however, not the slightest doubt that apart from the all-important considera-

tion of expansion, her rulers wisely realised that unless the nation assumed the initiative China would eventually fall a prey to Western aggression, and thus in course of time the existence of the Island Empire would itself be menaced. A glance at the map gave them an indication of the danger threatened on all sides. From the north Russia pressed upon Manchuria and Korea. In the south the borders of the British Empire were already extended as far as Burmah, conterminous with the Chinese province of Yunnan, while France had established herself in the Annam peninsula. In the west, the Indian Empire was only separated from China by the tributary provinces of Tibet. Moreover, the circumstance was not overlooked that Great Britain possessed two strong naval bases in the Far East—Singapore and Hong-Kong. At one time the great Powers of the West were convinced that of the two Eastern empires China was predominant. Japan on her side realised that she must prove to the world that this was an error of judgment. The result was the war between China and Japan, the outcome of which proved that a new Power was rising to prominence in the Far East. Japan had, however, only triumphed over an oriental race, in many respects not unlike herself. Before her recognition as a world-Power could be complete, and before her people could claim equality with the white races of the West, it was essential that she should win a victory over some European country on the field of battle. Her success in the campaign against China was followed by further Western aggression in the Far East. France, Germany, and Russia had no sooner induced her to evacuate Port Arthur than the last-named Power herself entered into occupation of the "forbidden" fortress. Germany seized Kiao-chau. Great Britain leased Wei-hai-wei, a Chinese fortress which, like Port Arthur, had fallen to the Japanese arms, though its cession was not, as in the case of the Kwantung stronghold, included in the treaty of peace. France also strengthened her position in the South. War with a Western country was desirable in order to gain place and prestige, but it was essential as a measure of self-protection against the menacing encroachments which were being made on all sides of the great neighbouring continent, and as a means to the end which all

Japanese statesmen had in view—the founding of a colonial empire.

The motives of Russia were no less calculating. She held this important advantage as far as Manchuria was concerned—she was already partly in possession. Moreover, she claimed that her rights and concessions had been legally granted by China, and that the action of Japan was unwarranted inasmuch as it sought to interfere with the prerogative of the Peking Government to conclude compacts with foreign Powers without reference to Tōkyō. There was no doubt, however, that in obtaining rights and concessions in Manchuria Russia preyed upon the weakness of China, or, to speak with more regard to accuracy, upon the lamentable frailty of her statesmen. Consequently the “deal” was essentially the result of intrigue. To use a common though expressive phrase, it was a piece of dirty work. The Russian envoy, himself the representative of a Government not altogether strange to the ways of corruption, approached a coterie of Chinese statesmen who, in a country administered by an effete bureaucracy, held sufficient power to conceal their selfish interests beneath the cloak of negotiations “on behalf of China.” In other words, there was no doubt that the Russians paid bribes in hard cash for any concessions they received. Having thus obtained a substantial footing in Manchuria, they did not hesitate to increase their hold upon the occupied territories. That which they could not gain by bribery they seized by force of arms. Had not Japan intervened, it is clear that Manchuria would have become an integral part of the Russian Empire. The Island Empire was fully justified in ignoring the pretensions of Russia to “legitimate rights,” for undeniably the latter had secured her concessions as the result of corrupt intrigues with Chinese statesmen; not by the will of the Chinese people. The claim of Russia to recognition as a Power in the Pacific was no less legitimate than that of Japan herself. Her territories in Asia stretched to the uttermost limits of the Far East, while her island of Saghalien was separated only by a narrow channel from Japan. It may be urged that, in view of the undeveloped resources of Siberia, Russia was not justified in her policy of

expansion. But in this connection the obstacle which has always beset the path of Russian progress must be taken into consideration—her need for an ice-free seaport. Vladivostock, which is only partially kept open during the winter months by means of ice-breakers, was insufficient for her purpose. The facilities it affords would be altogether inadequate to the requirements of a Siberia in process of extensive development, and this circumstance has been largely responsible for retarding the enterprise of Russia in her own Asiatic territories. She therefore regarded the acquisition of an outlet on the Manchurian coast as essential to her progress, and had she been able to obtain possession of Port Arthur and Dalny—both are ice-free ports—there is no doubt, leaving Manchuria altogether out of the question, that an era of prosperity would have dawned in Siberia.

It was not for a moment to be expected that Japan could place herself in a position sufficiently strong to resist a combination of Powers. Her army and navy had only been tried against the pathetically weak forces of China. Although she obtained a large indemnity from her late antagonist, she had spent it with that feverish haste which is always characteristic of nations or individuals unaccustomed to the sudden acquisition of wealth; and her finances, still further crippled by huge expenditures on armaments, were in an enfeebled state. With true diplomatic cynicism she cast her eyes around the world's horizon and looked with eagerness for a friend. There is no doubt that her preferences in this direction leaned towards Great Britain, whose action in declining to join France, Germany, and Russia in dislodging her from Port Arthur after the war with China had produced a deep and friendly impression in Tōkyō. Overtures were made both to Great Britain and Russia at the same time with a view to the conclusion of an alliance with one or the other Power. Whether this course was adopted merely as a diplomatic means to a diplomatic end, the end being to bring pressure upon Great Britain by endeavouring to persuade her that Japan was not altogether friendless in the world, will probably never be known. It is difficult to imagine that two countries with interests so divergent as those of Russia and Japan in the Far East should

under any circumstances be able to negotiate a treaty of alliance. Prince Ito, who, it is believed, was always more in favour of an alliance with Russia than with Great Britain, was on an official mission in St. Petersburg at the time when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded, and I learned on good authority that he was by no means pleased with the action that had been taken in his absence.

As soon as the document was signed making Great Britain and Japan firm friends, Russia and Japan became bitter enemies. The Treaty of Alliance expressly stated that the High Contracting Parties mutually recognised the independence of China and Korea, and declared themselves to be uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Furthermore, they recognised that it would be admissible for either of them to take such measures as might be indispensable in order to safeguard their interests if threatened by the aggressive action of any Power. As Russia was already in occupation of Manchuria, and had gained considerable influence in Korea, she naturally drew conclusions unfavourable to herself from the terms of this clause. Article II. set forth that if either Great Britain or Japan in the defence of their respective interests should become involved with another Power, the other High Contracting Party would maintain a strict neutrality, and would use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally. Article III. declared that if in the above event any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party would come to its assistance, conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it. It was only to be expected that Russia, who was the ally of France, would read between the lines. In the *ante bellum* negotiations regarding Manchuria and Korea the insistence of Japan was due to her realisation of the fact that the preparation of her military forces was complete, while the equivocal attitude of Russia was consequent upon a recognition of the inadequacy of her army then stationed in the Far East, and of the backward state of her defences at Port Arthur and Vladivostock. Despatch after despatch passed between the two Governments, until, on February 6, 1904, Japan, weary of delay, broke off diplomatic relations, and the

Russian Minister receiving his passports hastily quitted the capital. It has been said in circles usually well informed, that in order to accomplish their object the Japanese Department of Communications, acting at the instigation of the Foreign Office, held back the last official despatch addressed to the Russian Minister, and that this despatch contained a suggestion of a compromise on the ground that while Japan's predominance should be recognised in Korea, the position of Russia in Manchuria should be reaffirmed.

Whatever truth may be contained in this statement, there is no doubt that a compromise on the lines indicated would not have produced a lasting settlement. Both nations realised that the war must come sooner or later, and in view of this circumstance it must be held that Japan was wise in declining to be deceived by Russia's temporising tactics, and that she was entitled to choose the time for opening the conflict when the military conditions were most favourable to herself. The ethical standard of her methods of diplomacy need not be discussed here. Neither the Japanese nor the Russians were in a position to set each other an example in this respect. Both were cunning and corrupt in the means they adopted to gain the end. Japan secured a great triumph in the struggle that followed. Her succession of seemingly overwhelming victories astonished the world, which was altogether misinformed as to the military weakness of Russia's position in Manchuria. This astonishment in the course of time gave way to unbounded admiration, which was not diminished by the feeling of abhorrence that swept over Europe as the measures taken by Russia to repress the coincident revolution within her own territories were published far and wide. I venture to suggest that a calm consideration of the whole of the circumstances, as presented in a subsequent chapter, should lead to a modification, if not a revision, of many of the opinions at present held regarding the achievements of Japan. Before passing to a discussion of the peace negotiations and the far-reaching effect of the war, it is perhaps advisable to make some mention of the unfortunate positions in which two other countries, not directly involved in the conflict but immediately concerned

in its issue, China and Korea, found themselves. The only analogy to the situation suggesting itself is that of two rival burglars who enter a mansion and proceed to fight over the spoils without the least regard to the rights of the legitimate owner. For Korea, it must be confessed, little sympathy could be felt. Geographically, she was merely, as it were, a peninsula of the great sub-continent, China. Strategically, her importance lay in the fact that she outstretched in convenient proximity to Japan. History showed that she had always been more or less a prey to the tutelage of her more powerful and immediate neighbours, and that any independence she had gained at intervals was due rather to the rivalries of these neighbours than to her own initiative. She had sunk lower and lower in the national scale, and at the time of the Russo-Japanese war, after the lapse of centuries, showed not the least signs of an awakening. The corrupt interests of individuals had taken the place of that national patriotism which alone keeps the heart of a country beating. The case of China was entirely different from that of Korea. She had at one remote period been in the forefront of the world's civilisation, and the Japanese themselves did not deny that they owed much of their early progress to her influences. Although for centuries past she had steadily declined in the scale of nations, she had not yet descended to those utter depths which characterised the forlorn position of Korea. Moreover, at the time of the Russo-Japanese conflict, she was beginning to show the first signs of the awakening which has now become a process of actual development and which will some day give the world a genuine cause for astonishment. In many other respects a comparison between the two nations would be singularly out of place. Korea was a petty kingdom with a petty past; China, a vast empire with a glorious history. The one might conceivably be submerged; the other was a Colossus among the countries of the world, a Colossus, moreover, which as history proves, had always absorbed its conquerors.

Both the Chinese and the Koreans underwent many sufferings as the result of the conflict waged in their midst by two alien peoples. Not a few of them were killed—some

by stray shot and shell, others because they acted the part of spies or because they were at least suspected of espionage. The trial afforded these latter was neither more nor less than a drum-head court-martial. The prisoners were given little opportunity of being heard in their own defence, and scant justice was meted out to them. "He is only a miserable Chinaman, or a dirty, ignorant Korean. If we are in doubt, let us shoot him." This was the invariable attitude both of the Russians and the Japanese towards the native peoples upon whose territories they were fighting out a feud under the banner of civilisation. The Chinese and Koreans were in an altogether unfortunate position, inasmuch as being lamentably weak themselves they wished, largely it must be confessed for the sake of peace and quietude, to stand well with the side that would ultimately emerge victorious. Ignorant concerning the causes of the conflict, and incapable of forming any intelligent judgment as to the respective military merits of the combatants, they wavered from time to time in their partisanship, and alternately incurred the wrath both of the Russians and the Japanese. Thus the people residing in a district openly expressed their favouritism towards Russia so long as the Russians were in occupation of that district. So soon as the Japanese advanced and the Russians retired they discreetly altered their opinions. This change of front was not unnatural. Imagine the plight of agricultural communities consisting of simple-minded people, and placed in lands far distant from the eyes of civilisation, finding within their midst vast bands of armed men who, in seeking shelter, unscrupulously turned them out of their homes, plundered their crops and confiscated their food supplies. Those among our countrymen who did not hesitate during the South African War, and without the least warrant, to criticise the behaviour of the British Army, were silent during the Russo-Japanese conflict when, over a front extending to a hundred miles, village after village was wiped out and hundreds of innocent people who dwelt on the line of march were cruelly slaughtered. A certain amount of hardship to peaceful dwellers within the zone of hostilities is inseparable from all war, no matter how mercifully conducted. But it is an unwritten law among

soldiers that the utmost limit of consideration should be shown to neutral peoples whose proximity to the scene of action exposes their lives to great danger. The claim of the Chinese and the Koreans to gentle treatment at the hands of the combatants was all the greater inasmuch as they were the unwilling spectators of a devastating conflict waged upon their own territories by alien armies. Nor must it be expected that our ally, despite the many inspired statements to the contrary, was any more tender in her methods than were the Russians. In Korea and Manchuria she commandeered labourers wholesale, paying them her own rate of wages, and on occasion she had no compunction in resorting to the barbaric practices of the torture-chamber. Moreover, her method in carrying out executions, in punishment of what with extreme latitude were deemed capital offences, was not always characterised by decency.

In Korea the Japanese resorted to methods as revolting in conception as they were fiendish in execution. Some of their victims were crucified, and volley after volley was carelessly fired at their bodies until, after suffering indescribable agony, they finally succumbed. The methods of the Russians as applied to Chinese and Korean spies, though less ingenious as far as torture was concerned, were equally abhorrent. Too high a tribute cannot be paid to the wonderful stoicism displayed by the Chinese whose lot it was to dwell within the areas of the shell-swept battlefields. The average Chinaman may be incapable of becoming militant, though even this is open to question. The heroism displayed by the Chinese on several occasions, notably under General Gordon, during the Taiping rebellion at Wei-hai-wei during the China-Japan War, and by the Wei-hai-wei native regiment under British leadership in the Boxer rising, could not be surpassed. The Chinese are certainly not cowards. While the big guns were hurling their missiles of death and destruction over the plains of Manchuria, the peasant farmers, undismayed, went on peacefully tilling their soil. Amid this vast and often lurid scene of strife, there was no more wonderful sight than that of peaceful communities of simple and seemingly disinterested people serenely pursuing their avocations, pursuing them

in many instances in the deadly area which separated the two armies, pursuing them in fields frequently ploughed up by short-range shot; and while the heavy artillery roared in front and in rear of them, and shells screamed over their heads, they calmly lived their normal lives and paid little heed to the danger of death which beset them on all sides. It is safe to predict that people who are capable of stoicism such as this, stoicism which is not the result of an incapacity to realise and therefore a negative quality, but which is a splendid and essentially positive attribute, will live to play a leading part in the history of the world. Compared with the theatrical *hara-kiri* of the Japanese, and the almost fanatical ardour which impels them to perform deeds of sensational heroism, it must be admitted that there is something very fine, very impressive, about the calmness of the Chinese in the face of death.

While the Koreans and the Chinese had good cause to hate the Russians as well as the Japanese, as a matter of fact they showed a distinct preference for the former. The Japanese had never recovered the standard of respect which they had held for the Chinese previous to their victorious war with them. In their eyes the Chinese had "lost face." Consequently the island people considered that they were the dominant race in the Far East, and they neglected no favourable opportunity of impressing this view upon the individual Chinese. As an Oriental people themselves they had obvious advantages over the Russians, advantages which, for instance, gave them a more satisfactory insight into the mental attitude of the Chinese, and which enabled them to arrive at a more accurate appreciation of the economic conditions that governed their standard of living. Although unable to speak to each other in a language understood by both, the Japanese and Chinese could communicate by means of a common syllabary. Thus one frequently saw Japanese officers tracing on the ground with the end of their scabbards a number of characters for the enlightenment of Chinese from whom they wished to extract information. It should be added that the Japanese have a natural aptitude for acquiring the Chinese language, and many of

them speak it fluently. The special knowledge they admittedly possessed, however, they certainly used more to their own advantage than to that of the native people. Coolie labourers hired by the army were paid if anything below the standard wages ; and supplies were commandeered wholesale. In other words, the Japanese, who themselves existed on a low economic scale, underrated rather than justly estimated the value of the services rendered by the Chinese and Koreans. Before the outbreak of war the Russians had already a reputation for generous treatment in the matter of the remuneration which they paid to those whom they employed. Whatever might be urged against them by their critics, it could not be said that they were parsimonious. On the contrary, if anything, they went to the other extreme and were reckless in the distribution of their roubles. As soon as the Russians entered into the occupation of Manchuria, money began to circulate freely. Cities and towns rose from the plains; harbours and railways were constructed; and, as a consequence, thousands of Chinese enjoyed lucrative employment, and communities which had hitherto lived under impoverished conditions suddenly found themselves in a state of comparative prosperity. During hostilities this liberality, if not prodigality, was conducted on a necessarily much larger scale than formerly owing to the increased demands consequent upon the presence of a vast army in the field. Despite the grandiloquent declaration of Japan that one of her principal objects in going to war was to preserve the integrity of China, Russia in the main succeeded in securing and retaining the sympathy of the Chinese people who dwelt in Manchuria, and also in a large measure that of the Koreans.

The Chinese and Korean Governments merited little sympathy, for the troubles which they had brought upon themselves were due to their own vacillating policies. For a long time they had been accustomed to pit the Powers against each other in diplomacy as a means of escape from their own difficulties, and, consequently, they could not expect to gain by the issue when Japan and Russia were pitted against each other in warfare. The Chinese and Korean peoples, however, deserved sympathy inasmuch as they were the victims of

circumstances entirely beyond their control. Living under régimes of corrupt autocracy which withheld from them the principles even of elementary education, which compelled them to pay extortionate taxes, and which enforced its will by tyranny—not hesitating on occasions to resort to methods of barbarism—they were incapable of taking the initiative in the betterment of their own condition.

XII

SIDELIGHTS ON THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN AND AFTER

I HAVE dealt with the causes of the Russo-Japanese War, and also with the position and conduct of the neutral peoples within the theatre of that war. I now propose to treat of some of the main factors that contributed in bringing the campaign to a close. The principal of these was in relation to financial resources. At the time when President Roosevelt offered his mediation, the treasuries both of Japan and Russia were in an impoverished state, and their credit in the matter of foreign loans had reached its limit—that is to say, for the purposes of war. In the chapter which follows, and in a later chapter dealing exhaustively with Japanese finance, the reader will find many details concerning the cost of the war as far as Japan was concerned, and the means adopted to defray such cost. These will prove that in the conduct of modern warfare money is as important as men, and that in its final stages material resources are if anything more important than human reserves. Causes other than that of financial exhaustion combined to make peace between Japan and Russia. Admittedly great as was the patriotism of the Japanese, there can be no doubt that the tremendous strain to which it was subjected was not without some weakening effect. Although Russian squadron after squadron had been annihilated, the same could not be said of the Russian armies in the fields of Manchuria.

After a series of tremendous battles which created a grim record even in the history of carnage and bloodshed, after a series of brilliant victories on the one side and masterly retreats on the other, a great Russian army still stretched itself in bold battle array across the roads which led to Harbin and the north. Moreover, it was an army which in point

of numbers was, for the first time during the campaign, the equal of the combatant forces of Japan. And it was commanded by a general—General Linevitch—who had made his way from humble rank and whose hard fighting tactics were known to be similar to those favoured by the Japanese generals. While the resources of Russia in the matter of men were practically illimitable, Japan began to experience extreme difficulty in replacing the killed and the wounded. Both nations had entered upon the conflict with excessive confidence. The Russians boasted that they would be in Tōkyō within a few weeks, while the Japanese were so sure that they would be able to repeat their achievements of the China War that they actually fixed a day upon which they were to make a brief and dramatic assault upon Port Arthur, to be followed within a few hours by a triumphal entry. The Russians became weary of defeat after defeat brightened by not so much as a single successful engagement of any magnitude; the Japanese, of victory after victory, which, as they were always the attacking force, cost them if anything more lives than the defence was called upon to sacrifice, and which, although causing repeated retreats, never accomplished the utter demoralisation of the Russian armies. In the graphic language of special correspondents we were told of the despairing impression made upon the people of Russia by the train-loads of wounded returning from the front. We were also told of the still more despairing impression created by the knowledge of the fate that had overtaken the thousands of men who were destined never to return. But we were always led to believe that the Japanese were a race of exemplarily zealous patriots whose pride in sacrificing their lives for their Emperor precluded them from indulgence in human lament. The Japanese practically elevated their dead soldiers to the rank of deities, and their wounded men they almost worshipped as living gods. In Great Britain we stood amazed at the wonderful quality of restraint displayed by our ally in this time of national crisis. We were told time and time again that in the lofty purpose of patriotism they were guilty of none of those frailties from which the races of the West are not altogether free. We hardly looked upon them in the light of ordinary mortals.

We imagined that they were possessed of some wonderful spirit which had been denied the rest of the world, a super-human spirit which had revealed to them the seraphic secret not only of ideal existence but of ideal death and of an ideal hereafter. We were woefully misled. It has become necessary to set forth the simple fact that the Japanese are ordinary human beings. While the feudal conditions from which they have just emerged and the extreme poverty of their country have produced in them a curious mental attitude which is mistaken for stoicism, I can say with confidence from my own experience, and without desiring to detract from their true merits, that in essence they are no braver, no more capable of withstanding hardship or of bearing up against sorrow or calamity, than ourselves. To all those who were in a position to observe the actual conditions it was evident that one of the primary causes that induced the Government to end the war was the knowledge of the fact that the nation was sick of the war. The Japanese people are not Stoics; they only wear the masks of Stoics. Thus when Port Arthur was not taken within a few hours; when the siege lasted month after month; when hundreds of men, horribly maimed by shot and shell, who returned from the front in the earlier stages of the campaign, were followed by thousands in similar plight; when not hundreds but thousands of homes were bereaved of fathers, of sons, and of brothers; when the extraordinary taxes began to drain meagre resources; when the price of staple foods increased; when all this happened and the end was still not in sight, the individual of Japan conducted himself much in the same way as might have been expected of the individual of any other nation in similar circumstances. He showed signs of nervousness about the future and paraded his grief; for whatever may be said to the contrary, the frequent processions and pageants to ancestral shrines were essentially parades of grief. Those among us who lived in Tōkyō in these times heard constantly the strains of funeral music and the roll of funeral drums, as processions of rickshas conveying weeping women and grief-stricken men, wearing not their habitual mask of stoicism but the frank expression of sorrow, followed the ashes of dead warriors to their last resting-place.

Another factor that contributed to the termination of the war was the waning spirit of the men in the field. The more readily will this be understood when it is remembered that the principle of communalism, which was the essence of Japanese life in the feudal ages, has left its mark on the people, who to-day, perhaps more so than any other nationality, are deeply attached to the soil of their fatherland. It is not surprising, therefore, that towards the end of the campaign the soldiers in Manchuria were showing unmistakable signs of home-sickness, and that numerous letters received in Japan from the front told of their eager desire to see peace restored.

Circumstances of a similar nature to those that produced a national longing for peace in the case of Japan, were equally evident throughout Russia. I have merely emphasised the former because I wish to make it clear that, in many important respects at least, the Japanese cannot be regarded in the light of an exceptional race. I would even go one step farther, and say that if anything they are less capable of sustained effort than many other races. In my contact with them I have always noticed that both mentally and physically they are ill-equipped for prolonged hard work, and that they take more intervals of rest and of sleep in the course of their labours than do Western peoples.

Although General Linevitch constantly assured his Government that his armies were in a favourable position to fight and win battles, the responsible advisers of the Tsar, realising that the internal condition of the country demanded external peace without delay, and that the financial resources for the purposes of war were at an end, counselled the acceptance of mediation. They were also not unmindful of the fact that the revolutionary propaganda had made considerable progress among the troops at the front, and that in the event of another battle taking place there would be wholesale surrenders, probably by men who had fired not so much as a single shot. Rarely in history has a great war been fought in which the people of one of the combatant nations took so little interest. As far as Russia was concerned, it was essentially a bureaucrats' war, and the great mass of the population knew little and cared less about the issues at stake, while a not inconsiderable section was actually gratified by

the embarrassment which defeat after defeat in the field brought upon the Government at home.

Thus, when President Roosevelt offered his mediation, both parties were only too willing to signify their acceptance. The Japanese entered upon the peace negotiations with an altogether exaggerated estimation of the value of their military successes. One of the two great political organisations, the Progressive Party, advocated the imposition of terms which were as fantastic in conception as they were futile of attainment. The leader, Count Ōkuma, who is an advanced politician of Chauvinist tendencies, suggested among other things that Russia should be compelled to cede the whole of the island of Saghalien and certain parts of the Maritime Province; that her domination should be restricted to the northern bank of the Amur; that her forts at Vladivostock should be razed to the ground; that she should consent to a limitation of her naval forces in the Far East; that she should surrender all her interned ships; and that she should pay an enormous indemnity. That the Government shared these extravagant pretensions is evident from the terms which they originally submitted to the Russian peace plenipotentiaries, and which may briefly be outlined as follows:—

- (1) Russia to acknowledge that Japan possesses paramount interests in Korea.
- (2) Russia to transfer her lease of the Kwantung Peninsula.
- (3) Russia to evacuate Manchuria, and to relinquish all territorial advantages and all preferential and exclusive concessions and franchises in that region in impairment of Chinese sovereignty or in conflict with the principle of equal opportunity.
- (4) Japan to engage to restore to China, subject to the guarantee of reformed and improved administration, all those portions of Manchuria which are in her occupation, save only the regions affected by the lease of the Kwantung Peninsula.
- (5) Saghalien to be ceded.
- (6) The railway between Harbin and Port Arthur to be ceded.
- (7) The trans-Manchurian railway to be used by Russia exclusively for commercial and industrial purposes.

- (8) Russia to pay an indemnity.
- (9) All the Russian ships which were interned to be surrendered as lawful prizes of war.
- (10) Russia to engage to limit her naval strength in the waters of the Far East.

Japan experienced some difficulty in finding suitable plenipotentiaries to represent her at the Peace Conference. Prince Itô, who had negotiated the treaty that terminated the war with China, and who, in wisdom and in ripe experience, stood head and shoulders above his colleagues in the councils of State, would have been the ideal selection. He was offered control of the mission to Portsmouth, but with that remarkable astuteness which had always been the outstanding feature of his character, he declined acceptance of the honour on the ground that the labours involved demanded the energies of a younger man. In view of the fact that he subsequently accepted a responsible post necessitating his direction of the re-shaping of Korea, I am inclined to attribute other reasons besides that of old age to his refusal to undertake the peace mission. He knew that in Korea he would on occasions be able to call in the aid of military force in order to gain his ends; whereas the task that would have confronted him at Portsmouth—a task that the Emperor had pre-ordained must result in peace—permitted of no other weapon than that of diplomacy pure and simple. Furthermore, Itô fully realised the essential differences which characterised the closing stages of Japan's two great campaigns. In the negotiations that had taken place between the two Oriental countries at Shimonoseki in 1895 he had been in a favourable position to exact substantial terms. Not only the Chinese fleet, but the Chinese army as a force in being had been destroyed; Chinese territory had been occupied, and the road to Peking lay open to the victorious Japanese forces. The military and strategical position at the end of the Russo-Japanese war was altogether different. Although repeated disasters attended Russian arms, none of these were, in the strictest sense, of an overwhelming nature. In spite of the fact that Russia had lost her fleet, she still possessed an army in being—an army which in point of numbers was stronger than it had been at any period of the war. More-

over, not an inch of her continental territory was in the occupation of the enemy. Notwithstanding the diminution of her prestige in the Far East, Russia was still, as events have since abundantly proved, a Power of the first rank in Europe. Finally, she was not without friends. The sympathies of the Continent were largely on her side. France was her ally, and Germany accorded her whole-hearted support. Indeed it may be said that the grouping of the Powers, though not so clearly defined, was nevertheless similar in many respects to that which brought about the evacuation of Port Arthur by the Japanese after the China War. Itō was no doubt aware that if he went to Portsmouth he would be hampered by the knowledge that while it was expected of him that he should negotiate with the single object of concluding peace, he was not in a position to insist upon anything like the full extent of the Japanese demands.

It was evident that the position of the Japanese plenipotentiary was to be compared to that of a poker-player possessing an extremely doubtful hand. It is little wonder, therefore, that Itō, whose conception of duty and standard of patriotism could not be gainsaid, declined the offer of a tremendous task which came to him when, after an active career wholly devoted to the interests of the State, he was beginning to feel the burden of declining years. The late Marquis, then Baron, Komura, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs, stepped into the breach, and Mr. (now Baron) Takahira, who was the Japanese Minister in Washington, was appointed as the second plenipotentiary. On the Russian side Count Witte, and Baron Rosen who represented his country at Tōkyō until the outbreak of war, were nominated as the peace envoys. The extreme views advanced by prominent leaders in regard to the terms which, in their opinion, Japan might reasonably hope to exact from Russia, had produced sanguine expectations among the people who vainly imagined that, as the result of the coming conference, an indemnity would be received sufficiently large more than to compensate them for the heavily increased taxation imposed to defray the extraordinary expenditure necessitated by the war. Although as individuals they were willing to suffer hardships and bereavements attendant on the prolongation of the campaign, they

could not understand that the nation was in no position, either strategically or financially, to insist upon full compliance with its demands. On his departure for the United States Baron Komura was accorded a magnificent send-off. Whatever restraint the Japanese may have displayed in the hour of triumph on the battlefield it could not be said that they made any effort to conceal their feelings of joy as the hour of peace approached. From every housetop the flag of the Rising Sun fluttered bravely in the breezes. The railway from Tōkyō to Yokohama, over which passed the train conveying the principal plenipotentiary to the place of embarkation, was lined with people who secured every point of vantage and who frantically waved their hands and cried *banzai* to the departing mission. Baron Komura left the shores of Japan on his errand of peace amid the cheers of his countrymen and the salutes of his country's guns. In him was centred not so much the nation's hopes as the nation's confident expectations. Of all those, however, who were present on the occasion of his leaving, he himself was perhaps the least sanguine. Hitherto his diplomatic career had proceeded smoothly along ordinary lines. The conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which took place when he occupied the portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs, was the work not of an individual but of the Cabinet as a whole. Moreover, it was a comparatively simple achievement, inasmuch as it was the result of the recognition by Great Britain of Japan's fitness to be our ally, rather than the outcome of diplomatic ingenuity displayed at Tōkyō.

Baron Komura was in office when the negotiations which culminated in the war with Russia were in progress; but in these it could not be said that he displayed any remarkable degree of statesmanship. Only the wording of the despatches was his; the arguments they set forth were the result of the deliberations of the Cabinet and of the Elder Statesmen, prominent among whom was Itō. Baron Komura was therefore on the eve of a diplomatic ordeal, an ordeal which in the case of former wars had sorely tried men of far greater talent than himself. It has been said that he undertook the mission out of motives of lofty patriotism, and that while he knew that in concluding peace he would fulfil the

wishes of his Emperor and his Government, he realised that the inadequacy of the terms would bring down upon him the wrath of the people. This assertion may to some extent be true; but the fact cannot be overlooked that Baron Komura was a young and ambitious man to whom the post of peace plenipotentiary in connection with one of the greatest wars ever fought in history must under any circumstances have seemed attractive.

The Japanese mission in its progress to Portsmouth maintained a stolid silence. Meanwhile Count Witte, during his voyage across the Atlantic, gave a remarkable interview to the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* who accompanied him, and this was despatched to London by means of wireless telegraphy and was immediately retransmitted to the *Asahi* newspaper in Tōkyō, where its publication caused a tremendous sensation. The essence of Count Witte's mid-ocean declaration was that Russia would not pay one penny of money in the form of an indemnity, and that she would not cede one inch of her territory. This news was the signal for a furious outburst on the part of public opinion in Japan. Threatening communications were received at the office of the *Asahi*, in the course of which the journal was accused of furthering Russian aims by giving publicity to Russian statements. The newspapers filled their columns with bellicose articles, and there was a demand for a continuance of the war and the instant recall of Baron Komura. It was evident that the Japanese nation had set its heart upon securing territorial and financial compensations, and that there was a widespread feeling that if either of these was unattainable then the war would have proved futile. The Government, who received their first intimation of the attitude of Russia from the interview accorded the *Daily Telegraph* by Count Witte, wisely declined to give way to popular clamourings, and, being better informed than the people concerning the exhausted condition of the nation's resources, decided that they would not be a party to raising any preliminary obstacles in the path of peace.

At this stage, perhaps, a comparison between the personalities of the two principal plenipotentiaries and the methods they adopted will be enlightening. Count Witte

depended largely upon frank diplomacy for his success, while Baron Komura, who had been tutored in the school of diplomatic reserve, maintained silence as far as the outside world was concerned. As to which course was the best to adopt when the scene was laid in the United States there could be no possible shadow of doubt. When I say that Count Witte showed wonderful insight in his timely recognition of the force of public opinion as represented by the American press, I am not necessarily defending the methods of the American journalist, for I think that these methods are occasionally characterised by an excess of enterprise.

Before Count Witte landed on American soil it could not be disputed that the sentiment of America was almost exclusively in favour of the Japanese. By the geniality which he at all times displayed until his labours were concluded and the hour of his departure arrived, he succeeded in winning over thousands of friends to the cause of Russia. As soon as he landed he delivered a highly complimentary address "to the American People," in the course of which he made well-chosen references to the traditional amity between his country and the United States, and spoke of his own personal liking for the American nation and the American people. During his stay at Portsmouth he frequently reiterated these sentiments to journalists who sought interviews with him, and his attitude towards the press was one of marked cordiality. Consequently the impression he made upon the American people by his outspoken manner was from the first favourable, and, both in public and in private, he took full advantage of every available opportunity to increase his popularity. His commanding personality and the warmth of his hospitality contributed not a little to the success of his mission. The American press, which in its desire for conciseness frequently ignores the dictionary meaning of the English language, said of him: "Witte is a man after our own heart—although engaged in one of the greatest missions in the history of diplomacy, he puts on no frills." Doubts may be cast upon Count Witte's sincerity in flattering American susceptibilities; but no intelligent criticism can deny that, first and foremost a diplomatist entrusted by his Imperial master with issues vital to the welfare of his country, he dis-

played a discernment and a wisdom in taking into account the subtle but essential equation of public opinion in America, such as completely to overshadow the somewhat querulous personality and the mediocre attainments of his opponent. His position as the representative of a losing cause was no enviable one, and the best tribute that can be paid to him is to say that he not only made peace with Japan, but that he won the friendship of the United States. The policy adopted by Baron Komura afforded a striking contrast. He seemed utterly incapable of realising the force of public opinion in America, and together with his colleague, declined either to accord interviews or to make statements outside the chamber in which the peace conference was held. When at last he appreciated the progress Count Witte was making towards winning the sympathy of the American people he made a tardy recognition of the potentialities of American sentiment, and, acting in consequence of his directions, a subordinate member of the mission made frequent communications to the public through the medium of the press. As these lacked complete authority and could, if occasion required, be denied, they were, compared with the outspoken utterances of Count Witte himself, altogether unsatisfactory. Moreover, Baron Komura was at an additional disadvantage, inasmuch as at public functions he acquitted himself as an orator of poor quality. As a departmental diplomatist, with leisure for deliberation and Cabinet support at his elbow, he was no doubt the equal of Count Witte; but as an envoy depending for success largely upon spoken and not written words, upon argumentative skill and mental incisiveness, he was no match for his great antagonist. The contrast between the two plenipotentiaries was all the more extraordinary because it could not be said that they represented countries where the principles of government widely differed. In Japan no less than in Russia the suppression of public meetings and the suspension of the press are frequently resorted to when, in the opinion of the ruling authorities, the occasion may demand.

In these circumstances it must be concluded that Baron Komura committed a tactical blunder in not recognising that the conditions which obtained in a free country

were altogether different from those which existed in Japan. On the other hand, Count Witte was to be commended for his foresight in realising that American sentiment could be employed as a force in the cause of Russia, and there was justification for his policy because it was his duty to do his utmost for his country, a justification which was certainly not diminished by the fact that the Japanese subsequently sought, though less frankly, to imitate his methods. On August 9, at a preliminary meeting of the Japanese and Russian peace plenipotentiaries, held for the purpose of the presentation of credentials, an extraordinary incident occurred. In the course of his interview with the *Daily Telegraph's* correspondent while crossing the Atlantic, Count Witte had explained, among other things, that he was not a peace plenipotentiary in the strict sense of the term, but that he had been commissioned by the Tsar to proceed to Portsmouth and there ascertain whether the terms offered by Japan were of a reasonable nature. In view of this statement the Japanese were afraid lest Count Witte's powers should be inadequate, and they were almost prepared for a sudden termination of the conference at its first meeting. As a matter of fact what actually occurred was this: the Russian plenipotentiaries' credentials when exhibited were found to invest them with complete powers. The Japanese thereupon pleaded, with a *naïveté* which has probably never been surpassed in diplomacy, that in the belief that formalities of organisation alone were to be discussed they had left their credentials at the hotel! Baron Komura readily offered to send for the necessary documents, but Count Witte immediately proposed that the conference should be adjourned, and this was accepted. At a subsequent meeting the Japanese presented credentials which only empowered them to act finally after having obtained the sanction of the Emperor, whereupon Count Witte claimed similar privileges. It was evident that the Japanese had taken literally Count Witte's statement on the high seas that he was not proceeding to Portsmouth as a peace plenipotentiary in the strict sense. What the Russian envoy no doubt meant by this utterance was that his primary instructions were to ascertain Japan's terms, and if these were extortionate, to decline instantly to enter into negotiations.

Baron Komura left his credentials at the hotel because he was anxious to ascertain Count Witte's position, and, if this was not a satisfactory one, to bring about a dramatic termination of the conference without at the same time revealing his own inadequate powers. In view of the tremendous issues involved, his ruse was childish, and it placed him immediately at a disadvantage as far as personal prestige was concerned. When the Japanese terms were presented they were found to contain several clauses of a humiliating nature which nearly brought about an abrupt termination of the conference, and which afforded ample justification for the construction Count Witte had placed upon his instructions. Japan, no doubt, acted on the principle of asking a maximum with a view to allowing a margin for negotiation. Her object would have been better served had she restricted her legitimate demands to Manchuria, Korea, and Saghalien, and her aspirations to an indemnity. When, however, she suggested that Russia should limit her naval strength in Far Eastern waters, and that the Russian warships interned in neutral ports should be surrendered as prizes of war, she became unnecessarily offensive, and her cause suffered in consequence. During the war the Japanese had, with one exception—the *Retshitelny* incident at Chefoo—given tacit recognition to the laws of neutrality relating to interned warships, and it would have been altogether in violation of the principles of those laws if the surrender of the interned warships had been insisted upon as one of the terms of peace.

As I have pointed out, Russia was as much a Far Eastern Power as was Japan herself. She possessed an enormous seaboard in Asia, and it could not be expected that she would permit a foreign Government to dictate to her the extent of the measures she should take to secure its protection. In view of her experiences in connection with Japan she realised more than ever the necessity for elaborate precautions to preserve her territories, with their ports, harbours, and rivers, her commerce and her fisheries, in the Far Eastern zone. The proposal that she should limit her naval strength in Asiatic waters, therefore, was preposterous. Indeed, it is impossible on any grounds whatever to find justification

for the presumptuous attitude adopted by the Japanese plenipotentiaries on this question. No matter what ambitious expectations may have been entertained by an over-confident nation, neither the Government nor its envoys had the slightest pretext for believing that Russia would accede to such a humiliating demand. Consequently, it cannot be pleaded for them that the proposal was embodied in the general list of claims solely with the object of providing that margin for negotiation to which I have already alluded. To attempt to justify Japan's action by advancing the necessity for a policy of precaution is equally unreasonable. In the first place her responsible statesmen required no convincing as to the utter futility of making such a demand; and in the second place, had she persisted in pressing so extraordinary a measure of national protection, she would have betrayed a craven spirit in regard to her future, the mere contemplation of which, in the light of her recent triumph, would have been grotesque. The conclusion, therefore, is forced upon one, that no matter what motive may have inspired her, Japan could not have been wholly ignorant as to the bitter resentment that would be aroused by her insistence on the limitation of Russia's naval strength in Asiatic waters.

No nation with a particle of self-respect would permit the means which give her freedom of diplomatic action and liberty of strategical movement to be restricted at the arbitrary behest of a foreign Government. It was understood that President Roosevelt, recognising the humiliating character of the two demands with which I have just dealt, induced the Japanese plenipotentiaries to withdraw them, and thus a premature breach in the negotiations was averted. Count Witte took up a firm and frank stand on the principle that he would not consent to the cession of one inch of Russian territory or the payment of one penny of Russian money in the form of an indemnity. He urged that to grant either of these terms would be wholly inconsistent with Russian tradition, and he pointed out that the Japanese had occupied only one-half of Manchuria, and that they had not succeeded in entering Russian territory. In reply to the statement of the Japanese that their troops had already seized Saghalien, he pointed out that the island had been ceded to Russia by Japan

in exchange for the Kurile Islands in 1875, and was therefore to be regarded as an outlying possession, and not in the strictest sense as an integral part of the Empire.

The Russian attitude created something like consternation in Tōkyō. Councils of statesmen were held before the Throne, and press and publicists urged the Government to insist upon the payment of an indemnity and the cession of the whole of the island of Saghalien. The more humble people upon whom the burden of taxation had fallen heavily, and many of whom had suffered bereavements as a result of the war, were inclined to be indifferent until told by bellicose agitators that the absence of an indemnity would inevitably lead to the perpetuation, if not the heavy increase, of special taxation, and might conceivably threaten the nation with bankruptcy. The more ignorant among the masses seemed to imagine that an indemnity meant a general share-out among the victorious people, and that they would not only receive back all that they had paid in the form of taxation, but in addition would be given a gratuity as compensation for their patriotic sacrifice. In high quarters, well informed as they were as to the exhausted state of the national resources, wiser counsels happily prevailed. Baron Komura had already received his instructions, and these were to make peace. Councils of State held during the negotiations were merely intended to induce Russia to believe that Japan was wavering between peace and war. It may have been that Russia also was not prepared to continue hostilities, in which case it must be admitted that Count Witte's achievement in inducing the Japanese to forgo an indemnity was a not inconsiderable one. The Japanese attached great importance to the meeting that had taken place between the Emperor of Russia and the Emperor of Germany previous to the opening of the peace conference. They firmly believed in their own minds that the Kaiser, whose sympathies were well known to be with Russia, had given certain advice, if not assurances, in consequence of which Count Witte considered himself justified in showing a bold front. Whether or not the Japanese were right in their conclusion is a matter which history will probably never reveal. One is inclined to believe, however, that Russia on her own account was determined to resist the

demands for an indemnity, and that she was fortified in this determination by her knowledge of the weakness of her enemy's financial resources. Throughout the conference Count Witte had succeeded in taking the leading part in the negotiations. In other words, he completely overshadowed the Japanese plenipotentiaries. When the press representatives complained of lack of information he promptly suggested to Baron Komura that the presence of correspondents should be permitted in the Conference Chamber, saying that Russia had nothing to lose but all to gain from the fullest publicity. Naturally Baron Komura declined to accept the proposal, whereupon Count Witte informed the press correspondents that as unfortunately the Japanese objected he could not assist them further in the matter. Nevertheless it was noticeable that inspired statements of the Russian side of the case, as presented from time to time at the conference, frequently found their way into the columns of newspapers published in various parts of the world, and these no doubt exercised a considerable influence on public opinion.

Count Witte's final communication to the Japanese in regard to their demands for an indemnity and the cession of the whole of the island of Saghalien practically amounted to an ultimatum, which, coming as it did from the plenipotentiary representing the losing side in the battlefields, showed what a singular turn the negotiations had taken. Japan then proposed that Russia should purchase back from her the northern half of Saghalien for 1,000,000,000 roubles, or £100,000,000, which sum was also to include the cost of the maintenance of the Russian prisoners in Japan. It was rumoured that Count Witte favoured acceptance of this proposal on the ground that if the war was continued, although Japan would be reduced to bankruptcy, Russia would probably lose part of her possessions in Far Eastern Asia. The Tsar, however, would not listen to the suggestion of peace on terms which were considered tantamount to the payment of an indemnity. President Roosevelt again proffered his mediation. He represented to the Japanese that if they insisted on the ransom of Northern Saghalien they would place themselves in the position of carrying on a sanguinary war for the sake of money alone,

and that therefore they would not only forfeit the respect of the world, but would in consequence also be deprived of all further financial assistance. At the same time he expressed the opinion to the Russians that acceptance of the Japanese proposal would not necessarily injure their prestige. The Russians stood firm, and the Japanese, revealing the weakness of their diplomatic position, yielded. Thus, as Count Witte had predicted, Russia did not cede one inch of her territory or pay one single penny in the form of an indemnity. The Japanese surrendered the northern half of Saghalien with extreme reluctance. They had never forgotten that it was by means of coercive diplomacy that Russia, in 1875, induced them to exchange this rich and large island for the small and barren Kurile Islands. Since their military occupation they had been somewhat premature in renaming all the prominent points and places throughout Saghalien.

That Japan obtained the minimum of her demands is a fair summing-up of the peace deliberations. She secured a recognition of her predominance in Korea, the transference of the Russian lease of the Kwantung Peninsula, the promise of the evacuation of Manchuria by Russia, and the assignment to herself of the railway between Changchun and Port Arthur, with its branches, together with all the rights, privileges, and properties appertaining thereto. As far as Manchuria was concerned she practically took the place of Russia in the territories which she had succeeded in occupying during the war. Her claim to the ownership of the railway as far as Harbin could not reasonably be upheld, because at the time of the peace conference the Russian army was still in possession of the line between Kwan-chengtze (Changchun) and that city; and, according to the estimates of the Japanese generals at the front, two years at least would be required before their forces could be expected to cover successfully the long march northwards to Harbin.

The only financial consideration Japan received was the balance in her favour as a result of the agreement between the two parties severally to pay the expenditure involved in connection with the maintenance of prisoners of war. The Japanese having been defeated in diplomacy began to excuse

themselves on the ground that they had been chivalrously lenient. A prominent statesman remarked to me at the time: "Our *Bushido* taught us that we must be generous in our treatment of a fallen foe, and it precluded us from accepting money." It must be admitted, however, that *Bushido* when applied to statecraft had certain limitations. In the case of Russia it did not prevent Japan from putting forward a claim for indemnity, while in the case of China, only a few years previously, it did not prevent her from accepting indemnities, not only in consequence of her own war with that country but also as a result of the Boxer rising. A large section of the people of Japan entertained no such idealistic philosophy such as that which soothed many of the leading statesmen in their contemplation of peace without indemnity. As soon as the terms of the treaty became known in Tōkyō there was an outburst of popular indignation. The whole of the press, with the single exception of the semi-official *Kokumin*, vehemently attacked the Government. Several flags, which formerly had fluttered bravely in the breeze in celebration of victory on the battlefields, were lowered to the half-mast, and agitators ran hither and thither inciting the populace to active protestation. The climax was reached when the police, in their attempts to prevent a mass meeting, barricaded the gates of Hibya Park, an open space in the centre of Tōkyō and situated in close proximity to the leading European hotel. The mob, frustrated in their purpose and having knowledge that the Minister of the Interior had been responsible for the instructions issued to the police, turned their attention to his residence, which stood in its own grounds immediately facing the park. They surged in their thousands against the main gateway, and only at the point of the sword were they held back from forcing an entry. Meanwhile a party of rioters secured poles with which they tried to demolish the surrounding walls and to batter the roof of a small dwelling situated within the grounds and close to the highway. Hundreds of mounted police and gendarmes charged the rioters amid a hail of stones, and for a time succeeded in clearing the streets; but not before several desperate characters had succeeded in forcing their way into the entrance-hall of the residence of the Minister of the Interior,

where they encountered some military officers who cut one of them down and drove the others back. The police did not hesitate to use their swords, with the result that many people, not necessarily active participators in the disorder, were killed and wounded. Towards evening the crowd made another determined assault upon the Minister's house. This time they conducted their attack from another side—that which ran parallel with and was adjacent to the European hotel. Several men contrived to pass the police cordon, and applying flaming torches set fire to one of the secretarial houses, the terrified occupants of which escaped with difficulty. When the fire-engine, an appliance of a mediæval pattern, arrived, it was greeted with volleys of stones. Meanwhile the rioting had spread to all parts of the city. Several Government offices, more particularly those of the Foreign Department, were surrounded by angry mobs who spent hours in hurling missiles and howling imprecations at the Ministers of State whom they openly threatened with assassination. The disturbances continued for several days. The police, incapable of suppressing them, continually danced about like a lot of wild dervishes, slashing right and left with their swords; and while doing everything in their power to protect foreigners, used little discrimination in the choice of their native victims. Special precautions were taken to guard the residences of the statesmen who, when a Cabinet Council became necessary, were attended in their progress by large cavalry escorts. Itō was a notable exception. He refused an escort, and no harm came to him. Angered by the bloodshed caused in their midst, the rioters set fire to hundreds of police-boxes and made vigorous onslaughts upon police-stations, several of which were burned to the ground. They also seized some tramcars, and, compelling the officials and passengers to alight, applied torches to the woodwork and set them going at full speed until they collapsed in the middle of the highway, a mass of flaming débris. The offices of the *Kokumin Shinbun*, the semi-official newspaper, were besieged for several hours, and the defence was vigorously maintained by the staff led by one of their number, who with his sword cut down a student and wounded several other raiders. In the circumstances the daily issue was produced

under great difficulty, a difficulty which was increased by a boycott on the part of the newsagents. In view of the character which the disturbances eventually assumed it could not be said that anti-foreign feeling in Japan was dead. While the anger of the mob was directed mainly against the Ministers of State, who were regarded as having betrayed the interests of the country, there was undoubtedly a general feeling of hostility towards all foreigners who came within the category of "the white man." In this connection, were not other evidence of a substantial nature available, I need only refer to the official view of the situation, a view which considered it necessary to instruct the military authorities to provide the various legations with guards. Ten Christian churches were burned down ; several desperate assaults were made upon the Russian cathedral ; Mr. Harriman, the American magnate, was roughly handled in his 'rikisha on returning from a dinner party at the United States Legation ; and several instances occurred in which foreigners were stoned, happily without any serious results.

Order was not restored until martial law was declared and the city flooded with troops provided with ball cartridge. The authorities did not deem it advisable to publish a list of casualties, but there is no doubt that the number of killed and wounded was considerable. By a curious coincidence, during the days when the rioting was at its height, it was announced that communication with the outside world was not possible owing to a breakage in the cable between Nagasaki and Shanghai. This was a fortunate accident from the point of view of the Japanese, who naturally wished to see the uninterrupted rise of their bonds on the European bourses as the result of the declaration of peace. Singularly enough a despatch describing in a mild way the events which were taking place reached Europe some time before the post-office announced that the cable was repaired, and thus before more accurate and enlightening accounts were transmitted abroad. The Government suspended the publication of various native papers opposed to its policy, and although the war was ended, continued its press censorship over foreign telegrams—a censorship which was not withdrawn until some months later. The leaders of the agitation against the peace

terms were arrested and thrown into prison. An illuminating circumstance of the rioting was the striking discrimination displayed by the people between the police and the soldiers. The former were looked upon as the brutal instruments of a Government who had concluded peace with dishonour. It was recognised that the latter were the heroes who had fought and won the war, and who, in spite of the fact that they were requisitioned to restore order, were, in view of their brilliant achievements on the battlefields of Manchuria, exonerated from complicity in bringing about a national humiliation. As soon as they appeared on the scene they were greeted with cheers of *Banzai*, the temper of the crowd rapidly improved, and the orders of the military were obeyed with marked docility and even with respect. In short, it was realised that in a land where conscription is enforced, soldiers belonged peculiarly to the people. Disturbances occurred in other parts of the country, but these were rigorously suppressed at their inception.

Soon after the conclusion of his labours at Portsmouth, Baron Komura was taken seriously ill. Disappointment in consequence of the peace negotiations was no doubt largely responsible for his physical collapse. Many weeks passed before he was able to leave the United States. In the meantime his relatives received anonymous letters threatening his assassination, and more than one *Shintō* emblem of death was sent to his private house. When he reached the shores of Japan the excitement had to some extent subsided, but nevertheless it was considered necessary to take elaborate precautions against possible attempts upon his life. His return was in strange contrast with his departure. No cheering crowds greeted him on landing, no triumphal arches spanned the road. Met only by a few intimate friends he hastened to Tōkyō, and, accompanied by a strong escort, drove quietly to his home. Soon afterwards, the Katsura Cabinet, wisely anticipating the difficulties of *post-bellum* finance, tendered its resignation. Count Hayashi was recalled from London to fill the position of Foreign Minister under the new Premier, Marquis Saionji, and Baron Komura was appointed in his place as Ambassador to the Court of St. James. It may be observed that the authorities have always

maintained that the peace disturbances were the result of ignorant agitation conducted by ignorant agitators and fomented by the opponents of the Government. With this view I am inclined to agree, because, from personal inquiries made at the time, I came to the conclusion that the great majority of thinking Japanese had grown weary of the war and welcomed peace. That the terms eventually concluded received the whole-hearted assent of the Emperor and the unanimous approval of the leading statesmen of the country there can be no doubt. Baron Komura had merely a limited responsibility, but making full allowance for this circumstance, it cannot be said that he achieved as much as might reasonably have been expected of him. On the contrary, had he been more frank in policy and more firm in decision, Japan would probably have gained concessions beyond her irreducible minimum. At least to-day she might have been in occupation of Northern Saghalien.

The Russo-Japanese War has not settled the Far Eastern question. The disastrous results which attended the campaign as far as Russia was concerned have not lessened her belief in the necessity for an ice-free port that will serve as an outlet for her Asiatic commerce. Nor is the lapse of time ever likely to alter her determination. She is firmly convinced that it is her destiny to regain possession of Port Arthur and Dalny, an ambition the realisation of which, in her opinion, the recent events have merely deferred. While the hands of the clock have been put back, the pendulum still swings. The chapter dealing with the Amur railway describes the measures being taken by Russia to restore her place and prestige in the Far East. Japan has not hesitated to take full advantage of the benefits she gained in consequence of the war. The ink was hardly dry on the treaty of peace before she compelled Korea to give her a protectorate over the country. The general policy she disclosed in Manchuria showed that if anything she had less regard than her late enemy for the principles of the Open Door; while the mere fact that, as far as the Kwantung Peninsula, the railway southwards from Changchun, and the mines adjacent were concerned she actually took the place of Russia, was, in itself, sufficient indication of the insincerity

of her declarations preceding the war that she was actuated solely by a desire to see the sovereignty of China upheld.

It is difficult to imagine that having successfully fought one of the greatest campaigns in history, Japan would have consented to withdraw from Manchuria and to hand back the territory to China. She had justly won the right to the possession of the Kwantung Peninsula and of part of the railway. But it must be added that in view of her assurances on the eve of hostilities—assurances which gained for her considerable sympathy—the world confidently expected that her policy in Manchuria would be more liberal than that of the Russians, and that she would do nothing inconsistent with the principle of equal opportunity. Such has not proved to be the case. The section of this book dealing with Manchuria will establish the truth of my statement, and thus the Japanese will not be in a position to urge, as they have done only too often in the past, that criticism is levelled against them without the production of fact. For present purposes it is only necessary to say—and this, let it be understood, after due allowance has been made for the advantages Japan must inevitably gain from geographical proximity—that foreign traders do not enjoy the same measure of prosperity under the Japanese régime in Manchuria as they did in the days of Russian occupation. Irrespective of local considerations discussed elsewhere, it must be remembered that in a broad sense Great Britain is in an infinitely more disadvantageous position by reason of the turn events have taken than she was before she assumed such an important rôle, as the ally of Japan, in shaping those events. The heart of the Russian Empire is situated far distant from Manchuria; the Russians themselves are not enterprising as a commercial people and until recently have shown no considerable tendency to emigrate to the regions of the Far East; their scale of wages and style of living are based on the European standard; and their progress as a State is hampered by an administration, still largely bureaucratic and constantly faced with financial difficulties. On the other hand, Japan is situated in close proximity to Manchuria; the Japanese are an alert and imitative people and are settling in Manchuria in large numbers; their standard of wages and of living is an Oriental one;

and their commercial enterprises are stimulated by Government subsidies and by active Government assistance in other directions. The loans which they raised in Great Britain and in the United States enabled them to fight the war with Russia, and the result of that war increased their prestige and their credit to such an extent that it gave them a fair prospect of taking our place as the leading Power in the Far East. Japan might perhaps have worked out her own destiny without our assistance, but her progress would certainly have been retarded had not she been encouraged by a Western Power. The only justification, therefore, which can be found for the alliance—and this must be held to be quite adequate—was the possibility of Japan becoming the friend of either Russia or Germany, contingencies which would have proved detrimental to the welfare of the British Empire in spheres beyond the Far Eastern region. It could, of course, be urged that the aims of Russia and Japan were irreconcilable, and that in view of their traditional enmity a close friendship was impracticable. Assuming that these two Powers had come to a working arrangement, it would have been found that their interests clashed to such an extent that sooner or later a breach was inevitable. One could not conceive the Russians making an alliance with Japan in which they were prepared to treat that country on terms of equality. There was, however, danger to be expected from other quarters, if not from Russia, and Great Britain, to protect her own interests, was compelled to become the ally of Japan. The only alternative would have been an alliance with Russia; but this, to the average Englishman, was altogether unthinkable. It was believed that Russia contemplated an attack upon our Indian frontier, and that her occupation of Manchuria was merely a prelude to an attempt at further aggression in the direction of Peking. As a matter of fact, we overestimated the military and commercial possibilities of Russia, who for many years would have found more than sufficient scope for her efforts in the colonisation of Manchuria. An alliance with Russia would probably have led to the break-up of China, as it is difficult to imagine how otherwise Great Britain could have obtained a *quid pro quo* for the Russian occupation of Manchuria. If this had been

granted, Japan would have been thrown into the arms of Germany, and together these two Powers would have claimed their share of the spoils. Before the powerful combinations such as I have indicated, the United States would have been impotent to enforce her traditional policy of maintaining the integrity of China. At the same time France, in virtue of her intimate relations with Russia, would have supported if she had not actually joined Great Britain and Russia, and in return would have been permitted to extend the frontiers of her possessions in Southern China. An understanding between all the Powers to the exclusion of Japan was out of the question.

It will be seen that Great Britain was compelled, by force of circumstances over which she had little control, to join hands with Japan. There were few who predicted that the war between Russia and Japan would have such decisive results. It was generally believed that both Powers would suffer materially in the conflict, and that thus Great Britain would find room, as it were, to drive in the wedge of commercial expansion. At least we trusted that if Japan were victorious she would reciprocate our support by helping and not by hampering British commercial activity in spheres where the principle of equal opportunity for all nations obtained. As events have turned out, however, we find ourselves in this position : as a result of a successful war fought largely by means of British money, Japan is rapidly becoming the predominant commercial Power in the Far East. We cannot complain of the advantages she must inevitably gain as the result of geographical proximity, and we are not in sufficiently strong a position to protest against her infringements of the principle of equal opportunity in Southern Manchuria and Korea. On the other hand, Russia, realising that Japan is following in Southern Manchuria practically the same policy which she herself favoured when in occupation of that region and against which Great Britain in her case so vigorously protested, fails to see why she should release her hold upon Northern Manchuria ; and Japan, conscious of her own defects, gives tacit acquiescence to the action of her late antagonist. Thus, in consequence of the war, instead of Russia occupying the whole of Manchuria we

find that this territory is now under the influence of the two Powers who so recently fought upon the issue of its restoration to China. Meanwhile, Japan, having materially increased her prestige, is unlikely to tolerate for long the treatment meted out to her emigrants, not only by the United States, but by our colonies—British Columbia, Australia, and New Zealand; and sooner or later we may have to choose between the friendship of our Anglo-Saxon kindred in the United States and in our colonies on the one hand, and the fulfilment of our strict treaty obligations to our ally on the other. In addition it is clear that the result of the Russo-Japanese War has had some general effects upon world-wide conditions. To those who are deeply concerned in the religious aspect it will appear obvious that the fact of a heathen nation triumphing over a Christian country will for centuries oppose an obstacle in the path of Christian propaganda. The Japanese, believing as they do that Christianity is not essential to civilisation and that it can be altogether dispensed with as far as a nation's welfare is concerned, see no reason why they should forsake the faith of their fathers to adopt an alien religion. They now realise that one of the principal causes that brought about the defeat of Russia was the indulgence of her officers in the frivolities of life to the detriment of their duty, and they reason that if this be possible in a Christian nation then their own way of thinking is superior.

The war had a far greater, though less concrete issue, than that for which ostensibly it was fought. Frankly, it was the issue between a white race and a yellow race. This fact should not be overlooked by students in Great Britain who, isolated as they are from the society of the Japanese and knowing only of their good qualities, are apt to exclude them from the category of the coloured races. They may urge that the Japanese have earned their right to be placed upon an equality with the Western races, and they may point to her ancient culture in support of this contention. I, who have no race prejudice, cannot entirely agree with this argument. For I hold, and will prove in the course of this book, that, apart from the question of colour antipathy which at best is a mean and ignorant sentiment inasmuch as it

will not stand the light of logic, Japanese civilisation amounts at present only to a veneer; that it has been hastily assimilated and in many instances ill-digested; and that it cannot reasonably be claimed that the Japanese, whose period of enlightenment embraces only fifty years following centuries of darkness and isolation, can have advanced in all matters to a place of equality with the nations of the West. Again, it may be urged by the admirers of Japan that at least her progress compares favourably with that of Russia. They will point to the incidents of the revolution and of the mines in Siberia; but the writer, who has travelled extensively in Russia, and made personal investigations on the spot, is confident that these have been grossly exaggerated. The same spirit of ready credulity accepts the theory of Russian barbarity, and at the same time places the Japanese upon a pedestal. This spirit is obviously the outcome of ignorance. Many of our writers love to exploit heroes because of the vivid material they provide for the pen. Thus, for instance, Father Gapon, who was subsequently proved beyond the shadow of a doubt to be a scoundrel of the worst type, was originally presented as a picturesque figure inspired by religious zeal and animated by a love of freedom and justice. We in England, who have had internal peace for centuries, imagined that a revolution could be suppressed by moral suasion. But in the time of civil strife passions run high and cruel deeds are inevitable. It is an excess of enthusiasm, blinding the perspective, that will compare the culture and civilisation of the Japanese to that of the Russians—the great part which Russia has played in the history of the world, and the petty feudal struggles of an isolated people; the art, the music, the literature, and the science of the Russians; and the *kakemono*, the lacquer-work, the bronzes, the mournful inharmonic *samisen* and *koto*, the feeble writings which supply no original contributions to the world of thought, and the imitative rather than the inventive qualities of the Japanese. Victory on the battlefield is no index to culture and civilisation. On the contrary, it only proves that new nations, unaccustomed to the luxury which is inseparable from culture and civilisation, and knowing not the joy of living, are, in consequence, the better equipped for strife.

I do not grudge Japan her great triumph, nor do I seek to underrate it. I merely wish to represent it in its proper perspective. In our admiration for her brilliant military achievements we should not exaggerate her place and progress as a people. A large section of the Japanese, belonging, it must be admitted, to the more ignorant class, believe that when their country defeated Russia they defeated the white man and Christianity. This was proved in the subsequent peace riots when without discrimination of any kind they destroyed ten Christian churches. There can be no doubt that the result of the Manchurian campaign has lowered the prestige of every white man among the masses of Japan. It has, moreover, bred a spirit of arrogance which, happily, responsible statesmen are endeavouring to check, and which, if they are not successful, will have far-reaching consequences that may imperil the existence of the nation. In common phraseology, the Japanese are in danger of having their heads turned by sudden success. But they are rapidly finding that they cannot accept the benefits of civilisation without its disadvantages. No longer are they content with a simple fare of fish and rice ; their standard of living is increasing ; and the burdens of State rest heavily upon them. It is because of these circumstances that Japan's competitors hope in the course of time to make up the ground lost during the period of her transition. The growth of the very civilisation we have implanted in her will eventually lead her to a position of economic equality with ourselves. Time alone can prove whether she will be able wholly to withstand the evils while accepting the blessings of this civilisation. There is no reason to believe that she will attain greater success than has been achieved by the Powers of the West. On the contrary, there is evidence that her own native vice reinforced by Western vice will present no mean peril in the future that lies before her. Until she has reached a position of economic equality with the rest of the world she will possess advantages with which it is impossible to compete ; but when finally that position is reached, geographical proximity to the markets of the Far East will alone give her superiority in competition with Western nations. Meanwhile, other races, stimulated by her example, have awakened to self-consciousness. It is difficult

to estimate the extent of the influence which the war produced in this direction. The struggle of two alien nations within her own borders brought home to China more than ever the urgent necessity for reform, and the sequel was a promise, on the part of the Throne, of constitutional government within a stipulated period. While she could tolerate the presence of the Russians in Manchuria her sense of national pride showed signs of revival when Japan, a Far Eastern country like herself, and one who in the past owed much to her teaching, rose to prominence and was accorded a place among the Powers of the world. Incidentally it may be observed that the advance of China, which is the great market of the Far East, will eventually act as a check upon Japan. An alliance between these two countries, such as that predicted by writers who believe in the Yellow Peril, will not be possible for many generations. Their interests are wholly irreconcilable. They have their rivalries and their jealousies similar to those which would render improbable an aggressive union of all the Western races against the nations of the East. It is no secret that the malcontents in India have received encouragement from the Japanese success against Russia; and one might even go farther afield, to Turkey, to Persia, to Egypt, and elsewhere, to discover traces of its indirect influences upon the destinies of peoples. Whether or not the ultimate effect of these influences will make for the welfare of the world as a whole is a matter for conjecture, and its discussion is beyond the scope of the present work.

XIII

SIDELIGHTS ON THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FORCES, AND SOME NAVAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN

BEFORE proceeding to deal with certain aspects of the military and naval events which occurred during the war, it will be opportune to give some comparative idea of the two forces engaged—their morale, and their fighting qualities. Both were poorly paid conscript armies, and in Japan, as well as in Russia, military discipline was strictly enforced in the ranks. As all the world knows, the Japanese triumph was largely due to the display of a heroism which has rarely been equalled and never excelled in the history of warfare. To account for this heroism various reasons have been advanced. It has been said that the Japanese owed it to their *Bushido*, to their religion, and to their absolute devotion to the throne. But those who have made a study of Japanese history will realise that while all of these were contributory factors none of them was the primary cause. The much-vaunted *Bushido* of Japan advances no principles either of honour or integrity which have not been accepted by Western nations for centuries past. Although its teachings offer some original points of view, insomuch as they apply to Oriental conditions, their ethical effect does not in the main differ from that of the unwritten code which governs the conduct of every English gentleman at the present time, or from that chivalry for which our knights-errant were conspicuous in the days of old. In other words, *Bushido* tells the world nothing that it did not know. The precepts of *Bushido* applied only to the Samurai who, in olden times, merely practised them in regard to his superiors and his equals, for it is abundantly proved that he was a tyrant to the lower orders.

The Japanese claim that the spirit of *Bushido* has gradually spread among all classes, but to what extent they are justified in so claiming can only be estimated by a critical analysis of the character of the average individual. This, I fear, would not support the Japanese contention. Buddhism has had little effect upon the martial spirit of the masses, for, as Chamberlain says, the complicated metaphysics of the faith has awakened little interest in the Japanese nation. The majority of the naval and military officers, however, belong to a sect of Buddhism known as the Zen sect, adherence to which makes for philosophic calm. The teachings of *Shintō*, the native religion, exerted a far greater influence upon the fortunes of the campaign than either *Bushido* or Buddhism, an influence, moreover, that was not confined to the officers but which existed throughout all ranks in the field. It is of the essence of *Shintō* that pious loyalty should be displayed towards the Emperor whom the Japanese have come to look upon as the representative on earth of a race of heavenly gods. The word *Shintō* is the name for nature- and ancestor-worship. Thus the Japanese soldiers who fought in Manchuria believed that death in their country's cause was the fulfilment of the *Shintō* ideal, that after death they would join the glorious companionship of their ancestral spirits, and that generation after generation would offer up incense and prayer before their ancestral shrines. They had no other conception of righteousness beyond that which was consistent with their duty to the State. Before this, all other considerations were as nothing. They had one creed—the creed of true patriotism; one faith—the faith that if all came to the worst on earth the hereafter would be eternal peace; and, unlike their Christian enemy, the horrors of an everlasting hell presented no dread-inspiring alternative. To them, death was robbed of much of its sting. To them, death was a form of deification. It was a sacrifice upon the altar of their god-emperor, a sacrifice which, no matter what their sin as individuals might have been, uplifted their spirits to the heavens above.

Although, together with other causes which I shall shortly proceed to outline, these religious influences were undoubtedly contributory to the splendid fighting qualities dis-

played by the Japanese in the field, it must not for one moment be supposed that their invariable effect was to produce that ecstatic state which deprives a violent death of its horror and which, in the face of certain annihilation, renders the act of self-immolation a matter of willing and even of joyful commission.

The great mass of Japanese, in spite of *Shintō* with its fundamental teaching of devotion to the Emperor, could not wholly overcome those instincts common to human beings of all races and of all climes. During the war there was more than one instance of Japanese regiments, stricken with fear, recoiling from an attack upon the Russian defences, and it was said that upon several occasions their generals placed bodies of armed men in the rear in order to shoot down any soldiers who might precipitately retreat. It must be admitted, however, in common fairness to our allies, that cases of open cowardice were exceedingly rare, and that these only occurred under circumstances that would have sorely tried the bravery of any troops in the world. At Port Arthur, detachments of infantry were frequently ordered to perform tasks in the very teeth of the Russian defences, tasks that left little doubt concerning the fate which must inevitably overtake all but a remnant of the force employed. It was little wonder that the philosophy of Buddhism or the faith of *Shintō* was unequal to the strain of this human sacrifice, too often as purposeless as it was wanton. Religion undoubtedly inspired the Japanese to greater achievements than those of which their enemy were capable. But it did not make them altogether impervious to the dread of the dangers of the battlefield, as some enthusiastic writers have represented. One is rather inclined to attribute a large measure of their success to a more material agency, an agency that was at work in the days of their feudalism and of their restoration, and which produced in them a psychological condition that went a long way towards making the ideal soldier. Their own feudal strifes, accompanied as they were by a wholesale shedding of blood and the fanatical use of the sword, had led the Samurai class to hold human life in light estimation. The common people, very often the victims of these warrior brigands, were in relation to them

merely as serfs to lords; but the ceremonial usages and customs of the times instilled into them something more than subserviency, for reverence was not only expected, it was exacted from them, and on bended knee and with bowed heads they were compelled to submit to the Samurai who, with two swords at his side, literally stood over them. While those who were not of the Samurai order may have resented such treatment, they nevertheless envied the lot of their overlords. It was an age when warlike achievement counted for everything, and the warrior class was regarded as the main fabric of society. When, less than half a century later, the Restoration was brought about, the Samurai, as the exclusive military class, was abolished, and all sections of the population were admitted to service in the army and navy of the Emperor. The common people were eager to attain the only fame hitherto known to them—the fame of military achievement. Moreover they were desirous of emulating the former deeds of the Samurai and of proving that in bravery and endurance they were his equal. Japan was in a stage of development similar to that which characterised the Middle Ages in the West when, time after time, masses of men in armour met each other with steel against steel and ceased not the conflict until either one side or the other was exterminated.

That Japan was not involved earlier in struggles of magnitude with foreign countries was alone due to her policy of isolation and to the great distance at which she was situated from the Continent of Europe. Had it not been for these circumstances she might have been under foreign tutelage to-day. When, owing to Western expansion consequent upon increased facilities of communication, the Powers invited her to awaken, she wisely responded, though not until several severe lessons in the form of bombardments had been administered to her. Realising the necessity for promptly securing the best means for national defence, and her people being essentially a warlike race, she naturally turned her immediate attention to acquiring those scientific attainments of war that the new civilisation had brought in its wake. Not having advanced step by step with the rest of the world, she was indeed fortunate inasmuch as she was permitted to make up for

lost ground. The concrete results of the progress of gradual evolution in the many countries that composed the outside world were instantly available to her students. She was thus saved the trouble of invention, the worry and cost of experiment and research, and altogether a not inconsiderable amount of thought and pains. She was in a position to take the best and leave the worst that the world could offer. Her awakening has been more conspicuous in a military than in any other sense, a fact which her admirers are too often prone to overlook. She deserves credit inasmuch as she showed considerable discrimination in her examination of the various military and naval organisations of the world, and her ready assimilation of the system which found favour in the eyes of her administrators was an achievement of no mean order. No less remarkable were the sound judgment she displayed in the purchase of war materials and the imitative faculties she developed in the erection of arsenals and dockyards, and in the manufacture of arms and ammunition of foreign pattern. The masses also shared, to some extent, the ambitions of her leading statesmen who, as soon as the veil of isolation had fallen from their vision, wished to see a policy of imperial expansion inaugurated, and to secure for Japan entry into the comity of nations. Factors such as those I have described, it will be remembered, exerted a determining influence upon the course of the war with China, and at a later date, while, as it were, they were still fresh, they no doubt materially affected the fortunes of the campaign against Russia. And finally, Japan chose her own time for opening hostilities, a time when she had at her command at least three-quarters of a million of well-trained and hardy men, when her arsenals were stocked with guns and ammunition, and when the strategical situation in the field of warfare was distinctly in her favour. Her geographical position of proximity to Manchuria and Korea—a position described fully in a previous chapter—gave her an overwhelming natural advantage. Altogether her prospects at the outset were infinitely superior to those of Russia.

A brief review of the condition of Russia and of her position in the Far East at the time will enable the reader to appreciate the truth of this statement. The Russian soldiers

were not inspired by high motives of patriotism. On the contrary, the revolutionary propaganda had made considerable progress in their midst. Conscripted from a class essentially ignorant, they cared little, if they knew anything at all, about the policy of imperial expansion in Manchuria. That the Tsar and his advisers were aiming at the establishment of an ice-free port in the Far East was of small consolation to them in their sufferings on the battlefields. Compelled to leave their homes at a moment's notice; conveyed in crude railway trucks thousands of miles across the wastes of Siberia—snow-bound in winter and heat-ridden in summer—to the unfamiliar plains of Manchuria; called upon, often within a few hours of their arrival, to engage in terrible strife with an enemy as strange to them as the Eskimo is to the Englishman, they were indeed ill-fitted for the task of winning victories. That they were unable to triumph was due to causes over which they had not the slightest control. Kuropatkin has said with truth that the defects of the regulars as well as the reserves were the defects of the whole Russian people. It was not that they lacked either bravery or the capacity to withstand hardship. In these respects, and taking into consideration the extraordinary difficulties under which they were labouring and the fact that their heart was not in their work, it must be admitted that apart from the many instances of conspicuous heroism on record, they proved themselves worthy foes even in their failures—the failures of the long drawn-out battles against tremendous odds, followed by retreats which were none the less remarkable achievements because they were the inevitable outcome of defeat, the repeated reformations and presentations of solid fronts to the enemy, the never-to-be-forgotten defence of Port Arthur, and the forlorn though fighting hope of the Baltic Fleet. Unlike the Japanese they had no religion to teach them that death in their country's cause purified their souls of sin and admitted them to a glorious companionship of ancestral spirits. They knew that, however glorious their death might be from the soldier's point of view, this could not absolve them from the consequences of misdeeds on earth, and that while heaven was the reward of the good, hell was

the punishment of the wicked. In the matter of leadership the Russians compared unfavourably with the Japanese. It was not that the Japanese displayed such extraordinary military genius as some writers would have us believe; it was rather that the Russian officers were singularly incompetent, and in many cases culpably negligent.

Kuropatkin has written that instances might be cited of men who had been in command of forces in a military district for a very prolonged period without having once commanded troops at manœuvres and without having mounted a horse for years. He added that in proportion as commanders were promoted they had less and less practice in directly commanding troops in the field. In another passage he points out that "The Russo-Japanese War furnished an immense amount of material for judging what we ought to do in order to increase our military preparedness and the efficiency of our army. The three wars waged by Russia in the last fifty years have shown clearly the defects of the body of officers in our army. These are undoubtedly due largely to the backwardness of Russia's culture and the general conditions of life and activity of the whole population. But apart from this, if the military uniform had been made to attract the best and the most energetic men of the nation, unquestionably, from a people numbering many millions, hundreds of men would have been developed, capable of commanding our armies. It would appear to be necessary, therefore, first to make the military uniform attractive to the flower of the Russian youth; and second, to strive insistently to have the most energetic wearers of the uniform pass through the service in the ranks of the army, developing their knowledge and spiritual forces by the constant thought that the army is designed for war. We have obtained the first of these objects; the military uniform really did long ago acquire honour in the land of Russia. As a matter of fact, there exists here such an incomprehensible deference to the military uniform as can only be accounted for by the low level of culture of our population. Not so very long ago, a man who merely wore a military cap and a cockade was regarded in the rural districts as possessed of authority. The peasants doffed their hats to

him, and in winter turned their heavily laden teams out of the road into the snowdrifts to let him pass, and listened in silence to his vulgar abuse. But we have failed to obtain the second object, of which I have just spoken, for the mass of the most capable and energetic men who wear the military uniform have not only not served in the ranks of the army, but have not even had any connection with it. As long ago as the eighteenth century, the practice was established of conferring the uniform on children of prominent grandees, who might be promoted in rank while caracoling around the room on a hobby-horse. Then the military uniform, and even the title of general, ceased to mean that a man actually belonged to the army, or was occupied with military affairs. Military uniforms made their appearance in all ranks of society, with the exception of the priesthood. The members of the interior council, ambassadors, senators, honorary wardens, ministers of the various departments, their assistant ministers, governor-generals, governors, prefects, and chiefs of police, and a host of persons in the military public administration on the border marches, all wear the military uniform, and are carried on the rolls of various grades. But, with a few exceptions, they have no connection with the army, and only weaken it. Only a very small number of the generals included in the very thick roster-book of our army perform duty in the line. And worst of all is the fact that those who do perform line duty lag in rank and particularly in pay behind those who do not perform duty in the line. Such being the condition of affairs, it is evident that the strongest, most energetic, and most capable elements have sought to quit the service in our line."

In many of the Russian officers was represented the worst side, not of Russian society in particular, but of Western civilisation generally, a civilisation the Japanese had only just acquired and the bad features of which had not yet affected them. It was not that the Japanese lacked vice. Centuries of extreme poverty and of isolated environment had rendered their vice almost as Spartan, if the term may be forgiven, as their virtue. Their vice was unaccompanied by debauchery. It was vice without luxury, vice with a minimum of sensuality, a countenanced and therefore a

calculated vice. Consequently, although they were not by any means strangers to vice they were spared many of the ill-effects that would have been inevitable had it been accompanied by profligacy. Unlike their Christian enemy, the fruit was not forbidden them. And, therefore, as they were specifically unmoral, the accusation of immorality could not reasonably be brought against them. Whatever may be thought of the condition of the Japanese in this respect from the Western point of view, there is no doubt that it contributed in no small measure to the successful conduct of the campaign, inasmuch as the time of their officers was not taken up in the pursuit of pleasure to the detriment of their duty.

A large proportion of the Russian officers gave themselves over to unbridled licentiousness. Accustomed to lives of luxury and indulgence at home, they seemed incapable of realising that among the first duties of a soldier was restraint, and that the fulfilment of this duty was rendered all the more necessary in view of the fact that they were engaged upon active service. On their occupation of Manchuria, cafés chantants, theatres, opera-houses, and drinking saloons were established in all the principal towns. In fact, Russian life in its worst as well as in its best features was faithfully reproduced in these provinces of China. During the war the authorities were exceedingly lax in enforcing military discipline as applied to officers not actually engaged at the front, and in not insisting on a strict administration of the towns consistent with the exigencies of warfare. Many non-combatants of an undesirable character were allowed to remain upon the scene, and an unusually large horde of parasitical camp-followers attached themselves to the Russian army in the field.

When the Japanese torpedo-boats made their first attack on the Russian fleet in Port Arthur many of its officers were absent from their posts attending a birthday dinner ashore. It was not until the Japanese land forces had made considerable advance that General Stoessel thought it necessary to adopt siege administration. The supply of champagne in the town was altogether disproportionate to the supply of other and more useful commodities, but in spite of this circumstance it became exhausted, except in certain privileged

quarters, several months before the surrender of the fortress took place. It is, indeed, a sad commentary upon the character of Russian leaders that a large proportion of the cargoes of the ships trying to run the blockade in the latter days of the siege consisted of cases of champagne. The voyages of these ships, it must be remembered, were promoted and paid for by prominent Russian officials resident in China coast-ports, who were thus fully aware of the composition of the shipments. To have attempted to forward luxuries when the necessities of life were in so great a demand was unpardonable. Farther north along the Manchurian system the buffets of the railway stations were converted into drinking dens. In neutral territories and within a few miles of the Russian lines, low-class dealers, representative in the truest sense of the scum of the earth, established warehouses which they stocked with alcoholic liquors of all kinds and of very questionable quality, from beer and bottled cocktails, to sweet champagne and fiery liqueurs; and the authorities actually facilitated their trade by furnishing passports which enabled them to travel backwards and forwards in safety. In many instances they were even convoyed by detachments of Cossacks.

Harbin, the principal Russian base in Manchuria, was the centre of gaiety and dissipation. Here, officers on their way to and from the front assembled in large numbers. The theatre and the opera-house were filled to overflowing; cafés chantants kept their doors open to eager throngs far into the night; gambling dens and drinking saloons flourished like weeds; and licentiousness, with little disguise, ran riot. Money was almost as plentiful in this city of the far-distant Manchurian plains as it was in the heart of any capital in Europe. The majority of the Russian officers were men of means, and they squandered their roubles with characteristic recklessness. No matter how high went the cost, there was a large and constant demand for champagne, and prices that would have seemed prohibitive in ordinary times were cheerfully paid. Enterprising merchants and storekeepers did not hesitate to take full advantage of the situation, and, by regulating the volume of the various commodities which they placed upon the market, raised prices generally, and thus amassed enormous fortunes. From time to time

scenes were witnessed that were a disgrace to the uniform of the Tsar; and officers, whose anger had been aroused either as a result of jealousy over some questionable love affair, or as a consequence of excessive indulgence in wine, frequently became involved in brawls that led to duels in the course of which much blood was spilt, and much gallantry, of a kind that might have been better employed against the common enemy, was displayed.

It was not altogether surprising that Harbin, the centre of gaiety and dissipation in Manchuria, should also be the headquarters in the theatre of war of that lamentable maladministration with its systematic course of bribery and corruption which characterised the conduct of the campaign. Contractors and traders who in the days of peace had been in business on a small scale, suddenly amassed wealth, and it was notorious that highly placed officers in return for a share of the proceeds had given them extensive orders for army supplies, orders which it was never intended that they should fulfil, and of which, after the roubles were paid over, nothing more was heard. It cannot be doubted that the prosperity of Harbin was largely due to the wholesale misappropriation of Government funds.

Similar methods of maladministration were practised throughout the whole region under Russian occupation. World criticism has shown a tendency to carry to excess its condemnation of Russia's defects, and an inclination to ignore the deficiencies of other countries engaged in past wars. In this connection we cannot wholly forget that our South African campaign was not unaccompanied by "scandals." In point of fact, it is extremely doubtful whether any nation, howsoever well governed in time of peace, can prevent a leakage of public funds in time of war, when, owing to the exigencies of the moment, strict and immediate supervision becomes an impossibility. It can scarcely be a matter for wonder that Russia, a State in whose official life the canker of corruption had flourished for generations, should have failed to establish a precedent in morals during one of the greatest campaigns the world has seen; a campaign in which everything, even including the systematic delinquencies of responsible departments, was carried out on a scale com-

mensurate with the vastness of the whole field of operations. It must not be imagined that the Japanese were altogether free from the effects of maladministration. For example, certain transactions in which a Cabinet Minister was involved became a notorious scandal in Tōkyō, and in several other instances publicity was rigorously suppressed by the Government. But in the case of the Japanese, the evil was not allowed to spread until it became a scourge, nor, for the very reasons I have outlined as explaining the excellence of their military morale, did the danger of its spreading ever develop possibilities of any gravity.

Apart from all questions of the efficiency of organisation, the competence of officers, and the spirit and morale of the troops engaged, there were other serious factors which militated against the success of Russia. She was dependent for the transportation and maintenance of a vast army in the field, upon a single line of railway stretching from Moscow, across Siberia and Manchuria to Port Arthur, and along which traffic in winter was frequently impeded by heavy snowdrifts. There were not wanting prophets in this and in other countries who predicted that the system would break down completely under the strain of war requirements. These prophets, however, were proved by actual circumstances to have been wrong in their judgment. The Siberian railway worked with an unflinching smoothness throughout the whole of the campaign, and its wonderful efficiency, which, as far as Russia was concerned, was the outstanding achievement during the war, astonished the world and dismayed its arm-chair critics. No praise can be too high for those officials who were responsible for its splendid management at a time when serious failure would have led to the infliction of far greater disasters than those which actually overtook the Russian forces in Manchuria. But the Siberian railway, as a single line, had its limitations. Consequently, it was not until the period immediately preceding the opening of peace negotiations that Russia was in a position to place in the field an army numerically approximate to that of her enemy. With her long and slender line of communication trailing many thousands of miles across the Ural mountains, the Siberian steppes and plains, around Lake Baikal where there are fifty

tunnels to fifty versts, across the Chinese frontier, and to the southernmost limits of Manchuria, Russia was at an enormous disadvantage compared with Japan, who, as soon as she had gained command of the sea was able to disembark at will thousands of troops on the coasts of Korea and Manchuria—and this, it should be recollected, after a voyage lasting only a few days, and, with transports adequately convoyed, attended by little risk save that inseparable from ocean travel.

Had Japan postponed the opening of hostilities until the Siberian railway was doubled, she would have found Russia strongly intrenched in Manchuria; and had she been so rash as then to challenge the issue in war, it is safe to assume that she would have been opposed by a force twice, if not three times, as large as that she encountered in the recent campaign. When on February 6, 1904, she broke off diplomatic relations with St. Petersburg, she was well aware of the weakness of Russia's military position in Manchuria. The estimates formed in Europe of the strength of the Russian army in the Far East were altogether exaggerated. It is extremely doubtful whether, apart from the garrisons of Port Arthur and Vladivostock, Russia was able at the outbreak of war to place more than 30,000 men in the field. In this matter the Japanese were accurately informed through the medium of their spies, who penetrated every part of Manchuria in the guise of pedlars, photographers, and barbers. "Let us patronise M'sieur le Major and be shaved. The lieutenant boy will lather us," was a common saying among the Russian officers. Not only were the Russians sadly deficient in men, but they also lacked guns, equipment, and supplies. It is not denied by them that if the Japanese by landing a force had followed up their first torpedo attack upon the Russian warships in the harbour at Port Arthur, they would have experienced little difficulty in seizing the fortress. At that time the defences were far from complete, and the garrison was wholly inadequate.

Subsequently, feverish preparations were made to resist a siege, and under the circumstances it is saying much for the readiness of Russian resource that within a few months Port Arthur was converted into one of the strongest citadels in the world. When about this time a Japanese squadron bom-

barded Vladivostock, considerable surprise was created by the fact that there was no reply. This silence on the part of the Russians, however, was not voluntary ; they had sent all their heavy cannon to Port Arthur, a circumstance with which their enemy was happily not aware. It might be urged that if the system of espionage employed by the Japanese was as perfect as was generally supposed, they must have been acquainted with the indefensible state of Port Arthur at the beginning of the war, and that consequently their inability to effect a *coup d'état* was inexcusable. There is no doubt that having gained a distinct advantage at the outset by disabling several of the Russian warships, they exhibited a hesitation in their operations which spread over a period of several months, and which gave their enemy opportunity to advance his preparations. The course of subsequent events proved that the Japanese did not consider it wise to land an army in the Kwantung Peninsula until they had sealed up Port Arthur by sinking eight merchant ships in the narrow mouth of the harbour. This means of checking Russian naval strength proved only of a temporary nature, for several of the wrecks were blown up, and a passage was restored. Moreover, the Russians gained to some extent inasmuch as the new passage was known only to themselves.

In the meantime, however, the Japanese achieved their main object and landed an army on the coast of the Kwantung Peninsula. Had they taken risks at the outset, they would have been saved all the heavy losses which were subsequently involved in the long and weary siege. It can only be assumed that in spite of the fact that they disabled several Russian warships in their first attack, they did not regard their naval position as sufficiently strong to provide not only for the blockading of Port Arthur, but also for the task of conveying large numbers of transports.

The statements I have made receive confirmation and amplification from the writings of no less an authority than General Kuropatkin himself, who, in a notable passage, describes the advantages possessed by the Japanese over the forces that were under his command. "The Japanese line of communications was short and secure," he says, "while we were at a distance of 8000 versts from our base of supplies and were connected with our country only by one

weak line of railway. The advantage that they had over us in this respect was immense. The slow concentration of our army, which had to be brought 8000 versts on a single-track railroad, gave them time, after the war began, to form new bodies of troops, in considerable numbers, and send them to the front. They had time enough, also, to supply their army with innumerable machine guns, after they had observed, in the early stages of the war, the importance of machine-gun fire. The field of military operations in Manchuria had been familiar to the Japanese ever since their war with China. Its heat, its heavy rains, its mountains, and its *kaoliang*,¹ were well known to them, because they had seen them all in their own country. In the mountains, especially, they felt perfectly at home, while a mountainous environment, to our troops, was oppressive. The Japanese, moreover, in their ten years of preparation for war with us, had not only studied Manchuria, but had secured there their own agents, who were of the greatest use to their army. The Chinese, I may add, assisted the Japanese, notwithstanding the severity and even cruelty with which the latter treated them. The Japanese had a considerable advantage over us, also, in their high-powered ammunition, their machine guns, their innumerable mountain guns, their abundant supply of explosives, and their means of attack and defence in the shape of wire, mines, and hand grenades. Their organisation, equipment, and transport of carts were all better adapted to the field of operation than ours were, and their bodies of sappers were more numerous than ours. The Japanese soldiers had been so trained as to develop self-reliance and ability to take the lead, and they were credited by foreign military observers with 'intelligence, initiative, and quickness.' In the fighting instructions that were given them, very material changes were made after the war began. At the outset, for example, night attacks were not recommended; but they soon satisfied themselves that night attacks were profitable, and they afterwards made great use of them. Major von Luwitz, of the German army, in a brochure entitled 'The Japanese Attack in the War in Eastern Asia

¹ A cereal cultivated largely in the northern provinces of China proper, and in Manchuria. Owing to its density and height it affords excellent cover during military operations.

in 1904-05,' says that while the Japanese did not neglect any means of making attacks effective, the secret of their success lay in their determination to get close to the enemy, regardless of consequences. The non-commissioned officers in the Japanese army were much superior to ours, on account of the better education and greater intellectual development of the Japanese common people. Many of them might have discharged the duties of commissioned officers with perfect success. The defects of our soldiers—both regulars and reservists—were the defects of the population as a whole. The peasants were imperfectly developed intellectually, and they made soldiers who had the same feeling. The intellectual backwardness of our soldiers was a great disadvantage to us, because war now requires far more intelligence and initiative, on the part of the individual soldier, than ever before. Our men fought heroically in compact masses, or in fairly close formation, but if deprived of their officers they were more likely to fall back than to advance. In the mass we had immense strength; but few of our soldiers were capable of fighting intelligently as individuals. In this respect the Japanese were much superior to us. Their non-commissioned officers were far better developed, intellectually, than ours, and among such officers, as well as among many of the common soldiers, whom we took as prisoners, we found diaries which showed not only good education but knowledge of what was happening and intelligent comprehension of the military problems to be solved. Many of them could draw maps skilfully, and one common soldier was able to show accurately, by means of a plan sketched in the sand, the relative positions of the Japanese forces and ours. But the qualities that contributed most to the triumph of the Japanese were their high moral spirit, and the stubborn determination with which the struggle for success was carried on by every man in their army, from the common soldier to the commander-in-chief. In many cases their situation was so distressing that it required extraordinary power of will on their part to stand fast or to advance. But the officers seemed to have resolution enough to call on their men for impossible efforts—not even hesitating to shoot those that fell back—and the soldiers, rallying their last physical and spiritual strength,

often wrested the victory away from us. One thing is certain: if the whole Japanese army had not been inspired with an ardent patriotism; if it had not been sympathetically supported by the whole nation; and if all its officers and soldiers had not appreciated the immense importance of the struggle, even such resolution as that of the Japanese leaders would have failed to achieve such results."

The official reports of the British military attachés who were privileged to accompany the forces, in the field also supply valuable information concerning other causes which brought about the Russian defeat. After the battle of the Yalu, General Sir Ian Hamilton wrote: "I have come to the conclusion that the most important lesson to be learnt by European armies from this conflict lies in the contrast afforded by—

"(1) The entire absence on the Russian side of any of those ruses or artifices which have from time immemorial played such an important part in battles.

"(2) The eager adoption by the Japanese of any ingenious device which might hoodwink their enemies, and thus afford their troops a better chance in the impending conflict.

"Thus the Russians crowded the hill-tops, letting the extent of their lines be easily inferred, and even watered and exercised their horses opposite their camps in full view of the enemy in broad daylight.

"*Per contra* the Japanese had the most stringent orders forbidding man or beast to show themselves. As before related, they planted a forest of pines to conceal their march from the plateau down upon Wiju, and hung branches on strings between uprights to cover their gun-pits from observation."

The Japanese found that cunning, with which quality they are more abundantly gifted than any other nationality of my acquaintance, was of immense use to them on the battlefield. As General Sir Ian Hamilton observed at the time, the Russians seemed to have no idea of those small deceptions that are, nevertheless, so invaluable to troops. They made frontal attacks on strongly prepared positions held by infinitely superior forces "with apparently no scheme or plan of any kind." Writing of the battle of the Shaho, Colonel

Haldane noted the indefatigability of the Japanese in making entrenchments wherever they paused, the successful co-operation of the Japanese artillery with the infantry, and the comparative immunity of their infantry, when moving, from loss under Russian shrapnel fire. The same officer added that in formation of their infantry for attack the Japanese appeared to have been guided by the following general rules :—

- (a) Present a difficult target to the enemy.
- (b) Offer the greatest facility for fire at all times.
- (c) Furnish the power of readily taking cover.
- (d) Promote mobility.
- (e) Lend themselves to easy reinforcement, and
- (f) The maintenance of command.

In explaining that rapidity of movement was the great feature of the infantry attack, Colonel Haldane pointed out that the men were so well developed physically that they could move forward at a quick double or rush, carrying packs, equipment, and 300 rounds of ammunition, without exhaustion. In peace time they were trained in gymnastics under their own officers, and in war, during halts, every opportunity was taken to continue that training and to practise them in running. On occasions they performed some wonderful feats in the way of man-handling guns, feats in which the men whose occupation in ordinary life was drawing rikishas, naturally excelled. It must not be assumed that the Japanese did not make some serious mistakes, both in the course of their preparation for the war, and in their conduct of the operations at the front. Their field-artillery had a range of only 6200 metres, and on that account was inferior to the Russian guns. After the conclusion of the war the army was equipped with a new field-gun with a range of 7800 metres, each piece costing, together with ammunition waggon, about £2000.

On the outbreak of hostilities the Japanese possessed few machine guns; and it was only after they had experienced to their cost the deadly effect of these weapons at Port Arthur, that they realised the important part they played in modern warfare, and purchased them in anything like large numbers. The painful weakness of their cavalry prevented them from taking full advantage of their victories. "There is no doubt,"

wrote Colonel Birkbeck, one of our military attachés, "that this question of cavalry is one of the very few in which the foresight of the Japanese statesmen who prepared for this war has been at fault, and it is a mistake for which the nation has all along paid a heavy price, culminating in Marshal Oyama's inability to reap the full fruits of his victory at Mukden. As Major-General Akiyama remarked, one of the most important lessons of the war is that a proper proportion of thoroughly efficient and properly trained cavalry is as essential to success as the guns and other parts of the whole machinery of an army. No cheap or hastily improvised substitute can properly take its place."

The Japanese horses were sturdy little animals, thoroughly in keeping with a land where everything is undersized. The average trooper was an inelegant rider, and, quite apart from any military duties which he might have been called upon to perform, his time and attention were fully occupied in trying to retain his seat. When mounted, out of regard for his own safety, he handled his horse gently, almost nervously. But he subsequently took out his revenge on the picket lines or in the stables. Japanese horses at the best are inclined to be vicious. This characteristic, however, is the inevitable result of the long course of rough treatment to which they have been subjected by their owners. On the other hand, the Russians are born horsemen. During the war, with one or two exceptions—notably on the occasion of Mistchenko's raid—the Cossacks found little opportunity of distinguishing themselves. Had the fortunes of the campaign gone in their favour, they would have been able to secure to Russia the maximum fruits of victory. The havoc that could be wrought by these big men, well mounted and well armed, upon troops falling back in disorder, can easily be imagined. In these circumstances it must be concluded that the Japanese were fortunate in not having a single reverse, for the composition of their forces was far from favourable to successful retirement. Many tributes have been paid to the capacity for preparation and organisation shown by the Japanese during the war. While their ability in this direction was undoubted, it must be remembered that from beginning to end, with the exception of the engagement of August 10, 1904, on sea, and the battle of Shaho on land,

they chose their own time for attack. Owing to inferior numbers and lack of adequate supplies, the Russians, excluding the Port Arthur fleet, were never in a position to take the offensive. Consequently the Japanese were able to keep to something like a programme, and their calculations were not upset by the demoralising factors of defeat. They never announced a movement before it was an accomplished fact, and then they always prefaced the statement with the words, "as pre-arranged."

Our attachés reported that Russia did not believe Japan would fight her, and that she was therefore unprepared for war and consequently had not time to collect much more than the supplies necessary for immediate requirements when hostilities commenced. On the other hand, from the very first moment of the landing of troops at Chemulpo, some onlookers were astonished by the admirable organisation and precision shown by the Japanese. Commander Wemyss, R.N., reported that the arrangements made for landing troops were so good that nothing had to be borrowed or purchased from the shore. Everything he saw pointed to the fact that all preparations had been made weeks beforehand.

It has been alleged by some experts that the authorities in Tōkyō failed to exert themselves to the fullest extent in sending reinforcements to the front. In support of their criticism they state that the 8th division did not leave Japan until October 1904, while the 7th division was only despatched to the front a month later. The 13th and 14th divisions were not ready to take the field until the summer of 1905, and similar delay took place in the mobilisation and embarkation of the reserve troops. Moreover, it has been stated that if Kuroki had been provided with a larger army at the Yalu the war might have been ended there and then. Had the Japanese, however, further delayed crossing the Yalu while additional troops were being sent to the scene, the Russians also would have been afforded an opportunity of increasing their forces. It is generally conceded that Kuroki reached the Korean frontier with as little delay as possible, and in view of the fact that his main object was to drive the Russians from the favourable high ground in Southern Manchuria while they had relatively few troops at their disposal, he was compelled to force an

early engagement. If the Russians had been given time to strengthen their position on the Yalu the Japanese task would have been a tremendous one. Events have proved that the Japanese always held superiority in numbers over the Russians during the progress of the campaign; but it was demonstrated by the conditions which existed towards the end of the war, that there were limits to the number of soldiers that even Japan could provide. Every able-bodied man in the reserves was summoned to the colours, and the dearth in adult males was evident from the fact that the merchant shipping was manned to a large extent by mere youths. In these circumstances the authorities were wise in retaining divisions, and as many reserves as possible, in order to make up for losses at the front as they occurred. They considered that they had provided the generals with adequate forces. I do not deny that more complete victories would have been obtained had the forces been larger; but it is open to question whether or not the Japanese would have been justified in taking the risk, at a comparatively early stage in the campaign, of placing in the field an army so large as to leave them deficient in the matter of reinforcements and reserves. While they made light of the Russian navy they were nevertheless bound to regard it as a factor in the situation, and to take into consideration all possible contingencies, even including those which might have relation to home defence.

In many other respects the Japanese displayed considerable caution in the conduct of the campaign. At Port Arthur they were slow to begin the attack, and their hesitation, which is held to have been warranted by the naval situation at the time, had the effect of prolonging the siege many months. Again, in view of the possibility that the Baltic fleet would eventually reach Far Eastern waters, they did not feel justified in taking any risks during the battle of August 10, 1904; and consequently, although they realised the incalculable advantage that would result to them from a complete victory over the Russian Asiatic squadron, they fought throughout at long range, thus allowing a considerable number of the enemy's ships to survive as a fleet in being.

In their desire to provide against all possible contingencies the Japanese frequently neglected to take advantage of the

opportunities which the moment offered, while on some occasions they paid a heavy penalty for their rigid adherence to routine. To conduct siege operations according to a programme of invariable procedure is to court disaster; for not only are the invested forces thus relieved of that harassing element in a defence—the necessity for anticipating and preparing for surprises, but they are automatically given periods of strategic freedom during which they can develop and direct their ingenuity and strength upon those movements in the attack when the greatest degree of vulnerability is revealed. The Japanese learnt this lesson to their cost in the case of the battleships *Hatsuse* and *Yashima*. As a result of prolonged observation, the Russians in Port Arthur came to the conclusion that the blockading squadron deviated very little, if at all, from the same course day after day. Consequently, under cover of darkness they laid a number of mines along the track of the enemy, and these reaped the splendid harvest of two first-class battleships of modern construction. The caution displayed by the Japanese was, singularly enough, mingled with a certain amount of recklessness. It cannot truthfully be said that the early attacks upon Port Arthur were planned with that wisdom which characterised Japanese operations in other parts of the field. There is not the slightest doubt that General Nogi imagined that he would be able to repeat his achievement of the China war when, within a few hours, he had stormed and captured the fortress. As early as July the Japanese authorities actually sent to the scene a steamer named the *Manchu Maru*, which conveyed a number of prominent statesmen, attachés, and war correspondents, for the purpose of witnessing the grand finale. From time to time those on board were assured that the end was near, and the Japanese officers made ill-timed ridicule of the first Russian sortie because it was led by bands playing music. Subsequently, however, they realised to their cost that as foemen the Chinese were not comparable with the Russians, and they lost heavily as a result of their supercilious contempt for the fighting qualities of their enemy. A closer regard to history—history that tells of Napoleon's terrible retreat from Moscow, the Russian endurance at Sevastopol, and the heroic deeds of Plevna—would have

saved them much in the way of bitter experience. Moreover they appear to have laboured under the delusion that the defences of Port Arthur were as backward in July as in the previous February, when the Japanese plan of landing an army and seizing the fortress after a few hours' fighting could easily have been realised. In the interval of respite that was allowed them while the enemy were continuing to blockade the entrance of the harbour, the Russian garrison had not only been enormously increased, but the fortifications had been improved with almost miraculous haste. Still, however, the western chain of defences, which on the outbreak of the war had been in a perilous state of incompleteness—the whole line being held by but three thousand men—afforded the weakest points to the attack. Fortunately for Port Arthur, the Japanese directed their early assaults from the eastward. It was here that they learnt their first lesson concerning the value of machine guns. As, with superb bravery but transparent madness, caring little for cover and nothing for consequences, they swarmed forward in their thousands, the Russian gunners, effectually concealed behind enormous works and guided by range-marks known only to themselves, mowed them down in masses with streams of lead from their machine guns, and on their side suffered practically no losses. Whatever possessed Japanese generals who showed such conspicuous foresight and ability in other parts of the field to attempt frontal attacks upon what was then one of the strongest fortresses in the world, is beyond comprehension. Either they must have been woefully ignorant of the strength of the defences which they endeavoured to storm, or else they must have had an altogether pathetic contempt for the character of the men who manned those defences. In any case their neglect to take into account in the making of their plans the deadly effect of the machine gun is at least one colossal error to be laid to their charge. The needless slaughter in front of Port Arthur was so appalling that there was more than one instance of refusal on the part of soldiers to face a death which in all the circumstances appeared to them to be inevitable. Consequently, regiments fresh from Japan, with the bands of music and the *Banzais* of cheering crowds still ringing in their ears, were

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sent on storming parties almost as soon as they had landed and before they had time to become unnerved by the hopeless horrors of Port Arthur. In time the Japanese realised that the occasion called for less heroic and more scientific methods, and they mounted siege guns and sapped their way to the heart of the fortress. The first siege gun did not open fire until six months after the beginning of the war, and it was not until mid-September that the Japanese brought to bear upon the fortress eighteen 11-inch howitzers and sixteen 5.9-inch howitzers, together with a total siege train of 152 pieces. On the other hand, the Russians possessed 546 guns, 54 of large and 149 of medium calibre. Had the Japanese realised earlier the futility of frontal attacks and the necessity for heavy artillery, many lives would have been saved.

During the war, this disregard for consequences on the part of the Japanese developed another aspect—that relating to the judgment of the world in general and to the obligations of International Law in particular. A notable illustration of their conduct in this respect was afforded by the “cutting-out” of the interned torpedo-destroyer, *Retshitelny*, from the neutral harbour of Chefoo, an act which might have involved grave complications. As I was an eye-witness of this incident, I am qualified to give an accurate and impartial account of what transpired. On the night of August 11, 1904, the Russian destroyer succeeded in evading the Japanese fleet and arrived safely in Chefoo harbour. It was believed that she conveyed official despatches for transmission by telegraph from Chefoo, intimating the intention of the Port Arthur fleet to make its way to Vladivostock, and asking for the co-operation of the admiral commanding the cruiser squadron then sheltering in the northern port. It would appear that some such communication did take place, for the Vladivostock squadron duly emerged, and in an encounter with the Japanese under Admiral Kamimura on August 14 was badly beaten. Four days previously the ships of the Port Arthur fleet had been scattered in all directions, some returning to Port Arthur, while others sought refuge in neutral ports situated farther south than Chefoo. The *Retshitelny* complied with the requests of the

Chinese authorities, submitted to disarmament, and was legally interned. A small contingent of Chinese sailors, transferred from one of the two Chinese cruisers then in port, were placed in charge of her. In the early hours of the morning following her arrival a Japanese flotilla appeared off the entrance to the harbour, and two destroyers with lights out steamed inside. One of these I immediately boarded. Everything was ready for action, and the men were standing to their allotted posts. On questioning the commander as to his object in making a night visit to Chefoo, he replied in indifferent English but with perfect frankness, "We come to capture Russian ship." I explained to him that as the destroyer had been disarmed in accordance with the laws of neutrality such drastic action on his part might involve his country in serious international complications. He paid not the slightest heed to my warning, but I could tell by the alert expression that suddenly came over his face that the news I had conveyed to him was not unwelcome. "What you say," he exclaimed with animation, "Russian ship, she got no guns?" I explained to him that while she still retained her guns, these were useless, owing to the fact that to comply with the necessary disarmament their breech-blocks had been removed by the Chinese authorities. A smile of satisfaction instantly lighted up his features, and drawing in his breath after the manner common to his countrymen, he rubbed his hands and replied, "That very good. All the more easy for me to capture Russian ship." He accepted a cigar, and apologised for his inability to offer me a whisky and soda. On leaving the destroyer I told the Chinese coolies to row me to the spot where the Russian destroyer was anchored in what might be termed the inner harbour—a sheltered basin largely used by merchant shipping.

The sea was smooth and the weather calm. It was certainly an ideal night for a ship-to-ship encounter and a hand-to-hand struggle. I rowed round the Russian destroyer, but beyond the outlines of a few men in the prevailing darkness, observed no unusual animation on board. I afterwards learned that the commander was well aware of the presence of the Japanese and of their intentions, and that in not showing any premature signs of alarm he was acting according to a

preconcerted plan. Soon the Japanese destroyers, with sinister stealth, crept into the inner harbour and stopped in close proximity to the *Retshitelny*, one on either side of her. An officer together with petty-officers and a number of men, all fully armed, put off in a small boat to the Russian ship. On going alongside they were requested to state their business. "Give my card to your captain," said the officer, producing the orthodox visiting card on which was inscribed his name and rank in Japanese characters. "The captain is asleep in his cabin, but I will see what he says," replied the Russian sailor. After an absence of a few moments he returned with the answer, "The captain wishes me to say that it is not usual for the officers of two countries at war to pay social calls upon each other. Therefore he cannot receive you." The Japanese did not waste any further time in parleying, but, led by their officer, scrambled on board. The Chinese who had charge of the ship were powerless to resist them, and the noise of the confusion quickly brought the Russian commander and his officers and men from their berths. The events that followed were largely prearranged by the Russian commander. As soon as he had received information that the Japanese ships were in the harbour and that they contemplated an attack, he had called his men together and given them orders that in the struggle about to take place they were to follow implicitly his example. At the same time he told the chief engineer that on a given signal by him, he was to proceed below and fire the powder magazine, with the object of blowing up the ship and thus depriving the Japanese of possession. Up to a certain point the programme was observed with commendable exactitude. As soon as the Japanese officer saw that the Russian commander was on deck he approached to within a few paces of him, and halting, gave utterance to the following pompous pronouncement: "You must either surrender or come out and fight." The idea of the Russian ship without breech-blocks to her guns and without fires in her stoke-hole, interned and disarmed, being invited to enter into an engagement in the open seas with a Japanese flotilla, was ludicrous in the extreme. The commander explained with a courtesy which under the circumstances sounded not unlike sarcasm, that he regretted he was

not able to comply with the request, as, owing to internment, he was no longer in a position actively to command the ship, and that, as a matter of fact, owing to observance of the laws of neutrality, she had been deprived of the means of offering battle. Were it not for these unfortunate drawbacks, which were not of his own making, he would be only too pleased to oblige. In reply, the officer repeated again and again his peremptory request that the Russian ship should "come out and fight, or surrender," and the commander, being convinced that the Japanese were bent upon a cutting-out expedition, gave the signal to the chief engineer, who promptly went below and lighted a time-fuse which connected with the powder magazine. During the few moments that intervened before the explosion took place the Russian commander engaged the Japanese in an argument upon international law. In blowing up his ship it was not his intention to slaughter the raiders; on the contrary, he had made up his mind that he would do all in his power to save them. At the instant when, in his judgment, the fuse was likely to reach the powder magazine, he seized hold of the Japanese officer, who was a much smaller man than himself, and jumped overboard with him. The Japanese clung tenaciously to his foe, but after a desperate struggle in the water they separated, and were subsequently picked up, the Japanese by his own men and the Russian by a small boat belonging to a friendly ship in harbour. According to the prearranged plan the remaining officers and men followed the example of their captain, and, seizing the Japanese as fast as they could, either hurled them overboard or leapt into the sea with them. By the aid of the searchlights which had been trained on to the scene from the foreign warships in the harbour, I could see that a fierce *mêlée* was taking place on the narrow deck of the destroyer. The Japanese petty-officers had drawn their swords and were slashing right and left, while the men, or the few of them who could get sufficient elbow-room, were either firing point-blank with their rifles, or else deliberately shooting those of the enemy who, having jumped overboard, were struggling to reach a place of safety. I distinctly saw one burly Russian throw three of his little antagonists over the side, and then it appeared that he was shot, for he

staggered and reeled into the darkness, beyond the paths of the searchlights. Meanwhile the two Japanese destroyers drew nearer, and one of them, with but little regard for the safety of neutral shipping in the harbour, trained her guns and swept the deck of the *Retshitelny*.

The events I have described occurred within the space of a few minutes. Suddenly there was a loud explosion, and a mass of coloured flame leapt into the air. Russian sailors swam to my boat from all directions. Some of these, a colleague of mine rowed to a ship the nationality of which was at the time unknown to him. "We Japanese," came a voice from above; "we want no Russian men." "But these poor fellows are exhausted. Can't you do something for them?" protested my friend. "No; go away. We no want Russian men," was the inhuman answer. Happily, better treatment was experienced on hailing a British ship, where a demand made subsequently by the Japanese to give up the men as prisoners of war was refused. I fully expected that the Russian destroyer had been sunk, but as the red sun rose over the water it illuminated a scene that told its own sad tale.

The *Retshitelny*, dismasted and without her bridge, was being slowly towed by a Japanese destroyer past the lines of foreign warships lying in the outer harbour. The second destroyer had stopped in close proximity to the two Chinese cruisers, one of which was the flagship of Admiral Sah. The events that transpired and of which an authoritative account was afterwards placed at my disposal, I will endeavour to relate in a few words. It appeared that Admiral Sah vigorously protested to the Japanese against their wilful abuse of China's neutrality, whereupon the officer in command of the destroyer, affecting to have only just realised the gravity of the situation, volunteered to give chase to the other vessel and induce her to restore the *Retshitelny* to the custody of the Chinese Government. He held out hopes, moreover, that his mission would prove successful. Throughout these negotiations the Chinese were powerless to adopt a strong attitude. Although the cruisers had cleared for action, they were at anchor and their fires were banked, while those on board could not fail to see that the Japanese were ready to launch a torpedo on the least sign of hos-

tility. Promising to return the *Retshitelny* without delay, the Japanese destroyer steamed after her sister ship, and, needless to add, neither they nor their prize were again seen in Chefoo harbour. Soon after their departure Admiral Sah put out to sea in a pinnace, hoping that he might find the Japanese and persuade them to comply, even at the eleventh hour, with a request to respect the laws of neutrality. Failing in his mission, he became ill as a result of humiliation, and on more than one occasion it was rumoured that he contemplated suicide.

The capture of the *Retshitelny* caused considerable stir throughout the world. Japan claimed that she was justified in her action, inasmuch as China had not been able to enforce her own neutrality. In support of her view she asserted that the *Retshitelny* had made use of Chefoo solely for the purpose of sending despatches, that she had not been properly disarmed, and that she had taken coal on board with a view to an early departure. Moreover, she alleged that the Russians had attempted to establish communication by means of wireless telegraphy between Chefoo and Port Arthur. As a matter of fact there was little to choose between the two countries as far as respect for the laws of neutrality was concerned. Japan herself had not hesitated to make convenient use of Chinese territory whenever it suited her purpose. Her consulate at Chefoo, where a naval officer of some distinction was in residence, maintained constant communication day and night with the Japanese fleet outside Port Arthur, while a number of officers, who adopted various disguises, resided in the native city and directed a far-reaching system of espionage. It was notorious, despite all official denials to the contrary, that the Japanese established an advanced torpedo base in the Miao-tao group of islands. It was clear that the cutting-out of the *Retshitelny* was a display of petty irritation by the Japanese, consequent upon the success of that ship in having run the blockade and discharged her mission. Their conduct, viewed from any standpoint save that of their own, was wholly inexcusable. Their statements that the destroyer was not properly disarmed and that she had taken coal on board were untrue. Several hours before the Japanese entered the harbour the com-

mander showed me over the ship, and I was thus thoroughly satisfied from personal inspection that the requirements of the laws of neutrality had been properly fulfilled. The Japanese either invented their case or accepted the irresponsible gossip of Chinese coolies, who, being in their pay, gave them agreeable items of "information." Had they taken measures to ascertain from authoritative sources the true circumstances, they would have been satisfied that China had asserted her position as a neutral country. The object of the Russian ship in making for Chefoo did not enter into the question. She had run the gauntlet of the blockading fleet, and therefore had earned and was entitled to the asylum of any neutral port. Japan recognised this view in the cases of the ships that sought refuge at Tsingtau (German leased territory) and at Shanghai after the naval battle of August 10, and also later when, on the fall of Port Arthur, several Russian ships succeeded in reaching Chefoo. That no definite understanding on the point had in the meantime been arrived at in regard to Chefoo, was evident from the fact that, fearing a repetition of the *Retshitelny* incident, the Russians themselves some weeks afterwards sank the destroyer *Rastoropny* which had succeeded in reaching the port with despatches. In view of their own lack of respect for the rights of China, and more especially of the fact that in the case in point no violation of the law had been committed or even contemplated, the Japanese plea that breaches of neutrality in other directions justified their action in regard to the Russian destroyer was altogether untenable.

Yet another and an earlier example of Japan's heedlessness of the consequences that might follow her defiance of International Law was provided on the outbreak of hostilities, when a powerful squadron attacked and sank the Russian cruiser *Varyag* and gunboat *Koreitz* outside the harbour of Chemulpo, in Korea. Speaking with strict regard to accuracy the "Peninsular Kingdom" was neutral territory. Predominance in Korea, however, was one of the unproclaimed issues upon which the war was fought. Seoul, the capital, had long been the scene of a bitter diplomatic struggle between Japan and Russia; and the Emperor and his Government—both equally corrupt and practically effete for all administrative purposes—were powerless to uphold the least semblance of

neutrality. In these circumstances the inclusion of the country in the theatre of war was inevitable. The Japanese in their attack at Chemulpo risked the complications that might have arisen owing to the presence in the harbour of foreign ships, including a British cruiser whose officers were in sympathy with the unfortunate position of the *Varyag* and the *Koreitz*. And complications certainly would have arisen had not the Russians, with splendid heroism and generosity, made up their minds that rather than place the commanders of the foreign warships in a delicate position they would steam out and fight against overwhelming odds. As will shortly be seen, Japan's preparations for this occasion were far from consistent with the principles of her much-vaunted *Bushido*. Russians have always been loud in their complaints that the Japanese opened hostilities before the formal declaration of war. With these complaints I have little sympathy, except in so far as they relate to the engagement at Chemulpo. As soon as her Minister was handed his passports at Tōkyō, Russia must have realised that war was inevitable. The Japanese had every inducement to make haste, for command of the sea was of first importance to their operations as a whole. That the majority of the Russian officers were on shore attending a birthday party when, two days before the formal declaration of war, the Japanese delivered their first attack upon the ships in Port Arthur, showed their utter incapability of realising the imminence of danger. Had they been efficient, they would have forestalled their enemy by appearing with their ships off the coast of Japan. Had they even taken the ordinary precaution of scouting the neighbouring seas, they would have been apprised of the approach of the Japanese fleet and could then have steamed out to battle. As it was, several of their finest ships were ignominiously scuttled by torpedoes, while lying helpless. The case of the ships at Chemulpo which were sunk on the day preceding the formal declaration of war was altogether different. The admiral at Port Arthur had frequently telegraphed to the commanders of the *Varyag* and *Koreitz*, ordering them to rejoin the fleet immediately. This circumstance in itself would seem to render his lack of precaution in regard to the ships in his own harbour singularly culpable. None of the messages

intended for the commanders of the Russian ships at Chemulpo reached their destination. Consequently, while still waiting for orders as to their future movements, the *Varyag* and *Koreits* were surprised by the appearance of a formidable Japanese squadron which insisted upon forcing an engagement. An explanation of this disastrous failure to establish communication between Port Arthur and Chemulpo was subsequently given me by a foreign official attached to the Korean Government service. Speaking with intimate knowledge, this gentleman informed me that for several days preceding the outbreak of hostilities there had been a total suspension of traffic over that section of the Korean telegraphs which, under normal conditions, connected with the Russian Manchurian system, including the Kwantung land-lines. It afterwards transpired that wires had been deliberately severed and poles cut down by the agents of the Japanese, the object of course being to prevent the Russian ships at Chemulpo from receiving Port Arthur's messages. The only alternative telegraphic route lay *via* Japan itself, where, it goes without saying, no Russian despatch would have escaped the official scrutiny.

While Japanese caution occasionally gave way to recklessness, there were many instances when it was replaced by those dashing qualities and heedlessness to losses which at critical moments decide the fortunes of battle. Owing, as I have already remarked, to the possibility of the arrival of the Baltic fleet the navy was unable to take serious risks, but the army was differently situated, inasmuch as it was numerically stronger than the opposing forces and could therefore afford to lose heavily in order to gain its object. Having assured themselves that everything was in a thorough state of preparation both for advance and retreat, that practically the last round of ammunition and the last shell necessary for immediate purposes had been delivered, that sufficient reinforcements had arrived, and that the enemy's position had been fully ascertained, the Japanese generals did not stop to count the cost of victory. In all wars occasions arise when it is inadvisable to stint human life. During the South African campaign our commanders were no doubt hampered by the knowledge that if they incurred heavy casualties, public opinion at home would severely

censure them. In Manchuria, where the operations were conducted on a hitherto unprecedented scale, parsimony in human life would have led to overwhelming disaster. The need for resolution can well be imagined when it is recalled that the battles lasted not hours but days and were fought along a front often embracing 180 miles. From time to time the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief and his staff were moved forward as the army advanced stage by stage, but they were always situated several miles in rear of the attacking force. A vast network of communications stretched out to all parts of the field and these were hastily extended as the occasion required. Light railways connecting the rear bases with various important strategical points along the front facilitated the rapid movements of troops and enabled reinforcements to proceed to places where they were most wanted.

Marshal Oyama and his brilliant Chief of the Staff, General Kodama, practically conducted the battles by telephone. Spread upon a table in the centre of the little huts in which they invariably made their headquarters were a number of maps dotted with coloured flags, while set apart on trestle stands were the signalling apparatus, switchboards, and batteries from which radiated a veritable web of wires. Here, above the distant booming of hundreds of guns, the tinkling of the telephone bell seemed strangely incongruous. Previous to each engagement the plan essential to success was thoroughly discussed and wisely arranged at war councils, for it was realised that the battle must be won on paper before it was fought out on the field, and that penetration by the enemy at any point along the wide front, if not instantly checked, might mean defeat. Orders were given to commanders that certain positions must be taken even though regiments were annihilated wholesale in the process. Oyama knew, as soon as the first shot of a general engagement was fired, that if his officers did not shirk losses and if the men were ready to die in sufficient numbers, the issue could not be in doubt. Events proved that his orders were faithfully carried out, although not infrequently at enormous cost, and once the battle had begun, the unforeseen exigencies of the moment were reduced to a minimum. Colonel Haldane, one

of the most distinguished of the British military attachés with the Japanese army in Manchuria, reported that "rarely, if ever, have the Japanese brought overwhelming strength to bear at that point where success if won is most decisive." In answer to this criticism it has been stated that they never possessed adequate numbers. In my opinion the real reason was to be found in the rigidity of the Japanese plan of prearrangement which, while providing for victory, restricted the initiative of commanders. Oyama realised that initiative might bring about a decisive defeat as well as a decisive victory, and consequently preferred to leave as little to chance as possible. Without a rigidly prearranged plan he would have found it difficult effectively to maintain his command over operations which extended along a front of from 100 to 180 miles; and if much in the way of initiative had been allowed individual commanders, whose knowledge of what was taking place in other parts of the field was necessarily limited, the task of the Commander-in-Chief would in all probability have been complicated beyond measure. As it was, Oyama's calculations were frequently upset at the enormous cost involved in the capture of decisive points. In other words, the stubborn resistance of the Russians was again and again a revelation to him. It was a resistance which increased rather than diminished with each engagement. On the other hand, the Russians were never numerically strong enough to warrant a forward movement with any material chance of success. Their only serious attempt to advance—that of Shaho—ended in disaster. Moreover, they were constantly compelled to abandon positions and fall back, leaving in the enemy's hands many guns and vast quantities of ammunition and supplies. As soon as retreat ceased and a new front was presented all these losses had to be made good, and consequently the margin of reserves remained at a minimum.

Hampered by lack of preparation from the very beginning, the Russians were always being challenged, but were themselves never in a position to challenge. In other words, their plans related only to defence and not to offence. And as the attack developed they were subjected to surprises, to meet which called for the display of the best initiative on the part

of the commanders of units. As, unlike their enemy, they could not prearrange battles, it was not to be expected that their organisation, always incomplete, should prove adequate to the strain of efficient attack. In these circumstances it was impossible for Kuropatkin to direct the whole field with the same thoroughness as that which characterised Oyama's command; and owing to the fact that the Russian generals, from motives of rivalry or jealousy, wilfully neglected to co-operate and in many instances actually lacked the necessary initiative and ability to deal effectively with the situations that faced them from time to time, it frequently happened that a battle was being lost at one end of the line when there was a very positive chance of success at the other.

With all their defects and disadvantages, however, the Russians were not so hopelessly beaten as the world has been led to believe. On several occasions the prospects of victory remained for a considerable period in their favour. Had they been in sufficient force they would, no doubt, have offered a far stouter resistance to Kuroki's army on the Yalu, or would at least have endeavoured to check his advance in the favourable ground among the mountains of Southern Manchuria. Fearing that Port Arthur might be isolated at any moment, their primary consideration was for the strength of the garrison of that place, and consequently their weakened forces in other parts of the field were only able to delay, and not to arrest, the progress of the Japanese. There were some military authorities who urged that, in view of the inadequate preparations at Port Arthur, Russia should have abandoned the fortress, that her fleet should have been concentrated at Vladivostock and her army in Manchuria. Such a policy would not only have been disastrous to the prestige of Russia, but, as events turned out, would have produced at an early stage a calamitous effect upon their campaign as a whole. Vladivostock is a poor substitute as a naval base for Port Arthur. It is situated in close proximity to the coast of Japan, and in a sea the approaches to which are narrow straits. Moreover, its harbour is only kept open during a great part of the year by means of ice-breakers. The rapidity with which the defences at Port Arthur were strengthened after war broke out did away with many of the objections urged against the

retention of that fortress. The Japanese army that was detained in the Kwantung Peninsula laying siege to Port Arthur represented that margin of men necessary to render more complete the Japanese victories in the north. This fact was amply proved at the battle of Mukden, when Oyama, aided for the first time by Nogi's army which had accomplished the fall of Port Arthur, was able to execute a far-reaching turning movement and to secure his greatest triumph of the whole campaign. At the last moment the Russians made a desperate attempt to keep Port Arthur open. Before they retreated from Nan-shan, on May 27, 1904, General Oku, who was in command of the Japanese second army, had made his ninth successive assault upon their positions. The defeat of the attempt of General Stakelberg to relieve the fortress on June 14 and 15 at Te-li-ssu, brought about an important change in the conduct of the campaign.

At Liao-yang the Russians for the first time met the Japanese with a force which, though considerably inferior in numbers, was the largest that they had so far been able to place in the field. Moreover, Port Arthur was already beleaguered, and the immediate safety of that place was no longer of the first consideration. It is admitted on all sides that Kuropatkin's defence at Liao-yang was superb. His orderly retreat, after six days' fighting, was in itself sufficient indication of the narrowness of the enemy's victory. A Japanese gentleman of distinction, who had intimate relations with the Foreign Office in Tōkyō, subsequently told me that for a long time the issue of the conflict hung in the balance. "Oyama," he said, to use his own words, "sent several depressing messages to Tōkyō, and one of these read, that unless the Russians retreated within the next few hours he himself would be compelled to take measures to withdraw." The same authority told me that when, at the battle of Mukden, General Nogi, with that almost superhuman courage which characterised his operations outside Port Arthur, swept far to the north in the course of his outflanking movement and was in danger of being annihilated, a large portion of the forces of General Oku were sent to his relief. "If the Russians had known," he added, "how weak was the line held by the remainder of Oku's men, they would

have been able to penetrate it with ease. And then perhaps all would have been finished with us." Were no other evidence available, the long pauses between general engagements were sufficient indication of the stubbornness with which the Russians contested the ground. After each battle both armies were compelled to burrow themselves in the earth while awaiting reinforcements and supplies ; for the Japanese, owing to their lack of cavalry, were never in a position to follow up their victories. The campaign in Manchuria has been rightly called "a war of field sieges."

It is conceded even by the severest critics of Russian administration during the war, that the defence of Port Arthur deserves to rank as one of the greatest achievements in military history. Reference has already been made to the lamentable state of unpreparedness which existed at that fortress when hostilities opened, and to the failure of the Japanese to take full advantage of the opportunities that presented themselves. Many authorities contend that, splendid as was the Russian resistance, it might have been prolonged for a few weeks. This view, however, depends for its support upon a more or less superficial examination of the fortress immediately after the surrender had taken place, and it first gained currency through the medium of a despatch sent by a well-known correspondent, who had spent but a few hours in the town itself, and whose information could have been gained only as a result of that hearsay and gossip which owed its origin to the excitement of the moment and to the natural chagrin of a large number of officers on finding that Port Arthur was to undergo the humiliation of surrender. The Japanese, who under the circumstances must be regarded as the most competent authorities to judge the situation, held an altogether contrary opinion. When subsequently a false rumour was circulated in Tōkyō that General Stoessel had been sentenced to death in consequence of the finding of a court-martial that he had prematurely capitulated, General Nogi, in the course of a striking interview, said : "There have been many attacks upon the conduct of General Stoessel. These I cannot endorse. On the contrary, I consider that he personally is a brave soldier and an able and energetic commander. From my own observation and inquiries I am satisfied that

he did all that he could do under the circumstances in which he found himself in Port Arthur. Had our positions been reversed, I feel that I could have done no more. I do not think that a Japanese court-martial, had such been within the bounds of possibility in this instance, would have found him guilty on the evidence obtainable. But things may be different in Russia. Stoessel is a soldier. To him death for his country can have no fears. It is sufficient that a court-martial, which should be a tribunal above suspicion, has considered that in the interests of Russia Stoessel should be so treated. Were I sentenced for having lost so many brave lives at Port Arthur, I would readily accept the judgment. No doubt General Stoessel, as a soldier, will do the same. As soon as I heard the news I was extremely anxious, and sent immediately to the Foreign Office and the General Staff, but was unable to obtain confirmation. Still troubled, I went to see Kodama, the chief of the staff, myself, who expressed the opinion that the rumour was not true. With that I am inclined to agree. Even if the news is true, he is only sentenced, and he may be therefore still safe. In my opinion it is only a malicious report circulated by enemies at home to mar his reputation. In the absence of a denial, however, I must feel inexpressibly sorry, more especially as I know and realise the peculiar circumstances that directly caused him to come to the decision to surrender. He underwent more trials, troubles, anxieties, and hardships than can be imagined. It has been said with some truth that there were sufficient ammunition and provisions to have held out some little time longer. But while these are necessary factors in themselves they are by no means the only ones. A commander needs whole-hearted co-operation among all his officers and men, but this was not accorded General Stoessel. On our side there was but one great idea—to capture Port Arthur; and all fought and died to that end. Stoessel had not only to face the daring and reckless attacks of an army so united, but also to combat dissension and strife which was continuous in all corners of his camp. I have been informed that on occasions officers and men actually refused to obey his orders. Under such circumstances it was impossible for him to prolong the defence. As I have said before, the Japanese

concentrated their thoughts upon the capture of the fortress, and had no other troubles to worry them." General Nogi did not desire that his words should be regarded as the outcome of a chivalrous spirit, but that they should be looked upon as an expression of his deep conviction.

The dissensions to which General Nogi has referred existed from the beginning of the siege. In a book written by a Mr. Nojine and translated by Captain A. B. Lindsay and Major E. D. Swinton we are told that "The battle of Kinchou was just over, and Fock's division had retreated towards Port Arthur. Smirnoff was commandant of the fortress. Stoessel had under his command the whole peninsula which formed the military district. After the battle of Kinchou it was supposed that the troops would retreat within the confines of the frontier of the concession, and the commandant drew up an order as to the distribution of the different units in the fortress and took it to Stoessel for approval. Stoessel, without looking at the scheme, cancelled the order and announced that, as the district under his command had almost entirely passed into the hands of the enemy and as the land within the frontier alone remained, he would take upon himself the defence of the fortress; and that its present staff would be broken up, since he considered it to be useless. He also added that Smirnoff would be a member of his staff.

"The commandant was in an awkward position. Stoessel defied him, and the fortress, which, thanks to his own efforts and skill, was being gradually got into a state of readiness, was to be taken from him and to be commanded by a man who would wreck all. That moment settled the relationship between these two. It was the first act of the tragedy which ended on January 1. Quietly, and with perfect politeness, Smirnoff answered: 'I was appointed commandant of this fortress by the Tsar; the fortress staff is the organ of the commandant, appointed by Imperial orders. I have no intention whatever of resigning either the rights entrusted to me by the Tsar or the duties consequent on them. You, sir, as my commanding officer, can give me general orders relating to the defence of the fortress, but I remain its master until the Tsar himself deprives me of it. If my removal from the duties of commandant admits of no

delay, you have it in your power to publish an order to that effect.'

"To which Stoessel replied: 'I do not mean to remove you from duty. You will remain commandant, and I shall run the fortress. Whether such action is legal or not is my affair. I will answer for that.'"

It should be added that this Mr. Nojine, who was a representative of the *Novy Krai*, the newspaper published in Port Arthur, had, for reasons which need not be detailed here, incurred the displeasure of General Stoessel; that he escaped from the fortress on board the *Rastoropny* to Chefoo; and that he was not present during the last days of the siege. His book has been regarded as an indictment of Stoessel, but under the circumstances his charges must be accepted with some reservation. It is clear that as soon as Stoessel assumed command there were two parties within the fortress, one in favour of the commander-in-chief and the other in favour of Smirnof. It was the latter who opposed the surrender, and who were largely responsible for the bitter criticisms upon Stoessel. Whether they were animated solely by motives of patriotism may consequently be open to grave question.

The mere fact that at a later date a court-martial did condemn Stoessel for his surrender of Port Arthur has in no way altered the opinion of the Japanese concerning the excellence of his defence. Briefly, the critics of the Russian general alleged against him that he usurped the command from General Smirnof, that he absented himself from the firing-line on every possible occasion, that together with his wife he lived a life of comparative comfort while the remainder of the garrison was reduced to siege rations, and that he surrendered the fortress against the will of the majority of his general officers at a time when there were ample supplies of food and ammunition to prolong the siege for at least several weeks. It was further contended that if the siege had been prolonged General Nogi would not have been able to render that assistance to the army in the north which resulted in the disaster of Mukden. I propose to take these counts seriatim, and to state the replies as I have received them from various sources, both Russian and Japanese. The

mere fact that Stoessel succeeded not only in assuming but in maintaining command would appear to be substantial proof of his strength of character, and the worst charge that could be laid against him on this score was that of the indulgence in a great ambition. The insinuation that he was a coward was altogether an unworthy one. He was not by any means a stranger to the battlefield when the Russo-Japanese war commenced, and he had gained distinction on more than one occasion. The Japanese emphatically state that they frequently saw him directing operations on the front line of the Russian defence works, and they candidly admit that he was made the special target of their sharpshooters. General Nogi has himself said that his antagonist was a brave soldier. The statement that the fortress was surrendered when there was ample supply of food and ammunition is a correct one. But according to the general who commanded the Japanese artillery outside Port Arthur it required qualification. The supply of Russian shells for their heaviest guns was exhausted, and they were thus deprived of all means of replying to the Japanese 28 centimetre pieces, the fire of which, as soon as 203 Metre Hill was captured and used for the purposes of observation, was directed with deadly accuracy wherever the Japanese willed. Therefore, when, after a series of terrible assaults with varying success, the Japanese finally established themselves upon that dominating height, Port Arthur was doomed. Stoessel knew that the Japanese could have speedily followed up their success by conducting an elaborate assault upon the remaining defences in that part of the field, thus compelling the Russians, enfeebled by the long strain of the siege and diminished in numbers by heavy losses, to fall back upon the town, where in all probability fierce hand-to-hand fighting would take place. In that event, he realised how extremely doubtful it was that General Nogi would be able to restrain his troops from committing atrocities among the non-combatant section of the community. That the Russian commandant was justified in taking into account so extreme a contingency—quite apart from his knowledge that the Japanese troops were burning with a desire to be revenged for their terrible repulses, and ignoring altogether the ghastly precedent of 1895—was con-

clusively proved by the known fact that the authorities in Tōkyō were anxiously considering the best means to avert such a dreadful catastrophe when their minds were relieved by the capitulation of the fortress.

Stoessel was no doubt dispirited by the utter hopelessness of the position in which he found himself. Help from the north, after the series of disasters that had befallen Kuro-patkin, was farther away than ever; and although the Baltic fleet had started on its voyage eastward, it was only too apparent, as events subsequently proved, that months must elapse before it could be expected to arrive on the scene. Taking the most sanguine view of his situation, Stoessel could not have prolonged the siege for more than two or three weeks. It has been urged by some critics that he should have retired together with his garrison to Liaotishan—the frowning promontory that forms the southernmost limit of the Kwantung Peninsula and which is situated seven miles to the west of Port Arthur. For many reasons a retreat in that direction would have been altogether impossible. Liaotishan, although offering many natural advantages as a defensive position, was not fortified, nor was it provided with as much as a single tin of rations. A retirement from Port Arthur to that place could only have included a limited proportion of the garrison, and in view of the progress which the Japanese had made in the west it is difficult to see how such an operation could have been effectually covered. It may be urged that Stoessel should have foreseen these difficulties and made preparations to meet them. The Russians, however, had their hands full in strengthening the defences in other parts of the field nearer to Port Arthur. Stoessel realised that the only alternative to surrender was a last heroic stand, and probably he would have been prepared to take this extreme measure had it not been for the fact that he made the grave initial error of allowing an excessively large number of non-combatants to remain in the town. Criticism can only be directed against his conduct on the ground that he did not allow sufficient time to elapse before he chose the alternative to a final death-struggle, and surrendered. Many of his own officers frankly declare that the capitulation was premature, and in this view they are

supported by the foreign attachés who accompanied the investing forces.

While taking into consideration the statements made by Stoessel and those of his friends on his behalf, and the observations of General Nogi and other leading Japanese military authorities, it is altogether problematical as to whether Port Arthur could have been retained several weeks longer. I am inclined to think that the Russian general did all that was humanly possible to uphold his country's cause. And when I say humanly, I mean it in the strict sense of the word. In these days of advanced civilisation, when the luxuries of life have added to its value, it would seem that the conception of a soldier's duty has undergone a change. Whereas in the days of old it was expected of him that he should die rather than surrender, the modern warrior fights only so long as he has a reasonable chance of winning. We who have in mind some melancholy experiences in South Africa, must not be too harsh in our judgment of the Russians, who only lowered their flag at Port Arthur after they had sustained for several months terrible losses and hardships compared with which the Boer War could show no parallel. When General Stoessel surrendered Port Arthur he did what nine out of every ten generals placed in similar circumstances would have done. It cannot be forgotten that either his critics were men under his command whose responsibilities were limited, or else they were foreign attachés and correspondents who had not undergone the ordeal of the siege themselves, and whose judgment was merely the outcome of observation from the outside, coupled with a necessarily superficial examination of the inside immediately after capitulation.

As civilisation continues to increase the value attached to human life, so will there be a greater reluctance on the part of those who conduct war, to sacrifice human life. This will be in singular conflict with modern scientific conditions. Long-range guns, the telephone, and wireless telegraphy have expanded the field of military operations to such an extent that if an army is to be victorious, positions of strategical importance must be seized without consideration for human life. Both Russia and Japan have lagged behind in the

scheme of civilisation. Hence the terrible losses which in Manchuria both sides endured with patience, and inflicted upon each other with reckless fury. It was not to be wondered at, however, that Stoessel, when faced with the only alternative to surrender, chose to lower the flag; for that alternative would probably have meant the wholesale massacre of men—perhaps, also, of women and children—in the narrow, crooked streets of Port Arthur. Had he not done so the world would no doubt have hailed him as one of the greatest heroes of history; but I cannot forget that long before the capitulation took place the newspapers of Europe were filled with violent protests against what they were pleased to term the useless slaughter at Port Arthur, and much gratuitous advice was offered Stoessel that in the interests of humanity he should recognise the inevitable and cease a futile resistance. When I say, therefore, that Stoessel did all that was humanly possible, I wish to infer that had he done more, this would have entered into the category of the superhuman. I ignore the suggestion that he could have prolonged the siege for a few weeks and still have surrendered in time to avert an onslaught which would have involved extermination, for this is hypothesis pure and simple and is entirely beyond the power of man to pronounce upon. Both his critics and his friends agree that sooner or later the place was destined to fall. Had the fortress held out a little longer, the battle of Mukden might conceivably have been delayed or it might have been fought with less successful results; but it is clear that the Japanese army was never in danger in consequence of Nogi's retention at Port Arthur, for the Russians were not in a position to take the offensive until the war actually ended. It is regrettable that Stoessel, having directed such a gallant defence, should be wholly condemned simply because he did not continue that defence for a few weeks longer, more especially when it is remembered that his ability to do so was problematical. As long as he kept the flag flying at Port Arthur, he was regarded as a great general. The moment he signed the terms of capitulation he was looked upon as an incompetent coward, and it was not until the siege was over, although frequent communication had been maintained while it lasted, that any charges were made

against his capacity. The worst that can be said of him is that he missed a splendid opportunity of becoming a dead hero. In these days the world judges by results, and the result of the siege of Port Arthur was its capture by the Japanese. I have dealt with some of the outstanding incidents of the campaign on land in order to show that despite the various drawbacks that hampered the Russians, they succeeded in offering a far better resistance than the world has been led to believe.

The naval warfare was of special interest to the world, inasmuch as it was the first occasion upon which the fleets of two first-class countries had met in actual battle under modern conditions. The engagements of the China-Japan war and the Spanish-American war were, in comparison, trivial affairs. Moreover, it was recognised that in later years armaments had made considerable progress, and experts realised that important lessons would be learnt from their application in real warfare. From the very beginning the Russian navy was hampered by maladministration and pursued by misfortune. The first torpedo attack upon the squadron in Port Arthur, which crippled several of their best ships, would have been averted if responsible Russian officers had been at their posts instead of on shore. The prompt repair of the Russian ships, with facilities that were wholly inadequate, was the only commendable feature of this and other regrettable incidents.

So soon as the Government realised the hopeless inefficiency of the navy in Far Eastern waters, a change of commands was decided upon, and Admiral Makaroff, who was regarded as Russia's foremost naval commander and upon whom the hopes of the nation were centred, was ordered to proceed to Port Arthur. When he arrived upon the scene he took drastic measures to improve the discipline of the officers, and his presence had the effect of restoring in no small measure the shattered morale of the men. He soon realised that which his predecessor had wholly failed to comprehend. With the judgment of one who was competent in his profession, he unhesitatingly decided that so long as the fleet remained inactive under the shelter of the shore guns it laid itself open

to surprise torpedo attacks ; and allowing for as little delay as possible the new commander-in-chief prepared a plan to force in the open sea a battle with the blockading fleet. Night after night he went out on board a destroyer and scouted the Japanese position. When, on April 13, 1904, the whole fleet was leaving Port Arthur, it met with a disaster which was the outcome of misfortune rather than mismanagement. The flag-ship, *Petropavlovsk*, struck a mine, and speedily sank. Admiral Makaroff, and the famous painter of war-scenes, Verestchagin, together with all on board, with the exception of eighty officers and men including the Grand Duke Cyril, were drowned. The fleet returned to the harbour, and remained inactive until August 10, when it emerged with the object of making an attempt to reach Vladivostock. The action which followed, and which lasted from noon until night, was fought at an exceptionally long range. Admiral Wiren, who subsequently succeeded to the command at Port Arthur, has stated that the causes of the Russian failure on this occasion were due rather to faults in the construction and equipment of the ships than to inefficient handling. According to him, the maximum speed of the fleet was under thirteen knots, while its guns were outranged by those of the Japanese. The marksmanship of the Japanese gunners was superior to that of the Russians. Three 12-inch shells hit the flagship *Tsarevitch* in rapid succession, and one of these killed Admiral Vitgift, who was in supreme command, and also killed or wounded many members of his staff. The effect of this misfortune was disastrous to the Russians. Prince Uhtomsky, who succeeded to the command, was a pampered admiral of the longshore type. He promptly gave orders for the fleet to return to Port Arthur, and five battleships, one cruiser, and three destroyers managed to regain the harbour. The flagship and several destroyers sought refuge in Kiaochow, where they were disarmed. The *Askold* reached Shanghai, and was also interned. The *Novik* alone made a dash for Vladivostock. The extent of the casualties inflicted on the Japanese on this occasion will probably never be known. It is certain that the Russians withdrew prematurely from the engagement. Uhtomsky was no doubt unnerved by his knowledge of the fate that had overtaken Vitgift,

and of the plight of the flagship. From the events of the day, deductions can be drawn that show the inability of the Japanese, in consequence of their own condition, to render the victory more complete. That the major portion of the Russian fleet was able to return to Port Arthur, practically unmolested, after a battle lasting many hours, was in itself a significant index to the crippled state of its enemy. That the *Tsarevitch* and the *Askold* succeeded in escaping to neutral ports was additional indication of the weakness to which the Japanese had been reduced ; for, particularly in the case of the former ship, an easy prey presented itself. Her funnels had been riddled with shell, and consequently she was consuming exceptionally large quantities of coal and was proceeding at a considerably reduced speed. The casualties on board had been heavy, and she was therefore undermanned. All her senior officers were either killed or wounded, and for a time a sub-lieutenant was in command. In spite, however, of her pitiable condition, she succeeded in evading the Japanese fleet and in reaching Kiao-chau.

Circumstances such as those I have narrated would seem to lend colour to the statements repeatedly made in well-informed quarters, that almost at the moment when the Russian fleet gave up the battle, Tōgō was about to signal to his ships to return to the naval base. That he was not able either to sink or to capture a single Russian ship, although he held an overwhelming advantage in the number of torpedo-boats and destroyers, requires some explanation on the part of those who claim that on this occasion the Japanese achieved a glorious victory. Moreover, it must be remembered that the Russians were at a disadvantage, inasmuch as their object was not so much to force a battle to an issue as to make good their escape to Vladivostock.

The Japanese, who had been watching outside Port Arthur, consequently held a superior strategical position from the outset. The ships that returned to Port Arthur did not emerge again as a fleet, but were eventually sunk in detail by the Japanese siege guns on the land side. Considerable controversy has arisen over the failure of the Russian fleet at Port Arthur. The military authorities of the fortress urged that the inefficiency of the navy was largely responsible for

the making of the conditions that brought about the surrender. They alleged that the commanders preferred to shelter in idleness beneath the shore guns rather than challenge a decisive battle with the Japanese, victory in which would not only have brought relief, but would probably have changed the whole fortunes of the campaign.

On the other hand, the naval authorities pointed to their misfortune in losing, in quick succession, two distinguished admirals, of whom much had been expected. Furthermore, they stated that after the battle of August 10, many guns and men were landed from the ships, and that these were used with considerable success in the land defence of Port Arthur. This last circumstance is within general knowledge; but the naval authorities cannot escape responsibility for the culpable inactivity which they displayed at the beginning of the war, and which resulted in the fleet being seriously crippled by torpedo attacks at the very outset.

It must not be imagined that all the Russian ships of the Port Arthur fleet were inefficiently commanded. There were many instances of conspicuous service on the part of individual commanders. The cruisers *Bayern* and *Novik* were always handled in a seamanlike manner. In the annals of naval history it would be difficult to find an incident which, in point of initiative and gallantry, surpassed the action of the *Retvizan* in the engagement of August 10. Seeing that the *Tsarevitch*, which had been made the special target of the Japanese gunners, was in distress, the *Retvizan* boldly left her place in the line of battle and bore the brunt of the enemy's fire, thus enabling the flagship to make good her escape. The conduct of the commander of the battleship *Sevastopol* during the last days at Port Arthur was also highly meritorious. Realising that if he remained in harbour his ship would share the fate of the remainder of the fleet and be sunk by the Japanese shore guns, he took her outside, and, with torpedo-net out, defied the Japanese torpedo attacks for several days, when, in accordance with his orders, the ship was sunk, and thus saved from falling into the hands of the enemy.

There are several other aspects of the naval warfare in its relation to the siege of Port Arthur which have not received

sufficient attention. There has been some discussion concerning the wisdom of the Russian policy in locating a squadron at Vladivostock. Compared with the achievements of the Port Arthur fleet, the Vladivostock squadron was handled with conspicuous daring, and any report that it had left harbour always caused grave anxiety in naval circles in Tōkyō. On more than one occasion the squadron passed through the straits, and appeared in the waters on the south of the mainland of Japan. Although as a fighting force it was more or less of a negligible quantity, it had the effect of compelling the Japanese to maintain a squadron under Admiral Kamimura in the sea of Japan, and of necessitating the convoy of Japanese transports.

Submarine mines and the wireless telegraph were factors which cannot be ignored in a general review of the siege of Port Arthur. Until the Japanese heavy guns on the land side were brought to bear on the ships in the harbour, mines had inflicted more damage than either shell or torpedo in the naval warfare. No fewer than three battleships had been sunk by this agency. The danger of contact with mines, however, was not limited to warships. Several merchant vessels also were either damaged or sunk on the China coast. The Japanese declared that these latter disasters were caused by Russian mines which had been improperly laid, but independent testimony tends to show that frequently both Russian and Japanese mines went adrift. As the result of the war, it must be held that the waters within a radius of at least 150 miles from a mine-field cannot be altogether free from danger to neutral shipping.

According to international law a blockade, to be legal, must be effective. At no time during the siege was the Japanese blockade effective. Chinese junks under cover of night frequently entered Port Arthur with supplies, and two destroyers and several small boats carrying despatches succeeded in making their escape. In regard to steamers, however, the blockade was more successful, and it is doubtful whether more than two of these were ever able to evade the Japanese fleet and to reach Port Arthur. On the other hand, it is questionable whether many of them ever made a serious attempt to gain their destination. In several instances captains

openly boasted in the club bars of coast ports, that they had taken money from both sides—money paid down beforehand on the understanding that they would proceed to Port Arthur, and money from the Japanese when, by prearrangement, they handed over their ships and their cargoes almost as soon as they had left Shanghai, the headquarters of the blockade-running organisation. The fact that few of them stood the least chance of reaching Port Arthur was no excuse for their contemptible treachery. The ships used for the purpose were in most cases worn-out vessels of slow speed, and many of the officers were recruited from the beach-combing class. In their maintenance of a blockade the Japanese were largely assisted by the agency of wireless telegraphy. As soon as a merchant vessel or junk making in the direction of Port Arthur was sighted by one of the cruiser-scouts, the circumstance was immediately signalled to the patrol squadron; in response, warships appeared on all sides of the horizon, and the offending blockade-runner was speedily headed off and captured without any strenuous chase being necessary. Wireless telegraphy thus enabled the Japanese to keep a minimum number of ships on the actual work of guarding the entrance to the fortress. In view of all the circumstances it must be confessed that running the blockade of Port Arthur was an extremely hazardous undertaking. The Japanese patrolled an area within twenty miles of the fortress, and insisted on stopping many ships that were proceeding between Shanghai and the northern ports of Tientsin and Newchwang. Near Port Arthur itself they constantly maintained a line of torpedo boats and destroyers. Assuming that the Japanese flotilla had been successfully evaded, a ship would still have run great danger in attempting to steam through the main gateway of Port Arthur, for the Russians did not allow the chart of their mine-fields to pass out of their hands. At other points along the coast also there was considerable danger from both Russian and Japanese mines. Captains of blockade-runners were usually instructed by the Russian authorities in Shanghai to beach their ships in the night at Liaotishan, the promontory to the south-west of Port Arthur.

After the fall of Port Arthur five months elapsed before the arrival of the Baltic fleet in Far Eastern waters. It was

generally recognised that Admiral Rozhdestvensky was leading a forlorn hope. The ships under his command were a heterogeneous collection, and in many instances the guns were manned by cavalymen and infantrymen. One well-known Russian officer facetiously told me that a large proportion of the sailors recruited for the expedition had never seen water, except in a well, until they reached the port of embarkation. It was notorious that during the long voyage to the East several mutinies occurred on board the Russian ships.

In facilitating the progress of the expedition, France proved herself a true friend and ally. She permitted the Russian fleet to remain for a considerable time at Madagascar and in Kamranh Bay in Cochin China, and but for this material assistance Rozhdestvensky would probably never have reached Far Eastern waters. From time to time Japan vigorously protested against the action of France in permitting flagrant breaches of neutrality. Incidentally it may be opportune to observe that the Russian naval officers have always contended, though there is little truth in their allegations, that the British authorities gave active help to the Japanese fleet. They assert that at the beginning of the war, coal from Government stores at Hong-kong was supplied to their enemy; that the British warships at Wei-hai-wei were in constant communication with the blockading squadron at Port Arthur; and that, finally, the Baltic fleet was spied upon by British warships in its progress through the China Sea. There are some critics who contend that Admiral Rozhdestvensky should have divided his fleet and sent a portion through the Tsugaru or through La Perouse Straits. It mattered little which of the various courses at his disposal he adopted. Admiral Tōgō with his fleet, which in the meantime had been thoroughly refitted, was calmly waiting in a harbour on the southern coast of Korea. Owing to his advantageous strategical position and the superior speed of the Japanese ships he would have been able to anticipate any movement of the Russian squadron in a northerly direction, and, as he was well informed concerning its progress, could have detached a part or even proceeded with the whole of his fleet, to meet the enemy in any quarter. Rozhdestvensky's hope was a slender one. That there would be sufficient fog

effectually to mask his movements was extremely problematical. In view of the inefficient state of his ships and of their crews he could not reasonably look forward to a glorious victory. He realised that he must make a bold dash through the Korean Straits in the teeth of the enemy, and that while he might lose some of his ships—perhaps many—at least a proportion of the fleet would succeed in reaching Vladivostock. The issue was practically decided within a few hours, on May 27, 1905. At first the Russians were aided by a mist, but this soon lifted. A heavy sea was running at the time, and their ships, having deck cargoes of coal, rolled considerably; thus the gunners, whose marksmanship was at no time good, were considerably hampered in their work. Admiral Kamimura appeared with his squadron to the south of the Russian fleet, while Admiral Tōgō, with whom was Admiral Kataoka, headed the enemy off to the north. The Russians were thus pressed both from the north and southwest towards the east, in a direction where the strong fortress of Shimonoseki was situated.

In the engagement that followed, the Russian ships, which were compelled to maintain a northerly course, were practically dealt with in detail, and in the disastrous torpedo attack at night many of them were sunk. The fact has been commented upon that the torpedo work of the Japanese, which was so ineffective on August 10 of the previous year and which failed at a later date to sink the *Sevastopol* outside Port Arthur, was so signally successful on this occasion. There were many rumours current at the time that they had laid mines in the track of the Russian fleet, but these could not be substantiated. Within three days the last Russian ship had been accounted for. Only one cruiser—the *Almaz*—succeeded in reaching Vladivostock; and Admiral Nebogatoff with his squadron of three ships, including the first-class modern battleship *Orel*, surrendered.

Admiral Tōgō has stated that if instead of attempting to proceed direct to Vladivostock the Russians had seized a base somewhere along the China coast, his task would have been an exceedingly difficult one, and the naval warfare would undoubtedly have been considerably prolonged.

The lessons of the campaign have resulted in important

changes in the construction of warships the world over. During the days of Port Arthur the Japanese realised the importance of concentrated fire from heavy guns, and they arrived at the conclusion that the battleships of the future must be of heavier displacement and heavier in armament than those which they employed during the war. Soon after the fortress fell they laid down the keel of the *Satsuma*, a battleship which approaches the *Dreadnought* in fighting capacity, and which was the first of its kind to be launched. The Russo-Japanese war has also been responsible for the abolition of fighting-tops and of the ram, the reduction of woodwork to an absolute minimum, and the multiplication of fire-extinguishing appliances. In consequence of the effectiveness of mines, the Powers are paying special attention to the construction of mine-laying vessels. Incidentally it may be mentioned that Great Britain was the only nation to whom the privilege was granted of having attachés with the fleet in action."

The organisation of the Japanese medical service during the war was thoroughly efficient. The staff in the field consisted of 4517 military surgeons, 630 pharmacutists, and 4517 assistants, non-commissioned officers, and men. Of those totals, 18 surgeons were killed and 104 wounded, while there were 340 casualties among the assistants. The medical corps was largely helped in its efforts by the strict adherence of the men to the rules laid down for their benefit. In the South African war the British soldier disdained to take precautions against disease, and frequently one saw men drinking out of streams in which lay the carcasses of dead horses and mules. For the Japanese soldier, however, a bacillus-destroying filter was provided, and he was not above making constant use of it. Portable boilers were also part of the equipment for the army, and whenever possible the drinking water was boiled. Pills were served out to be taken after every meal as a preventive of disease; all transports and buildings used for military purposes were periodically disinfected; care was taken in the compounding of medicines; clothing was specially designed so as to minimise the danger of frost-bite in winter and of sunstroke in summer; and a system was adopted whereby rice was kept from freezing in winter and from fermenting in summer.

While the Japanese diet was found to be excellent inasmuch as it was convenient for the commissariat to handle, the authorities arrived at the conclusion towards the end of the war that it was not the best obtainable for maintaining health and strength. A large number of cases of beri-beri were directly attributable to the consumption of rice. The percentage of cases of beri-beri in the army during peace time was 0.44. In the China war this increased to 18 per cent., while in the last war 16 was the percentage. It will be seen that the Japanese have made little progress in combating the disease.

One of the reasons given for the inability of the Japanese to follow up the Russian retreat was that they were incapable of sustained physical effort. For their victories they certainly depended more upon spirit than upon strength. At a critical moment in the battle of Mukden the cavalry brigade was compelled to rest for a while, and as a consequence, the Russian army succeeded in escaping through its only loophole. The superior physique of the Russians undoubtedly gave them that margin of strength which enabled them time after time to effect a more or less orderly retirement. The Japanese have profited by the lesson, and meat is now one of their principal rations. The Japanese Red Cross Society—one of the most wonderful organisations of its kind in the world—proved of immense utility during the war. In this connection it may be of interest to give some statistics showing the comprehensive scope of the Society. The membership is now 1,414,125, including 9166 foreigners embracing over thirty nationalities among which are the following: 6440 Chinese, 628 Germans, 580 Koreans, 504 Americans, 358 English, 128 Austro-Hungarians, 103 French, and 82 Russians. One out of every 20 Japanese males and one out of every 430 Japanese females is connected with the organisation. The movable and immovable properties are valued at about a million and a half sterling, including materials set down at £50,000 and instruments and accessories estimated to be worth £17,000. During the war the Society expended over half a million pounds. Its personnel numbers 5000 men and women, and includes 212 medical practitioners, 143 pharmacutists, 668 male and 2701 female nurses. The *post-bellum* programme

of the Society provided for the construction of two large hospital ships and a hospital train.

It has always been urged that in official reports the Japanese considerably underestimated their casualties. There are of course no means available of testing the truth of this contention, but impartial observers who witnessed the wholesale slaughter in the field, more particularly at Port Arthur, declare that the returns made by the army and navy cannot be relied upon. Admitting the official figures as correct, the war stands out as one of the bloodiest in history. The returns compiled by the statistical bureau of the Army Department, covering a period from the beginning of the war until three months after the declaration of peace, gives the following tables :—

1. Killed in action	47,152
Died of wounds	11,424
Died of disease	21,802
Total deaths		80,378

2. The above divided according to rank :—		
Commissioned officers	2,113
Non-commissioned officers and men	76,908
Non-military employees (<i>gunzoku</i>)	1,357
Total		80,378

3. The above divided according to arms of the service :—		
Gendarmes	64
Infantry	63,485
Cavalry	829
Artillery	3,957
Engineers	1,944
Army Service Corps	8,130
Quartermaster-General's department	81
Medical Corps	517
Veterinary Corps	11
Bandsmen	3
Non-military employees	1,357
Total		80,378

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From other sources I learned that the following must be included in the final casualty list :—

Missing and unaccounted for	1,500
Sick and recovered	209,065
Wounded and recovered	161,925
<hr/>	
Total	372,490

If we add to the above total the killed, and deaths from wounds and sickness, it will be seen that the grand total of Japanese casualties during the war was 452,868, of which 220,501 represents the actual number of killed and wounded, while 230,867 gives the total number of cases of sickness fatal and otherwise. The remainder are classified as missing. The figures which I have set forth relating to the Japanese army suggest an interesting comparison with the German casualties in the war with France. In each instance a million men were employed, but the actual German losses were 39,615 less than those of the Japanese, the killed in action being 30,288, and the deaths from disease 9327 below the Japanese totals. Surgeon-General Koike, after peace was concluded, delivered a lecture in the course of which he presented some interesting comparative statistics. His table relating to sick and wounded treated in hospital was as follows :—

SICK.			
	Recovered Completely	Recovered, but Incapacitated for Active Service.	Died.
	Per Cent.	Per Cent.	Per Cent.
China-Japan War	50.94	34.82	14.24
Russo-Japanese War	54.81	37.54	7.65
WOUNDED.			
China-Japan War	62.23	30.28	7.49
Russo-Japanese War	71.58	21.59	6.83

The majority of the missing men belonged to the army engaged in the siege of Port Arthur. As neither side permitted the other to approach within close proximity to their defence works, hundreds of soldiers died where they had fallen, and were buried by the enemy. The progress made in the treatment of the sick is evident from the following tables prepared by Surgeon-General Koike, giving the proportion of sick to wounded, and of deaths from wounds to deaths from sickness :—

	Wounded.	Sick.	Died of Wounds.	Died of Disease.
China-Japan War (1894-5)	1	6.93	1	12.09
North China Campaign (1900)	1	4.37	1	1.97
Russo-Japanese War (1904-5)	1	1.15	1	0.37

	Percentage of Sick for all Troops Engaged.	Percentage of Deaths from Sickness.
China-Japan War	59.20	9.29
North-China Campaign	34.88	4.33
Russo-Japanese War	36.04	2.99

It is a striking tribute to the efficiency of the medical organisation that the average monthly percentage of sickness during the Russo-Japanese War was 8.69, or nearly 2 per cent. less than the average monthly percentage during 1902—a period of peace. The cases of sickness from contagious diseases were 11.2 per cent. of the total cases of sickness from all causes. The number of sick or wounded men sent from the field to hospitals in Japan was 281,587, and 60,000 recovered and resumed their places in the ranks. During the period of the war there were four times as many deaths from disease in the field as there were among the patients sent to Japan. The divisions composing the army outside Port Arthur suffered double the losses of divisions in other parts of the field. The number of deaths, 8130, among the commissariat and transport service was considered large, but to account for this it was pointed out that the work involved

was arduous and the men employed were of inferior physique. In an interesting article that appeared in the *Japan Mail* on the conclusion of the war, it was pointed out that the battles of Heikautai and Mukden, together with the skirmishes after January 1905 and the fighting in northern Korea and Saghalien, cost the Japanese army more lives than did the whole previous campaign from the Yalu to Mukden, with its six big fights and with the siege of Port Arthur. The fair inference seems to be that the Russians fought desperately at Heikautai and Mukden, and from the losses suffered by the victors in these battles some idea may be gathered of what it would have cost to continue the campaign with Harbin and Vladivostock as objectives—to continue it for the sake of a pecuniary payment. The following table gives the Japanese naval casualties during the war :—

Killed	1890
Died of wounds	111
Wounded	1674
										<hr/>
Total	3675

(Ratio of killed to one wounded, 1.2.)

As twelve Japanese ships of various sizes were sunk during the war owing to mines and other causes involving heavy losses of life, the casualties incurred in actual battle were exceedingly small.

In the course of the naval engagements Japan did not lose a single ship, and her total casualties on these occasions were as follows : killed, 192 ; died of wounds, 51 ; wounded, 886. Of the latter only 329 were sent to hospital, the remainder being treated on board the ships. The ratio of killed to wounded in actual battle was 1 to 3.6. As the ratio on land was 1 to 2.7, the supposition which prevailed before the war that the percentage of fatalities among the casualties would be greater at sea than on land, has not been verified. Unfortunately the official returns of Russian casualties are not available, but whilst on sea these must have been much heavier than those of the Japanese, of the opposing forces the losses on land were about equal. Altogether it is not an exaggeration to say that the total casualties of all kinds on

both sides reached a million. The exact totals of deaths will probably never be known. Some idea of the permanent injuries inflicted by the war may be judged from the fact that of the Japanese army and navy, 1978 men lost limbs, and 1024 men were deprived of their eyesight. For several weeks following the capitulation of Port Arthur ships laden with wounded arrived in rapid succession at Chefoo on their way to Russia. Let the eye turn where it might on board these vessels it rested on scenes of indescribable sadness. Here and there in quiet corners stricken giants had withdrawn themselves in suffering solitude, while thronging the decks in listless groups stalwart black-bearded soldiers and blue-eyed sailors, their manhood spent, their strong hearts broken, waited patiently for the ship to sail on her long voyage homewards. Under the hatches, in a gloom hardly pierced by the oil lamps swinging from the beams overhead, were rows of wooden cubicles in which lay tossing many a poor fellow whose agonies would cease in the stillness of the ocean night-watch. It would be impossible to find a more terrible testimony to the horrors of modern warfare than was presented in these ships' companies of maimed and shattered Russians. Nowhere could be seen a whole man. In some cases a patient had survived the amputation of all but the stump of one limb, while the ghastly nature of the facial injuries would permit of no description outside the pages of a surgical work. The windows of spacious deck-houses, once the smoke-rooms of liners, were darkened, for here were placed those men who from splinter or explosion had lost their sight. The last of these ships to leave the fortress was nothing more or less than a floating lunatic asylum. By night and day from the padded cells with which she had been fitted came the frenzied shrieking and maniacal laughter of officers and men, once brave and resolute, whose minds had become hopelessly deranged either through injury or as a result of the tremendous strain to which they had been subjected during the last terrific days of the bombardment.

The large number of prisoners that fell into the hands of the Japanese cannot be taken as an indication of the completeness of their victories. The fact cannot be overlooked that enormous numbers of men were engaged over

an extensive area, and that the Russians were constantly compelled to fight rear-guard actions against overwhelming odds and in circumstances in which it was difficult for bodies of troops to keep in satisfactory communication with the main army. On the whole the Japanese treated their captives fairly well. They placed them in temples and other buildings in the interior of Japan from whence escape was practically impossible. It was indeed strange to see Russian officers seated on Japanese mats in little rooms the walls of which consisted only of sliding screens made of miniature squares of paper set in bamboo frames. In some instances there were dainty gardens outside these paper prisons, where gold-fish sported in ponds, and fountains played. In the immediate neighbourhood, strong guards were posted. To enable the prisoners to communicate with their friends at home, the authorities established an information bureau; but strict adherence to the letter of petty regulations and underhand methods of surveillance marred to a large extent their good intentions. A typical example of their pompous display of authority was related to me by a Russian officer who was a prisoner. "I received a permit to go to the theatre," he said, "but was told that I must be back in my paper prison at a certain hour. I enjoyed the piece very much. It was exciting, and therefore I forgot all about the time. I was anticipating the end when suddenly a Japanese picket walked into my box and took me out in full view of the audience. I was five minutes late, and in another five minutes the play would have been over. If they had only whispered to me I would have gone. But no; they must make a public exhibition of me." The Russian prisoners were well liked by the ordinary Japanese people with whom they came in contact in the towns and villages. More than one mixed marriage was the result, and many lasting friendships were made. The Russian army succeeded in capturing only a few hundred soldiers and sailors—the remainder of their prisoners were merely non-combatants. The officials in Tōkyō professed to be ignorant as to the whereabouts of Japanese who had fallen into the hands of the enemy; but graphic accounts were frequently published of brave men seeking death in *hara-kiri* rather than face the shame of ignominious surrender.

These heroes—the guests of the Russian prison authorities at the time—were extolled as national martyrs and held up to the rising generation as examples of true nobility. At a later date when they returned *via* Suez from Russia their appearance excited little comment in the Press and evoked swift retribution from their superiors. This circumstance shed a singularly illuminating light upon the sagacious efforts of the Japanese to keep the patriotic sentiment from waning, even at the expense of truth.

I have explained that the large number of prisoners taken by the Japanese was not indicative of the completeness of their victories. The same also applies to the enormous quantity of spoils which fell into their hands. Owing to the magnitude of the operations it was impossible for the Russians to take with them in their retreats the immense supplies of reserve stores that had been accumulated at the front, or to save all the guns placed in position for general engagements. It is extremely doubtful whether, in any future campaign, a defeated army with a battle line as extensive as that which the Russians sought to hold, would be able to escape with less loss in men and spoils than was the case in the general retirements that followed the principal engagements in Manchuria. Altogether, the Japanese secured possession of 1100 guns, 11,530 rifles, 9600 swords and lances, and a great many waggons and minor articles. Few of the guns and rifles were serviceable, and the majority of them were distributed throughout the country as trophies.

The Japanese have been highly praised for the system of espionage which they maintained during the war. As a matter of fact, it was a system with little subtlety, and its operation was perfectly obvious to all who came in contact with it. As far back as 1900 a friend of mine, while dining in the hotel at the little pilot town of Taku, situated at the mouth of the Peiho, was joined by a Japanese naval officer who, in an outburst of enthusiasm, invited the company at the *table d'hôte* to pledge his health on the occasion of his departure on a dangerous mission. When questioned regarding the nature of his errand, he replied with amazing frankness: "I must go as a Chinese coolie to Manchuria. I may be killed if I am discovered to be a Japanese." It is within

the writer's knowledge that this officer distinguished himself during the campaign, and holds an important position in the Japanese navy to-day. For many years before the war Manchuria was swarming with Japanese spies, whose duties, however, did not call for the exercise of any particular ingenuity or the display of any conspicuous heroism. Owing to the resemblance of their features to those of the Chinese, and their knowledge of the Chinese language, they were easily able to disguise themselves as natives. The Russians were well aware of the presence of spies, but outside the limits of their immediate jurisdiction they were powerless to take drastic action. As barbers, pedlars, and photographers, the Japanese were located not only in Russian towns, but also in the towns and ports of other nations having possessions or leased territories in the Far East. For in the matter of espionage our ally made little distinction between friend and foe. As a matter of fact espionage is bred in the bone of the Japanese. It is one of the outstanding attributes of that ancient civilisation of which we have heard so much. Mr. Diosy, who in no circumstances could be accused of unfriendliness towards the Japanese, has written that "The worst legacy of the Tokugawa Shōgunate was the widely ramified system of spying. It brought to the pitch of perfection a system that has stood Japan in good stead in the preparations for her wars, but has severely damaged her national character." He also expresses the opinion that the Japanese are the best spies in the world; that the Bakufu system trained their ancestors to be eavesdroppers; and that more than two generations must pass before they get the spy taint out of their blood. I agree with Mr. Diosy that the Japanese race is largely composed of natural spies, but I disagree with his statement that the Japanese are the most efficient spies in the world. For it is clear that a nation showing but qualified toleration of spying as an occasional expedient, is more likely to produce the perfect instrument in this art of dissimulation and disguise, than is a race in which craftiness and eavesdropping have become inherent during centuries of social and political intrigue. In the case of the former, the individual possessing the consciousness that he is acting a part can specialise in the work and disarm suspicion; whereas in the latter case,

national reputation has preceded the spy and his occupation becomes identified in his personality. While the Japanese have an innate distrust of the foreigner, in their own political and business affairs they repose little confidence in each other. Consequently Japan has become a land of intrigue, and evasiveness and suspicion are the outstanding characteristics of the race. This applies to all classes of the community, from the highest to the lowest. During the war, the Government made full use of the faults as well as of the virtues of the people, whose natural aptitude for espionage was turned to good account. To quote one of many instances in this connection, I may mention that a certain Japanese consul who had occasion to visit Port Arthur officially on the eve of hostilities, took with him a naval officer of high rank disguised as a common servant.

In Tōkyō and in Yokohama the lives of many of the European residents and tourists were made unbearable. Private correspondence was tampered with in a manner which, after making full allowance for the exigencies of war, was wholly unjustifiable. Letters to ordinary individuals were ruthlessly torn open and clumsily sealed up again, so as to convey the impression that they had been damaged in transit. In numerous instances communications never reached their destinations. Many of the servants in the employ of the legations, the hotels, and private households, were in the pay of the Government; while it was notorious that the guides who were engaged by tourists, and the interpreters attached to foreign military and naval officers and to the war correspondents, augmented their incomes by the practice of espionage. The clumsy way in which these men went about their work deceived nobody. Frequently they were caught with their ears to keyholes, and over and over again they were discovered picking locks and opening boxes and portmanteaus. Consequently Europeans never indulged in conversation that might be construed as unfavourable to the Japanese, in front of their servants, or without first examining the corridors in the vicinity of their rooms. Any documents which for private reasons they wished to keep secret they carried about in their pockets. Apart from the organised secret service composed of servants, the towns

swarmed with police agents in mufti. For a European to come under suspicion it was not necessary for him to speak against the Japanese. It was sufficient that he expressed, even with qualification, praise of Russian gallantry. As soon as he entered a 'rikisha a policeman did likewise and trundled after him wherever he went. If he took train to the mountains or to the seaside he was assiduously followed. Wherever he went, the mere knowledge on the part of the natives that he was under surveillance resulted in the ominous rumour being spread far and wide that he was a Russian spy, and the newspapers in various localities did not hesitate to record his presence as of one who was acting in that dubious capacity. In their ultra-patriotism the proprietors of many Japanese hotels and restaurants would refuse him shelter, and when at last, owing to the intervention of the police who eventually realised the dangerous lengths to which their suspicion might carry them, he secured accommodation, the worst room available was given him, and he was subjected to many trivial annoyances. The man with the camera was exposed to particular danger and ill-treatment. If while taking a photograph of a museum or of a rural scene a detachment of soldiers with a field-gun happened to pass by, he was promptly pounced upon by a policeman and requested to proceed to the police station, where his plates or films were confiscated.

A story is told of a Frenchman with a curious sense of humour, who, in wandering round Nagasaki with a filmless Kodak, was taken to the police station at least twenty times. On each occasion he explained that he was "practising snap-shotting," and after the camera had been minutely inspected by the entire office staff, secured his release. With all their precautions, however, the Japanese succeeded in arresting only two men against whom they were able to bring specific charges of espionage. One of these presented a clear case. The other was extremely doubtful. But both men were convicted and sentenced to terms of imprisonment. The doubtful case was that of a French officer who had been in the Japanese service, and who was well known and well respected throughout the length and breadth of the land. The evidence was heard in secret, but in an official statement

subsequently issued upon which it must be assumed the case for the prosecution rested, it was shown that the accused had been communicating Japanese military movements to military officers in France and to a French newspaper. There was not the least evidence that he acted the part of spy for the Russian Government. There was considerable controversy in consequence of the conviction, and the Emperor soon saw fit to grant a pardon on the ground of the prisoner's ill-health. The officer, who was in a very enfeebled state, did not long survive the disgrace inflicted upon him, and he died in his own country. That his communications had been harmful to the Japanese could not be doubted. Whether they amounted to espionage in the strict sense of the word is open to grave question, and probably the object of the Japanese would have been achieved in a more commendable way had they given him a preliminary warning, instead of ending a long and honourable career by jumping to the conclusion that he was a spy. Elaborate as was their system of detection, it was by no means successful. To my knowledge the Russians were in possession of the plans of all the principal naval ports, and a Russian agent actually secured a passage on board a Government ship which voyaged to the naval ports. He visited all the dockyards and arsenals, and was successful in obtaining a valuable series of photographs. Owing to the inability of the Russians to take the offensive these were of little use to them.

The observance of secrecy in regard to their military and naval movements has been looked upon as one of the principal factors in Japan's triumph. On this subject, as well as on many others concerning Japan, mistaken views are held. There are few races in the world more fond of gossip than the Japanese. They will sit for hours around their charcoal braziers, smoking and chatting. The tea-houses and restaurants which abound throughout the land, and which are patronised by the highest as well as by the humblest members of the community, are veritable gossip-shops and schools for scandal. When it is remembered that the walls of these resorts are composed largely of paper, some idea will be gained of the rapidity with which news can on occasions spread. Frequently after attending

important councils leading statesmen proceeded to their favourite tea-houses where, over their *saké* cups and before a bevy of geisha, they held informal discussions. The native newspaper reporters, whose status is exceedingly low, obtained much of their information during the war from geisha and tea-house sources. While the Japanese maintain reticence in their relations with foreigners they talk freely and very often indiscreetly among themselves. Moreover, yellow journals flourish in the country, and the members of the staffs make use of their natural spying abilities in following day and night the movements of distinguished people and in keeping in close touch with any servants who may be open to betray their masters' confidences for the consideration of bribes. Consequently many personal details of an objectionable nature find their way into print, and news of State importance is often published many days and often weeks before official announcements are made. Again and again the police authorities found it necessary during the war to enforce the law which provides for punishment in cases where items of information contrary to the interests of the army and navy were given publicity, and at the same time they exerted their influence with the editors to induce them not to insert in their newspapers anything that might react unfavourably upon the situation generally. In spite of these precautions, however, news frequently leaked out and ultimately found its way into journals published abroad. Notable instances were the publication in a London morning newspaper of the plan of the battle of Mukden several days before that battle was fought, the announcement that the Japanese were building a *Dreadnought* in secret, the revelation of Tōgō's naval basis, and the sinking of the *Takasago*. The last item of information became public property owing to the carelessness of the Japanese themselves. While making no official announcement that the cruiser had been lost, by a singular omission they published, in the usual list of casualties appearing in the Official Gazette, the name of every member of the crew as drowned.

In connection with the sinking of the battleship *Yashima* it was generally supposed that the Japanese had maintained complete secrecy. As a matter of fact the Russians were well

acquainted with the incident, and a number of foreigners who had seen a transport filled with sailors upon whose caps was written in Japanese characters the name *Yashima*, had their suspicions immediately aroused. Admiral Tōgō adopted elaborate precautions to conceal the locality of his bases, and he would not even allow refuse to be thrown overboard, as this might conceivably have given to coasting captains an approximate idea of his whereabouts. Nevertheless it is on record that the Russians knew perfectly well the position of the Japanese naval bases both during the operations outside Port Arthur and in the period preceding the Battle of the Japan Sea.

Because the Russians did not oppose the landing of the Japanese in Manchuria at the commencement of the war it must not be imagined that they were ignorant of the fact that the landing was in progress. At the time they were busily engaged in completing the defences at Port Arthur and in other parts of the field. I can state without fear of contradiction that during my residence in Tōkyō, which dated from the beginning of 1905, news of the battles as they were in progress was obtainable and could have been telegraphed stage by stage had it not been for the censorship. I recall distinctly that the beginning of the Battle of the Japan Sea and the result of the cannonade that followed was known in the capital within a few hours, and as a matter of fact a telegram containing this information was submitted by me to the naval authorities and rejected on the ground that its transmission would not be in the interests of the State. The wisdom of the Japanese in seeking to suppress news that was prejudicial to military interests could not be doubted. Before I comment upon their treatment of war correspondents let me say at the outset that I write without the least bias. As far as I myself was concerned, the restrictions imposed upon the newspaper representatives at the front did not apply, for during the war I was engaged either upon neutral territory in close proximity to the field of operations, and in the waters adjacent to Port Arthur, or else as correspondent in Japan with headquarters at Tōkyō. While I am in perfect agreement with the principle of the censorship, I am entitled to complain of its hopeless inefficiency in so far as it came under my attention in the capital.

The censors at the various Government departments were constantly changed during the day, and that which one man refused another frequently passed. Thus a correspondent was under the necessity of repeatedly submitting the same message for inspection in the hope that he would ultimately find a more lenient, or, as the case might be, a more intelligent official in charge of the department. He was in duty bound to adopt this course for fear another correspondent might forestall him. Occasionally, information contained in a despatch passed for one correspondent was rejected without rhyme or reason when tendered by another. For instance, the Japanese would not permit me to telegraph the news that ten Christian churches were burnt by the mob during the peace riots, but simultaneously they allowed the representative of a news agency to do so. Moreover, in rejecting despatches they declined to give any idea of the time when such despatches might become acceptable, or to suggest amendments which would be likely to meet the official objections. The only course open to the correspondents was to keep steadily submitting the rejected item in various forms on the chance that one of these might meet with approval, or that some day the information itself would be permissible for publication abroad. Thus the censors by their inefficiency only increased the work of their own departments and caused unnecessary irritation. It has been argued, and with some justification, that owing to the exigencies of war the accredited newspaper representatives at the front could not reasonably expect much consideration; in Tōkyō, however, different conditions obtained. Whereas in Manchuria the field telegraph accepted only a limited number of words for transmission, the telegraph department in Tōkyō had largely increased its staff for the purpose of dealing with the abnormally large amount of traffic, and received messages of any length. Though the number of censors was adequate, it must be confessed that their knowledge of English was not in all cases of the best, and this at times led to misunderstanding. Having instituted the machinery by which the correspondents in Tōkyō could undertake their work, it was the duty of the Government to see that such machinery operated efficiently.

In spite of the precautions adopted with regard to journal-
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istic despatches, news that the authorities were desirous of keeping secret frequently found its way into foreign newspapers. This was due to the fact that in the course of their duties, ministers and consuls constantly transmitted items of important information in private cypher to their Governments, and consequently news sometimes leaked out which, if the Japanese had possessed control, would never have been published. While correspondents were vainly endeavouring to send home the result of the first day's fighting in the Battle of the Japan Sea, the United States Consul at Nagasaki communicated with his Government in code, and the despatch was published widespread. News of a similar kind conveyed through diplomatic sources was published in a European capital, though in a less detailed form. Under the circumstances the object of the Japanese authorities in preventing correspondents from forwarding despatches was wholly defeated. If the required secrecy is to be maintained in future warfare, it will be necessary for the countries concerned not only to exercise supervision over correspondents on the spot, but also to obtain from the Foreign Offices of friendly Powers some definite guarantee that information relating to military operations and conveyed through diplomatic channels will not be prematurely divulged. The Japanese authorities parted with the censorship reluctantly, and it was not until a month after the war had ended that they allowed telegrams to be despatched without reference to themselves. It has always been part of the governmental policy of the country to seek to direct, by means of influence and sometimes even of pressure, the various agencies responsible for the expression of public opinion, and there is little doubt that if it were possible to maintain a permanent censorship many of the leading statesmen would favour such a course. The treatment accorded war correspondents in the field by the Japanese has received the commendation of the military men of all nations. Some have even gone so far as to predict that the occupation of a war correspondent is doomed. With this, however, I cannot entirely agree. The Japanese made an initial mistake by indiscriminately issuing passes to large numbers of correspondents. When attachés of all the leading countries were included, it will readily be understood that the armies in

Manchuria were unduly hampered by the presence of an excessive number of foreigners. Nor were all the correspondents at the front serious journalists. In more than one instance credentials of certain newspapers had been given to men whose sole object in proceeding to the theatre of war was not seriously to describe the operations, but to indulge their sporting instincts in the capacity of spectators.

It is an open question as to whether the policy of the Japanese in placing obstacles in the way of correspondents was altogether a wise one in their own interests. While it restricted the efforts of the representatives at the front, it only led to the display of considerable ingenuity on the part of those responsible for the news services in other localities, more particularly in the adjacent neutral territories. For instance, the world first heard of the repulses of the Japanese assaults at Port Arthur from the Pechili port of Chefoo, where, having the advantage of an uncensored wire, correspondents had established themselves and had organised a service of blockade-running junks which brought from the besieged fortress copies of the Russian newspaper, the *Novy-krai*, containing full accounts of the fighting. Other items of news detrimental to Japanese interests, and already detailed in this chapter, found their way into the newspapers through channels that the adjacent neutral territories provided. For instance, several correspondents resident in Tōkyō evaded the censorship by forwarding despatches by special messenger to Shanghai for further transmission. In the absence of any international agreement on the subject it is difficult to see how, in time of war, the leakage of news from neutral territories is to be avoided. In the matter of her own newspapers Japan secured effective control by exercising a rigorous censorship in the offices where those newspapers were published. In the writer's opinion the same means should be open to any other nation at war. It is not sufficient that the ordinary editor and his assistants should be constituted the arbiters of what is and what is not prejudicial to the interests of the army in the field and of the country at large. To secure effective control over foreign correspondents resident in a country engaged in war, or to find a remedy for the evils attendant upon the publication of military secrets contained

in despatches sent from neutral territory, presents difficult problems. As news not conveyed by eye-witnesses or submitted to censorship is necessarily liable to impart inaccuracies and to circulate undesirable facts, the presence of war correspondents with the armies in the field tends to produce a counteracting and steadying effect, inasmuch as it ensures the presentation in the world's press of statements which, if not always true in a literal sense, have at least the authority of official supervision and are therefore in the interests of expediency.

In the Russo-Japanese war the censorship was frequently abused in order to cover up the blunders of both sides. The absence entirely of war correspondents from the field would probably lead to worse evils than those which result from their presence; for soldiers are only human, and in their reports they might occasionally be tempted to conceal some of their defects, if not their reverses. At the same time it is intolerable that a general should be harassed in his work by having constantly at his heels a large number of critics—some of doubtful competency. While I am not prepared to say that the Russo-Japanese campaign made out a case for the abolition of war correspondents, I believe that it proved up to the hilt the necessity for placing them under proper restriction. My solution of the difficulty would be to permit only a limited number of men of known integrity representing leading papers to accompany an army in the field. In the despatches or articles which they might communicate to their papers I would permit, under a strict censorship, only descriptions of events that had actually taken place, and would prohibit anything in the nature of criticism or speculation. I would not allow any of them to leave the army while the operations were in progress, and would deal with any breach of the regulations relating to the maintenance of military secrecy, with the utmost severity. From each attaché following the army I would require a promise that he would not forward his reports to his Government until the campaign was at an end. In the Russo-Japanese war the attachés, while applauding the action of the Japanese in placing obstacles in the way of correspondents, failed to appreciate similar obstacles when they themselves were the

victims. The Japanese kept as strict a watch upon their movements as they did upon those of the newspaper representatives.

It will be of interest in the course of this chapter to give some idea of the light in which the great mass of the Japanese people regarded the achievements of their soldiers and sailors. As far back as 1894, at a time immediately preceding the China-Japan war, Lord Curzon, in commenting upon the manifestation of national sentiment in Japan, wrote: "A collateral illustration of the same thoughtless and sometimes foolish patriotism is the passionate excitement displayed by the Japanese at any assertion, however extravagant or ridiculous, of the national spirit. In this respect they may be termed the Frenchmen of the East." Some years ago, Colonel (now General) Fukushima, who had been acting as military attaché at St. Petersburg, rode from the capital to Vladivostock. The exploit involved nothing more than a feat of endurance. The officer kept to well-beaten tracks, and at no time did he incur the least danger. Yet upon arriving in Japan he was hailed by the whole nation as one whose achievement was equal in importance to the explorations of a Livingstone or a Stanley. "When he landed," wrote Lord Curzon, referring to this incident, "he was received with as much honour as though he were a Moltke returning from the Franco-German campaign. One trembles to think what will be the fate reserved for a genuine Japanese hero should such a one ever appear."

Since Lord Curzon's book was published Japan has produced heroes in abundance. The China-Japan war and the Boxer rising were responsible for many of these, but as a result of the Russo-Japanese war at least half a million live heroes were created, and thousands of dead ones were deified. Every soldier who returned from the front was met at his native place by a procession of villagers carrying banners, and he was paraded through the streets. In the large towns the welcome was undertaken by the neighbours from the quarter in which the returned warrior lived. Hardly an hour passed without one of these quaint pageants making its appearance. Usually they were headed by a band composed of three or four diminutive youths dressed in grotesque uniforms. The big drum was always an indispensable in-

strument, while the brass and reed sections were invariably represented by antiquated cornets and tin whistles. The noise produced may have sounded as martial music to Japanese ears, attuned as they are to a meagre scale of dismal enharmonics, but to the unfortunate European who was not directly interested in the rejoicing, it was neither more nor less than an execrable din. There could be no doubt that serious, very serious attempts were being made to reproduce some of the stirring airs of the West, and occasionally one could detect amid the mutilated instrumentation a broken bar of "See the Conquering Hero Comes"; but as each member of the band had his own independent idea of *tempo*, the recognition was faint and fleeting. It was clear that the musicians were not conscious of their imperfections, for on passing the European hotels they visibly swelled with pride, at the same time particularly emphasising the big drum and blowing exceptionally hard blasts on the wind instruments. The patriots who had hired them for the occasion were under the impression that they had secured the services of a first-class band of European music; while the people in the streets, obviously charmed by "Western harmonies," and intensely pleased with the accomplishment of their fellow-countrymen, stopped in their way and listened with marked attention. Those who formed the procession were for the most part dressed in kimonos, but occasionally one saw individuals who were no doubt councillors or prosperous tradesmen, wearing top hats with their kimonos, or attired in frock-coats of antique fashion with trousers of khaki or brown holland. No attempt was made to march in order. The motley throng slouched along in a go-as-you-please style, and both heroes and welcomers bore expressions of deep, almost of strained seriousness.

The world has been led to believe that one of the principal characteristics of the Japanese race is humility, and that consequently they accepted their victories with a stoical placidity that would have been impossible among Western nations placed in similar circumstances. As a matter of fact there was little interval between the battles when processions consisting of people waving lanterns and shouting *Banzai*, were not parading the streets in all directions. On

one occasion, so intense was the excitement of the dense crowds in Tōkyō, that the police were unable to maintain order and a number of people were seriously injured. Again and again during the period of jubilation Lord Curzon's estimate of the Japanese was fully borne out. At a later date, though in another phase, namely, on the occasion of the peace riots, further evidences were forthcoming of the excitability of the Japanese "at any assertion, however extravagant or ridiculous, of the national spirit." During the war, correspondents commented upon the absence of public display when soldiers were sent to the front; but as their departure, owing to reasons of military secrecy, usually took place in the night and the time was not publicly announced, it is easy to account for the lack of any manifestation of sentiment on the part of the populace. When troops left in the daytime scenes were witnessed not unlike those which have occurred in Western countries during war. Owing to the fact that in their official despatches Japanese commanders always attributed victory to the illustrious virtue of the Emperor, it has been assumed that they were exceptionally gifted with humility. The phrase referred to, however, is merely a matter of form, but of course no Japanese would have the temerity to admit this openly. Though the Emperor of Japan does not take the field, he is generalissimo of all the forces, and the pretence that he commands them in action and that his spirit is responsible for victory is perpetuated. In the event of defeat, the Japanese generals would, no doubt, be compelled to fall back upon their own deficiency as an explanation. It is thoroughly understood that his Majesty inspires only victory. When returning to Tōkyō in triumph the Japanese generals and admirals bore themselves with a gravity of manner which in its way was quite as significant of a realisation of the part they themselves had filled in bringing about victory, as was the dignified, though perhaps less grave bearing, of the generals and admirals of other countries who have been placed in similar circumstances. In view of the fact that the majority of them had rendered service to their Emperor under feudal conditions, it must be admitted that they accepted the welcome of the populace with a grace that showed a readiness to adapt

themselves to the modern spirit. They were met at the station by the representatives of various public bodies, were accorded municipal welcomes, and, bowing and saluting, drove through the streets which were lined with cheering crowds. Moreover, they made speeches in response to addresses presented by city councils, attended banquets given by various sections of the community, and allowed themselves to be interviewed freely by newspaper reporters.

No words of my own would convey a better idea of the manner in which the Japanese regarded their military heroes, than the following passage taken from the *Japan Times* on the occasion of the return of four generals to Tokyō, and which is a translation of an article that appeared in a vernacular journal: "The *Hochi*, in a charmingly felicitous style, likens the four generals who have now returned to the 'four flower-symbols' (*Shi-kunshi*)—the plum-blossom, orchid, chrysanthemum, and bamboo, a quartette immortalised by the *Bunjin-gwa*, the old classical school of painters in black and white. In this 'anthology' of the *Hochi*, General Kuroki, who won the first victory of the war, is compared to the wild plum, the *Mume* flower, that puts forth its petals earliest in the year, even against winter's frost and snow. The writer carries the simile so far as to allude also to the sour-sweet fruit, which is noted for its healthy acid qualities; the general is likened to it, because his early successes served to inspire the men of the other armies with courage and confidence, and stir them up in a spirit of emulation. The 'orchid' is General Oku, leader of the second army; brilliant in his movements, and having particularly to his credit the smallest casualty list, he receives the less attention in the papers at home and abroad, but he bears his honours with the modesty of a gentle orchid, that fills a sequestered glen with its fragrance. As to the hero of Port Arthur, General Nogi, no floral emblem can be so fitting as the chrysanthemum, uplifting its glorious corolla against the frosty air of the late autumn. As the flower undergoes a whole year's careful culture, through the cold of winter and the heat of summer, so had the stout heart of the general borne all the vicissitudes of the campaign in the Kin-chao Peninsula, and, above all, the inconsolable sorrow of losing his two sons; and in the end,

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he appears as glorious as the Imperial flower. Of General Nodzu, the last to return, the writer says he can be likened to the sturdy bamboo: his bravery has been tested and proven undaunted in all the wars of the Meiji era, and has shown at its best in the face of ill-fortune; just as the enduring, unbreakable bamboo, under the weight of the heaviest snow, still remains evergreen, fresh, hardy, and vigorous, to bear up through everything. The journal concludes this essay in happy imagery by impressing on the nation never to forget to treasure these four heroes, any one of whom may well be held up to the gaze of posterity as a model *samurai* of the highest type."

While the Japanese nation as a whole freely indulged in hero-worship where leading commanders were concerned, those people who were better informed showed some discrimination in awarding praise, and did not neglect in other quarters to pay honour where honour was due. When a telegram was received from London announcing that the British press compared the achievements of Marshal Oyama with those of Marlborough, Moltke, and even of Napoleon, a bland smile spread over the countenances of many Japanese who were well acquainted with the character and capabilities of the Commander-in-chief. More than one prominent official told me that Oyama was selected for the high office because he was a genial old man, and that as a matter of fact General Kodama, the Chief of the Staff, was the guiding genius throughout the campaign. They added that as Kodama was comparatively a young man it had been impossible to vest him with the supreme command, and that Oyama was chosen for the post because he had considerable personal influence in the army and because the various generals were willing to serve loyally under him. The principal object aimed at was to avoid the least dissension.

The truth of these statements was fully confirmed by the observations of foreign correspondents and attachés in the field. The representative of a foreign newspaper, accredited to the Russian forces and captured by the Japanese at the battle of Mukden, related to me his experiences when taken to headquarters. "It was Kodama," he said, "who gave and wrote all the orders. He would speak to Oyama as if

he were merely fulfilling a matter of form, and Oyama always nodded his head in assent. In the few minutes' conversation I had with Kodama he remarked, 'It is deplorable, this awful slaughter; war is indeed terrible.' Although as he spoke his face was exceedingly grave, you could see by the gleam in his eye that he was happy. He left me for a few minutes and returned, his face now wreathed in smiles. 'I have just received a report,' he exclaimed. 'We have captured thousands of prisoners, and many guns. It is impossible at present to estimate the Russian dead; they are so numerous. You must drink *sake* with me.' I came to the conclusion that despite Kodama's lamentation over the horrors of war he was in his element upon the battlefield." The strain of the war left its mark upon the health of Kodama, and within a year of its conclusion he died in Tōkyō. He was undoubtedly one of the greatest soldiers the world has ever seen, and his loss to Japan was irreparable. While the Japanese are unanimous in their opinion regarding the greatness of Admiral Tōgō, they pay high tribute to the genius of Admiral Shimamura, who acted as his Chief of Staff during the war, and some even go so far as to say that the part he played contributed more than is generally known to the completeness of the naval victories. When Tōgō received his appointment at the beginning of the war he was in command of the Maizura naval port, and his selection involved promotion over several other admirals. The initiative he displayed in sinking the *Kowshing* during the China-Japan war had never been forgotten; and this circumstance, together with his other known qualities, made him peculiarly acceptable for the supreme command.

The celebrations at the conclusion of the war were not dissimilar to those which from time immemorial have marked the successful conclusion of wars in Western countries. Champagne flowed freely, and the Japanese officers, who during the campaign had shown commendable restraint, gave way to the indulgence of frank enjoyment. In addition there were innumerable private festivities in the tea-houses and restaurants of the towns and villages throughout the land. Moreover, many military and naval men of all ranks displayed an arrogance towards ordinary members of the com-

munity that was a clear indication of their self-consciousness. The Emperor reviewed both the army and the fleet. Thirty-two thousand troops paraded on the occasion of the military review, and no less than one hundred and fourteen generals attended. Altogether seventy-six regimental flags were borne past the saluting point, and many of these had been torn into shreds by shot and shell. Incidentally it may be observed that the Japanese do not hold with those authorities who assert that because regimental flags attract the enemy's fire they should not be borne on the battlefield. Although many ensign-bearers were killed or wounded, the conclusion was arrived at that the sacrifice was fully compensated for by the inspiring effect which the presence of the colours in their midst produced upon the soldiers. The British squadron in Far Eastern waters joined the Japanese fleet in the naval review; but as a number of ships captured from the Russians were also included in the lines, no official invitations were, for obvious reasons, issued to the Diplomatic Corps.

The Japanese lost no opportunities of parading their trophies. Arranged beneath the walls of the Imperial Palace at the time of the military review was a vast display of spoils consisting of 85 lances, 70,000 small arms, 281 field guns captured in the field engagements commencing with the battle of Yalu and ending with that of Mukden, 8 fortress guns (1 24-cm. and 7 23-cm., found in Port Arthur); 30 15-cm. cannon and mortars, secured also in the different forts of Port Arthur; 140 guns below 12-cm. calibre including 11 machine guns, found principally in the landward forts at Port Arthur; 41 Maxims, 1538 ammunition wagons, 624 wagons of other descriptions; 11,612 gun cartridges, and one balloon captured at Port Arthur. In other open spaces there were similar displays, though on a less elaborate scale. In a large plot of ground adjacent to the temple known as Kudan, where the spirits of the men who had fallen in the war were worshipped, rifles and sabres were stacked tier upon tier in the shape of a lofty monument, and this at night was illuminated. The celebration of the religious rites brought enormous crowds to the scene, for whom innumerable side-shows and *saké* shops provided all the boisterous fun of the fair. My object in describing in

detail the reception accorded to the Japanese warriors and the festivals that followed the campaign, is to correct the impression so widely spread by writers with a superficial knowledge of the country, that the Japanese are a race possessing among other superhuman qualities that of complete self-repression on all occasions. I have shown that in the hour of their triumph they indulged in natural exultation, and that in their rejoicings, consideration for the susceptibilities of their enemy was not more marked than would have been the case with any other country similarly placed. In the hour of their disappointment that followed the conclusion of peace they gave way to an outburst of passionate feeling, which, involving as it did a temporary sway of anti-foreign sentiment, afforded a peculiar insight into the character of the people.

As the Japanese progress in the war was one of sustained triumph I can only speculate as to what might have happened had they suffered even a single reverse. I am of opinion that in this event the whole fortunes of the campaign would have been changed. Although the Japanese are careful in preparation they are impetuous in execution. They are apt to lose heart when their programme, as always prearranged, is not successful. This fact was demonstrated over and over again during the campaign.

The object of the Government in endeavouring to observe secrecy in regard to certain matters was not, always, so much to deprive the Russians of information as to keep the truth back from the masses. Several months before Port Arthur fell, the people, whose hopes had been raised by the sanguine statements published in newspapers and elsewhere, completed their arrangements for the grand celebrations that were to take place as soon as news of the capitulation was received. Flagstuffs were erected in every quarter, tens of thousands of lanterns were purchased, and the roadways were lined with wooden frameworks covered with gay colours. The moment when the flags should be unfurled and the lanterns illuminated was anxiously awaited. Meanwhile the Japanese army at Port Arthur was being repulsed with terrible losses, accounts of which the newspapers were prohibited from publishing. Although ominous rumours began to circulate, these were

very indefinite, and the populace hearing of victories in other parts of the field remained calm. It was obvious that the least item of bad news made a deep impression throughout the country. The announcement of the sinking even of one small ship resulted in general despondency. One could tell from the melancholy expressions on the faces of the officials whenever unfavourable reports had been received from the front. When, owing to the prevalence of a thick fog and through no fault of his own, Admiral Kamimura was unable to locate the Russian squadron which had escaped from Vladivostock, he was severely criticised and a hostile demonstration was made in front of his house. During the whole of the war Japan was never sorely tried except at the beginning of the siege of Port Arthur, and the reverses in this part of the field were fully compensated for by the victories farther north and on sea. As she was the attacking force she was in a position to prearrange her movements; but it is a matter open to question whether the organisation of her army or the morale or physique of her men would have been equal to withstanding successive defeats of the magnitude of those which she inflicted upon her enemy. Whatever may be thought of the capacity of the Russian officers, the war proved in a striking manner that the powers of endurance and the sturdy heroism of the Russian soldiers were nothing short of superb. Time after time they faced disasters that would have overwhelmed the armies of other countries. It was due to them that in the days immediately preceding the end of the war Russia presented, if anything, a bolder front than she had done during the whole progress of the campaign. It was due to them that the truth of the saying that Russia is invariably defeated but never beaten, was once again demonstrated. And finally it was due to them that Count Witte was able to take his firm stand at the Peace Conference and to declare that Russia would not cede one inch of territory or pay one penny of indemnity. Colonel Waters, the British military attaché who was with the Russian forces in Manchuria, has expressed the opinion that the discipline of the men was excellent. There was no more enduring, patient being, he believed, than the Russian soldier. He did not grumble or criticise, but he bore all the hardships, many of

them unnecessary ones, with great fortitude. That he did not win victories was alone due to circumstances over which he had no control. Education had been denied him, and it was not surprising therefore that he lacked initiative. A more recent tribute to the gallantry of the Russian sailor was paid by Mr. Robert Hichens, who, in an account of the earthquake scenes at Messina, related that while the Italians expressed great admiration for the British bluejackets, they could find no words to describe the wonderful heroism of the men composing the Russian detachment. That Russia lost the war was not the fault of her men ; it was the fault of the maladministration of a bureaucracy, as a result of which the ordinary individual, having not, in reality, been raised above the level of serfdom, lived as a serf, fought as a serf, and died as a serf. The war was a blessing in disguise to the Russian people. It demonstrated in a striking way the hopeless inefficiency of the bureaucracy, and gave an impetus to the revolutionary movement. It was undeniably one of the factors that made for the dawn of freedom in Russia.

"It is evident," said Kuropatkin in his farewell address to the officers of the First Manchurian army, "that neither school nor life have contributed to the development in Great Russia, during the last forty or fifty years, of strong and independent character. Now, by the inflexible will of our Sovereign Chief, the blessing of liberty has been conferred on Russia. The bureaucratic tutelage has been removed from the people, and they have acquired the possibility of freely developing and of applying their forces for the good of our native land. Let us have faith that these blessings of freedom, together with well-equipped schools, will soon exercise a beneficial effect in raising the level of the material and moral forces of the Russian people."

XIV

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC: AMERICA AND THE IMMIGRATION QUESTION

EARLY in 1905, the San Francisco Board of Education first suggested the segregation of Japanese school children ; but they were unable to obtain from the municipality the necessary appropriation for defraying the cost of providing the additional accommodation required in consequence of the proposed change. Owing to the destruction of the Chinese quarter by the fire following the memorable earthquake, a large number of the residents left the town, and consequently the accommodation provided in the Chinese schools was more than sufficient to meet the requirements. The authorities immediately seized upon the opportunity in order to carry out their policy in regard to the Japanese. Their action was based upon a law enacted in 1872, which provided for the establishment of "separate schools for children of Mongolian or Chinese descent." This law was undoubtedly aimed at the Chinese who were at that time entering the State in large numbers. Subsequently the flow of Japanese immigration began to increase ; but until 1905 there was never any suggestion that the system of segregation should apply to any but the children of Chinese nationality. Owing to various causes which are detailed elsewhere, the feeling against the Japanese gradually developed into bitter hatred. The Board of Education acted, therefore, in accordance with the popular sentiment when, in October 1905, they ordered that the name of "Chinese school" should be changed to that of "Oriental School," and that Japanese scholars who had hitherto been distributed throughout twenty-three primary and grammar schools in the city, should be segregated on the same principles as those which had governed the

education of the children of Chinese parents. Not only did they contend that their action was in strict accordance with the provisions of State law, but they sought to justify themselves by setting forth their objections to the association of Japanese scholars with white scholars. Among other things, they urged that numerous complaints had been received of Japanese children attending school when suffering from trachoma. Their most serious objection was, however, that a number of Japanese young men took advantage of the educational facilities in the city, and were taught in classes which included white girls of tender years. Moreover, they went so far as to assert that some of these young men had been guilty of immoral conduct. Mr. James D. Phelan, who was Mayor of San Francisco from 1896 to 1902, stated in the course of an interview that several scandals ending in police courts had resulted, "the moral code of the two races being entirely different."

Mr. George Kennan, the well-known contributor to *The Outlook*, New York, after an investigation on the spot, pointed out that of the 28,736 school-children in San Francisco on the 8th of December 1908, there were in primary and grammar schools just 93 Japanese, or a little more than one to a school building. Of the 93 Japanese nearly one-third were born in the United States, and 28 were girls. Of the 65 boys, 34 were under fifteen years of age. Of the 31 who were over fifteen only two had reached the age of twenty, and the average age of the remainder was 17.2. Twenty-five of them were in grammar schools, so that the number "sitting beside children of tender age" in primary schools was six. It must not be forgotten that the total number of young Japanese men attending the schools varied from time to time, and that there was every prospect that, in view of the rapid growth of Oriental immigration, the number would largely increase in the future. In any case, the presence even of a limited proportion of young men in classes intended for children was undesirable. This evil could, however, have been remedied without resort to such drastic measures as those which were adopted by the Board of Education. It was admitted on all hands that the Japanese children were well-behaved, and that their mental qualities were of a high order. A solution of

the difficulty could have been found by the separation of adult scholars.

Abundant evidence was forthcoming to show that in their action the authorities were animated by a sentiment deeper than that which appeared on the surface, and that in reality they wished to raise in an acute form the whole question of Japanese immigration. In this, it must be confessed, they succeeded ; but while their cause in its wide application was deserving of sympathy, it suffered inasmuch as many of the leaders were labour agitators some of whom were notoriously dishonest. The Japanese declined to accept the situation and through the medium of their Ambassador vigorously protested that their national pride had been wounded. Almost immediately a crisis in the relations between the two countries was precipitated. The situation was complicated by the sharp conflict of views which instantly arose between the State and the Federal authorities. While for the time being this complication increased the difficulties of diplomatists, it was not altogether to be deplored in view of the singular circumstances of the moment. Thus the United States was in a position to say to Japan : We agree with you that the segregation of your children is a violation of treaty rights. We wish you to understand that the action of San Francisco is not countenanced by the Government of the United States, and we will take steps to ensure that State law shall not override solemn international obligations. The question was therefore reduced to an issue between the Federal and State authorities. It was decided that a case in connection with a Japanese pupil should be taken before the Courts in order to test the legality or otherwise of the action of the Board of Education, and the District Attorney was instructed to lend his assistance to the attorneys for the Japanese. The case for the Federal Government was lucidly outlined by the Hon. Elihu Root, who was then Secretary of State in the Roosevelt Administration. He pointed out that the treaty of November 22, 1894, between the United States and Japan, provided in the first article that—

“The citizens or subjects of each of the two High Contracting Parties shall have full liberty to enter, travel, or reside in any part of the territory of the other Con-

tracting Party, and shall enjoy full and perfect protection for their persons and property. . . .

"In whatever relates to rights of residence and travel ; to the possession of goods and effects of any kind ; to the succession to personal estate, by will or otherwise, and the disposal of property of any sort and in any manner whatsoever which they may lawfully acquire, the citizens or subjects of each Contracting Party shall enjoy in the territories of the other the same privileges, liberties, and rights, and shall be subject to no higher imposts or charges in these respects than native citizens or subjects or citizens or subjects of the most favoured nation."

On the other hand, the statutes of California stipulated that—

"Every school, unless otherwise provided by law, must be open for the admission of all children between six and twenty-one years of age residing in the district, and the Board of School Trustees, or City Board of Education, have power to admit adults and children not residing in the district, whenever good reasons exist therefor. Trustees shall have the power to exclude children of filthy or vicious habits, or children suffering from contagious or infectious diseases, and also to establish separate schools for Indian children and for children of Mongolian or Chinese descent. When such separate schools are established, Indian, Chinese, or Mongolian children must not be admitted into any other school."

The following passage represented the conclusions of Mr. Root :—

"The other question was whether, if the treaty had the meaning which the Government of Japan ascribed to it, the Government of the United States had the constitutional power to make such a treaty agreement with a foreign nation which should be superior to and controlling upon the laws of the State of California. A correct understanding of that question is of the utmost

importance not merely as regards the State of California, but as regards all States and all citizens of the Union.

“There was a very general misapprehension of what this treaty really undertook to do. It was assumed that in making and asserting the validity of the treaty of 1894 the United States was asserting the right to compel the State of California to admit Japanese children to its schools. No such question was involved. That treaty did not, by any possible construction, assert the authority of the United States to compel any State to maintain public schools, or to extend the privileges of its public schools to Japanese children or to the children of any alien residents. The treaty did assert the right of the United States, by treaty, to assure to the citizens of a foreign nation residing in American territory equality of treatment with the citizens of other foreign nations, so that if any State chooses to extend privileges to alien residents as well as to citizen residents, the State will be forbidden by the obligation of the treaty to discriminate against the resident citizens of the particular country with which the treaty is made and will be forbidden to deny to them the privileges which it grants to the citizens of other foreign countries. The effect of such a treaty, in respect of education, is not positive and compulsory; it is negative and prohibitory. It is not a requirement that the State shall furnish education; it is a prohibition against discrimination when the State does choose to furnish education. It leaves every State free to have public schools or not, as it chooses, but it says to every State: ‘If you provide a system of education which includes alien children, you must not exclude these particular alien children.’

“It has been widely asserted or assumed that this treaty provision and its enforcement involved some question of State’s rights. There was and is no question of State’s rights involved, unless it be the question which was settled by the adoption of the Constitution.

“This will be apparent upon considering the propositions which I will now state:—

“1. The people of the United States, by the Constitu-

tion of 1787, vested the whole treaty-making power in the National Government. They provided :—

“ ‘The President shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. (Art. II. sec. 2.)

“ ‘No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation ; . . . No State shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power. (Art. I. sec. 10.)

“ ‘This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land ; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.’ (Art. VI.)

“ Legislative power is distributed : upon some subjects the National Legislature has authority ; upon other subjects the State Legislature has authority. Judicial power is distributed : in some cases the Federal Courts have jurisdiction, in other cases the State Courts have jurisdiction. Executive power is distributed : in some fields the National Executive is to act ; in other fields the State Executive is to act. The treaty-making power is not distributed ; it is all vested in the National Government ; no part of it is vested in or reserved to the States. In international affairs there are no States ; there is but one nation, acting in direct relation to and representation of every citizen in every State. Every treaty made under the authority of the United States is made by the National Government, as the direct and sole representative of every citizen of the United States residing in California equally with every citizen of the United States residing elsewhere. It is, of course, conceivable that, under pretence of exercising the treaty-making power, the President and Senate might attempt to make provisions regarding matters which are not proper subjects of international agreement, and which would be only a colourable—not a real

—exercise of the treaty-making power ; but so far as the real exercise of the power goes, there can be no question of State rights, because the Constitution itself, in the most explicit terms, has precluded the existence of any such question.”

I have quoted at length the observations made by Mr. Root because they are important not only as representing the views of a distinguished statesman, but also because they are the considered conclusions of an eminent authority on international law. Moreover, as incidents similar to the San Francisco school question will undoubtedly recur, it is advisable that an official interpretation of the constitutional relations existing between the Federal Government and a State should be placed on permanent record. The strong attitude adopted at the time by the President aroused deep resentment throughout the western States, the people of which are noted for their sturdy independence of character. In a Presidential Message delivered to Congress, the following remarkable passage occurred:—

“The overwhelming mass of our people cherish a lively regard and respect for the people of Japan, and in almost every quarter of the Union the stranger from Japan is treated as he deserves ; that is, he is treated as the stranger from any part of civilised Europe is and deserves to be treated. But here and there a most unworthy feeling has manifested itself toward the Japanese—the feeling that has been shown in shutting them out from the common schools in San Francisco, and in mutterings against them in one or two other places, because of their efficiency as workers. To shut them out from the public schools is a wicked absurdity, when there are no first-class colleges in the land, including the universities and colleges of California, which do not gladly welcome Japanese students and on which Japanese students do not reflect credit. We have as much to learn from Japan as Japan has to learn from us ; and no nation is fit to teach unless it is also willing to learn. Throughout Japan Americans are well treated, and any failure on the part of Americans at home to treat the Japanese with a like courtesy and consideration is by just so much a confession of inferiority in our civilisation.

"Our nation fronts on the Pacific, just as it fronts on the Atlantic. We hope to play a constantly growing part in the great ocean of the Orient. We wish, as we ought to wish, for a great commercial development in our dealings with Asia; and it is out of the question that we should permanently have such development unless we freely and gladly extend to other nations the same measure of justice and good treatment which we expect to receive in return. It is only a very small body of our citizens that act badly. Where the Federal Government has power it will deal summarily with any such. Where the several States have power I earnestly ask that they also deal wisely and promptly with such conduct, or else this small body of wrongdoers may bring shame upon the great mass of their innocent and right-thinking fellows—that is, upon our nation as a whole. . . .

"I recommend to the Congress that an Act be passed specifically providing for the naturalisation of Japanese who come here intending to become American citizens. One of the great embarrassments attending the performance of our international obligations is the fact that the statutes of the United States are entirely inadequate. They fail to give to the National Government sufficiently ample power, through United States Courts and by the use of the army and navy, to protect aliens in the rights secured to them under solemn treaties which are the law of the land. I therefore earnestly recommend that the criminal and civil statutes of the United States be so amended and added to as to enable the President, acting for the United States Government, which is responsible in our international relations, to enforce the rights of aliens under treaties. Even as the law now is something can be done by the Federal Government toward this end, and in the matter now before me affecting the Japanese, everything that it is in my power to do will be done, and all of the forces, military and civil, of the United States which I may lawfully employ will be so employed. There should, however, be no particle of doubt as to the power of the National Government completely to perform and enforce its own obligations to other nations. The mob of a single city may at any time perform acts of lawless violence against some class of foreigners which would plunge us into war. That

city by itself would be powerless to make defence against the foreign Power thus assaulted, and if independent of this Government it would never venture to perform or permit the performance of the acts complained of. The entire power and the whole duty to protect the offending city or the offending community lies in the hands of the United States Government. It is unthinkable that we should continue a policy under which a given locality may be allowed to commit a crime against a friendly nation, and the United States Government limited, not to preventing the commission of the crime, but, in the last resort, to defending the people who have committed it against the consequences of their own wrongdoing."

In another and a later message the President declared that there would be no objection to excluding Japanese from the schools on the score of age, and that the only point at issue was the exclusion of the children themselves. In plain language he expressed the intention of using all the forces of the Government, civil and military, in order to protect the Japanese residents. It could not be denied that the views expressed by Mr. Roosevelt on the school question were shared by all Americans whose sense of justice was not overshadowed by blind prejudice. On the other hand, it was generally recognised that, in regard to the rapid growth of Japanese immigration, Californians had a genuine grievance, and one that called for instant remedy. In these circumstances it was exceedingly regrettable that a cause which in its essence was not objectionable, should have been sullied by actions of hostility towards the Japanese. Those actions were by no means representative of the views of the most intelligent section of the Californian community, but were wholly and solely due to the sporadic ebullition of mob violence fomented by the agitation of labour leaders—men whose individual characters were notoriously corrupt and transparently dishonest. That men such as these should be allowed to create a situation of international gravity was altogether unthinkable. The whole issue of immigration was in itself fraught with possibilities that menaced the welfare of the United States, and aggravation in the form proposed by the San Francisco Board of Education merely tended to

convert a good cause into a thoroughly bad one. The President, in virtue of the supreme office which he held, was bound to take a large view of the general situation. He realised that the ports of the Pacific coast, to say nothing of Hawaii and the Philippines, were wholly unprotected, and that although the Japanese were without the necessary financial means with which to conduct a long campaign, they were in a strategical position to effect a *coup de main*.

The unfriendly references to the Japanese that were constantly made by the Press and the publicists of California, although possessing a certain symptomatic value, could not be construed as informing to one in Mr. Roosevelt's position. It is within my own personal knowledge that the Department at Washington was well advised concerning the true character of the Japanese and their policy. From the reports of their own accredited agents, diplomatic, consular, and otherwise, the Federal Government knew that apart from the immigration question the Japanese system of espionage in American territories was elaborate, and that the Japanese policy in the Far East was inconsistent with the principles first definitely expounded by an American Secretary of State, the late Mr. John Hay—the principles of the maintenance of the Open Door and the preservation of the integrity of China. The school question was a mere incident in the situation. The immigration question was not even a situation in itself. The real situation embraced the problems of the Pacific as a whole. Mr. Roosevelt adopted the only line of action open to one who was the trustee of vast interests of State. His eulogy of the Japanese was merely intended to convey to the labour agitators of San Francisco that, whatever might be their views on the subject, the United States had entered into solemn treaty obligations with the Japanese on the basis of their being a civilised people. His threats to use military force, if necessary, were evidence of his determination to secure for the Japanese that equitable treatment which the United States meted out to all civilised peoples; and if on the surface the language he used in the process appeared violent, it was at least the only language used and the only language understood by the individuals whom he addressed. In short, the policy of the President was prompted not only

by the considerations of diplomacy, but also by the dictates of simple justice. Consequently it was not surprising that in the end his will prevailed. The Mayor of San Francisco and the members of the Board of Education were summoned to Washington, where, after consultation with the President, an agreement was arrived at on the basis that "all children of alien races under the age of sixteen who speak English may be admitted to the white schools, and special schools will be established for children of alien birth who are deficient in the elements of English."

The test case was withdrawn. At the same time an understanding was arrived at with the Japanese on the following basis: That the Tōkyō Government would voluntarily restrict emigration to Hawaii, from whence the majority of the Japanese coolies had found their way to California, and that no permit would be given for the emigration of labour to the United States. Exercising its legal rights the Washington Government then passed a measure providing for the exclusion of all Asiatic coolies coming from the insular possessions of America. The settlement was one acceptable to the Japanese Government. It did not, however, meet with whole-hearted approval in California, where the opinion prevailed among a certain section of the community that the Mayor of San Francisco had surrendered the rights of the State. As a matter of fact, while the negotiations were in progress a Bill passed the Californian Legislature providing that an alien who did not become a citizen of the United States should not hold a tithe of land for more than five years, that if within that time he did not become a citizen the District Attorney should compel the sale of his land or houses, and that no lease of real estate for a longer period than one year should be made to any alien. It was not denied that this measure was aimed at the Japanese. Furthermore, there could be no question in regard to the consistency of its provisions with those of the Constitution. Eventually, however, in conformity with the President's wishes, action was suspended. Two months later, at the end of May, there was another violent outburst of feeling against the Japanese. An attack was made upon a Japanese restaurant in San Francisco, and the premises were seriously damaged. The origin of

the disturbance was the discovery by the labour agitators that two of their number were actually committing the crime of dining in the restaurant! The flame of popular passion having been again kindled, unfortunate incidents were of common occurrence, and the Japanese retaliating with vigour, blood was spilt on both sides.

Meanwhile an angry sentiment was aroused in Japan. Hitherto the Government had succeeded in a large measure in suppressing public opinion, and it must be confessed that until open violence was displayed towards the Japanese residents in San Francisco their fellow-countrymen in the homeland exercised in the Press and on the platform a restraint that was highly commendable. When, however, the San Francisco trouble developed into a racial feud, there were not wanting signs that the Japanese nation as a whole deeply resented any restrictive measure which tended to discriminate them from the civilised communities of the world. In other words, there was at last frank expression of a sentiment which, since the beginning of the crisis, had been merely kept in check. The attitude of the Government was, of course, strictly correct. They realised that at that time little was to be gained by provoking hostilities with the United States. Nor were they blind to the fact that the immigration problem was not confined to the United States alone. They knew that it was also a vital issue in the colonial possessions of the ally of Japan; and that apart from this all-important consideration it was a question of serious moment whether or not the ties of the alliance—as yet merely recorded on paper and not the result of affection between the two peoples—would stand the test in any struggle in which Anglo-Saxon kith and kin were engaged. Several publicists, however, did not hesitate to voice the real sentiments of the Japanese people. Prominent among these was Count Okuma, who sent the following telegraphic message to the *New York World*: "I greatly regret that anti-Japanese outrages are being repeated in San Francisco. We as a nation were not satisfied with the settlement of the recent school incident or with the unjust discrimination exercised against our emigrants and their actual exclusion.

We patiently hoped that the principles enunciated in the enlightened statement of President Roosevelt to Congress last December would prevail, and that every unjust discrimination against the Japanese would be stopped. Any repetition of the injustices against Japanese will seriously impair our warm feelings towards America, and our traditional friendship will be weakened thereby. Fair and just treatment is essential to maintain friendship. Repeated outrageous acts will not only damage American interests, but also disgrace American civilisation. For the sake of justice and humanity I sincerely appeal to the American people to stop the Boxer-like outrages and unfair discrimination against the Japanese, and I pray that Washington's farewell address will not be forgotten by the American people."

The friends of the Government endeavoured to stem the evil influence produced by Count Okuma's utterances, and to achieve their purpose they sought to minimise his importance in the State, and to throw doubts upon the worthiness of his motives. In the first place they pointed out that he had always been a politician of militant tendencies, and that his views were merely expounded on behalf of the Progressists with the object of hampering the existing Administration. The writer's knowledge of Japanese affairs tells him, however, that Count Okuma not infrequently says what most of his countrymen think but are afraid to utter. Even assuming, as some have alleged, that his views were merely representative of the Progressists, it could not be overlooked that this organisation was the second strongest party in the State. In a further contribution Count Okuma committed himself to the following remarkable statement: "America has no enemy at present, and it will be a thoughtless policy if America purposely makes an enemy by inflaming public opinion against Japan. The United States is the wealthiest country in the world, but it has not sufficient defence in the Pacific if the two nations are to come to hostilities. There is nothing more dreadful than crazy persons. The Japanese are a crazy nation in fighting, and will display their madness as in the late war. The Japanese are always ready to throw away their lives for the nation; they regard their lives as lightly as they do the weather.

On the other hand, Americans and Europeans attach the chief importance to money. Those who love money love their lives. Suppose the two nations, whose ideas towards death are fundamentally different, should fight. The final result is easily seen, and the understanding of this fact seems to be the cause of America trying to expand the navy on a great scale."

Apart from the criticisms of leaders, the views privately expressed by those Japanese who feared publicity were not without significance. With few exceptions these showed that the nation realised the gravity of the situation, and that though the time was not opportune for obtaining satisfactory redress, the incidents of 1906-7 would be stored up in the memory as against a day when Japan felt sufficiently strong to assume an uncompromising attitude. The talk of a boycott of American trade which originated during the period when the school question was under discussion was renewed. But as the United States was the largest customer in Japan's export trade the suggestion found little favour among the mercantile community. Meanwhile an illuminating side-light on Japanese policy generally was afforded by the fact that the South Manchurian Railway Company—a semi-official corporation—having successfully made a large debenture issue in London, promptly proceeded to spend the money thus obtained on purchasing railway material in the United States. For the time being the protests of British capitalists who had loyally financed Japan in her hour of crisis were completely ignored.

The Californians were by no means satisfied that the immigration had been effectually restricted. They alleged that large numbers of Japanese were smuggled into the country and that a considerable proportion of these crossed over the Mexican border. The official returns showed that during May 1907, 2250 immigrants entered the State, an increase of over a hundred in comparison with the corresponding period of the previous year. In view of the fact that the law providing for the total exclusion of unskilled labour had been in force for some time, this increase certainly called for an explanation. It was urged by the Secretary for Commerce and Labour at Washington that the increase was merely consistent with the general growth of immigration,

and that it only represented a larger influx of the better class Japanese. In spite of official protestations of friendship, constantly recurring incidents of an unfortunate nature intimately associated as they were with what is undoubtedly the most dangerous of all human sentiments in the scheme of international relations—racial feeling—increased the irritation which was felt on both sides of the Pacific. Japan, as well as the United States and Great Britain, possesses yellow journals, and these, as in the case of other countries similarly afflicted, enjoy an immense circulation. For some time a war of angry words was waged in a section of the Press of the two countries. While endeavouring, on the one hand, to restrain the popular passion, the Japanese Government, on the other, showed some vigour in their representations at Washington. They made it known to the central authorities that unless their nationals were properly protected a serious view of the situation would be entertained in Tōkyō. In this respect their attitude differed to some extent from that which they had assumed on the school question; for they argued that the lives and not the susceptibilities alone of their subjects were involved on this occasion, and that if the local forces were not sufficient to maintain order, a remedy could be found in the employment of the Federal forces. In order to appreciate thoroughly the difficulties which beset the United States authorities, it should be remembered that San Francisco had not fully recovered from the effects of the disastrous fire that was a sequel to the memorable earthquake. The organisation of the city was by no means restored to anything approaching efficiency; the charges of corruption in municipal matters lay over the heads of several of the leading men responsible for the local government; and the time of the police force—utterly inadequate to normal needs—was largely taken up in dealing with rowdy elements of the population who were out on strike.

The Japanese were not disposed to regard the latest outburst of feeling as merely an issue between the Federal and State authorities. While they had agreed to the restriction of immigration—the direct outcome of the proposal to segregate their children—they were incensed by the implied discrimination, and the great mass of the people felt in

their own hearts that part of the prestige gained as a result of the war with Russia had been surrendered. The restaurant affair and other similar incidents were readily seized upon by the Government in an endeavour to restore a failing credit in their own country. The pin-prick policy they adopted at Washington only had the effect of irritating the American people who as a whole condemned the Californian persecution, but who heartily supported the Western States in their desire to restrict immigration. Finally, the New York press began to denounce the Japanese in strong terms. No attempt was made to defend the reprehensible conduct of the labour agitators in San Francisco, but the persistency with which the Japanese demands were urged was severely criticised. Incidentally the anti-foreign record of Japan was prominently cited—the long list of hideous massacres and savage assaults in the pre-Restoration period, the massacre of Chinese at Port Arthur, the fiendishly brutal murder of the Queen of Korea in the days of dawning civilisation, the frequent attacks upon foreigners by individual Japanese more particularly in Korea, the assault upon Mr. Harriman, and the burning of ten Christian churches at a time when, according to world consent, Japan had entered the comity of nations.

The writer can say from his own knowledge that the American accounts on this score were not exaggerated. He himself was attacked by two desperate Japanese when passing through Korea, and accepted the tardy apology of the police official because he recognised the unwisdom of attaching too much significance to incidents of this kind. Foreign residents in the Far East have related many similar experiences, and they are mentioned here merely to demonstrate that, in seeking to place an undue significance on the mob violence at San Francisco, the Japanese showed themselves in the light of inconsistency.

In July 1907 the President decided to send the battleship fleet to the Pacific. Various statements, many of them characterised by a wealth of detail, have been set forth to account for the motives which prompted him to take this drastic action. For instance, it was said that the cruise was merely a practice on a grand scale, and again, that in leaving the Atlantic coast unprotected the President wished to bring

home to the nation in a striking manner the necessity for a large increase in the navy. The Washington correspondent of the *New York Times* offered an explanation, which was probably nearer the truth than any other, when he announced that the cruise was due to the attitude of Japan. In the same despatch he added that "the constant diplomatic hectoring of this country by Japan before it was announced that the battleships were going to the Pacific was more than enough, in spite of the friendly protestations so effusively made, to justify the conclusion that there might be an ulterior motive behind it not so entirely friendly." In another passage the same correspondent declared that "the resources of friendly diplomacy were practically exhausted by this Government in meeting the captious Japanese even more than half way. The more complaisant we seemed to be, the more pressing the Japanese became. . . . The time came for some action which would take the nature of a definitive answer." The various theories advanced were, of course, purely speculative. As a matter of fact, an action which involved the despatch of the American fleet on a record voyage from the Atlantic to the Pacific needed no explanation to the minds of intelligent men. The suggestion that it was to be merely a practice cruise amounted to an inference that the American fleet was hopelessly inefficient; and as it was a matter of fact and not of opinion that the American fleet was not hopelessly inefficient, it was necessary to seek elsewhere for a motive. The idea that the President was demonstrating the inadequacy of the navy by leaving the Atlantic coast unprotected was palpably absurd. Such demonstration might conceivably have been one of the calculated effects of his action; but to urge that it was his single motive would be a melancholy reflection upon his fitness to occupy the highest office in the Union. For it must not be overlooked that an enormous cost was involved, a cost that would have been altogether out of proportion to the value of any practical lesson administered to the nation. I repeat that there was only one reason why the battleship fleet was despatched to the Pacific. That reason was to assert, as against Japan, American prestige in Eastern waters. Moreover, the fleet was equipped ready for war and was accom-

panied by a number of destroyers. Mr. Roosevelt was, of course, silent concerning his real motives. Actions only cease to be diplomatic when they are explained. It was noticed, however, that no more Presidential Messages eulogising the Japanese were issued. The Californians were no longer naughty boys to be chastised with the big stick and to be scolded with the big voice. The friction between the Federal and State authorities disappeared for the moment in face of the possibility of a far graver issue, the issue between nation and nation. In their implied blame of the Government for not affording adequate protection at San Francisco the Japanese had shown where, in their own minds, they had placed the responsibility. The reply of the President merely amounted to a frank acceptance of that responsibility.

While the immigration problem was the primary cause of the difficulty, it was not the only one. Reports of Japanese intentions concerning Manchuria created widespread alarm lest the principle of the Open Door, which had become just as much a cardinal aim of American diplomacy as had always been the Monroe Doctrine, should be flagrantly violated. An interesting point raised at the time—and one keenly discussed not only by Americans in their own country but also between Americans and Englishmen in all parts of the world—was the application of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in the event of war between the United States and Japan. Only one conclusion was arrived at, the only conclusion possible in Anglo-Saxon communities. No sane individual doubted that Great Britain would renounce the Alliance rather than become a party to spilling the blood of her own kith and kin. Only recently we have been told that the two-Power standard as accepted by the British Government bears no relation to the navy of the United States. It remains to be added, though for obvious reasons it will for ever be unwritten and unsaid as far as diplomatists are concerned, that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance can under no conceivable circumstances have an offensive application to the people of the United States.

Before the battleship fleet sailed for the Pacific, there was, no doubt, an understanding between Great Britain and the United States. War was not seriously expected. Although the situation was a menacing one, neither the United States

nor Japan was willing to force the issue to the arbitrament of the sword. There was, however, the danger, ever present when the international horizon is clouded, that not caring to turn back both countries would reluctantly drift with the stream that leads to the whirlpool of war. The attitude of Great Britain was fully provided for by Article III. in the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which read as follows :—

“If by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, wherever arising, on the part of any other Power or Powers, either Contracting Party should be involved in war in defence of its territorial rights or special interests mentioned in the Preamble of this Agreement, the other Contracting Party will at once come to the assistance of its Ally, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it.”¹

It will be seen that one party need only have come to the assistance of the other in the event of an *unprovoked* attack. As the United States had not the slightest intention of waging war upon Japan without provocation, the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance could not possibly have been held to apply to the immigration question, the exact merits of which Great Britain, having in regard to her colonies similar difficulties with Japan, was well able to judge.

While the battleship fleet was being prepared for the long voyage from the Atlantic to the Pacific the war of words continued unabated. The *Sun*, which was opposed to the project, declared that “the navy was going to the Pacific Ocean for war with Japan, and that Japan recognised the fact and was energetically preparing for it.” The *New York Times* referred to the sudden cessation of pin-pricks when Tōkyō learned that the *Armada* was to be moved to the Pacific. In an illustrated supplement to the *Tribune*, a serial story describing a war between the United States and Japan was begun. Mr. William Randolph Hearst, whose control of newspapers with enormous circulations stretching

¹ This provision has been considerably modified by Article 4 of the renewed Treaty (1911), which states that should either contracting party conclude a Treaty of Arbitration with a third Power, it shall not be incumbent upon that party to go to war with such Power. At the moment a General Arbitration Treaty between Great Britain and the United States is awaiting the approval of the Senate.

across the continent is one of the wonders of modern journalism, published inflammatory articles under his own name, in the course of which he attacked Japan as "a sort of pirate among nations, who regards war as a profitable profession." In the meantime, Mr. Taft, who was on a visit to Tōkyō, made a statesman-like speech in which he urged that war between Japan and the United States would be a crime against civilisation. He characterised as infamous the attempts that had been made to cause trouble, attempts for which he said the newspapers were largely responsible. In spite, however, of the interpretations that were placed upon the plan to despatch the battleship fleet, there was never any suggestion on the part of the Government that it should be abandoned. In October of 1907 there was another anti-Japanese riot at San Francisco. An intoxicated man broke the window of a Japanese laundry, the proprietor of which forcibly detained him while he sent for the police. The offender was roughly dragged to the rear of the premises, where a young Japanese, armed with a gaspipe, stood guard over him. The report that a white man had been made prisoner by the Japanese spread like wildfire. An angry mob soon collected, the premises were demolished, and the Japanese, besieged behind, hastily constructed barricades. Police reserves were called out, and on this occasion they acted with commendable energy, clubbing the rioters with an impartiality which was as effective as it was praiseworthy. Eventually the disturbances which at one time threatened to spread over a large area were quelled, but not before two Japanese were so seriously hurt that their condition necessitated their removal to the hospital. Ten other Japanese and about twenty Americans also received injuries, the latter largely in consequence of their coming in contact with the police. In view of the racial animosity existing in the city the action of the Japanese in forcibly detaining a man whose conduct was the outcome of alcoholic excess was unwise and provocative. The incident itself was only important inasmuch as it revealed the fact that in spite of the recent so-called settlement in regard to the immigration and school questions, the ill-feeling between the two nationalities was deep-seated. That the Washington Government was not

altogether convinced that the immigration problem had been satisfactorily solved was evident from the fact that at the beginning of December 1907 the Ambassador at Tōkyō called the attention of the Japanese Government to "the great increase in the number of Japanese arriving on the Pacific coast." Several days later the Japanese Ambassador at Washington, Viscount Aoki, was recalled. There was much speculation at the time concerning the reason for his departure. Among other things, it was stated that he was merely proceeding to Tōkyō in order to make a verbal report of the situation, that he had been too pressing in his representations at Washington, and again, that he had not displayed enough vigour. Perhaps the real reason of his recall was to be found in the fact that he was wholly unsuitable to the post of Ambassador at Washington. His sympathies leaned towards the German school of diplomacy. He had held the position of Minister at Berlin; he had married a German lady; and his son-in-law was a German Count. His ideas were certainly not in accord with the conditions that prevailed in a country where the republican form of government existed. He attached little value to the weight of public opinion, and the organs of the Press he regarded as evils that were not at all necessary. It is not within my province to enter into a discussion as to the wisdom or otherwise of Viscount Aoki's attitude; but adaptability to the conditions of the country to which he is attached would appear to be one of the essential qualifications in the making of a good diplomatist. That the Japanese Government themselves recognised the truth of this dictum was evident. As successor to Viscount Aoki they appointed Baron Takahira, a diplomatist who had mastered the difficult art of talking much and saying little, and who, during the former period of his office as Minister at Washington, had established his popularity with the American people.

The discovery in Japan, early in 1908, that a large number of men were engaged in a regular trade having for its object the smuggling of immigrants into Pacific ports, proved that there was some ground for the American complaint, and incidentally destroyed the value of official statistics which were published with the object of showing that more Japanese

were returning from than proceeding to the United States. Moreover, it was clearly established that a large number of labourers succeeded in evading the authorities by making false representations in regard to their occupations. The Japanese contended that a misconception had arisen owing to the fact that many of their students, unable to support themselves while residing in the United States, accepted humble positions. Admitting the truth of this statement, the harm done to American labour by increased competition was not diminished. It mattered little or nothing that a coolie in his spare time was engaged in studious occupation. So long as he worked in the fields or in the factories he was an element of competition.

On the occasion of the departure of the battleship fleet the following presidential allusion appeared in a message to Congress: "Until our battle fleet is much larger than at present it should never be split into detachments so far apart that they could not in event of emergency be speedily united. Our coast-line is on the Pacific just as much as on the Atlantic. The interests of California, Oregon, and Washington are as emphatically the interests of the whole Union as those of Maine and New York, of Louisiana and Texas. The battle fleet should now and then be moved to the Pacific, just as at other times it should be kept in the Atlantic. When the Isthmian Canal is built, the transit of the battle fleet from one ocean to the other will be comparatively easy. Until it is built I earnestly hope that the battle fleet will be thus shifted between the two oceans every year or two. . . . The battle fleet is about starting by the Straits of Magellan to visit the Pacific coast. Sixteen battleships are going under the command of Rear-Admiral Evans, while eight armoured cruisers and two other battleships will meet him at San Francisco, whither certain torpedo-destroyers are also going. No fleet of such size has ever made such a voyage, and it will be of very great educational use to all engaged in it. The only way by which to teach officers and men how to handle the fleet so as to meet every possible strain and emergency in time of war is to have them practise under similar conditions in time of peace. Moreover, the only way to find out our actual needs is to perform in time

of peace whatever manœuvres might be necessary in time of war. After war is declared it is too late to find out the needs; that means to invite disaster. This trip to the Pacific will show what some of our needs are, and will enable us to provide for them."

In a later speech the President said that "the officers and men of the American Navy must always be prepared for any emergency in order, as Americans, to maintain the cause of peace. America never wished for war, but if she should enter into war with any country she must fight until her enemy hoisted the white flag." He added significantly that America was under an obligation to protect her labouring classes, and in order to accomplish this she must have a powerful navy. Almost simultaneously an announcement was made that Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, was to be converted into a strong naval base. Early in May 1908 the imposing fleet of sixteen battleships, having a total tonnage of 186,100, and an average steaming capacity of ten knots an hour, arrived at San Francisco, where it was accorded an enthusiastic reception. After a stay lasting two months it steamed westward, and, in response to official invitations, visited New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. It was not denied that the demonstrative welcome of the fleet in the Colonies was of extreme significance. Sooner or later, and perhaps sooner than most of our statesmen are inclined to think, the sentiment of our Colonies in regard to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance must be reckoned with. Nobody who is well informed can doubt for a moment the unpopularity of this measure of Imperial policy among the peoples of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. They have experienced their own difficulties in dealing with the Asiatic immigration problem, and their sympathies are heart and soul with the United States in her efforts to stem the tide of cheap labour. The withdrawal of British battleships from the Pacific may have been advisable from the point of view of the strategic situation in home waters. That it was disastrous to our prestige in the East is the opinion commonly held in the Colonies, where among certain sections of the community the crude impression exists that the protection of British territories and British interests have been abandoned to the doubtful protection of

the Japanese. Whether or not the attitude of the Colonies is justified by actual circumstance is a matter which need not be discussed here. It is only necessary to observe that the Colonies have more opportunities than ourselves of coming into contact with all classes of the Japanese, and that, therefore, any feeling of hostility which they may entertain towards them is consequent upon personal experience of their manners and methods. The striking welcome accorded the American fleet was an unmistakable indication that the Colonies have an overwhelming preference for the natural alliance that exists among all branches of the Anglo-Saxon race—an alliance recorded in a sentiment far deeper and far stronger than any that can be represented in written words; an alliance without the limitations of time or of the political expediency of the moment. In a speech reported by Reuter, Sir Joseph Ward, the Premier of New Zealand, in welcoming the American fleet, said that it was coming to Australasia not as that of a foreign country, but as that of a nation which was kith and kin of the Anglo-Saxon race. There would some day, he added, be a fight to decide whether white men or Orientals were to govern Australasia and the Pacific Islands, and the American fleet would then fight shoulder to shoulder with the Old World. The Press of New Zealand frankly declared that in the future Great Britain and America would be called upon to compete with Japan for the command of the Pacific, and urged with remarkable unanimity that the two great Anglo-Saxon countries should shape their policy in unison. At Sydney over half a million people awaited the arrival of the fleet. Several newspapers urged that Australia should co-operate with America in protecting their mutual interests, even if by so doing her relations with Japan should be strained. The Americans, on their side, were not slow to appreciate the significance of the visit of the fleet to Australasia. As soon as the invitations were received, the New York *Tribune*, one of the most conservative organs of public opinion in the United States, commented as follows:—

“There are, however, two other motives, not unworthy nor unnatural, which we must suppose to be potent in the case. One is suggested by the remembrance that the British Navy

has so reduced its strength in the Pacific as no longer to have its old-time predominance there. It would scarcely be unfair to say that it has voluntarily abdicated its supremacy in the Pacific in favour of its Japanese ally. Nor can there be offence in recalling that the Japanese alliance is not regarded with enthusiastic favour in Australia, or in suspecting that the statesmen and people of the Commonwealth, who are so earnestly intent upon making and keeping it, in their own familiar phrase, a 'white Australia,' are especially gratified at the advent in Pacific waters of an American fleet somewhat more powerful than any under the flag of the Rising Sun. That is to be said without the least thought of anything like the probability of a clash between the two chief Pacific Powers. It is simply a recognition of the undisguisable fact that racial feelings are uncommonly strong in Australia, and that the Australians would rather have an Anglo-Saxon fleet, American if not British, dominant in Pacific waters than any other."

When telegrams reached America describing the enthusiastic welcome of the fleet, the Press emphasised the fact that the Australians were kinsmen face to face with problems similar to those which existed on the Pacific coast and the United States, and several newspapers went so far as to indulge in a speculation of an Anglo-American Alliance brought about through the influence of Australia. Rear-Admiral Sperry, who was in command of the fleet, addressed an open letter to the Australian public in which he referred to the inner significance of the enthusiastic welcome, and this he regarded as implying something more than a welcome to the fleet itself. In the course of an interview he said: "It is pleasing to me to think that this indicates real and heartfelt sympathy between the two English-speaking nations, which are united not only by the ties of blood, but also by great commercial interests in the Pacific and elsewhere." Subsequently the fleet paid a visit to Yokohama, where the cordial welcome of the Japanese went a long way towards dispersing the clouds that threatened to obscure the political horizon. While the battleship fleet was still in Far Eastern waters, the following important notes were exchanged at Washington:—

WASHINGTON, Nov. 30, 1908.

SIR,—The exchange of views between us which has taken place at the several interviews which I have recently had the honour of holding with you has shown that, Japan and the United States of America holding important outlying insular possessions in the region of the Pacific Ocean, the Governments of the two countries are animated by a common aim, policy, and intention in that region.

Believing that a frank avowal of that aim, policy, and intention would not only tend to strengthen the relations of friendship and good neighbourhood which have immemorially existed between Japan and the United States, but would materially contribute to the preservation of the general peace, the Imperial Government have authorised me to present to you an outline of their understanding of that common aim, policy, and intention.

1. It is the wish of the two Governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean.

2. The policy of both Governments, uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of the existing *status quo* in the region above mentioned, and to the defence of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in China.

3. They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other in the said region.

4. They are also determined to preserve the common interests of all powers in China by supporting, by all pacific means at their disposal, the independence and integrity of China, and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in that empire.

5. Should any event occur threatening the *status* as above described, or the principle of equal opportunity as above defined, it remains for the two Governments to communicate with each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to what measures they may consider it as useful to take.

If the foregoing outline accords with the view of the Government of the United States, I shall be gratified to receive your confirmation,—I take this opportunity, &c., &c.

(Signed) TAKAHIRA.

WASHINGTON, *Nov.* 30, 1908.

EXCELLENCY,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of to-day, setting forth the result of the exchange of views between us in our recent interviews defining the understanding of the two Governments in regard to their policy in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

It is a pleasure to inform you that this expression of mutual understanding is welcome to the Government of the United States as appropriate to the happy relation of the two countries, and as the occasion for a concise mutual affirmation of that accordant policy respecting the Far East which the two Governments have so frequently declared in the past.

I am happy to be able to confirm to your Excellency, on behalf of the United States, the declaration of the two Governments embodied in the following words:—

(Here followed a recapitulation of the terms as set forth in the Note tendered by Baron Takahira.)

—Accept, your Excellency, &c., &c.,

(Signed) ELIHU ROOT.

Some difficulty was experienced in finding a word that would best describe the simple "arrangement" that was concluded between the two countries. The American press christened it variously—an agreement, a new pact, a declaration, a note, a covenant, a friendly understanding, an established policy, and even an alliance. In some quarters the Notes exchanged were hailed as a final and satisfactory solution of all outstanding difficulties between Japan and America. As a matter of fact, a significance altogether unwarranted by actual circumstance was attached to the agreement. Those who were well acquainted with the conditions which had for some time prevailed in the Far East were in a position to assess the declaration at its proper value. When Mr. Taft visited Tōkyō in 1906 a verbal understanding was con-

cluded between the two Governments on the basis of the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Far East. In spite of that understanding, however, American diplomatic and consular representatives in the Far East frequently made reports to Washington which showed that the actions of Japan were contrary to her words, that she was hampering American trade in South Manchuria, and that she was not only favouring the Russian proposal to maintain control over large tracts of territory adjacent to the railway in Northern Manchuria, but that she was prepared to follow a similar course in districts where her influence was predominant. The American Government came to the conclusion that the moment had arrived when the verbal understanding should be converted into a written one. In this way the policy of the Open Door was reaffirmed. Japan was reminded of the firm intention of America to insist upon the maintenance of the integrity of China, and a basis upon which negotiations could, if necessary, be conducted in the future was established. The form of the agreement—an exchange of Notes—was such as to enable the Washington Government to act on their own responsibility without reference to Congress. In all respects it was pre-eminently a diplomatic procedure, and was undoubtedly the best way out of a situation of extreme delicacy. Neither Japan nor America was prepared for war; consequently neither was willing to go to war. The Pacific coast, the Philippines, and Hawaii lay open to attack. The Panama Canal was as yet uncompleted. Japan, on her side, had not recovered from the shock of her campaign with Russia. Her armaments needed replenishing; her people for the time being required rest after the horrors and privations of war; and, most important of all, her exchequer was empty.

As soon as the battleship fleet was on its homeward voyage, there was an unfortunate recurrence of anti-Japanese feeling in America. In spite of official statistics published from time to time showing that immigration was decreasing, the Western States strongly maintained that this was not the case, that many Japanese were surreptitiously entering the country, and that of these the majority found their way across the Canadian and Mexican borders. The official statistics related merely to immigrants who had complied with legislative require-

ments. The Japanese authorities themselves were prepared to admit that there was ground for the complaint that the regulations were being persistently evaded.

Count Hayashi in the course of an interview said that the Washington Government was not yet entirely satisfied as to the thorough efficacy of Japan's policy and was still conducting inquiries, so that no definite settlement could be said to have been reached with that Government. As for the newspaper statements that a serious question was pending between Washington and Tōkyō, they might be dismissed as mere fabrications suggested by selfish designs. Should experience prove that an exodus of Japanese subjects from Hawaii to the United States still continued, the Japanese Government would consider it necessary to restrict emigration to Hawaii also. Referring to Mexico, his Excellency said that the reports received from the Japanese Minister, Mr. Arakawa, showed that the place was quite unfitted to receive immigrants, and that these merely made Mexico a stepping-stone for obtaining access to the United States. It was therefore necessary to restrict emigration to Mexico also.

At the end of January 1909 the feeling against the Japanese again took the form of an attempt to introduce anti-Japanese legislation in California. Mr. Drew introduced a Bill prohibiting aliens from holding real property in the State. As the law of Japan itself did not then permit of aliens holding land in the country, no objection on the score of discrimination could have been taken to this measure. Other measures of a restrictive nature were presented by Mr. G. L. Johnson. These aimed at (1) compelling all Asiatics to live apart in certain designated areas of San Francisco and other large cities; (2) the segregation of Japanese school children; (3) and rendering it unlawful for any Japanese to be a director in a joint-stock corporation organised under the laws of the State, or doing business within its borders. Hitherto the value of the agitation against the Japanese had been to a large extent depreciated by the suggestion that its origin and continuance was the work of individuals of low-standing in the Californian community. This argument, however, no longer applied to the situation. On all sides it was admitted that Mr. Johnson was the foremost parliamentarian in the State,

and in view of the perpetuation of the conflict of opinion in regard to the competence of the State to enact legislation that discriminated against any particular nationality, his eminence as a lawyer rendered him a singularly formidable opponent. The war of words was instantly renewed. In a letter to Mr. Gillette, the Governor of California, the President said that "more Japanese were leaving the country than were coming in at present, and that there were indications that within a very few years the number of Japanese in America would not be greater than the number of Americans in Japan. Therefore there was not a shadow of excuse for action which would produce great irritation, and might result in upsetting the present Agreement, and opening the whole situation again." Mr. Roosevelt concluded: "These agitators will have themselves to thank if trouble comes from what they do, if there is a fresh influx of Japanese hither. They hamper the national Government in what is now so efficiently accomplished by agreement, by peaceful means, and through the friendly initiative of the Japanese Government, in keeping Japanese immigrants out of the United States save as Americans themselves visit Japan. Is it not possible to get the Legislature to realise the great unwisdom, from the standpoint of the country at large, and above all from the standpoint of California, of what is being done?"

In the course of a speech Mr. Roosevelt made an eloquent appeal for the assistance of his audience in his efforts to give Japan a "square deal," and through the various channels of publicity that were open to him plainly indicated that he looked upon the situation as extremely critical. The Governor of California, in the course of an interview, spoke with unmistakable significance. "Japan," he said, "looks to the National Government for a settlement of differences, which causes Mr. Roosevelt to know more about existing conditions than we do. Therefore his wishes should be respected." Mr. Hearst, with that disregard for diplomatic relations which has always characterised his journalistic zeal, entered the lists without delay. The following was the text of a telegram which he instantly flashed over the wires from San Francisco to New York: "When the fleet was in the Pacific, Japan was overflowing with graciousness. When the fleet became

divided, and the largest part is now at the farthest point from the Pacific, Japan's irritability and petulance have suddenly returned, and have now reached so aggressive a stage that the smallest action of the Californian Legislature may be magnified into a *casus belli*. California cannot continually hold its legislative breath for fear of offending Japan. Nothing is so soothing to Japan's ruffled sensibilities as the presence of the American fleet in the Pacific." Meanwhile the *Hochi Shimbun*, a journal the standing of which is similar in Japan to that of Mr. Hearst's newspapers in America, took upon itself the task of addressing the President and people of the United States. An editorial urged that, although the Japanese still believed in the magnanimity displayed in the past, ceaseless affronts were exhausting their patience. "For the sake of peace in the Pacific," concluded the journal, "don't anger us." In the height of the agitation, a special report of the General Staff of the American Army was published, recommending that fortifications should be constructed immediately, at a cost of £700,000, in the harbour of San Pedro, the port of Los Angeles. "Assuming the absence of effective naval opposition," the document read, "a certain Oriental Power, within a month of the time its hostile intentions began to be even suspected, could land 100,000 men on our Pacific coast, which could be increased at the end of the second month to 300,000. It would be practically impossible for the United States to regain possession of the country after its occupation by the enemy. Without fortifications all harbour improvements would mean provision for the enemy to take possession and maintain possession."

Owing to the representations of Mr. Roosevelt, the Californian Legislature postponed consideration of the anti-Japanese measures for one week. Mr. Johnson took advantage of the interval, however, to observe that the Japanese were an "ulcer on society," and that it was urgent that action should be taken, and the intervention of the President ignored. Mr. Drew, also availing himself of the opportunity, frankly expressed the opinion that the time for war was opportune, and, as an illustration of Japanese tactics, he added that the Vice-Consul had threatened him with an appeal to the President. A joint resolution of the

Senate and the House of Representatives was introduced into the Senate, urging Congress to request the recall of the Japanese Consul at San Francisco, on the ground that he had attempted to influence the action of the Californian Legislature. After considerable pressure had been brought to bear upon the State Legislature, all the measures of an anti-Japanese nature were rejected. The opposition was based on the belief that legislation on the lines suggested would retard rather than hasten the exclusion of the Japanese, and a newspaper account of the debate stated that the majority of the audience of two thousand persons applauded every expression of anti-Japanese sentiment. The Bill providing for the segregation of Japanese school children was originally passed by 46 votes against 28, but a motion was immediately made for its reconsideration. It was only finally rejected after the President had sent a telegram to the Speaker of the Californian Assembly, from which the following is a striking extract :—

“During the last six months under this policy more Japanese have left the country than have come in, and the total number in the United States has diminished by over 2000. These figures are absolutely accurate and cannot be impeached. In other words, if the present policy is consistently followed, and works as well in the future as it is now working, all difficulties and causes of friction will disappear, while, at the same time, each nation will retain its self-respect and the good-will of the other. But such a Bill as this School Bill accomplishes literally nothing whatever in the line of the object aimed at, and would give just and grave cause for irritation, while, in addition, the United States Government would be obliged immediately to take action in the Federal Courts to test such legislation, as we hold it to be clearly a violation of the treaty. On this point I refer you to numerous decisions of the United States Supreme Court with regard to State laws which violate treaty obligations of the United States. The legislation would accomplish nothing beneficial, and would certainly cause some mischief, and might cause very grave mischief.

“In short, the policy of the Administration is to combine the *maximum* of efficiency in achieving the real object which

the people of the Pacific Slope have at heart with the *minimum* of friction and trouble ; while the misguided men who advocate such action as this against which I protest are following a policy which combines the very *minimum* of efficiency with the *maximum* of insult, and which, while totally failing to achieve any real result for good, yet might accomplish an infinity of harm. If in the next year or two the action of the Federal Government fails to achieve what it is now achieving, then through further action by the President and Congress it can be made entirely efficient. I am sure the sound judgment of the people of California will support you in the effort.

"Let me repeat that at present we are actually doing the very thing the people of California wish to be done, and to upset the arrangement under which this is being done cannot do good and may do great harm. If in the next year or two the figures of immigration prove that the arrangement is not successful, then there would be ground for grievance and for a reversal by the National Government of the present policy. But at present this policy is working well, and until it works badly it would be a grave misfortune to change it, and, when changed, it can only be changed effectively by the National Government."

The message was regarded as a masterly enunciation of American policy in regard to the immigration question. At the same time it was looked upon as a striking indication of the determination of the Washington Government to see that immigration was restricted, and of their fixed intention not to hesitate, should circumstances warrant, to resort frankly to measures of exclusion.

That the firmness of the Californian Legislature was not in any way shaken by the withdrawal of the Bill was proved by the fact that on February 24th a measure providing for the taking of a census of the Japanese was passed. It was understood that upon the result of this census would depend the future attitude of the State. Two days later, by twenty-eight votes to seven, the Senate passed a resolution asking Congress to extend the Chinese Exclusion Law, already in operation, so as to include all Asiatics. They also placed on record their opinion that the progress of the nation was

dependent upon a homogeneous population ; that the influx from the over-populated countries of Asia of people unsuited for American citizenship and for assimilation with the race was lowering to the American standard of life and dignity and to the wage-earning capacity of American labour.

California was not alone among the States in her active opposition to the Japanese. The Nevada Legislature unanimously passed resolutions demanding the maintenance of a war fleet in the Pacific, and, referring to the Japanese as a menace to America's peace, urged the Californian Legislature to "go ahead and enact such stringent measures as will absolutely stop forthwith the encroachment of Japanese." A Bill to prevent Japanese and Chinese from holding lands in the State was also adopted. The Senate saved the situation, however, by rejecting the resolutions and ordering the Bill to be "laid on the table." The Oregon State Legislature accepted a memorial urging Congress to broaden the existing laws so as to exclude Japanese and Hindus, but, as in the case of Nevada, the Senate refused to commit itself to any policy inimical to the higher interests of the nation.¹

¹ Since the above was written there have been several attempts to introduce strong anti-Japanese measures in California, and as far as the State Legislature is concerned the question cannot be said to have been finally disposed of. The Federal Government has, however, dealt with the matter in a conciliatory spirit. In the revised Commercial Treaty recently concluded with Japan no restriction clauses were included, but the Treaty was preceded by a declaration, signed by the Japanese Ambassador, stating that his Government were "fully prepared to maintain with equal effectiveness the limitation and control which they have for the past three years exercised in regulation of the emigration of labourers to the United States." (February 21, 1911.)

XV

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC: THE BRITISH COLONIES AND THE IMMIGRATION QUESTION

THE anti-Asiatic agitation which found violent expression in British Columbia in 1907 was no new movement. In 1894 the Imperial Government concluded a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan, which among other advantages conferred the right of free trade, travel, and residence in one another's territories. A special clause provided that the British Colonies should not be made parties to the Treaty unless they signified their adhesion. For some time there had been an agitation against the steady increase of Japanese immigration into British Columbia; but the Dominion Government resisted all attempts to secure the passing of legislation discriminating against the Japanese. Fearing, however, an outbreak of violence, the two countries concluded an understanding in 1900 by which the Japanese Government voluntarily undertook to restrict the number of emigrants to 500 or 600 annually. Six years later Canada signified her adhesion to the Anglo-Japanese commercial treaty of 1894. That the Canadian authorities were under the impression that the treaty did not nullify the understanding concluded with the Japanese in regard to immigration was evidenced from the utterances of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. When, in the following year, the sudden influx of 8000 Japanese caused intense excitement throughout British Columbia, the Premier stated that "the Government did not suppose that the Government of Japan had gone back on the understanding. Their contention and belief was that certain parties had eluded the understanding, and, instead of sending the emigrants direct from Japan to British Columbia, in which event the situation could have been more easily handled,

they had broken the understanding by first sending them to Honolulu and thence to Canada."

The Japanese Government on their side contended that the treaty nullified any previous arrangement. The action of the United States in adopting legislation in March 1907 which excluded Japanese coming from Hawaii, had the instant effect of diverting an additional stream of immigrants to Canada, with the result that a crisis was precipitated. On September 7, 1907, an organisation formed in the United States and known as the Anti-Asiatic League held a meeting at Vancouver which was attended by several thousand people belonging for the most part to the labouring classes. Subsequently about fifty or sixty men proceeded to the Chinese and Japanese quarters and began an attack by throwing stones through the windows of shops and houses. The ranks of the rioters soon increased, until eventually they numbered about five hundred men. Frequent and determined assaults were made; but the Japanese offered a sturdy resistance, and this, combined with the efforts of the police, finally prevailed in the early hours of the following morning. In the course of the *mêlée* fifty-six Japanese shops were damaged and two persons were wounded. On the following evening the rioting was again renewed, but the mounted police succeeded in quelling the disturbance. At a later hour the Japanese school was set on fire, but the Japanese themselves were able to extinguish the flames. Mr. Ishii, the Director of Trade and Commerce in Japan, who was in Vancouver at the time in pursuit of a mission having for its object the investigation of conditions on the Pacific coast, immediately telegraphed a report of the occurrence to the Japanese Consul-General at Ottawa, Mr. Nossé, who promptly made representations to Sir Wilfrid Laurier. In reply, a sincere expression of regret was tendered, and an assurance given that steps had been taken without delay to impress upon the Provincial authorities the necessity for their maintaining law and order in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. The Governor-General, Lord Grey, also hastened to express his regret that such "cruelties and indignities" should have been inflicted upon the subjects of a sovereign who was not only the friend, but the ally of the King. The Press of the

Dominion joined in condemning the outbreak in no uncertain terms. The guilty rioters were arrested and punished, and the Japanese shopkeepers who had suffered damage were properly indemnified. Three weeks later there was an echo of the disturbances at Atlin, Yukon district, where a number of white miners compelled the captain of a river steamer to transport about fifty Japanese miners to United States territory. As in the case of the San Francisco troubles, the outbursts against the Japanese in British Columbia were attributed to the inspiration of labour agitators. They were immediately preceded by riots across the border at Bellingham, where the Hindus, and not the Chinese and Japanese as in other parts of America, were roughly handled by a mob composed of labourers. Subsequently a number of the leaders crossed over into Canadian territory, where, joining forces with the local labour leaders, they so preyed upon the sentiment of the working classes that popular indignation culminated in open violence.

It could not be denied, however, that a widespread feeling existed throughout British Columbia that the time had arrived when definite restrictions must be placed on Japanese immigration. This feeling was, moreover, largely shared by the people resident in other parts of the Dominion who were acquainted with the conditions that prevailed on the Pacific coast. The rioting was merely an isolated incident in which labour agitators showed up prominently simply because the class they professed to represent were more deeply affected by the problem of immigration than were any other section of the community. When the responsibility was fixed, the rioters punished, and the damage paid, the memory of an unfortunate incident alone remained; but the evil which had brought about that unfortunate incident still called for an immediate remedy. That the necessity for restriction was recognised in responsible quarters was evident from the utterances of men who held prominent positions in the Dominion, and against whom it could not be urged that they were animated by other than sentiments of deep and abiding loyalty to the highest interests of the British Empire as a whole. Addressing a meeting of the Victoria Liberal Association, Mr. Templeman, Minister of Inland Revenue,

said "that he had always maintained the opinion that immigration into Canada should be of races which would become permanent citizens of the country. They should be of those types that would settle on the land and become citizens in the fullest sense of the term. They should be in character such 'as would assimilate, marry, and intermarry with our own people, so that in future we should have from ocean to ocean in Canada one great homogeneous people.' This doctrine he would lay down not dogmatically, because there were many obstacles in the way. He could not conceive why they should pursue a policy of encouraging in the North-West Territories an alien race that was determined to perpetuate in Canada the traditions and idiosyncrasies of Asia and who showed no inclination to enter into the citizenship of this country. If this was to be judged good policy in the eyes of Europeans, it would be consistent to hold no other view against the admission of the people of the Orient. The problem was very serious. The legislation which had been adopted against the Chinese influx was not practicable in the case of the Japanese. His own particular knowledge of the personal qualifications and characteristics of the two races was very limited, but he inclined to the opinion that they would be better served in Canada, if there were any choice in such a matter at all, by the Chinese. If they were to permit the Japanese to come in unrestrictedly, then logically he thought the Chinese should be permitted to come in unrestrictedly also. Holding these views, he was prepared to support any measure in Ottawa which would accomplish the object he had in mind—that was to conserve Canada for the people which, however varied at first in race and tongue, would eventually revolve into a great homogeneous confederation and united citizenship."

Mr. Templeman's speech was characterised as injudicious because it was inopportune ; but that it was a sincere expression of authoritative opinion no one acquainted with views held in responsible quarters could reasonably doubt. A report in *The Times* recorded that in a speech delivered by Mr. Borden, then Leader of the Opposition at Vancouver, he added a new clause to the Conservative platform to the effect that "while recognising our duty to the Empire, we respect-

fully maintain that Canada should in all vital essentials be accorded freedom of judgment, as perfect and unfettered as that exercised in any other portion of the Empire, even as that exercised by the Mother Country herself." The recent violence against peaceful subjects of Japan, said Mr. Borden, was a matter regretted by every true British subject, and for which the utmost reparation must be made at once. He added: "The action of the Ottawa Government has created an unpleasant situation here. The Government has taken a great responsibility in imposing upon the people a treaty which must be observed until it is abrogated. Neither Canada nor Great Britain can attempt to face the world and deal otherwise than fairly in the matter of the terms made with Japan. Canada made that treaty with all the knowledge of the consequences, nor did the Liberal representatives from British Columbia protest. While we must remember matters of trade and commerce and our treaty rights with the ally of Great Britain, let us also remember that there are greater and higher considerations than those of trade and material progress. The Conservative party, which brought British Columbia into the Confederation, will make its aim that this province shall remain British and that Canada shall be inhabited by men in whose veins flow the blood of the great pioneering race which built up and developed, not only Eastern, but Western, Canada."

From other quarters evidence was forthcoming that the immigration problem had taken an acute turn. The city solicitor of Vancouver drew attention to the fact that a quarter of the population was Oriental, and pointed to a similar grievance as that which had existed at San Francisco, when he added that Japanese as old as twenty-four years were attending the State schools. Meanwhile Sir Wilfrid Laurier was not silent. Speaking in Toronto, he made the following remarkable statement:—

"Our diplomatic relations carried on by the British Government have not been so successful as we could have wished them to be. If we take the record of the diplomacy of Great Britain so far as Canada is concerned, it has been a sacrifice of Canadian interests. In regard to the Japanese problem in the West, to denounce the treaty would be to act

in panic. I want to look about, to think, to reflect, to inquire, before I make up my mind. It is the duty of the Canadian Government to do the same and, if necessary, to send a commissioner to get more information." Sir Wilfrid Laurier explained that Canada had become a party to the Japanese treaty because she thought that Japan had prohibited a general emigration to foreign shores, and especially to Canadian shores.

In October the Vancouver City Council passed a resolution declaring that since January 1, 1907, no fewer than 7700 Japanese, 1900 Hindus, and 300 Chinese had arrived in British Columbia, and that this immigration was out of all proportion to the white immigration during the same period. Furthermore, they asked the Dominion Government to procure the abrogation of the treaty with Japan, and demanded the exclusion of Asiatics, for a time at least. The Cabinet decided to despatch Mr. Lemieux, Dominion Minister of Labour, to Japan, in order to negotiate if possible an immigration treaty. In the course of negotiations the Japanese Government definitely stated that under no circumstances would they be a party to any treaty differentiating injuriously against their own nationals. The envoy's mission therefore failed to achieve its main object, but a compromise was reached on the basis that the Japanese Government would exercise to the full all the restrictive functions in the matter of emigration for which the law of the land provided. The assurance was embodied in a note which was published towards the end of January, and the terms of which were set forth by Count Hayashi, the Foreign Minister, as follows:—

"I have the honour to state that although the existing treaty between Japan and Canada absolutely guarantees to Japanese subjects full liberty to enter, travel, and reside in any part of the Dominion of Canada, yet it is not the intention of the Imperial Government to insist upon the complete enjoyment of rights and privileges guaranteed by these stipulations when that would involve disregard of special conditions which may prevail in Canada from time to time.

"Acting in this spirit, and having particular regard to existing circumstances of recent occurrence in British Columbia, the Imperial Government has decided to take

efficient means to restrict immigration to Canada. In carrying out this purpose the Imperial Government, in pursuance of the policy above stated, will give careful consideration as to local conditions prevailing in Canada, with a view to meet the desires of the Government of the Dominion as far as is compatible with the spirit of the treaty and the dignity of the State."

In an official statement subsequently made to the Diet, the Foreign Minister said that the question then arose as to exactly what emigrants were to be vetoed, and it had been agreed that no restriction whatever should be imposed with regard to the following:—First, travellers, merchants, and students; secondly, Japanese subjects who, although belonging to the labouring class, had their wives and families in Canada; thirdly, labourers who had returned to Japan from Canada and who contemplated going back to Canada; fourthly, contract labourers, that is to say, men having fixed employment; fifthly, Japanese subjects discharging the duties of domestic servants and accompanying their employers; and sixthly, agricultural labourers. Obviously the only labourers not included in this category were those who drifted to Canada without any resources of their own and on the chance of finding employment. The Japanese Government had been frequently urged by its own consuls to check the emigration of such men. As for the prohibition just imposed upon labourers destined for Hawaii, this was to be assigned to a different reason, namely, the state of affairs in Hawaii itself, where Japanese immigrants, their exodus to the United States and Canada being checked, found their number in excess of the local demand and were threatened with much distress. They themselves had petitioned their Government to impose a restriction.

A regulation added to the schedules of the Federal Immigration Act effectually checked the Japanese ingress from Hawaii. In order to avoid wounding the susceptibilities of our ally, the provisions were specially made of a general nature, and stipulated that all immigrants who did not come from their places of birth or citizenship by continuous voyage would be refused permission to land. A large number of

Punjaubis, who, owing to the absence of a direct steamship service from India had arrived *viâ* Hongkong, and some Russian labourers whose journey from Vladivostock had not been continuous, were treated under the new regulations and refused a landing. The people of British Columbia were by no means satisfied with the diplomatic arrangement concluded at Tōkyō. They continued to clamour for the abrogation of the treaty and for the enactment of a rigid exclusion Act. But the Dominion Government declining to accept their view of the situation they promptly proceeded to take matters into their own hands. The Legislature passed a Bill on the lines of the Natal Act, which provides that immigrants who cannot pass a test in English or some other European language shall be refused a landing. As the Lieutenant-Governor gave his assent to the measure the Federal Government directed that a test case should be taken in order to decide the legality or otherwise of its provisions. For this purpose a Japanese on landing in British Columbia was formally arrested, and after the case had been argued on both sides, Chief-Justice Hunter delivered judgment in the following terms:—

“The question is, Do the provisions of the British Columbia Act contradict the provisions of the Act known as the Japanese Treaty Act? The British Columbia Act lays down certain conditions with which persons seeking to enter the province must comply. Amongst them is one that they must read or write in any language of Europe, the obligation being set out in a certain schedule. Now when we look at the Japanese Treaty Act we find in the broadest way that the subjects of each of the contracting parties have full right to enter, travel, and reside in the country of the other and to have full protection of their property. It is to my mind absolutely impossible to argue that, the Canadian Government having this power, the provisions of the Natal Act are not in contravention of the Treaty Act. It is very clear to me that the Natal Act is inoperative so far as it concerns the subjects of Japan. It is not necessary for me to decide that the Natal Act as a whole is inoperative, but it is inoperative so far as it concerns the subjects of the Emperor of Japan.”

The case was immediately taken to a Court of Appeal,

consisting of Justices Irving, Morrison, and Clement. For the Province it was argued that the British North America Act empowered the Legislature to deal with immigration, and that the Dominion Government, having no right to make a treaty with Japan, could not give sanction to the treaty. Judge Clement, in upholding the decision of the Lower Court, made some strong comments which caused considerable resentment in Parliamentary circles. "This matter of Japanese immigration," he said, "has been dealt with properly—that is to say, constitutionally—by the Parliament of Canada; and I must say that to my mind it smacks strongly of disloyalty to our settled form of government when the authorities of one Province undertake to override and render abortive the will of the people of Canada—*et quorum pars magna sumus*—constitutionally expressed in an Act of the Parliament of Canada; and when they ever make bold to forbid the honourable observance of our solemn engagements with a foreign Power."

The decision created one of those singular anomalies which not infrequently follow juridical exposition. While it was held that the Act could not apply to the Japanese against whom it was principally intended to operate, it was clearly established that it could be legally enforced against our Indian subjects. In other words, foreigners possessing treaty rights were more favourably placed than individuals who dwelt under the protection of the British flag and who owed their allegiance to his Majesty the King.

XVI

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC: THE FUTURE OF ORIENTAL EXPANSION

THE immigration problem on the Pacific coast is one of deep concern not only to the United States but also to Great Britain. In relation to ourselves it is essentially an Imperial problem ; in a wider and still more significant sense it is an Anglo-Saxon problem. The political events which have happened during the past few years have brought into prominence the dangers of the situation. Moreover, the irony of circumstance decreed that Great Britain and the United States, the two nations now beset by the problems of Asiatic immigration, should take a leading part in shaping those events. Both gave material support to Japan in her war with Russia. Both assisted in a large measure to gain entry for Japan into what is commonly called "the comity of nations." Their object was in itself laudable enough. They wished to see stemmed the tide of Russian aggression in the Far East, and to secure the policy of the Open Door. Russian aggression in the Far East was to some extent arrested. But though determined in the letter of treaties, the policy of the Open Door is less assured to-day than it was in the period of Russian occupation in Manchuria. It is a policy the fulfilment of which is dependent more upon the spirit than the letter ; it is in the spirit largely that it is being violated at the present time. Apart, however, from these considerations, essential to any comprehensive review of the immigration problem in its acute phases, the outstanding feature of the situation, plainly stated, is that the nations who in their adherence to the policy of the Open Door had supported Japan, were very shortly afterwards compelled to close their own portals against Japanese immi-

grants. I have said that they closed their portals ; but they were not in a position to bolt and bar them. For the prestige of Japan among the Powers of the world had improved to such an extent that she claimed that discriminating restrictions on the movements of her people when imposed by foreign countries were humiliating. She declined to become a party to immigration treaties, and herself voluntarily offered to remedy the evil. The means with which she could achieve her object were already in existence. As far back as 1896 a law had been enacted giving the Government the necessary power to limit emigration. For a time, at least, the difficulty was in consequence overcome. Previous experience does not tend, however, to encourage the belief that the solution is of a permanent nature. Restrictions imposed in the past by the Japanese authorities themselves had been persistently evaded by emigrants. This much was admitted in Japan as well as alleged in the United States and in Canada. Labourers having made false declarations to the effect that they were students were permitted to cross the Pacific in large numbers.

The principal centre of the evil was Hawaii. When the Japanese emigration law was framed, those islands constituted an independent country. Their incorporation in the territories of the United States rendered it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to control emigration. The Japanese Government signified their intention of fining any person who used his passport to Hawaii for the purpose of gaining entry to the United States ; but as any person so offending was beyond their jurisdiction when the offence was committed, the remedy suggested was obviously futile. The higher wages and better conditions obtainable on the Pacific Slope presented an irresistible attraction to the Japanese in Hawaii, the majority of whom were employed in the sugar plantations and factories. Within a few years the Japanese population in the island was reduced from 700,000 to 90,000, and it was not denied that the decrease was largely due to the enormous number of persons who fraudulently entered the United States.

When, later, legislation was passed at Washington prohibiting the emigration of Japanese labourers from Hawaii

to America, there was immediately an increase in the number of arrivals from the islands to British Columbia. Thereupon, the Canadian Government made representations, and in consequence of these and of negotiations with the United States, Japan, as stated before, voluntarily undertook to impose stringent restrictions on emigration to the Pacific coast. The problem is regarded as officially solved. The masses of the people in British Columbia and in California, however, are by no means disposed to accept such a sanguine view. They claim that Japanese of an undesirable class are still smuggling themselves into the forbidden territories. Furthermore, they strenuously object to the Japanese who are already settled on the soil, and they urge that, owing to the fact that these people possess an adroit habit of concealing themselves when officers entrusted with making a census are at work, the total number has been miscalculated. Any dispute on this score is beside the question. The fact remains that the white residents on the Pacific coast strenuously object to the presence of Japanese in their midst; and if events prove that further immigration has not been satisfactorily restricted, the problem that will arise can have only one solution. And as Japan has plainly intimated that she will not consent to exclusion treaties, that solution can only be found as a result of an appeal to arms. It would be idle to deny, no matter how much we would like to think otherwise, that when Japan voluntarily offered to take her own measures the resources of diplomacy were exhausted. Unless she keep her word implicitly, the future can hold nothing but trouble—trouble, moreover, in which Great Britain will have no choice of sides save she elect to strain to the point of breaking the ties which bind her to her Colonies; save she volunteer to prove false to her own flesh and blood, and to turn her back upon those loyal people who for so long have upheld the traditions of the race in the King's Dominions beyond the Seas. Not only in the United States and Canada, but also in Australia and New Zealand, the presence of the Japanese in large numbers is considered undesirable. The English-speaking peoples in the Pacific are therefore united in the determination to preserve the exploitation of their territories for the white

man, and for the white man alone. If any doubt on this subject is entertained in the Mother Country, then, for the sake of the maintenance of the integrity of the Empire, the sooner this doubt is once and for all dispelled, the better. The antagonistic sentiment in the territories of the Pacific is not limited to the Japanese; it extends to all Asiatics irrespective of their nationality or the country of their allegiance. But it must be confessed that the presence of the Japanese is detested more than that of any other race. As colonists they are looked upon as comparing unfavourably with the Chinese. The latter are held to be more amenable to law and order, less aggressively assertive in individuality, more honest in their commercial transactions, and altogether less prone to corrupt the social community in the midst of which they have temporarily taken up their abode. Moreover, the Japanese immigrants are subjects of a country strong in a military sense and acknowledged as a Power; whereas the Chinese are subjects of an Empire whose diplomacy, unsupported by force, has always been unequal to the task of resisting measures of frank exclusion taken from time to time, measures which were more discriminating than any imposed in regard to the Japanese. Thus the situation is complicated to an extraordinary degree owing to the fact that while Japan is the friend and ally of Great Britain, the presence of her people is resented by the Colonies more than the presence of the people of any other Asiatic race.

While this resentment has been in existence for some considerable time in the United States, Canada, and elsewhere, it has lately gathered force until at last it threatens developments the gravity of which must inevitably impress itself upon all those who have at heart the maintenance of Imperial interests, and, in a still greater sense, the evolution of the Anglo-Saxon race. It is to be feared that in the British Isles the danger is not sufficiently understood—not sufficiently realised. We who see little of the Japanese know little of them. We have for the most part formed our opinions from books that are written of the days of old Japan, the days when Japan was the land of quaint customs and picturesque scenes. Few Japanese visit England;

and those who do so are either officials charged with special missions or else the representatives of established business concerns in Japan. From contact with such as these it is impossible for us to form a true estimate of the Japanese character. The peoples of the Pacific, however, meet all classes of Japanese, particularly the labourers, who are the most undesirable class. If there is any truth in the saying that it is necessary to live with people in order to know them, then the Americans and the Colonials are in a position to form an opinion of the Japanese likely to be nearer the truth than any superficial survey of the tourist or the officially inspired writer. We who are far distant from the scene of racial strife cannot logically refute this opinion without casting a reflection not only upon the honesty but also upon the common-sense of our own kinsmen. It may be urged that dislike of the Japanese exists only among the rabble. But not infrequently the rabble give violent expression to the views that are held in higher and more intelligent quarters. This is exactly a statement of the case as it exists on the Pacific coast to-day. There is almost unanimity on the subject. To attribute the movement to the work of labour agitators alone is merely to seek a convenient though by no means satisfactory way out of a difficulty that is of first international magnitude. For the sake of our immediate interests we would like to think that the trouble has its origin among the lower orders of our civilisation. Unfortunately, the facts do not admit of any such construction. The actions of statesmen who insisted that Japan should restrict her emigrants pointed clearly to their conscientious belief in the undesirability of the presence of Japanese in anything approaching large numbers. Were other evidence required to indicate their views on the question it is to be found in their utterances which, though guarded in accordance with the requirements of diplomacy, are nevertheless pregnant with significance. Statesmen freed temporarily from the restraint of office, have in plain and unmistakable language set forth their views. These, briefly summarised, are to the effect that if Japanese immigration is not satisfactorily restricted, the white man will be prepared to resort to force in order to preserve for his kith

and kin the soil which was won by his own hardihood and enterprise. Publicists of eminence also have lent their powerful advocacy to a cause which, no matter how opposed to views held elsewhere, is based upon solid conviction, and is firmly established in the hearts and minds of all sections of the great communities dwelling in the Pacific.

We who live in the British Isles have preached the doctrine of the freedom and equality of mankind largely because we have not been brought closely into contact with peoples whose moral conceptions and economic standards are lower than those which govern ourselves. We have claimed that this doctrine is founded upon the essential principles of Christianity; but as circumstances have rendered the application of those principles impossible in our own particular case, it must be confessed that there is some ground for the charge of smug hypocrisy so frequently laid at our door. Only recently we have been compelled to realise by the irresistible force of accomplished facts that while the enunciation of the principles of Christianity lends itself to the display of considerable eloquence it is altogether in conflict with the expediency of a little rule that never ceases to regulate our individual lives—the little rule which says that charity begins at home. We have ourselves legislated against the alien. And it was Englishmen resident in England who, fearing competition, attacked a Chinese laundry at Liverpool. It is undeniable that if popular sentiment held complete sway, every alien who dwells in these islands would be given twenty-four hours' notice to quit. As time goes on we shall no doubt be faced with our own racial problem in an acute form. Let us, therefore, be chary of criticising others who are in a better position than ourselves to judge of their own local needs. We must not forget that soon after we had given vent to a fine outburst of indignation over the violence displayed against Orientals in San Francisco, we were brought face to face with a similar situation in one of our own Colonies. Whenever Englishmen go abroad they find that the local conditions compel them to abandon principles which in their ignorance they had held when at home. In England a coloured man is regarded more or less as a curiosity to be led from the ways of

heathenism to the paths of Christianity. Incidentally, for a time his manners and customs amuse us. Apart, however, from these dubious attractions, it is only a religious sentiment which enables us to tolerate his immediate presence. In some instances discrimination is frankly shown him. I have known all the guests in a boarding-house threaten to leave because a coloured man was introduced to the table. At the same time it must be admitted that as far as this country is concerned coloured people are not usually made to feel unwelcome. We must not imagine that this is due to our possession of a larger degree of Christian charity than that which governs the lives and actions of members of the Anglo-Saxon race in other parts of the world. It is merely due to the fact that our knowledge of coloured people is necessarily limited and superficial. Thus we are unable to appreciate to the full the evil resultant from their presence in large numbers among white communities. While the feeling in regard to this question has reached an acute form in the United States and in our Colonies in the Pacific, it exists in a different though none the less significant degree in South Africa, where it is an undeniable fact that the white populations, to use a common expression, "look down" upon the natives. Furthermore, the British who reside in the treaty ports of China, with few exceptions, dislike the Japanese, and a large proportion of British residents in Japan, who are not precluded by reason of business and other interests from speaking their minds, express opinions that are by no means favourable to the character of our allies.

To suggest that all our countrymen who live abroad in places where large communities of Japanese are established have been afflicted with blind race prejudice would be essentially gratuitous. It can only be concluded that in consequence of personal observation and experience they have formed opinions far more reliable than those held in Great Britain, where only a few Japanese, representative of the better class, are to be met with. While racial feeling on the Pacific coast had existed for many years, it is significant that it was not until after the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese campaign that it developed a violent stage. When I visited California in the early days of the conflict I

found that there was considerable sympathy with the Japanese. This sympathy was consistent with American sentiment, which has invariably been on the side of smaller nations in their struggles with established Powers. Moreover, Japan was looked upon as the chosen champion of the policy of the Open Door, and the immigration problem was not regarded as an immediate menace. The war produced a striking change. The Japanese imagined that their achievements on the battle-field entitled them to rights not only in the Far East, but also in all parts of the world. Instead of patiently waiting until their progress in other directions equalled that which they had attained in the art of war, they sought to force their presence in places where it was clearly not wanted. Their triumph in Manchuria had suddenly awakened to a remarkable degree the national spirit of enterprise. This led to an immediate increase in the tide of emigration to the Pacific coast. Special companies which made emigration their sole concern sprang into existence. No longer was emigration a matter of individual enterprise; it was conducted as a business on wholesale lines. Hitherto Japan had justified the outpouring of her people in the direction of America by drawing attention to the annual increase of half a million in her population, and declared that there was no available room in the Far East for this surplus. The explanation ignored the undeveloped state of Hokkaidō and Formosa; but as the climatic and economic conditions in those territories could hardly be considered attractive, there was some foundation for the plea that room for expansion had become a matter of urgency. When Japan secured a protectorate over Korea, and special rights in Manchuria, it was confidently expected that a solution of the difficulty had been found; but the course of subsequent events proved that this was not the case. A large number of Japanese who were likely emigrants evinced no desire to play the part of pioneers in the exploitation of territories that were wholly new. To these, superior conditions, economic and climatic, in California and British Columbia overshadowed any prospects offered in Manchuria and Korea. The measures taken by the Government to stem the tide Eastwards proved for some time ineffectual, and it is doubtful whether they were ever intended to be

otherwise. The class of Japanese who crossed the Pacific represented a type not altogether creditable to the land of their origin. Fully conscious of the magnitude of their country's triumph in Manchuria, they sought, by means not altogether free from arrogance, to impress upon the white people with whom they came in contact a sense of their equality. To the meaning of the word "prestige" they attached an undue importance, and wherever they went conveyed the idea that in their own minds they believed that in beating Russia, Japan, in a military sense, had assured her superiority over the white men of all nations. First the Americans and then the Canadians decided that the presence of Japanese in large numbers could not be tolerated. A well-known politician from San Francisco put the situation plainly to me when he said: "They get upon your nerves!"

As I have said before, to attribute the movement to blind racial prejudice is beside the question. White immigrants are only tolerated because they subscribe to a social and economic standard of living which approaches as near as it is possible to get to the standard prevailing in the territories wherein they seek to settle. What, then, it will be asked, is the objection to the Japanese? The objection to the Japanese is based both on social and economic grounds. A reference to the chapter on the social life of Japan will give the desired information concerning one side of the question. A reference to the chapters dealing with commerce, with politics; and with labour will complete the case. It is only proposed here to outline briefly some of the more salient features of the causes which have been directly responsible for producing a widespread dislike of the Japanese and their ways. To begin with, the Japanese will not assimilate; nor is it desirable, in the interests of white people, that they should assimilate. The Eurasian product of assimilation is by common consent invariably an undesirable element in the scheme of civilisation. "I am," Herbert Spencer said, "entirely in favour of the policy of excluding Asiatics from America or restricting them within the narrowest limits, and for this reason—if they come in large numbers either they will mix with the population or they will not. In the latter event they will ultimately become, if not slaves, practically in the position of slaves. If they do

mix they will form a bad hybrid. In either event difficulties must arise, and in the long run immense social disorganisation."

The Japanese have an altogether different moral standard from that which is accepted in Western nations. In spite of their recent political advancement they still lag far behind in this respect. Among them the system of concubinage, with all its sordid evils, still obtains. It is difficult to make their common class realise that white women who have been emancipated for centuries are not to be treated with that barbaric form of hauteur which is so marked a characteristic of the relations existing between them and the women of their own country. The fact that in Japan mere children are permitted to become wives is in itself sufficiently suggestive of the dangers that lie in the path of any attempt to reconcile the social standard of the East with that of the West. In their favour it has been frequently urged that the Japanese are a scrupulously cleanly people. They are certainly clean in a personal sense. But they are possessed of many little habits which we look upon as offensive, but the suppression of which they regard as in the nature of an excess of what, in the absence of any other word, might be termed squeamishness.

It is futile to argue that in reality we are no better than those whom we seek to criticise. We cannot forget this essential difference. When we see vice, at least we recognise it. It is certainly within the right of California and of our Colonies to exclude people who would bring with them social conditions that are fundamentally opposed to the very ideal of Western civilisation. Another point frequently urged in favour of the Japanese is their unfailing politeness. But who that has lived among them for any length of time fails to realise that this politeness is merely an outward form, frequently finding to his cost that it is altogether in contradiction to their deeds? Their very language is so limited as practically not to admit of anything else but marked courtesy. At the same time, it lends itself in a peculiar degree to evasive forms of speech. Having been reared in an atmosphere of curtsies and compliments, the Japanese endeavour to adapt the foreign tongues which they acquire to polite expressions similar to those which their own language renders with such

perfection. Their politeness is intended more often than not to disarm. In other words, it is brought into play because of their inherent reluctance to reveal their true sentiments in regard to any subject under discussion, more especially when the individual with whom the discussion is taking place happens to be a foreigner.

The principal objection to the Japanese is based upon economic grounds. It is estimated that in California alone there are at present nearly 50,000 Japanese. As this State, by no means overpopulated, is the second largest in the Union, extending along the Pacific Slope a distance of more than 700 miles, there would appear to be adequate room for settlers. The special correspondent of *The Times*, who investigated the conditions in California, wrote as follows: "It is no use blinking the facts; the anti-Japanese feeling in California is practically universal. Rich and poor, educated and uneducated, all express abhorrence of the 'little brown monkeys' and determination to expel them. How has this state of things been brought about? The answer is to be found in the energy, industry, and ability of the Japanese. Where they go they succeed; and, because their manner of life does not demand the luxuries of the Occidentals, they are able to work for a good deal less than the whites. The Chinese also live economically and underbid Occidental labour, but it is only in a very few trades that the Chinese become the competitors of the whites, and the Californians are willing to concede these trades to them. But the Japanese is different. There is no limit to his ambition. He starts restaurants, grocery stores, saloons, clothing shops; he controls many important agricultural industries in California; several Japanese have become millionaires by growing fruit; others have become rich by organising companies of labourers who are hired out to the white owners of vineyards and orchards. The Japanese cobblers of San Francisco, by banding together for mutual benefit, have obtained complete control of that industry here, crowding out every white competitor. A large proportion of the flowers sold in San Francisco are raised by Japanese, whose methods, perfected in their own country in hundreds of years, have proved far superior to those of the most skilful Americans. Japanese companies

supply labour for the great railroads, nearly all the railroad construction in California being done by Japanese under a system similar to the Italian 'padrone' system in the East. The raising of strawberries in this State is entirely in the hands of Japanese, whose superior methods have eliminated white competition. The potato market has also been virtually captured by them—the result, again, of greater skill than the white growers can command. The Americans have found themselves beaten at their own game—improved business methods."

In endeavouring to make out a case for the Japanese, the correspondent in reality succeeds in drawing up a very damaging indictment against them. He shows that they are not limiting their activities to supplying labour to the white man in the development of the State, but are engaging in large enterprises on their own account. Their success depends to a considerable extent upon their ability to undersell their American competitors, while, at the same time, in consequence of their lower economic standard generally, to derive an equal if not a superior profit. One investigation showed that there are 475 Japanese land-holders in California, and upwards of 3000 who either lease or rent land. As recently as July of 1910 certain extracts from a report prepared by a committee of the Californian State Legislature appeared in the British Press, and were hailed as showing that Japanese labour is necessary for the orchard and vineyard industries, and that, moreover, the creation of an ideally intelligent class of white farm labourer is practically an impossibility. But these extracts refer merely to the need for the employment of Japanese during the harvesting season which lasts only two months, and they do not attempt to explain how labour thus imported is to be utilised after this temporary demand is satisfied. It is undeniable that in the field of agriculture the Japanese do not work for less wages than do white men; on the contrary, they receive if anything slightly higher remuneration. The economic menace lies in the admitted fact that the average Japanese supports himself on twenty per cent., or less, of his earnings. The remainder he either sends home or else amasses until he becomes himself a capitalist engaging in

serious business. How the Japanese are able to accumulate wealth is explained by the circumstance that they reside in communities where the relatively high standard of living existing, normally breaks down before the principle of co-operation. Thus refusing and being denied the advantages of assimilation the individual Japanese becomes the natural enemy of customs and conditions. Whatever his wages may be, or howsoever urgent the immediate need of his services, he is already a positive element of economic competition, and by the natural process of advancement will present a serious problem in the future.

It is clear, therefore, that unless the Government insisted upon imposing restrictions, the Japanese would not only ultimately control a major share of the trade, but they would also become possessors of extensive areas of the soil. Surely it cannot seriously be contended that it is in the interests of the welfare of the State that an alien race, who can never be assimilated with the American people, should obtain a place of commercial predominance in one of the richest territories in the whole of the land. Again, it must not be overlooked that many Japanese remit the greater part of their earnings to their own country, and that when eventually they retire from business they return to Japan taking with them the proceeds of their enterprise abroad. It is conclusively proved that in the main they are not supplying the demand for labour ; but they are becoming the employers of labour. At present, those among them who control enterprises give work only to their own fellow-countrymen. But in the fullness of time, unless the precautions taken against such a contingency prove effective, the white man who cannot compete with Oriental conditions must inevitably find that the scope for his individual enterprise has diminished almost to the point of disappearing. It is inconceivable that any Government alive to the danger would not take serious measures to secure the commercial foundations of its own people ; for unless they did so, the day would not be far distant when the white man would become the employee of the yellow man. With commercial expansion comes political influence. If the Japanese secured the one to the detriment of the natives of the soil, it would not be long before they gained the other sufficiently to estab-

lish a real predominance that would constitute a menace, not limited to a single State, but affecting in a far wider sense the integrity of the United States as a whole. Unfortunately the British Press has dragged in by the heels many side issues which tend to confuse the problem in its application to the interests of national security and national welfare. I have too high an appreciation of the ability with which, under ordinary circumstances, the British Press is conducted, to accept at their face value many of the arguments advanced in the form of a serious statement of the case against America and the Colonies in this all-important matter of Asiatic immigration. I can only imagine that in their conception of the obligations of loyalty to an ally the men who are responsible for the direction of our leading journals have felt it incumbent upon themselves to suppress conviction. For instance, the suggestion that in California the Americans have found themselves beaten at their own game—improved business methods—is palpably absurd. Assuming that the Americans have been beaten, then it is to be attributed not to improved business methods but to conditions over which they had no control, the economic conditions which governed the enterprise of their rivals and which defied all attempts at competition. Any one who is acquainted with the dubious methods of the Japanese in transacting business, methods which are fully described elsewhere in this book, cannot fail to realise the utter fallacy of any argument that is based upon an assumption that the Japanese are superior business men to the Americans.

The objections urged against the Japanese as far as our Colonies are concerned are similar to those which exist in America and which I have already outlined in some detail. As the problem of Asiatic immigration is more acute in British Columbia than in Australia and New Zealand, I propose to deal with some of its general aspects in so far as it relates to that portion of the King's dominions. In the course of a speech in the Canadian House of Commons on January 21, 1908, M. Lemieux, the representative of the Canadian Government, who concluded an understanding with Japan on the subject of immigration and who has frequently expressed his cordial appreciation of the Japanese, reminded his hearers that "One must bear in mind that there

are now over 25,000 Asiatics in British Columbia, practically all of whom are male adults. There are about 75,000 male adults of the white race in the province. So that if, to-day, every fourth man in that province competing for a living is an Asiatic, are not the reasons for effectual restriction far more compelling than one would at first imagine?" A recent census shows that of the 17,000 Chinese in Canada, no fewer than 14,000 are domiciled in British Columbia. Originally a tax of 50 dollars per head was placed upon all Chinese immigrants. This was subsequently increased to 100 dollars; but as it did not prove effective in checking the influx of Chinese, a still further increase to 500 dollars was made from January 1, 1904. For two years no Chinese entered the Dominion. In 1906 there were sixteen, and in 1908 ninety-five, Chinese immigrants. It is not denied that there is a serious shortage of labour in this province. With an area of 395,000 square miles, British Columbia has a white population of only 260,000, or less than one person to the square mile. In many respects it constitutes one of the most desirable territories for immigration in the whole world. The country is described as evergreen, healthful, and invigorating, and it presents the greatest variety of climate of any of the provinces of Canada. With a coast-line of 450 miles on the Pacific Ocean, washed by the waters of a warm current that flows from Japan, it occupies a situation only rivalled by that of California, and one fully justifying the title given it of the "World's Sanitorium." The industrial resources are so immense as to be incalculable. There are over 82,000,000 acres of forest and woodland, and the area of standing timber is the largest and most compact in the world; wheat land covers an area of 10,000,000 acres; coal-measures are the most extensive in the world; the undeveloped deposits of iron ore are enormous; the fisheries have yielded over 103,000,000 dollars; while gold to the value of 114,000,000 dollars and other minerals to the extent of 185,000,000 dollars have been produced. In view of these facts it must be admitted that the world presents no fairer field for immigration than the rich territory of British Columbia, a territory which is without doubt the richest and the best in the whole of our dominions beyond the seas.

For its development both capital and labour are required. It is a land full of buried treasure. The quarter of a million white people who have already settled there have as yet barely scraped the surface. There is room for not only thousands but millions more, and herein lies the crux of the whole problem of immigration. Where are these thousands, these millions to come from? From the East or from the West? Are they to be white men with the habits of white men who will assimilate with the white race already settled on the soil? Or are they to be yellow men with the habits of yellow men whose assimilation with the white settlers is as undesirable as it is impossible? British Columbia has already made up her mind on this question. And her decision has the whole-hearted support of Canadians in all parts of the Dominion, for these realise that British Columbia is the breakwater that must be strengthened if it is to stem the yellow tide.

There is only one solution to the problem. British Columbia must induce thousands of white immigrants to settle on her soil. If immigrants cannot afford to pay their passages, then financial assistance should be afforded them. A return for the outlay in this connection will speedily be forthcoming by way of increased prosperity as a result of increased development. Capitalists will not neglect to exploit British Columbia. But they will demand that the labour which is necessary for this purpose shall be provided, and if white labour is not forthcoming, then yellow labour is the only alternative. Only recently the Montreal Board of Trade appointed a Committee to consider the subject, and after an exhaustive inquiry the following recommendations were made:—

(a) That the Provincial and Federal Alien laws be immediately suspended.

(b) That the Provincial Government immediately appoint one or more competent agents, to act under the supervision of the Agent-General, to travel through the industrial centres of Great Britain and give information as to the labour requirements and conditions in British Columbia.

(c) That some plan of assisted emigration be extended to farm labourers, unskilled workmen, and domestics. We believe that employers of these classes would readily undertake to reimburse the Provincial Government for any outlay on this account.

The report concluded: "Your Committee cannot close this report without reference to the opinion of many employers who gave evidence that a reduction of the head tax on Chinese would afford immediate relief to farmers, fruit-growers, and families requiring domestics. Your Committee prefer to see this a 'white man's' country, but in the event of refusal or delay in carrying out the above recommendations, your Committee are of opinion that the only alternative is to strongly recommend that the head tax on Chinese be reduced. The expansion of farming and fruit-growing is already checked, and the demand for cheap labour in the construction of railways is a problem which must be seriously considered."

In considering the above report the Victoria (British Columbia) Board of Trade made the following comments:—

"This opens up a debatable question. It cannot be denied that the province is suffering seriously owing to the scarcity of domestic servants, and labourers to undertake work that Europeans will not do. That desirable families have left the province because they could not obtain servants is well known; others have been deterred from coming here for the same reason, whilst farmers have placed their farms in the hands of real estate agents for sale, giving as a reason that they cannot obtain labour, except at prohibitive rates. These are unpleasant facts, but there is no use in hiding them; they must be faced. In the past families have depended largely upon Chinese for servants, and so have farmers for clearing land, fruit-growers for picking fruit, and others where only a cheap class of labour can be profitably employed. Since the head tax on Chinese was placed at \$500.00, their scale of wages has increased from 50 to 100 per cent., and a day's labour for outside men—in the city—has dropped from ten to eight hours. Take the

economic view of the question. There are about 10,000 working Chinamen in the province. At a low estimate, these men are earning \$13.00 a month more than they were three years ago, totalling \$1,560,000, while it costs them no more to live now than it did then. It is contended by some that the earnings of the Chinese are sent to China. If this be true, they are now enabled to send, in addition to what they formerly sent, over a million and a half of dollars annually out of the country, because by legislation they are placed in the position of becoming practically a close corporation, dictating the rate of wages that shall be paid to them, and the hours they are to work."

The Vancouver Board of Trade adopted a resolution advising against the unrestricted immigration of Asiatics and in favour of white immigration from European sources. The suggestion made by the Victoria Board of Trade that the province is suffering seriously owing to the scarcity of domestic servants, and labourers to undertake work that Europeans will not do, merely presents a difficulty that is insignificant in its relation to the whole problem. Were a plentiful supply of white labourers available, they would not be in a position to pick and choose any particular class of employment. Another important factor to be taken into consideration is the inherent dislike of the white labourers to the very presence of Asiatics in their midst. "Thousands of people," wrote the Hon. C. H. Mackintosh, formerly Lieutenant-Governor of the province, "do not care for a country where Mongolians are employed; many white women not unnaturally object to working with them."

From the economic point of view it is important to remember that the conditions of employment demanded by white labour are generous when compared with those required by Oriental labour; and in many kinds of employment, more particularly those which are of an unskilled character, no greater degree of efficiency is offered by way of compensation. Two causes, which are to some extent connected, must be held responsible for this state of affairs. In the first place there is the scarcity of labour. But this scarcity is in a large measure due to the dog-in-the-manger policy of the trade unions, who object to immigration of

all nationalities, irrespective of colour, in their desire to see maintained a maximum rate of wages and a minimum number of hours. The employer consequently turns to Chinese labour, and it is with this weapon that he fights the organised labour of the white man.

It is shown from the reports of the Boards of Trade quoted above, that in restricting the immigration of Chinese the Government has rendered it possible for those Chinese who are already in the country to obtain improved conditions. In other words, they have put into force that simple economic law which provides that a commodity when scarce and in demand shall be of greater value than when plentiful and also in demand. To some extent this new condition must operate favourably in the interests of white labour. For it is automatically raising the standard of Oriental labour almost as high as that which the white man sets for himself as a condition of his employment, thereby diminishing to a certain degree the margin in favour of Oriental competition. But then we have the capitalist, as represented by the members of the Boards of Trade in British Columbia, stepping in. On their side they declare that the scarcity of labour is retarding the development of the province, and that the continuance of the famine in this respect is altogether unsound from the economic point of view. They cannot help admitting that white labour is preferable to Asiatic labour. They agree with the trade unions in so far as they realise that the assimilation of Asiatics with the white race is impossible, and that a great portion of the wages earned by Asiatic labour must inevitably leave the country. But they take up the stand that rather than allow capital to go without its return they prefer to see the country overrun with Chinese immigrants. Practically they say, Labour we must have, and labour we will have. If you cannot give us white men, then open wide your gates to the teeming millions of China!

The attitude both of the capitalists and the trade unions is wrong. Both are selfish, and both are to a very considerable extent narrow-minded in their aims and unpatriotic in their views. British Columbia cannot be populated with white people in a day. But events have proved that were it

not for restrictions it could be populated, and thickly populated, with Orientals. What, ask the capitalists, are we to do in the meantime? Is the treasure to remain buried, and the money which would employ the labour to raise it to remain idle? Far-seeing statesmen who are in charge of Federal affairs have already given their answer to these questions. In restricting Chinese immigration they have in one stroke of policy reduced the disparity between white and yellow conditions of labour, and rendered the labour famine, always severe, so acute that unless vast territories of untold wealth are to lie for ever undeveloped, relief must be sought by the wholesale introduction of white labour. Again we hear the cry of the capitalist. Not only, he says, is the country making no material progress, but it is actually on the decline; for people who cannot get servants are rapidly leaving the soil for other lands where labour is more plentiful. The answer to this wail must be conclusive. It were better that British Columbia were only thinly populated by white people than that a condition should be brought about under which this population would become submerged among the hordes of yellow men from China. It is not the development of British Columbia that is at stake. It is the maintenance of that province, and incidentally of the whole of Canada as an integral portion of the British Empire, which is the real issue. What, in the long run, would be the position of a handful of capitalists among swarms of yellow employees? For a time they would make large sums of money; but in the end the means with which they sought to amass their wealth would inevitably encompass their own ruin. The Chinese, let it be understood, are an intelligent race. They are not, as many people think, a race of coolies. Moreover, they are a race which, by common consent, is in the process of awakening. And if the history of their once glorious past is studied, it will afford some index to the potentialities of their future. From a commercial point of view the danger of their menace is more imminent than is generally supposed. From a military point of view many generations will pass away before they gather sufficient power to enable them to cross the seas. But this immigration question must be viewed in its relation to the far future.

The statesmen of to-day are discharging solemn obligations to posterity. And if in the process immediate return on capital is sacrificed, it matters little in the scheme of centuries. Who, recognising responsibilities to destiny, could for a moment be so blind as to imagine that the Chinese would for ever be content to remain the humble employees of the white man, or that they would for ever consent to segregation and to other humiliating conditions which alone render tolerable their restricted presence in white communities to-day? The time would assuredly come when they would seek local avenues of investment instead of sending their money, as they now do, back to the homeland.

If the white capitalist were compelled to compete with the Chinese capitalist, who, experience shows, lacks nothing in enterprise, he would develop a far greater sympathy than he possesses to-day with the white labourer who competes with the Chinese labourer. Generations of Chinese settlers would attach their race to the soil of Canada, and from attachment and multiplication there would arise a demand for equality of treatment, and, in the long run, a share in governmental control. When the day dawned that these things were brought about, the Chinese abroad would have the support of a strong Government at home. Should any doubts be entertained in regard to the menace of Asiatic immigration on a large scale, these can at once be settled by a statement of the case in so far as it relates to the Japanese. Various estimates place the number resident in Canada at from 6000 to 12,000. Before the year 1896 no record was kept of the number arriving; but from July 1 of that year to June 30, 1901, it is estimated that 14,000 Japanese landed at Victoria. In 1902 a Royal Commission which was appointed to consider the whole question of Asiatic immigration issued a report in the course of which it was stated that the Japanese of the labouring class differed from the Chinese of the same class in that "he is more independent, energetic, apt, and ready and anxious to adopt, at least in appearance, the manners and mode of life of the white man. He avails himself of every opportunity to learn English, and often makes it a condition of his contract of hiring that he may do so. . . . The consensus of opinion of the people of British

Columbia is that they do not and cannot assimilate with the white people, and that while in some respects they are less undesirable than the Chinese, in that they adopt more readily our habits of life and spend more of their earnings in the country, yet in all that goes to make for the permanent settlement of the country they are quite as serious a menace as the Chinese and keener competitors against the working man, and as they have more energy, push, and independence, more dangerous in this regard than the Chinese."

In regard to the decision of the Japanese Government to restrict emigration, the Commissioners expressed the opinion that the course adopted was most opportune. "Nothing further is needed," they added, "to settle this most difficult question upon a firm basis than some assurance that the action already taken by the Government of Japan will not be revoked. Your Commissioners desire to express their earnest hope that in the continuance of this friendly policy legislation on this subject by the Canadian Government may be rendered unnecessary. Should, however, a change of policy be adopted in this regard by the Japanese Government whereby Japanese labourers may again be permitted to emigrate to Canada, the welfare of the province of British Columbia imperatively demands that effective measures be adopted to take the place of the inhibition now imposed by the Japanese Government. Your Commissioners recommend that in that event an Act be passed by the Dominion Government on the lines of what is known as the Natal Act, made sufficiently stringent and effective to accomplish the desired result."

Even those who advocate a decrease in the poll-tax on Chinese as a means of remedying the scarcity of labour, do not go so far as to suggest that the Japanese should be allowed a free and unrestricted right of entry. As a matter of fact, the legislature of British Columbia has only been prevented by a higher authority from enforcing the Natal Act. The Federal Government realised that the provisions of this Act would constitute a violation of the spirit of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The fact, however, that this self-same Act is in operation in other parts of the King's dominions has caused some resentment in British Columbia where it

is felt that the requirements of Imperial interests are insisted upon with some partiality. Apart from the fact, however, that Canada is a party to the Anglo-Japanese Commercial Treaty, it must not be overlooked that the principles of the Natal Act were applied in Australia before the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded. It is extremely doubtful whether, in view of her improved *status* in the world, Japan would consent to any new legislation which sought to apply the principles of the Natal Act in any other part of the Empire. As a result of the evolution of Japan, the immigration problem has become an exceedingly difficult one to solve. The evolution of China would produce a similar situation. Consequently, in taking, while there is yet time, legislative measures frankly aimed at exclusion in regard to the Chinese, American and Canadian statesmen have adopted an essentially far-seeing policy. That the United States and the British Colonies have made up their minds to exclude the Japanese at all costs is beyond the shadow of a doubt.

It has always been a singular feature of the writings of Western publicists friendly to the cause of Japan, that in seeking to make out a case they show an enthusiasm not altogether shared by the Japanese themselves. The following extracts from the observations of prominent Japanese statesmen and writers afford a striking illustration of the truth of this statement in its relation to the immigration question :—

“There could be no doubt that many Japanese labourers, under pretence of being students, had obtained passports from the Japanese local authorities enabling them to proceed to the United States.”—*Count Hayashi, formerly Foreign Minister.*

“The Japanese labourers themselves were more or less responsible for the restriction movement, inasmuch as they were generally men of a very inferior class, willing to work for low wages. The effect of this was to bring discredit on the whole Japanese nation; as the old proverb has it, if one hates the priest one hates his stole also.”—*Viscount Aoki, formerly Ambassador at Washington.*

“The collection of Japanese immigrants in the cities of the Pacific coast is detrimental to friendly relations between

agreement that the class of Japanese crossing the Pacific would constitute an undesirable element in any civilised community. This circumstance, apart from the economic issues involved, was in itself sufficient justification for the restriction of immigration. Unfortunately British public opinion has been singularly misinformed in regard to the problem in its various aspects. A typical instance of the sources from which information has on occasions been derived was supplied in a letter written by the late Bishop Awdry, who was at the time the head of the Church of England in Japan. "I would suggest," he said, "to those who are making difficulties for Japan, that there is a very great danger ahead if the policy of exclusiveness is carried far enough really to stir the nation. With Japan already powerful and China likely rapidly to become so, those who insist on a policy of mutual exclusion, whether on the ground of race or otherwise—Australia for the Australians, America for the white races, and the like—are certain to make effective the cry of 'The Far East for the Far Easterns,' and as the Far Eastern nations advance, and develop the resources of their own countries, the old idea that 'we white men may penetrate you, but you may not penetrate us,' will be too palpably immoral to be tolerated."

Singularly enough, an incident occurred which utterly destroyed the argument advanced by Bishop Awdry. In 1907, when the trouble on the Pacific coast had already reached an acute stage, Japan found herself face to face with the immigration problem in her own country. Certain railway contractors and managers of mines began to import large numbers of Chinese coolies, who were paid a rate of wages less than half that demanded by Japanese labourers. Thereupon conditions similar to those about which the Japanese complained so bitterly in California were created. Racial feeling became intense, violent collisions were frequent, and the Chinese were maltreated. In consequence of the agitation the Government resorted to the operation of an Imperial Ordinance issued in the year 1899, which practically vetoes the employment of foreign labourers of all nationalities. The Chinese were summarily dismissed from their employment and expelled from the country. The cry of the Far East for the Far Easterns to which the Bishop alluded as a probability of the

immediate future was, therefore, as far as Japan was concerned, first uttered in the form of an Imperial Ordinance twelve years ago, a period long before it could be urged that there was any need for retaliation in so far as the Pacific coast was concerned. Thus Japan has not hesitated to discriminate against Asiatics, and she even provided for the remote contingency of white workmen attempting to enter the country. Surely, therefore, she cannot logically complain of the treatment meted out to her subjects in other parts of the world ; and under the circumstances the attempts of her friends to prove that, in face of intolerance, her attitude is one of generosity would appear to be based upon ignorance of the local conditions in the midst of which they lived. Anybody acquainted with the real aims of Japanese policy will not deny that it has always been consistently based upon the principle of Japan for the Japanese, and that since the war with Russia this principle has been reasserted with remarkable vigour. It is, of course, extremely unlikely that Japan will ever be called upon to deal with the question of white immigration. No white man could possibly compete with the low standard which governs labour conditions in the country. In this connection, therefore, any law providing for restrictions which may be in operation is to all intents and purposes a dead letter. There is no room for retaliation, nor is there margin for reciprocity. In regard to Chinese immigration, however, the situation is altogether different ; and, as I have shown, Japan does not hesitate to resort to methods which, when applied in her own case elsewhere, have aroused her deep resentment.

Again, there is the argument that if the Oriental races enter the white man's territory, the white man is alone to blame ; that he has stirred up all these quiescent races who did not want him ; and that so long as he could wring concessions from the Asiatics and compel them to trade at the point of the bayonet he heeded not the warnings of those who told him that in the end they would prove his formidable competitors. Where would the British Empire have been, however, if all the races who had lagged behind the times had been allowed to remain quiescent ? Even the Ancient Briton himself was not allowed to live undisturbed among the prehistoric sur-

roundings of his caves. The mission of Christianity and the march of progress have rendered it inevitable that the sleepers among the nations shall be awakened. Western civilisation has done much for Japan. This the Japanese are the first to recognise. The dawn of enlightenment from the Western horizon gave the land all the freedom and no little share of the prosperity that it possesses to-day. It raised the masses of the people from the depths of serfdom to the level of humanity; it abolished torture and other hideous forms of punishment; and while perhaps it may have compelled the Japanese to trade, who can gainsay that the result has been of mutual benefit? History itself proves that China awakened the slumbering peoples of Korea, and that in a large measure she gave the Japanese the crude civilisation of their early days.

If Oriental labour becomes a serious menace to the white races, then the white races are the victims of uncontrollable circumstances, and not, as some would have us believe, of blind folly. Certainly it is within their province to insist that they shall keep their own territories and their own privileges to themselves. In doing this they are merely asserting the principle which has governed nations from time immemorial, a principle which decrees that the peoples of the earth who have lagged behind in the scheme of civilisation shall pay the penalty of their tardiness. If the Oriental races wish to override that principle, they can only achieve their object by force of conquest. If they choose this, the only means of attaining their object, will they find the white man prepared to meet them? This is the crucial point which the problem of the future will hold. Neither China nor Japan will for ever rest content with restrictions that place them on an inequality with their fellow-beings. Both nations possess a common cause. Moreover it is a cause so stupendous in character that it will completely overshadow all other problems that the age may bring to perplex the peoples of the earth. At the present moment a deep feeling of resentment lies smouldering throughout Japan. In the Diet the Government are continually meeting sharp questions and scathing rebukes from the representatives of the people who, never complaisant

over Japan's engagements on the immigration question, are becoming irritated by what they look upon as the world's disdain. Not long ago Count Okuma, voicing the general bitterness, said that the racial prejudice against his countrymen, even after their nation's attaining to the rank of a first-class Power, was a cause of future disturbance of peace. If the Japanese were treated persistently with the prevailing antipathy, and the pressure of other Powers were continually bearing on them as at present, the Japanese might be obliged to appeal to actual force and claim the right position due to them. "It was," added Count Ōkuma, somewhat irrelevantly, "English oppression that caused American independence." There are not wanting signs that present-day statesmen in the West are alive to the potentialities of the situation. These signs may appear infinitesimal in their relation to the vast issue that is gradually shaping itself; but they are none the less significant. In a recent contribution to the *Outlook*, New York, Mr. Roosevelt urged that a larger navy was needed to enforce America's rights, as otherwise the country would be at the mercy of any nation that might wish to disregard her desires to control immigration, to protect the Panama Canal, or, indeed, to take any stand upon international honour and righteousness. "America would fight," he concluded, "whether prepared or not. All that peace conferences would do would be to prevent the country from being successful in war."

In the course of a message to the *Standard* newspaper, in connection with New Zealand's presentation of a *Dreadnought* to the Mother Country, Sir Joseph Ward, the Premier of the Colony, gave expression to the following remarkable utterance: "The command of the Pacific, so vital to us, and so doubtful since Great Britain parted with Samoa, may one day needs be settled by her ships of war. The East threatens problems that may demand the same grim solution, and against these dangers and all foreign aggression we feel the British navy is our final palladium. Our obligations to the Homeland are in proportion to the protection she throws round our lives, liberties, and property, and no crisis was needed to rouse us to a recognition of the fact that, with her present wealth and developments,

New Zealand ought to bear an increased share of the burden of Imperial defence."

The military and naval forces at the disposal of Japan are far stronger than they were before the Russo-Japanese War. For the time being Japan may wish to see her surplus population diverted to Manchuria and Korea; but the superior conditions prevailing on the Pacific coast will for many years prove a far greater attraction to emigrants than the prospects of settlement on the Asiatic mainland. Apart, however, from the immediate question of limitation involved in the immigration problem—sufficient in itself to promote discord—the mere fact that restriction takes the form of racial discrimination will in the long run produce a crisis of utmost gravity. The plans of Japan may be delayed by financial difficulties, or possibly by complications with her continental neighbours; but it is her destiny to lead the way in demanding of the white races an equality of treatment for the peoples of Asia. As I have said, Japan is already in a strong position in the Far East. Indeed, to-day the forces of no other Power could hope to match her. In the Eastern Hemisphere she alone of all the nations possesses, not a squadron, but a navy—a navy, moreover, that can boast a fighting line of fifteen battleships and thirteen armoured cruisers, including no less than four ships of super-*Dreadnought* armament. At the same time, however, it must not be forgotten that in 1913 the Panama Canal will be completed. America will then be able to move her fleet freely from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Meanwhile Australia, Canada, and New Zealand are strengthening their home defences. These colonies have viewed with a sentiment almost akin to alarm the transference of British battleships from Far Eastern to home waters. While they recognise that the policy of the Imperial Government was dictated by strategic conditions that existed in Europe, they realised at the same time that the moment had arrived when they must assume a larger share of responsibility for their own defence than hitherto they had borne. If the Mother Country is unable to bear the burden of maintaining an adequate fleet in the Pacific as well as in home waters, then the Colonies are prepared to take the initiative in providing their own

means of defence after consultation with the Imperial authorities. But the Colonies are in complete agreement in their belief that the situation in the Pacific is such as to call for the display of statesman-like foresight. The measures they are taking for their own protection are not the result of panic; they are due alone to a realisation of dangers ahead, a realisation that has been brought about largely by their experience in connection with the immigration problem. Nor have they been slow to recognise that the influence possessed by Great Britain with Japan as a consequence of the Alliance will not for ever remain a factor in the situation, and that the day must come when a diplomatic solution dependent upon voluntary sacrifices by the latter will no longer be possible. It is, however, utterly futile for the Colonies to evolve elaborate schemes of defence unless they take into consideration the all-important need for men. The cry of a white Australia, a white New Zealand, and a white Canada is not sufficient in itself. Unless these vast territories, at present largely uninhabited and undeveloped, are soon thickly populated, that cry will some day represent the mere expression of an idle dream. And when the time comes that the Asiatic races seek expansion by force of arms, the Colonies will be ill prepared to meet the foe unless they are in a position to place in the field millions of hardy, well-trained men. These millions at the present day do not exist.

White men are necessary not only for the development of the Colonies, but also for their protection. Neither employers nor labour unions must be allowed to stand in the way. The only remedy for all the troubles which beset our Colonies to-day, and the only safeguard against the dangers which menace their security in the future, are to be found in the organised introduction on a large scale of white settlers. British Columbia has taken a definite lead in affording substantial assistance to immigrants of the labouring class. The Legislature has entered into an arrangement with the Salvation Army, under which one thousand labourers and domestic servants are brought out annually to the Province. For this purpose a sum of money is lent to the Salvation Army authorities, who

in turn lend various sums of money to the immigrants, and these make repayment from time to time out of their wages. Although this scheme is a praiseworthy step in the right direction, it is, of course, utterly inadequate as a satisfactory solution of the immigration question.

While there is a great scarcity of labour in the Colonies, there is an excess of labour in the Mother Country. Surely it is not beyond the capacity of statesmen to devise some measure by which the demand on the one side can be met with the surplus on the other. If this object were achieved, the advantages gained by the Empire as a whole would prove inestimable. The development of our Colonies would then be assured and their security guaranteed; at the same time the conditions in Great Britain would be materially improved, prosperity among the masses being increased by the diminution of competition in the labour market.

XVII

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC: THE STRATEGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMUR RAILWAY

THE ink was scarcely dry on the Peace Treaty of Portsmouth before Russian engineers began calmly to conduct surveys in the provinces of Amur and Baikal with a view to providing for the regeneration of Russia's policy in the Far East by means of a colossal railway undertaking. It is extremely probable, indeed, that the survey was in progress before the war was concluded. Apparently, nothing can shake Russia's faith in her Far Eastern destiny. Her course is as irresistible as that of the mighty river along whose wild bank she will carve her way. Like the Amur itself, she has encountered, and will yet encounter, difficulties of the most stupendous character. Confronted by obstacles no less formidable in the sphere of human effort than those mountainous and rocky obstacles of Nature which checked the Amur in the mysterious, silent past, she twists and turns but does not retreat. She bores her path onward to the great Pacific outlet, and, like the Amur again, all the signs are that, having achieved her object, she will so broaden and deepen her course that never can human agency overwhelm or divert her. There is still in Russia the impatient, determined spirit of that Tsar who flouted the perplexities of engineers by calling for a map and drawing a straight line between St. Petersburg and Moscow upon its surface, decreeing that this was the route for a railway. It matters not that the vast territories through which the Amur Railway must go are unexplored, or but partially surveyed; the construction of the line is resolved upon, and completion is only a question of time.

The simile may be changed. Russia is a giant on an inland height, gazing with strained eyes to the horizon

beyond which the waters lave the feet of the earth. Russia pines for the sea. Now it is towards Constantinople that the giant looks with envy; now across Persia. But the way to these lies over foreign soil. The spell of the East is upon Russia, and the giant turns, not unnaturally, towards the sweeping plains of his own Siberian territory. And thus, by 1906 (the Portsmouth Peace Treaty having been signed only so recently as at the end of the previous year), engineers were at work, and the survey of the first section of the Amur Railway—the Oriental section, as it is called—had proceeded to such an extent as to call for an important deviation from preconceived plans.

Before proceeding to outline the broad features of Russia's great policy of expansion in the Far East, it would perhaps be as well for the writer to state explicitly that, whether in expressing opinion or adventuring prophecy, he has here in mind only the *ultimate* and *inevitable* end of that policy. In this section of the present work he is not concerned with the many complex questions that will arise in the path of Russia's Imperial destiny—vital questions involving principles of world-wide consequence and producing from time to time grave situations that, however slight their determining influence upon the finality of inexorable purpose, will call urgently to the Western nations for wise and strong interposition at the moment.

During the past three hundred years Russian enterprise in the Far East has met with many checks; but if the progress of a nation is to be measured in territorial expansion, then her policy has been justified over and over again. The Cossacks have achieved for Russia what the sea-rovers have done for England. Towards the end of the fifteenth century, under Yermak, they crossed the Urals, and their progress eastwards, though gradual, was persistent. One hundred and fifty years later they had established themselves on the Pacific coast, having traversed a distance of 6000 miles of territory which presented hardships and perils unequalled in any other part of the world. Hitherto they had confined their explorations to the north of the Yablonoi Mountains; but as soon as reports reached them concerning the wealth of the peoples who dwelt in the

south, expeditions were despatched in the direction of the Amur. It was in 1643 that the first Cossack band succeeded in penetrating as far as the banks of that river. Other expeditions followed in their wake, and as these were invariably successful in their conflicts with the Manchus, a number of Cossack posts and forts were established in the newly exploited territories along the banks of the upper Amur and in the neighbouring regions of Northern Manchuria. At this time the Manchus were engaged in a dynastic struggle with China, and consequently the Russians found the moment opportune for advance. Later, however, the Manchus rallied their forces, and operating from Aigun destroyed all the Russian settlements. They crossed the Amur River, and in 1683 besieged and captured the stockaded town of Albazin where the remnants of the Cossack forces had assembled. But the Russian advance had only received a temporary check. It was not to be expected that the bold Cossacks, who had braved the dangers and hardships of numerous expeditions having for their object the penetration of the alluring country along the banks of the Amur, would beat an ignominious retreat. Albazin was recaptured and fortified, and from time to time frontier fighting took place. It was not until 1689 that an attempt was made to settle the outstanding differences between Russia and China by means of clearly defined diplomacy. In that year the Treaty of Nertchinsk was concluded between the two countries, and in the light of subsequent events it is of interest to note that its object was "to repress the insolence of certain rascals who, making hunting incursions beyond the limits of their territories, pillage, murder, and stir up trouble and quarrels, as well as to determine clearly and distinctly the boundaries of the two Empires of China and of Muscovy." It was stipulated that the boundaries between the two Empires should be the rivers Argun and Gorbitza, and the Yablonoi Mountains from the source of the latter river to the sea. China thus retained both banks of the Amur and gained a distinct diplomatic victory.

For nearly two hundred years there was peace along the frontier. Meanwhile Russian navigators had made important discoveries in the Pacific. Naval posts were established in Kamchatka and far south along the coast-line of that region

at present known as the Maritime Province, but which was then part of Manchuria. As a result of Mouravieff's memorable voyage along the Amur in May of 1858—a voyage which revealed the knowledge that there was water communication to the Pacific coast—the Treaty of Aigun was concluded. Some doubt has been thrown on the validity of this document owing to the fact that it was the result of negotiations with local officials and not with the Chinese Government. The treaty gave to Russia the whole of the region between the Yablonoi Mountains and the northern bank of the Amur, while the Ussuri territory was placed under the joint jurisdiction of both countries. The French text declared that the joint jurisdiction should only last until such time as the frontier should be delimited; but the Chinese version did not include any such stipulation. A month later Russia hastened to secure a delimitation of her frontiers in a form the legality of which could not be questioned. A supplementary treaty concluded at Peking finally established the Russian right to the north bank of the Amur and to the Ussuri territory. "Henceforth the eastern frontier of the two countries shall extend from the confluence of the Shilka and Erguné [Argun] Rivers down the Amur to its junction with the Ussuri River. The country to the north belongs to Russia, and that to the south, as far as the mouth of the Ussuri, to China. The rivers Ussuri and Sung-a-ch'a shall be the boundary of the two countries from the mouth of the Ussuri southwards to Lake Khanka. The country to the east of these two rivers belongs to Russia, to the west of these two rivers to China. From the source of the Sung-a-ch'a River the frontier line of the two countries crosses Lake Khanka to the Pai-ling River, and from the mouth of the Pai-ling River along the mountain range to the mouth of the Hu-pu-t'u River, and from the mouth of the Hu-pu-t'u River down the Hun-ch'un River and along the range of mountains between that river and the sea to the mouth of the Tumên River. All to the east of this belongs to Russia, all to the west to China. The frontier line of the two countries meets the Tumên River at about twenty *li* from its mouth."

By a stroke of the pen the whole of the territory north of the Amur thus became indisputably Russian, while the

Maritime Province extending southwards as far as the borders of Korea also passed into Russian hands. Moreover, Russian diplomacy had gained advantages beyond those set forth in the supplementary treaty. Among other things, the original Aigun Treaty stipulated that the Amur, the Sungari, and the Ussuri Rivers should not be opened to the navigation of any but Russian and Chinese vessels. This provision was not included in the supplementary treaty, but as Russia maintains that the Aigun Treaty is a legal document the clause remains in operation to this day. At the close of the recent war the Japanese sought to obtain some modification; but their representations were not entertained. Thus, as early as 1858, Russia obtained an important concession in Manchuria. For, while the Amur and the Ussuri may perhaps be termed boundary rivers, it must not be forgotten that the Sungari is a waterway of the first importance in Northern Manchuria. It was upon the banks of the Sungari that Russia, when in later years her position in Manchuria was strengthened by the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, built the important junction city of Harbin. It will be seen that for centuries past Russian diplomacy no less than Russian enterprise has been directed towards the East. To recapitulate—first the Cossack adventurers penetrated to the banks of the Amur, where they met a race of people who were at that time no less virile than themselves. Frontier incidents ensued, leading to the opening of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Then the Russian explorers followed the great Amur which winds its way thousands of miles until it enters the waters of the Pacific in the uttermost East. Meanwhile Russian navigators had discovered Alaska, had explored the Siberian sea-board far to the south and east, and had founded stations and settlements including the now important town of Nicolaivsk, at the mouth of the Amur. Again diplomacy set the seal upon the work of pioneers. But as Russian enterprise extended far eastwards, simultaneously it stretched out towards the south, the south where the climate was kindlier, the plains more fertile, and where, out of the reach of the icy grip of Arctic winter, the tide ebbed and flowed the whole year round. No wonder they trekked their way over

the snow steppes, and across the mountain ranges of the north, the north where mid-winter makes even of the sea a still and silent plain. No wonder the warm rays of the sun pointed a path and lighted their way to the south. The events of this period settled once and for all the destiny of the Russian Empire; and it is writ in the scheme of things to come that Russia who over-lords in the north the world's territory to its farthestmost limits in the Pacific shall stretch the hand of the conqueror far to the south where, in more beneficent climes, all things thrive and prosper at all times and at all seasons of the year.

The policy of Russia during the last two hundred years has been a consistent one. In this respect it has also been conspicuous. For, whereas the scattered territorial possessions of other nations in the Far East bear evidence rather of the political expediency of the moment than of settled and far-seeing policy, Russia can proudly boast of an Empire consolidated and continuous, an Empire that stretches from west to east, and which casts its shadows far away to the south until, as it were, they are reflected in the warm waters of the Pacific. Russia has undeniably won her right to this position. Her people have penetrated into a land of which it could well be said that it was a No Man's Land. There they have planted the Russian flag and the territory has become indisputably Russian. As far as the eastern limits of these vast territories were concerned Japan was, if anything, in a better position to effect a conquest. But Japan chose the parochial policy of isolation, whereas the aim of Russia was essentially a proud and an imperial one. It was the advance of Russia more than of any other Power that told Japan that she could not be in the world while refusing to be of the world. Recent events were clearly foreshadowed in the bygone years. In 1858-59 a Russian admiral obtained from Korea the coaling station of Port Hamilton, and demanded from China the cession of the whole of Manchuria. While he acted without official sanction, and therefore did not obtain the frank support of his Government, there was no doubt that he pointed the way to ultimate Russian policy in the Far East. When, several years later, the Russians plainly proposed that the island of Tsushima, which lies at the very gates of Japan, should be

ceded ; when, twelve years afterwards, Japan was compelled to relinquish sovereignty in Saghalien in exchange for the useless Kurile Islands, the eyes of the Japanese people were opened, and they saw for the first time the true significance of their position on the map of the world. And when a score or more years later Russia realised her dream of reaching the Pacific through Manchuria, Japan was ready to wage war with her.

Large as was Japan's gain in that successful campaign, it was insignificant when we compare it with all that she had lost during her years of slumber. On the few occasions that she had emerged from her isolation—those occasions when her marauders sailed to the coast of Fokien—she, too, like the Russians, went southward and was checked by the Chinese as the Russians were checked by the Manchus. Had she chosen to turn northwards she might have been mistress of half that territory known to-day as the Siberian continent, and there she might have met and fought the Russians instead of meeting and fighting them in Manchuria as she was destined to do centuries later. She awakened in time to check Russia, but the check she administered was not by any means the first which Russia had received in her progress southward. History shows that although Russia may be checked, never will she be thwarted. She has gone from west to east, and she will go from north to south. And Russian policy has been justified again and again. While she has experienced severe reverses from time to time, never has she been thrown back on her original position. Even her defeats have ended in gain, and after each of these she has waited her opportunity, and prepared her way for yet another step forward. Her advance is slow, but it is as sure as fate. The result of the war with Japan has caused her to study anew the position in the Far East, and the outcome is the determination to build the Amur line. It is all part of her southward policy, for the Amur line will spread Russian influence and Russian prosperity on both sides of the great river—in North Manchuria as well as in Eastern Siberia.

It may be well to review at the outset the present railway situation in the Far East. Russia has the Siberian Railway

in her own indisputable possession as far as the town of Manchuria, a town situated on the western border of the great territory from which it takes its name. From this point the line merges into the Chinese Eastern Railway which crosses Manchuria and, joining the Russian system at the Manchu-Primorskaya frontier, finds its terminus at Vladivostock. From Harbin the Chinese Eastern Railway continues southwards to Dalny and Port Arthur. A branch line on the border of the Maritime Province (Primorskaya) connects Vladivostock with the town of Khabarovsk, and is, of course, as indisputably Russian as the Siberian Railway proper which terminates at the town of Manchuria. Work was actually begun on the first section of the Amur Railway, starting at Nerchinsk, but at a later date it was decided that the line should join the Karimskaya-Stretensk branch at a point in the neighbourhood of the Kwenga river. At Kharbarovsk it will link up to the Ussuri railway, thus completing communication, through all-Russian territory, with Vladivostock. Construction has been divided into four sections, in regard to which the following details may be of interest :—

	Distance.	Progress.
Kwenga-Ourium .	183 versts . .	Open for traffic in 1910.
Ourium-Kerak .	621 versts . .	To be completed in the year 1913.
Kerak-Dia . .	638 versts . .	Work begun; date of completion unknown.
Dia-Khabarovsk .	480 versts . .	To be completed in 1915.

Owing to difficulties inseparable from pioneer work in an unexplored country, the construction of the line has been seriously retarded. The extremes of temperature to be met with in the region traversed cause intense hardship to the workmen employed. Heavy rains, resembling those experienced in tropical countries, are followed in the winter by Arctic weather. As the hard surface gradually thaws it is converted into a cold marsh in which, standing knee deep, the men are compelled to work. Blasting operations undertaken in the winter, in order to clear the way for a permanent track, involve elaborate engineering works for draining the land. The rule that no Chinese shall be employed has been strictly adhered to, and therefore all labour is imported from

European Russia, thus presenting an economic problem of no mean order. For strategical reasons, the route was carried as far north of the Amur as practicable. The last section of the line—that between Dia and Khabarovsk—presents engineering difficulties of considerable magnitude. Here bridges have to be constructed over four rivers—the Zea, Burea, Arhara, and the great Amur itself. In this section also nine tunnels will be necessary, their total length being nearly 24,000 feet, while the longest, that which pierces the Uril and Mutnaya watershed, will not fall much short of a mile.

The total length of the railway will be, as already stated, about 1300 miles. Its importance lies in the fact that it provides a link necessary to create an all-Russian route, over 6000 miles long, from St. Petersburg and Moscow to the extreme east. A number of branch lines are also to be constructed, the most important being that to Blagoveshchensk, from which place an extension will in all probability be carried out with a view to establishing communication between the Amur and the Chinese Eastern Railway. Ultimately it is also proposed to build an extension to Nicolaievsk, a port of considerable commercial value, situated at the mouth of the Amur. Nor do these developments embrace the whole scheme of railway enterprise in contemplation. According to a report by the American Consul at Vladivostock, the total expenditure to be incurred will reach a sum approximating two hundred millions sterling. A South Siberian railway is to be built from Uralsk *viâ* Orenburg, Orsk, Akomlinsk, Semipalatinsk, and Barnaul, linking up with the main line at the river Ob. From Akmolinsk there is to be a branch line to Petropaulovsk, situated on the main line. During the last few years the approaches to the Siberian system from European Russia have been considerably improved. Whereas formerly the only route was that *viâ* Moscow, it is now possible to proceed from St. Petersburg through Viatka, Perm, Ekaterinburg, Tiumen, to Omsk on the Siberian Railway. Moreover, additional bridges are being built across the Volga, and links made with existing railways which, generally speaking, will have the effect of shortening the route to Siberia, facilitating the movements of troops, and assisting colonisation and commercial develop-

ment. As the result of improvements already completed, it is possible to make the journey of 5500 miles over the Siberian system in a few hours under nine days. Then Russia is already insisting that China shall grant a concession for a railway from Kiakhta, which it is intended shall be linked up in the north with the circum-Baikal system, and in the south with the Peking-Kalgan system. When this enterprise is realised, the route between Paris and Peking will be 5600 miles, and it will then be possible to make the journey from London to Peking in eight and a half days.

Combining the Amur with the Siberian and the Chinese Eastern Railway, Russia will have, in actual possession or control, an enormous circle of railway passing through Baikalia, Amur, Northern Manchuria, and her Maritime Province. Twenty-five years hence China has the option of purchasing the whole of the Manchurian lines from both Russia and Japan, and this factor, no doubt, had great weight with the advisers of the Tsar in their decision to construct the Amur Railway. They reasoned that should China exercise this option, and the Amur Railway not be built, the Ussuri line through the Maritime Province from Vladivostock to Khabarovsk would be rendered useless from a strategical point of view. The question whether China will or will not exercise her option to take over the Manchurian lines is bound up with the whole problem of the future of Manchuria, which will be found fully discussed elsewhere. It is sufficient here to say that the fact that China possesses such option, combined with the additional fact that, under the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, neither Russia nor Japan can use the Manchurian lines for the movement of troops and munitions of war, is held by the Tsar's advisers to be ample justification for the construction of the Amur Railway—the all-Russian line connecting the capital with Vladivostock.

In the meantime, it is clear that Russia had by no means the worst of the railway bargain which was the result of the war. By the rights which she secured in Northern Manchuria, she retained the direct route to Vladivostock. On the other hand, she lost two blue-water ports, Dalny and Port Arthur, and all the valuable mineral and other

resources of Southern Manchuria, to say nothing of the prospect of obtaining paramount influence in Korea. But her Far Eastern venture was not wholly without its fruit. Russia is better off in some respects to-day than she was before she forced her way into Manchuria. Although she has surrendered her access to the two southern harbours, she is still in possession of a line of railway (the Chinese Eastern Railway) leading to a port, Vladivostock, which can be kept open all the year round by means of ice-breakers. This line of railway, moreover, passes through an immense area of Chinese territory where Russia's right of entry was formerly of a dubious nature, but where she now stays, as far as the line and its environs are concerned, with the full accord of Japan and of all the Powers. In other words, Russia, even after defeat in a great war, retained a cherished route to the sea, and she retained it with an authority infinitely stronger than that which she previously possessed. Japan, on the other hand, won rights over a section of line leading northward only to the Russian section, and ultimately to Russian territory.

Assuming that in twenty-five years the Manchurian railways are solely in Chinese hands¹—a possibility that at present seems exceedingly remote—Russia would fall back on Baikal, the Amur, and the Maritime Provinces, while Japan would retire to the Kwantung Peninsula and Korea. With the retrocession of the railways would disappear those exclusive privileges at present possessed by both Powers, and unless the agreements were extended or other concessions secured they would enjoy no advantages in these regions beyond those held by other countries under the most favoured nation clause. Were China permitted to exercise her right of purchase, Russia would possess a compensating factor in the Amur Railway. Whereas formerly she was in the Far East tentatively and timorously, so to speak, she will be found there in the future determinedly, masterfully. The vastly spacious territories of Baikal and Amur are destined to become Russian in more than right and name, for they are being systematically colonised, and their resources are in pro-

¹ Since the above was written Russia and Japan, anticipating events, are considering measures for the complete absorption of Manchuria.

cess of steady development. If in the future trouble arises in Manchuria, it can scarcely be doubted that Russia will not hesitate to put the Chinese Eastern Railway to such use as she may deem necessary in the exigencies of the moment, and with this line, which has already proved its value to her, and the Amur Railway, her position in Manchuria would be found to be incomparably more formidable than it was on the last occasion upon which it was contested. It will be objected that these considerations place the Amur Railway at once upon a strategical basis. This is an aspect of the project which will be dealt with later; but assuredly it is difficult to see how such a line could be constructed without strategy entering largely into the matter.

The conception of a railway across the Amur province was no new one. The linking of the capital with Vladivostock by a line joining the Siberian Railway and following the courses of the Schilka and the Amur had long been thought of as an alternative to the Chinese Eastern route. As a matter of fact, had Russia failed in 1896 to obtain a special convention with China permitting the Siberian Railway to continue its course across Chinese territory, the system was then to have been carried along the northern bank of the Amur to Khabarovsk, where it would have joined the Ussuri line which towards the close of 1897 connected that place with Vladivostock. The route through Manchuria was chosen in preference because it had superior commercial advantages and covered a shorter distance. The Amur Railway Bill was passed by the Duma on April 14, 1908, the measure having survived vigorous opposition. The line will be, as already stated, about 1300 miles long, and the Russian Finance Minister has asked for 300,000,000 roubles—roughly, about £30,000,000—for its construction. The estimates, of course, vary. Count Witte, who opposed the project, asserts that the cost will be £32,000,000. The Russian *Strana* thought the official estimate would be far exceeded, as in the case of the Siberian Railway which was estimated to cost 49,000 roubles per verst, but which actually cost 85,000 roubles per verst. The Manchurian Railway was still more costly, for it cost 152,000 roubles per verst, “and luckily for the contractors,” said the *Strana*, “the accounts were destroyed

in the Boxer troubles." The estimates of the party favouring the scheme were much lower, but the 300,000,000 roubles asked for by the Finance Minister must be accepted for the present as the cost of the railway. The line will give Russia the distinction of possessing the longest railway in the world. The trans-Siberian Railway, in its course from Moscow to the town of Manchuria (where, as stated, it joins the Chinese Eastern Railway), is 4232 miles long. The junction of the Siberian and Amur lines will be several hundred miles nearer Moscow than that of the Siberian and Chinese Eastern lines—the town of Manchuria, but the former route to Vladivostock will, of course, be longer than the latter. The all-Russian line from Moscow to Vladivostock will probably be some 6000 miles long. It is possible, although the route will be longer than the existing one, that the Amur Railway may shorten in actual time the journey between Europe and the Far East; for whereas the Chinese Eastern Railway is but a single line, the new system is to be double-tracked throughout, thus providing facilities for the institution of a fast service of expresses. Moreover, it is not unlikely that the Russian railway authorities may so arrange their schedule as to give the all-Russian trains the advantage.

The leading objections to the Amur Railway project in Russia were that the line was calculated to irritate Russia's Far Eastern neighbours; that it would arrest internal progress and measures of army reorganisation; that the survey was conducted hurriedly during the winter; and that the line was planned practically without maps. The opposition itself was divided. It was said, on the one hand, that the line should not be constructed because its purpose was essentially strategic, and because it was therefore a menace to the peace of the world; on the other hand, the line was opposed on the ground that it was strategically useless. Above all was heard the cry that the expenditure was reckless in view of Russia's financial position. The Finance Minister said blandly, however, that there was money enough for all pressing improvements, provided nothing unforeseen occurred and no costly domestic reforms were undertaken for the next few years. In other words, money could be found for the Amur Railway if for nothing else. In addition

to the 300,000,000 roubles for the Amur Railway, the Finance Minister asked for 200,000,000 roubles for doubling the track of the existing trans-Siberian Railway, and 300,000,000 for bringing the army supplies up to the standard. The Cabinet sought to reassure the Committee of the Council of the Empire by the promise that the passage of the Amur Railway Bill would be regarded by the Government as authorisation to build only one section, after which the matter would be referred again to the Chambers. It is difficult to conceive how an undertaking of this description could appease the opposition, because Russia is as deeply committed to the whole scheme by the construction of one section as if assent to the whole had been obtained in black and white in the first instance.¹

The Amur Railway must be regarded frankly as strategical in its main purpose. Any other view of it would be adopted in ignorance of the facts. At the same time, in justification of the construction of the line, a very good case can be made out for the development of the unexplored but not unsuspected resources of the two vast provinces of Baikal and Amur. "Russia," it has been well said, "is too deeply committed in her valuable Pacific provinces to leave them beyond the reach of the unifying locomotive." Nor is there need to see in the project the signs of feverish preparations for a dramatic war of revenge against the newly awakened Empire which seeks to dominate the Far East. As the *Times* observed, "It is sufficient for onlookers to recognise that, if the scheme is adventurous and perhaps rather reckless from the financial point of view, it is probably necessary; that it should tend to add to the world's supply of corn and gold; and that there is no need to peer behind the strictly peaceful assurances with which it is introduced." Inflammatory speeches, of course, have been made about this project as they are made about all similar ones. The following sentences, addressed to the Duma by the reporter of the Committee of National Defences, M. Savitch, was a sample: "We came to the unanimous decision that this line must be built without delay, and that we must complete it by or in 1912. We must also lay down the second track within

¹ Since the above was written, work has been started on all sections of the line.

the same time. . . . For we note that the strategic and political situation in the Far East has changed somewhat since the war—that our neighbours are sparing neither efforts nor means to increase their armed strength. Against whom those forces are aimed we do not, of course, know. But at all events we perceive that China is arming . . . Japan is arming, and, as we gather, the programme of Japan's military preparations will have been carried out precisely in 1912."

As far as the fear of the arming of China was concerned, M. Savitch was needlessly alarmed. It will be many years—certainly the result will not be achieved in the present generation—before the Chinese army will be able to risk a conflict with any chance of success against a first-class Power. Nor is the militarism of China an aggressive militarism. It is one of development and defence, and it will remain influenced for many decades by the Chinese character which is essentially peace-loving. It is not generally understood in Europe that the progressive movement in China is a process quite different from that which the last forty years has witnessed in Japan. China can have no territorial aspirations. Her Empire is sufficiently large to contain the ambitions of any race, and the progressive forces now at work are directed solely towards preserving and rendering efficient that which she possesses. In short, her awakening is in the way of internal development, and is essentially educational and industrial. The case of Japan was entirely different. Her aspirations always have been imperial, and the character of her people remains essentially militant. For her own obvious ends, Japan will see to it that her neighbour China does not become a powerful nation ; Russia need have no fear on this score.

Nor can it be believed that Russia has any such fear. Her concern is for the protection of her own territories, and her immediate desire is for preparedness against any covert or overt act of her recent enemy, Japan. Briefly, the Amur Railway project is evidence of a determination to relieve her dependence upon the trans-Manchurian Railway, and to escape the harassing limitations imposed upon that railway by the Portsmouth Peace Treaty. "If," according to one

Russian authority, "the Japanese are developing the railway system in Southern Manchuria and Korea, if they are perfecting the means of communication so as to facilitate the transport of troops to the seat of the last war, it is natural that the Russians in their turn should wish to make their communication sure. The construction of the Amur line is an attempt to solve the problem, and unless the line be built the Manchurian line cannot be defended, and Russia will have to retire to the Baikal. One may admit that the building of a Japanese railway from Gensan to the Tumên River exposes the Marine region and Vladivostock line to some additional risk."

To return to M. Savitch's observations, there is assuredly more ground for his statement that Japan is arming (such ground is fully stated elsewhere in this work) than there is for the rather sensational deduction which is drawn from M. Savitch's observations by Dr. Dillon, the St. Petersburg correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*: "In 1912, therefore, the tug of war is expected—only seven years after the Portsmouth Treaty! The bill and the pleas in its favour are, therefore, a half-stifled cry of alarm. The Tsar's advisers are inaugurating a policy which gives the lie to the solemn statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs who told the nation that, thanks to the Conventions he had signed, peace in the Far East was guaranteed for many years to come." The peace of the world is assisted but not assured by treaties; it has proved over and over again to be secured most efficiently by the preparedness of all nations to defend their own possessions. And this preparedness is Russia's present and frankly avowed aim. A policy which ignored the severing of strategic communication with Vladivostock by land (the Portsmouth Treaty having deprived Russia of the right of transporting troops and war material over the Chinese Eastern Railway); a policy which, in the event of the purchase of the trans-Manchurian line by China, would isolate the valuable Maritime Province; a policy which would leave undefended and undeveloped Russia's vast territory of Eastern Siberia—such a policy could only be described as a tacit relinquishment of rights that have been dearly won. Port Arthur and Dalny lost to Russia, Vladivostock remains her only outlet in the Far

East. In the event of another war, Vladivostock would occupy a position of strategic importance similar to that held by Port Arthur in the late conflict. Vladivostock would be Russia's naval base. Assuming that the Russian fleet suffered defeat, Japan would be in a position to blockade the port. Assuming, furthermore, that the Russian fleet were only partially disabled, and that it were possible still to harass and employ the enemy, though not to engage in an open sea-fight, Japan could yet maintain an effective blockade of all the narrow straits and channels leading to the Sea of Japan, and thus to Vladivostock. Moreover, the fact that in winter Vladivostock can be kept open only by means of ice-breakers renders transport and navigation difficult. All these circumstances combine to emphasise the necessity of efficient land communication if Russia is not some day to be called upon to surrender her solitary Far Eastern port, a surrender which must inevitably be accompanied by that of an admittedly richly cultivated province.

Yet for that sacrifice the opponents of the Amur Railway project in Russia were prepared. "Could the two provinces," asked Dr. Dillon, speaking of Baikal and Amur, and apparently including the Maritime Province, "be left undefended on the off-chance that Japan would not be tempted to appropriate them?" His own answer, "Undoubtedly," is difficult to accept. In the Peace Treaty which was wrung out of Russia as a result of the war in Manchuria she granted to Japanese subjects rights of fishery along the coast of the Russian possessions in the Japan, Okhotsk, and Behring Seas, since which time Japanese influence has grown considerably in this region. The fact is that no wise statesmanship leaves anything to chance, and especially to that worst form of chance, off-chance. Russia has many historical precedents to guide her policy; she has in mind, no doubt, the bitter experience of her friend and ally France, and she remembers Alsace and Lorraine. If ever a country had ground for caution, and her statesmen need of strategic foresight, such justification is here forthcoming. For in the first place Japan, through her possession of Korea, comes into actual possession of a frontier over which she may step into Russian territory; and she is in a position to have

naval bases on the coast of Korea, not a day's steam from Vladivostock. Moreover, the island of Saghalien, of which Japan now occupies the southern half, lies closely parallel to the north-eastern coast-line of the Maritime Province, a proximity which would have necessitated in any case the fortification of Alexandrovsk and Nikolaievsk. Were none of these considerations held to be substantial in themselves, it must be remembered that Russia has had an unpleasant experience to guide her. She bears in mind that it is not Japan's way to give long notice of her belligerent intentions. She remembers the torpedo attack upon her fleet in Port Arthur before the declaration of war, an attack which, delivered when she was unready, crippled her navy during the whole course of hostilities; nor has she forgotten the destruction of her ships in the neutral harbour of Chemulpo, and the previous mysterious severance of the wires in Korea which held back her messages instructing those ships to return to Port Arthur. Finally, her statesmen were fully acquainted with the popular demand in Japan, on the eve of the peace negotiations, for the cession of the Maritime Province, or, as an alternative, the disarmament of Vladivostock. Circumstances like these have convinced the Tsar's advisers, if not their critics, that the Eastern Siberian Provinces cannot be left undefended "on the off-chance that Japan would not be tempted to appropriate them." It is unnecessary to contest Dr. Dillon's dictum that "It is a mistake to suppose that whatever is not adequately guarded will necessarily be stolen." In his support of this dictum by the statement that the British Colonies are nowhere adequately defended, he overlooked the existence of the navy, which is maintained at its overpowering strength for this especial purpose and the existence of Colonial forces which are the pride not only of the Colonies, but of the whole Empire. But Dr. Dillon proceeded: "Suppose, for argument's sake, that Japan, heedless of what the world said, invaded and wrested the Amur region and Transbaikalia. What then? Let her. Russia need not acquiesce in the accomplished fact, and her just resentment would hang like a Damocles' sword over the head of Japan, one day to fall with dire effects. Russia can subsist and thrive even after the temporary—it would only be the temporary—loss of the

two provinces." In reply to this it must be said that no Power can view with equanimity the possibility of losing vast provinces; and the fact that such provinces can be recovered does not in any way strengthen the argument of the critics of the Amur Railway scheme.

It is not to be supposed that Baikalia and Amur with their thriving settlements and their buried treasure would be surrendered in the first instance without a struggle. Bearing in mind that the conquest of Primorskaya would be a necessary prelude to the annexation of the territories lying to the west, could it be conceived for a moment that the Russian army would tamely walk out of the strong fortress of Vladivostock; that guns, munitions, and ships would be delivered to the Japanese without a shot being fired; that the Ussuri Railway, the large towns, and the fisheries of the Maritime Province would be surrendered to the enemy without a murmur? Such a retreat would be a confession to the whole world that Russia had been driven out of the Far East by Japan, and Russia's prestige and financial credit in Europe would be reduced to the level of those of a second-class Power. No one who has studied the history of Russia, or who is acquainted with the character of the Russian people, could believe that such an ignominious retreat were possible. The proud boast of Russia, as a result of the Portsmouth Treaty, was that neither had she surrendered an inch of territory nor paid a kopeck of Russian money in the form of an indemnity; and this record she is not likely to blemish.

It is clear, then, that Russia must be prepared to defend her Eastern provinces. It is equally clear that the Amur Railway is essential to the defence of those provinces. As to whether or not these territories will ever be assailed, she has only past experience to influence her; and let it be remembered that in her case this past experience has been a bitter one. Certainly she is less likely to be assailed if the provinces are defended than if they are left undefended. If the line were not constructed now, it would certainly have to be undertaken in stages if the loss of the Eastern provinces was to be only temporary, as Dr. Dillon suggested. The building of the Amur Railway, indeed, becomes a peace measure of the first importance by contrast with the suggestion of a terrible conflict to recover territory,

section by section, the loss of which can probably be averted by the adoption of ordinary defensive measures. But if there is to be war because of the construction of the line, and war also if it is not constructed, it occurs to the writer that the former alternative is likely to be not only the more economical, but also the more merciful. For Russia will have the benefit of the development of the resources of the opened territory, and a war fought with the advantage of the facilities which the railway will afford is likely to be shorter and sharper than one fought for the recovery of territories already strongly held by an enemy. But when all is said that can be said on the one side or on the other, the circumstances, plainly stated, are that an Empire must protect and secure every inch of its territory; that the right of Russia to build the Amur Railway on her own ground cannot be disputed; and that it is only a menace to the peace of the world if some party other than Russia cares to take up a quarrel. It is, furthermore, a broad and accepted principle of modern statecraft that no civilised and progressive country should leave undeveloped and out of reach a vast expanse of its territories. The pace and tendency of real progress demands that States as well as individuals shall realise the utmost worth of their valuable heritages. Such realisation is but the operation of the policy of foresight, the policy which works, not for one generation, but for all generations.

A point of objection might with some reason be urged that the railway would assist Russia, if she were so disposed, to attempt the recovery of her lost influence in Manchuria. The Amur Railway would certainly enable her speedily to concentrate large armies on the area of former conflict. The single track of the Siberian Railway made it possible for her, by the end of the recent war, to oppose the Japanese with nearly one million men, well armed, well equipped, and well fed. With the Siberian Railway double-tracked to its juncture with the Amur Railway—also double-tracked—and with the freedom of movement which comes from an efficiently guarded and wholly Russian-owned line of communication, Russia could place in the field two or three million men, while her plans for depôt arrangements show that if necessity arises she will lack nothing in the way of a plentiful commissariat and supply of munitions. If it

should be said by critics that any scheme which provides for the placing of several millions of men in the field by Russia is in its essence aggressive, the explanation can be made that Japan has set the pace by decreasing the period of conscription from three years to two years in order to increase the numbers of trained men, and that she herself is preparing, in the event of war at any time, to place two million men in the field.

During the campaign of 1904-5 the useful working of the Siberian system, within the limits of its facilities, surprised the railway engineers of the world, and impressed military experts who had made lines of communication their special study. This railway was, in fact, the one feature of the war in regard to which Russia received unqualified praise. But the fact could not be ignored that the line was a single one, and the passenger service had to be suspended almost wholly in view of military needs. The troops, moreover, were transported with the least degree of comfort in ordinary box-waggons, nor was it until the end of the war that Russia was in a position to oppose Japan with anything approaching an equality of forces. She is unlikely to expose herself again to the risks which she ran in consequence of the inadequacy of her railway facilities. Hence the Amur scheme becomes a thoroughly practical one in military strategy, and, as military strategy is dictated by the interests of an Empire, must be held to be justifiable and patriotic from the Russian point of view. The Amur Railway in itself infringes no international rights. Inasmuch as it gives facilities for Russian aggression, it is a project of international interest; but it cannot be one of international complaint. And no good purpose can be served by alarmist speculation based on a supposition of any other motives for its construction than the frankly admitted ones of securing a reliable connection between the capital and Vladivostock, and the protection of three valuable provinces together with the development of their industries and resources.

Certainly the defensive character of the railway is undeniable, in view of the public statement of the Minister of Railways that, "congruously with the representations made by the War Department, the line must be able, without having recourse to sidings between the principal halting-places, to

run nine pairs of trains daily for permanent needs, but as soon as the sidings and branch lines are opened, twenty pairs of trains must ply, among them one pair for passenger traffic, and nineteen military trains." At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war only seven trains could pass over the Siberian Railway daily, but subsequently, in consequence of the capable management of Prince Khiloff, who was in charge of the communications and the construction of sidings, the service was increased to twenty trains. According to one estimate, when the Siberian track is completely doubled and the Amur Railway built, it will be possible to send daily over the lines four regiments of infantry and four of cavalry, or two brigades of artillery with 25,000 reliefs. The fact, however, that the system is capable of quickly transporting a grand army to the Far East is in itself no evidence of military aggression.

The opponents of the Amur Railway have made much of the cost that will be involved in defending the line. Nikolaievsk, Khabarovsk, Blagovestchensk, and Vladivostock must be fortified, and, according to one estimate, the cost of each will be "hundreds of millions of roubles." Vladivostock is already a fortress, and in view of the lessons learnt at Port Arthur, it is clear that, in any case, a large sum of money would have to be spent in improving and adding to the defences of Russia's only outlet of importance in the Far East. The fortifying of Nikolaievsk was a sequel to the stipulations of the Portsmouth Peace Treaty, and would be necessary even if the Amur Railway were not to be built. With regard to other defensive measures, these are essential to the strategic value of the line. Until the provinces are thoroughly developed, railway guards will be stationed along the route, for banditti and the forces of lawlessness must be reckoned with in regions so remote. It is evident that Russia's plan for consolidating interests in the Far East is proceeding in advance of the Amur Railway. Simultaneously with the decision to construct the line, it was announced that the Governor of Primorskaya would reside at Khabarovsk; that a special command with the full powers of a governor-generalship was to be created at Vladivostock; and that the whole of Russian Saghalien was to be placed under the control of a special governor.

Among the contentions put forward by the opponents of the scheme is that the railway will create such a situation as will necessitate the stationing of a strong Pacific Squadron at Vladivostock. This precaution, as well as others which have been seized upon as telling against the project on the score of expense, would be urgently needed, independently of the railway, if Russia is to keep the Eastern provinces under her own flag. Then we are told that Japan does not want another war, and that, in view of her *post-bellum* financial difficulties, she cannot indulge in the expensive luxury of territorial aggrandisement. Leaving out of consideration, for the time being, the undeniable facts that Japan is arming and that owing to the advantages she obtained as a result of her late war with Russia, she would, should occasion again arise, be able to strike more effectively and economically at her old enemy, it is not reasonable to suppose that a great Power like Russia could allow herself to remain in such a position of weakness in the Far East as to be at the mercy of any demands or representations that Japan might put forward. Again, it has been argued that the Amur line cannot be completed within the period stipulated; but is not this all the more reason for the work being expedited, since every year delayed gives Japan another year in which to restore her financial position?

Yet another point urged by the critics is that because the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway was one of the principal causes of war the Amur Railway will have a similarly evil inspiration. It is to be borne in mind, however, that the Chinese Eastern Railway crossed alien territory, and had as termini the two Chinese ports of Port Arthur and Dalny, both of which passed into Russian possession, and one of which was fortified as a Russian naval base. This was a situation admittedly delicate, and one not to be compared with the construction of the Amur Railway over indisputably Russian territory to an indisputably Russian port.

The opinion of Japan, as represented by its leading newspapers, will give a better indication of the necessity of the railway than the views that have been advanced in detail nearer home. The *Nichi Nichi*, an important newspaper owned and conducted by a former Minister for Foreign

Affairs, dealt with the matter at some length. This journal thought that the railway was purely strategical, and added that an enormous increase in carrying capacity would be available should the Russian army one day make use of the new system. "The line, working in concert with the Manchurian line," said the *Nichi Nichi*, "will give Russia two great highways through Siberia to the Pacific. The extravagance of the scheme is, however, glaring when the financial difficulties of the Russian Government are considered."

Later, the journal contrasted what it termed the "nervous petty activity" of Japan with "the slow, steady strides which the Russians maintain even after their recent defeat and troubled domestic condition," and referred to the justification which the Russians have in this "conscious confidence and pride in race."

The *Jiji*, another leading Japanese paper, owned and controlled by the son-in-law of Count Hayashi, formerly Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister to Great Britain, frankly welcomed the construction of the Amur line. While believing that the aim of the projectors was purely military, it considered that the scheme would develop the rich resources of the Amur province, and would lead to an increase of Russo-Japanese trade relations. The principal newspaper in Ōsaka, which is the first industrial centre in Japan, considered that the vital question in connection with the new railway was its necessity. If the same ambitious end accompanied the present project, the journal would dissuade the Russians from the repetition of the folly. But if the exploitation of the much neglected but rich resources of the Amur region were aimed at, it certainly would be worth the execution.

At any rate, let it be said that the attitude of the Japanese towards the railway is fairer than that assumed by many Western critics. They believe that the route traversed lies through a country presenting rich possibilities in the way of development, and that whatever may be the ulterior motive which in the main animates the projectors, the scheme possesses a positively commercial value, and is strictly within Russia's rights. As the Japanese have a very sound knowledge of the whole of the resources of the East, their opinion must be held to carry weight.

XVIII

PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC: THE ECONOMIC POTENTIALITIES OF THE AMUR RAILWAY

IN the preceding chapter the need of the Amur Railway for the purposes of military expediency has been fully demonstrated. The opponents of the scheme have, however, confidently prophesied that the line will be an economic failure. It will be remembered that a similar view was held in certain quarters in regard to the Siberian Railway; and although this system has by no means proved a paying concern, who can say that, in providing an overland route from West to East, Russia has not advanced her prestige as a great Power, and, in a wider sense, contributed to the interests of the world at large? Apart from these considerations, sufficient in themselves to justify a project of such magnitude, the line has led to great development in Siberia, and has paved the way for the realisation of other useful schemes, notably the Amur Railway itself. This latter will pass through the eastern part of Transbaikalia and the whole of the vast Amur Province, and it will establish communication with the Ussuri district which is admittedly one of the most fertile territories in the whole of the world. The enormous extent of country which it is confidently expected the railway will develop may be seen at a glance from the following figures showing the area of the two provinces: Transbaikalia, 236,868 square miles; Amur, 172,848 square miles. The Amur Province alone contains upwards of 50,000 square miles in excess of the area of the British Isles. The line, on entering it, will follow the course of one of the most magnificent waterways in the world. Formed by the confluence of the Shilka and the Argun, the latter tracing its source far into Mongolia, the Amur winds its way through

1,600 miles of rugged country until, on the eastern limits of the Siberian continent, it enters the Gulf of Tartary. It is navigable throughout its whole course, and steamers of 16-foot draught can proceed upwards of 150 miles above Khabarovsk. It is possible for steam craft of lighter draught to proceed not only along the entire course of the Amur, but also a further distance of 300 miles along the Shilka. In winter the frozen Amur presents a magnificent ice-road for sledge traffic. Through the medium of tributaries the influence of this great river is widespread in the area of Northern Asia. The principal affluents are the Zeya—navigable for fully 300 miles and flowing from a region rich in gold-mines—upon which stands the prosperous city of Blagovestchensk; the Bureya, a navigable stream approximating 400 miles in length; the Sungari, upon which are situated the thriving towns of Harbin and Kirin and which, with a navigable course of 600 miles, ranks second in magnitude in these regions only to the great Amur itself; and finally, in the extreme east, there is the Ussuri, a waterway that is navigable for a distance of 300 miles and is of first importance in its relation to the Maritime Province. If the Amur is traced to its original source in Mongolia—that is to say, along the Argun and beyond—its length is 2700 miles, and it drains an area of 800,000 square miles. It is estimated that the navigable waters of its basin extend to no less than 5000 miles. In view of the projected railway, which, at a strategically safe distance, will follow the course of the Amur proper—that is, from the confluence of the Shilka and the Argun—the particulars I have given are singularly illuminating, for they show at a glance the enormous extent of territory which it is expected that the railway will develop. The opponents of the scheme, however, declare that from an economic point of view the enterprise cannot possibly be justified. They state that the line will traverse an uninhabited and waterless stretch of country which must long remain unproductive, and that, being “exclusively strategic,” it will be run at a loss estimated at about £600,000 yearly. Incidentally it may here be remarked that the preliminary surveys of the first section by no means bore out the statement that the country is waterless, while for the rest

it is difficult to understand how it can adequately be populated without the provision of proper railway facilities. The following passage, taken from an article written by Dr. Dillon, and which appeared in the columns of the *Daily Telegraph*, gives an outline of the objections to the scheme held in certain influential quarters in Russia :—

“In vain did the Premier and his colleagues try to show that the main purpose of the Government was economic and cultural. Their acts belied their words. The Amur country is an unknown land. Its conditions, geographical, climatic, and geological, have not yet been investigated. ‘We have owned that region now for fifty years,’ writes the semi-official *Rossia*, ‘and all that we know for certain about it is that we know nothing.’ A few gold-seeking expeditions explored certain districts, but published no observations. Its forests are extensive, but even though the timber could be used for shipbuilding, the cost of carriage by rail would be prohibitive. In Western Siberia there is abundance of such timber, but although railway communication exists there is no demand for it at the price. Even in the province of Archangel, which is near Western Europe, there are vast woods which lie unutilised because the cost of transport is prohibitive.

“Now take the other province—the Transbaikal region. One of the very few investigators who have written about this country describes it as consisting of mountain-chains broken by valleys which are covered with bogs or boulders. Even the lowest of these depressions is three-quarters of a mile above sea-level. The mean temperature there in mid-July at one in the afternoon is 59 degrees ; in winter it is 89½ degrees below zero. Spring commences in May, and night-frosts are already felt in June and July. In August winter and summer get uncomfortably mixed, sunrise bringing summer, while sundown ushers in winter. For there are 77 degrees of heat by day and 13 below zero by night ! A Briton can hardly realise what these fluctuations imply. In the very best soil the mould is but 3½ inches thick. Locomotion is well-nigh impossible, for the paths that exist in the *taiga* are the tracks of wild beasts. Only in winter can a vehicle move about, when the bogs and fens and rivers are frozen hard. True, M. Stolypin assured the Duma that the

marshiness of these regions would 'sink into the depths' when trodden on by man. And the deputies dutifully believed him. But even a Russian Premier cannot make a law of Nature."

It will be seen that the arguments advanced by Dr. Dillon refer almost exclusively to the Province of Transbaikalia. He ignores the possibilities of the Amur Province through which the railway will pass for its greater distance. He says rightly that inasmuch as the territory has not been properly explored these cannot be estimated. At the same time it must not be forgotten that certain clearly defined indications have been discovered which lend colour to the belief that as far as the Amur Province is concerned the railway will lead to material development. That, however, is an aspect of the scheme with which I shall deal later. For the present let us take Transbaikalia, the province which is peculiarly the subject of Dr. Dillon's criticism. Referring to the westerly region bounded by the rivers Nertcha and Kwenga, the official report, founded on a survey of 609 versts, said that "It consists of a high raised tableland destitute of forests and having the character of steppe. There is abundant water, and the country is said to be very well adapted to colonisation. At present it is sparsely populated by the Cossack peasants. In the valley of the Olow, coal has been discovered." Further, we read that the Kholbon fields, although discovered in 1887, were not exploited, owing to the want of a market, until 1903; that the burning of the coal gives an elongated flame with very little smoke; and that while only a twentieth part of the area of the coalfields is in process of development, the official estimate declares that this area alone contains 100,000,000 *pounds* of coal, and is capable of producing 5,000,000 *pounds* per annum.¹ In view of these facts the suggestion that Transbaikalia is a barren waste would appear to be founded upon ignorance. Furthermore, we are told by the official survey that "In the middle region—that is, the area contained between the rivers Kwenga and Tchernay—there are tracks of broken wooded and very picturesque lands. In crossing this country of luxuriant meadows it is hardly possible to imagine that it is uninhabited. The eye searches involuntarily for villages and

¹ *Pound* = 36 lbs.

farms and expects naturally to find them. Opinions differ, however, as to the agricultural value of the district. Some declare that it offers excellent conditions for colonisation and cattle-breeding, while others—but these are less numerous—declare that the frequent frosts render the country unsuitable for agriculture. The eastern region, situated between the rivers Tchernay and the Ourka, is the least promising of the districts so far surveyed. It contains some savage wastes, wooden and uneven—meadows are less frequently met with, and they are, moreover, cut by winding valleys deep and narrow. There are few roads, and these are bad; while in many places the soil never thaws under the moss which is a characteristic of the country." The official reports state that gold-seekers are the only inhabitants of the country. The whole of the mountain region crossed by the projected line abounds in stone, and it is stated that some of the sources of supply resemble "open quarries." "Granite, of all shades and variety of grain and containing mica," adds the survey, "is everywhere to be found in this region."

With regard to the suggestion that owing to the severity of the winter no water can be obtained during a long period of the year, the authorities propose to overcome this difficulty by raising the level of the water in the rivers, by constructing, wherever possible, reservoirs in the deep lakes, and by sinking artesian wells. This last method has provided a never-failing supply of water of excellent quality along the existing Transbaikalia Railway. The argument advanced by Dr. Dillon that the railway is impracticable because the country which it will traverse consists of mountain-chains broken by valleys which are covered with bogs or boulders, is not altogether borne out by the official survey. "Marshes, in the proper sense of the word," says this authoritative document, "do not occur in the district of the line. It passes in places over soil both mossy and damp. These are restricted to the broad and deep valleys. The softening of the soil rarely exceeds a depth of 2 feet 9 inches. The ground slopes sufficiently, however, to allow of satisfactory drainage. A number of areas along the Ussuri line, which, for the same reason, were impassable before the construction of the railway, are now transformed into luxuriant meadows. One of

the principal stations on the Chinese Eastern Railway was constructed on ground that was formerly marshy, but which is now quite dry." Dealing with the rise and fall of the rivers, another passage from the report says that "No systematic observations have been made concerning the rainfall in this part of the country. It is only known that the passing floods occasioned by torrential rains produce unexpected and impetuous currents." Referring to the measures of precaution to be taken against these floods the report continues: "It is not considered a matter of doubt that their application will amply suffice to keep the line free from all danger of damage. And this conviction is based on the fact that all the pillars of the bridges are calculated for a double track." From these quotations it is clear that the authorities anticipate that large areas of Transbaikalia will be converted into "luxuriant meadows" similar to those which are to be found in the fertile Ussuri country, and that the flooding of the rivers can be overcome by engineering skill. As far as Transbaikalia is concerned, therefore, it must be conceded that the railway is not only a link in a great strategic scheme, but is also an economic development of the highest importance. This, briefly, is the verdict of impartial Government experts who have thoroughly explored the ground, and not the opinions of publicists or politicians who seek to bring the advisability or otherwise of the scheme within the narrow circle of party strife. For in Russia there is a little Russia party just as there is in England a little England faction. Undoubtedly there are sufficient indications to warrant the belief that the provision of adequate railway facilities will lead to the material development of Transbaikalia.

Before dealing with other territories which the line will eventually traverse, it may be not inopportune to give some further details concerning the Transbaikalia section, taken from the official survey which the writer has been privileged to inspect. Looking at the map, it might have been thought that the best route for the Amur Railway was to continue the Transbaikal line from its terminus at Stretensk, following the courses of the Shilka and the Amur until the latter river begins to swerve towards the south-east and ceases to be the shortest way to Khabarovsk. As a matter of fact this would

be the shortest route for the Amur Railway, and none other was considered until the researches and surveys of 1906 which have resulted in the present scheme. All previous projects for the penetration of the Amur Province by railway have been based on the Amur Railway, being a continuation of the Transbaikal Railway, commencing at the point of the terminus of the latter in order to follow the valley of the Shilka. A more critical investigation of the matter in 1906, however, proved that the cost of building the railway along this route would exceed per kilometre that of the most expensive system in Russia, with the exception of the one encircling Lake Baikal, and, moreover, the route did not offer any particular advantages, in point of view of strategy, or of agricultural and other development, compared with the scheme adopted.

The engineers sought another route which would still make the line a continuation of the Transbaikal Railway. The difficulties of the problem with which they found themselves faced arose mainly, it may be said, from the lack of maps of the vast territory to be penetrated. No map existed upon which the proposed line could be satisfactorily traced, nor is there any map available to the public to-day, though one has been created, of course, by the engineers of the railway. As an instance of the work involved, it may be stated that in order to determine the general direction of the line for 608 versts with which we are dealing, preliminary surveys over a total of 1600 versts had to be made, and added to these were numerous barometrical investigations over the mountain passes and certain watercourses of less importance than those included in the exhaustive research just mentioned. And, as an example of the discoveries made, a river hitherto thought to have practically a straight course was found to have a very pronounced curve to the west. A decision to deviate from the Shilka was the result of the investigation.

Originally it was proposed that the town of Nertchinsk, which is situated on the Nertcha at a distance of seven versts from the station named Nertchinsk on the Transbaikal Railway, should be the terminus of the great Amur Railway; but later a point near the Kwenga river, and on the same line,

near Nertchinsk, was decided upon. At present Nertchinsk is a small place of some 7000 inhabitants, and is the seat of administration for the eastern territory of the Transbaikalian mines. In the future it will be a large and important town, distinguished not only because of its connection with the far-flung Amur line, but because, under the plans of the Russian Minister of War, it was selected as an intermediary base of operations.

In the case of the Amur Province, however, the circumstances are altogether different, and not nearly so promising as those which obtain in Transbaikalia. At the same time, it cannot be over-emphasised that the Amur Railway scheme should not be examined critically in sections with a view to arriving at some general conclusion in regard to its economic possibilities. The better procedure would be to view the scheme as a whole; that is to say, as an all-Russian line establishing communication through Russian territory with the only great Russian port in the Far East, Vladivostock. In other words, the Amur Railway will be the main Siberian artery, an artery which cannot do otherwise than bring life and prosperity to illimitable regions the development of which has been too long neglected.

Frequently it has been laid to the charge of Russia that she has not sufficiently exploited her territories on the Asiatic Continent. Now that she is taking the first steps towards the realisation of her enormous assets in Siberia, it is urged with singular inconsistency that she is embarking upon a ruinous adventure. One writer referring to the fact that 20,000 miles of rivers are navigable in Siberia, declares that "While the question of building more railways is always considered in Russia, the improvement of navigation by cutting canals, &c., in Siberia is overlooked." It must not be forgotten, however, that the rivers present a frozen surface for many months in the year, and that if their possession is to be retained strategical communication in the form of railways must be first considered.

It may be that many years must elapse before the development of Transbaikalia and Amur will be sufficient to repay the enormous expenditure involved in the construction of the line. But, as I have pointed out before, it is necessary to take

a larger view than is involved in this consideration. Russian policy in Asia is the stake at issue, and with that policy is inextricably bound up the interests of Russian trade and commerce, not alone in two provinces, but in the vast territories above, below, and beyond. Nor is it possible to draw a dividing line between strategical and commercial utilities. One might conceive conditions in which it would be advisable to construct a line across a desert with the ultimate object of providing facilities for the adequate protection of a gold-field. In this instance, however, it is by no means certain that the Amur Railway will traverse a country barren of resources. Indeed, as far as Transbaikalia is concerned, there is conclusive evidence that the contrary is the case.

It is my intention to proceed, as it were, farther along the route of the line, and, before summing up its general economic possibilities, to discuss its utility, section by section. Up to the present the Amur Province is but sparsely populated. The few pioneers who have had the temerity to make their homes in that almost savage region are scattered in little communities along the banks of the great river, and their occupation is largely that of hunters and fishermen. There is, however, one notable exception, the provincial capital of Blagovestchensk on the mouth of the Zeya. Here, situated as it were in the heart of wilderness, dwell 50,000 people in a city that is almost as modern as any in Western Russia. From a town of wood it has become a town of brick. It boasts of wide streets, mercantile offices of architectural pretensions, modern hotels, an opera-house, a museum, and a public library. Blagovestchensk, in short, is an oasis of civilisation in a desert of barbarism. Its prosperity is due to the fact that it is the centre of a gold-mining industry. Altogether the Amur Province yields about 240,000 ounces of gold annually, of which a large proportion is obtained from the upper reaches of the Zeya, from whence it is conveyed to Blagovestchensk. No man can tell what extent of treasure in the form of gold lies beneath the soil. Superficial observations made by experts, together with the known worth of the country north of Blagovestchensk, justify the belief that, with the coming of railway development, rich discoveries of minerals will be made. Blagovestchensk is

certainly destined to become one of the most important centres in the Far East.

General Kuropatkin has expressed the opinion that the Amur Railway will be inadequate without connecting lines between the river and the Chinese Eastern Railway, and without the doubling of the Siberian track. "Only when these three live arteries exist," he declares, "will the Amur country be properly connected with the metropolis." A scheme which gives railway communication between Blagovestchensk and Harbin will, no doubt, be the ultimate outcome of the Amur undertaking. Blagovestchensk is the centre of the gold-mining industry, and Harbin, the most important town in Manchuria, is situated in the midst of a great grain-growing area. The country between these two towns, though sparsely populated, is well watered by tributaries of large rivers, and will present a promising field for commercial exploitation. There seems, therefore, to be some ground for the belief that should a pacific era be assured in the Far East such as would warrant Russia in constructing a number of branch lines, the commercial value of the Amur Railway, taken in conjunction with the double-tracking of the Siberian line, together with the improvements which would be effected to the river in the way of dredging, erection of pontoons, &c., would be materially increased.

Apart from the gold-bearing territory north of Blagovestchensk, it must be confessed that the Amur Province is largely an unknown land. The character of the country along the river bank, which is the only portion of the province having pretensions to population, is well described by Sir Alexander Hosie in a work published in 1901. "Along the whole of the north bank of the Amur," he writes, "Cossack stations have been planted from time to time at intervals varying from ten to thirty versts. They are simple clearings in the forest, and no attempt at cultivation on a large scale has been made. Gardens there are, but even they are small and ill-kept. There is, however, abundance of pasturage in the forest, and cattle-rearing is universal. At every station there are fenced stockyards, where the cattle are rounded up for the winter. As a rule, a station consists of a few streets of log huts, with a large white-painted wooden

church, surmounted by domes and minarets, usually of a green or purple colour, which vary in number according to the wealth of the population. During the winter the men devote themselves to hunting and felling timber for the steamers, and the entire absence of means of communication may account for the dearth of agriculture. True, at every station at which we stopped women and girls clad in gaudy skirts and wrappers, with shawls over their heads, crowded the river bank, carrying farm produce of all kinds for sale. Bread, milk, eggs, fowls, curds, butter, small oxen, calves, pigs, and, on very rare occasions, fish, could usually be had at very cheap rates. The Amur abounds with sturgeon and salmon, and yet I can recall only two occasions on which I noticed fish lines and hooks, and once, on the foreshore at Puzina, I saw a huge sturgeon being cut up and disposed of. There is abundance of wealth in the Amur, but there is nobody to collect or consume it." Between Khabarovsk and Blagovestchensk there were about forty of these stations, with populations ranging from five to over a thousand souls, and very evenly divided between males and females.

At Ekaterino-Nikolskaia, 375 versts from Khabarovsk, rafts were moored along the river face, and logs of pine were being dragged up the steep bank by horses and oxen. Beyond Ekaterino-Nikolskaia the river, which is half a mile broad above its junction with the Sungari, narrows considerably, and is hemmed in by low hills on both sides. Sir Alexander observes that there is nothing on the Amur to equal the gorges of the Upper Yang-tsze, which rise several thousand feet sheer up from the river, and inspire awe in the breast of the traveller below. The scenery on the Amur is of a different type. Hills densely clothed with elms, pines, and birches there are, with an occasional lofty crag overlooking the river; but want of life, especially on the Manchurian side, is apt to make the forest weary and monotonous. In the lower reaches of the Amur, however, the woodcutter has been hard at work and denuded the banks of pines. Before arrival at Pompeevka, a Chinese gold-mining camp was passed by Sir Alexander Hosie on the Manchurian side. Two gilt-topped red poles in the camp denoted the residence of a Chinese official who acts as superintendent of the mines.

The excessive moisture of the Amur regions in summer will retard the progress of agriculture. The district most suitable for cultivation is that situated to the east of Blagovestchensk, between the rivers Zeya and Bureya, both of which are navigable. According to Prince Kropotkin this area, owing to its fertile soil and elevation above the level of the rivers, offers a really rich territory for human settlement. In spite of the fact that there is no railway communication, that part of the Amur Province has already attracted a large number of Russian emigrants.

Leaving Transbaikalia and Amur altogether out of the question, it may be assumed, for the sake of argument, that the construction of the Amur Railway is justified on economic grounds, inasmuch as it will establish a satisfactory means of communication with the rich Maritime Province, and will also tend, in a large measure, to the development of the whole of Far Eastern Siberia, where, in the words of M. Stolypin, "forty million acres of cornland" await the touch of man. The line will join the Ussuri Railway system at Kharbarovsk, a town of 20,000 inhabitants, built on hills and deep valleys, and situated at the confluence of the Amur and the Ussuri. Apart from its administrative importance as the seat of the Governor-General of the Province, it is a place of enormous strategic value, a value which has been considerably enhanced in consequence of the events of the recent war, and which will be still further enhanced in view of the Amur Railway project. Its approach is guarded by a number of forts ; it is the station for a large garrison ; and in importance as a military centre it is second only to Vladivostock. In time of war it is conceivable that Kharbarovsk would be an advance base of operations. In many other respects Kharbarovsk is a place of some pretensions. Laid out on the American block system, it possesses fine wide streets, imposing Government buildings, shops stocked with European goods and fashionable fineries, a splendid club, which, by the way, is profitably conducted on a system of co-operation among the servants under the guidance of a committee, and a theatre. On the bank of the Amur there are public gardens, stretching back from which is a promenade or parade-ground flanked by a church and a

museum. In the public gardens, standing on a towering position, is a bronze statue of Count Mouravieff, the great explorer, who is represented with folded arms and looking across the Amur, along whose winding waters he had sailed on his voyage of discovery.

As the Amur Railway links up with the Ussuri line it will become an important factor in the development of the Ussuri Province. Mr. Putnam Weale, who is an acknowledged authority on the political problems of the Far East, has recently traversed this region, and in his work entitled "The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia," he gives us a picturesque and at the same time a useful description of what is undoubtedly at present the most promising territory of all the Russian possessions beyond the Urals: "You puff out of the troubled, yet thriving town of Vladivostock," says the writer, "to find yourself immediately running along the shores of Amur Bay. . . . At Sedanka, verst 16, numbers of Russian villas dot the countryside, and lend a peaceful aspect to the scene. In this neighbourhood such persons as are furnished with an abundance of this world's goods, procured through governmental complacency, live during the two hot summer months, and enjoy their Far Eastern exile amid pleasant woods and cooling streams, and a panorama which could not easily be surpassed. . . . There are soldiers everywhere along all lines of communication. The country in this region is, generally speaking, not under cultivation. It consists mainly of rolling hill and dale, cloaked in thick undergrowth, and having only a few slender wind-bent trees, standing out conspicuously on the higher slopes. Occasionally there are patches of land which have been cleared and ploughed: but this is the exception rather than the rule, for nature is very wild, and it has hitherto not been profitable for man to attempt to conquer her. Cart-roads, however, thread the country and lead to many quaint little Russian peasant homesteads, which are quite European in appearance. Yet somehow such farmyards seem queerly out of place; they have been very daring to have come so far, but will such transplanting be really successful? Instead of Russian carters and Russian horses at work, it is still merely the Chinaman from prosaic

Shantung who is the master of the road, and it is still the Mongol or Transbaikalian pony that he drives."

Of the Nikolsk district the same writer says: "The hill and dale, which are such features of the landscape from Vladivostock up to within a very few miles of the town, have now all disappeared, and in their place is merely a great rolling South African plain, as flat as your hand, continuing in every direction as far as the eye can reach. At a rough estimate this plain must contain many millions of acres suitable for wheat cultivation, for the flat country continues almost unbroken up to the Manchurian frontier and for yet more dozens of miles due north towards Lake Khanka. The urban population of Nikolsk may in years to come grow rich as handlers of the proceeds of enormous harvests, for although as yet farming is a negligible quantity, people are beginning to understand possibilities at which they contemptuously scoffed only three short years ago. They understand too well that the future is uncertain, and that all kinds of entrenching have become good. Agriculture, then, must shortly receive a great impetus. Outlying hamlets, with old-fashioned Russian windmills scattered here and there, are even now growing up on the great plain, and Russian peasantry are beginning to till and to sow, and to dream of big harvests. . . . The train slips away from Nikolsk station, and now the railway line suddenly bends sharply almost due north so that you may travel the straightest possible route to the great Amur. To the south-west the second line of metals may be seen heading for the station of Grodekov and the Manchurian frontier; and as you thus slowly travel in the fading twilight something of the grandeur of Russian schemes—something of their all-embracing nature, which is so careless and impatient of tiresome and petty details—is impressed upon you. It is so immense, this Russian Empire, so unending, so really great, and, best of all—instead of being split up into small component parts as is its only real rival, the British Empire—it audaciously stretches without a single break from the thirtieth degree east of Greenwich to within sight of the shores of the Americas. Where you now sit travelling slowly northwards you are still nearly nine thousand versts, as the crow flies,

from St. Petersburg ; it should therefore not greatly surprise you that the rich alluvial plains around you lie fallow. There are lines of hay-ricks on the horizon line, it is true, but the patches of yellow stubs, showing where corn cultivation has extended, are few and far between. At the siding of Dubinsk, twenty versts from Nikolsk, you reach one of the last stations at which there are signs of the frontier military activity. Here are extensive barracks providing quarters for the reserves of the advanced lines which lie far to the south ; but north of this station—that is, on towards the Amur—the ever-growing distance from the important Korean-Manchurian borders renders useless further military concentration, and the stations immediately lose almost completely their former military aspect. As you steadily move due northwards the line suddenly begins to bend and curve as it climbs the watershed of the Lake Khanka basin, and at verst 185—the versts are reckoned from the starting place, Vladivostock—the important village of Chernigovka is reached. This village, or rather collection of Russian villages and hamlets, has grown quickly during recent years, and it is now estimated that, with all outlying farmhouses, there are four or five thousand men and women settled in the immediate neighbourhood of the station. A large steam flour-mill has been erected, and the impetus it has given to agriculture is so marked that new mills are shortly to go up to encourage greater efforts. The Government is responsible for this enterprise. Indeed, everything worth having here has been promoted by the Government ; and had the people only Anglo-Saxon energy there is no saying what they might not make of their Eastern Empire. As you continue slowly and monotonously towards the north, with methodical halts every now and then, the enormous possibilities of this country become more and more patent to you. For between the stations of Chernigovka and Spasskaya, a distance of nearly forty versts, there is a region which, compared to the rest, may already be called densely colonised by Russian peasant settlers, who have been unwillingly dragged from the homeland. The wide cultivated areas are intersected by meadows and roads running in every direction, whilst the whole horizon is dotted both with pleasant

villages, built after the Little Russian style, and with picturesque windmills. They look almost unreal and unbelievable in such latitudes, and yet it is no mirage; it is again the handiwork of the Russian Government. It is computed that Southern Ussuri contains a fertile area of at least 5000 square miles which might be wholly given up to wheat cultivation, and which would easily allow of a Russian rural population of half a million or a million souls. . . .

"Once north of Spasskaya, there is another change in the character of the country, and broken and marshy land becomes more and more frequent. The dryness of Southern Ussuri is slowly disappearing. Lake Khanka, that strange sheet of water across which the theoretical boundary-line between Russian and Chinese territory is traced on maps, is now near, and moisture is in the air. This curious lake, which is sixty miles long and not much less in width, has been but little explored. . . . At one place the railway comes to a point within a very few miles of Lake Khanka, but although Russians and Chinese indulge freely in fishing along its shores, and, before the railway was built, sledges carrying passengers from Khabarovsk to Vladivostock used to cross its glassy surface in winter, the whole region is still *terra incognita* and the proximity of the railway alone gives it life and blood. From here onwards to the station of the Ussuri the tract traverses a vast steppe-like plain, constituting the so-called Prikhankoisk depression, which still lies desolate and untouched by the hand of man. It has been supposed that at some remote date the extent of Lake Khanka was much larger than it is now, and that this depression, as well as a considerable portion of the surrounding 'country, formed a part of the lake, which must then have been amongst the biggest inland sheets of water in the world. During the severe rainy seasons this whole locality becomes transformed into an immense water-basin, and all idea of agriculture has, therefore, hitherto been quite impossible. The richness of this belt, however, is such that the Government—when it has sufficient funds and courage for the purpose—proposes to drain the whole plain, an undertaking which, according to an expert's opinion, would not be difficult. The carrying out of this scheme

would secure an additional area of several hundred thousand acres suitable for wheat cultivation and give room for many additional thousands of settlers.

"The station of Ussuri, immediately to the south of the river of that name and verst 327 from Vladivostock, is soon reached, and you pass from Southern into Northern Ussuri. The Ussuri river itself is a most important waterway, rising in the vicinity of Lake Khanka and navigable by steamers along its entire coast until it falls, a broad, swirling sheet of water, into the Amur. This river not only has given its name to the whole of these regions, but served to develop the country before the day of the railway in a way which would have been impossible had there been only the rough roads to rely on. Here, as further south, new Russian settlements are at last being slowly established; but the immense unbroken stretches of plain heaving away in every direction proclaim that it must be the work of many years before the country can be more than sparsely inhabited. At the stopping places there are always the same little crowds of Russians, roughly dressed and long-bearded, and impartially mixed with Chinese and Koreans. All regard the train as a living friend, and the same constant buying and selling of the necessities of life goes on gaily. Yet you feel instinctively that you are rapidly becoming lost in the heart of a continent, and that these little clusters of peasant people, leading exile lives in such distant spots, surrounded by more energetic Asiatics, who come only to disappear again with all the money they have easily earned, have something pathetic about them. In winter, when an arctic cold has shut down on everything, the monotony of the life is said to be appalling. The Ussuri river is crossed by a splendid steel bridge towering high above the waters; and beyond this the character of the country again undergoes a change. The line now runs through a region covered with scanty woods of foliage trees, and the scattered settlements of Russian peasants and Cossack communities become rarer. At the station of Muravieff-Amursky, named in honour of him whose genius and daring added this province to Asiatic Russia, there is, however, a growing town, and ten versts further on Imma, or Gafskaya (verst 387), the one

important point in Mid-Ussuri, is reached. The river Imma flows into the Ussuri river a couple of thousand yards away from the main station, and is the first of three rivers, the Imma, the Bikin, and the Khor, all navigable for small steamers, which have had much importance in promoting the development of the country. When their future possibilities are better understood they will doubtless play a still more important rôle. These rivers all flow into the Ussuri from that great watershed, the Sikhoti-Alin, a massive and largely unexplored mountain range lying between this Ussuri belt of country and the now distant Pacific coast, and thus practically making half the country useless for colonisation, since the mountainous districts are savage and forbidding. The course of these rivers is, practically, from due east to due west, and they thus tap and drain a vast region of wild country lying on the eastern flank of the railway which would otherwise be quite impenetrable, and place it in water communication with the Amur. Were it not for this generous river system, with which Nature has endowed these regions, all development in the past would have been very difficult; as matters now stand there is no reason why in a very few years these waterways should not contribute very considerably to the rapid progress of the whole Pacific territory by serving as valuable feeders to the railway. Already there are quite a number of small steamers and barges engaged in the growing lumber traffic; and, as has been the case in Siberia, the existence of railway facilities side by side with water facilities has tended to bring about a sudden expansion as soon as settlers have been sufficiently numerous. . . . Of the broad belt of country lying between the Ussuri plains and the Pacific coast little is even now really known. Difficult passes lead over the mountains to the sea, but they are seldom used. The Sikhoti-Alin ranges, sweeping in great stretches hundreds of miles long from a point not far from Vladivostock right up to the vicinity of Nicolaievsk and the Amur mouth, are largely covered with dense primeval forests along whose fringes only trappers and explorers have wandered. These trappers have principally been the Pacific Coast aborigines, either Goldi or Gilyaks, whose numbers, never very great

because of the incessant struggle for existence with Nature, now appear to be rapidly diminishing. Chinese traders at such points as Vladivostock and Khabarovsk supply these people with stores and clothing on trust at the beginning of each hunting season, and receive in return the most valuable part of their proceeds of the chase. Many of the most costly pelts, such as silver-haired sables, and silver and blue foxes, as well as ermine, are obtained in these regions and shipped direct to the European fur-markets; whilst coarser furs, such as bear skins, otter skins, and wolf skins, are both used locally and exported in very great numbers.

"From the Grafskaya the railway runs always within a few miles of the Ussuri river until it reaches the Amur; and therefore it may be said that nearly the entire northern section of the line is practically in sight of Chinese territory, for the Ussuri river forms, just as does Lake Khanka, the boundary line. Yet although Chinese are met with in ever-growing numbers all along the railway, they are still mainly birds of passage growing rich at Russia's expense. The left, or Chinese, bank of the Ussuri is still practically untouched, and the Kirin provincial authorities, in whose jurisdiction lies all this region, content themselves with despatching small frontier parties, who make the usual perfunctory visit to various points without much solicitude for whatever may be actually going on. This carelessness is perhaps excusable when it is remembered that after crossing Ussuri river and going due west towards the Sungari valley there is only the wild country of which mention has been already made. This unconquered land is practically uninhabited, and 'Yu-Pi-Ta-Tzu,' or Fish-Skin Tartars, have only succeeded in penetrating the mountain and forests for short distances by following the course of mountain streams. Difficult tracks actually exist, by using which it is physically possible to travel over this belt; but only two explorers have succeeded in doing so. Thus both sides of the Ussuri valley are hemmed in by formidable barriers making it necessary for Russian settlements to be strictly confined to the plains along the river courses. There are enormous areas, however, in this comparatively speaking narrow belt,

which have not yet been touched ; and it is not too much to say that, immediately adjoining the Ussuri river and its affluents—and not including the country south of Lake Khanka—there is room for a Russian rural population of several million souls. The peasants who have already come complain, however, that the dampness of the climate of the Northern Ussuri or the Nikolsk regions is such that their corn is too often rotted before it is ripe ; that it has drunk too much water and become impossible food-stuff. In fact this corn has become named ‘drunken corn,’ and it is said that the flour made from it is so much less nourishing than the Russian variety that it has to be mixed with imported flour. To combat this evil in the regions immediately adjoining the Amur, the Russian settlers have for years past been lighting immense forest fires that have swept hundreds of thousands of acres bare of all trees and undergrowth and have thereby already brought about a marked improvement in the climatic conditions. Calculations show that no fears need be entertained that such a destructive policy is wasteful from the lumbering point of view. It is alleged that there are reserves of lumber in the Pacific province sufficient for all local requirements and for a great export trade for centuries to come ; and the long lumber trains, which are even now met with all along the railway, and the deep-laden barges on the rivers, prove that the big trade is already beginning. Moving onwards, with the country becoming wilder and wilder and even more picturesque as the Amur is approached, the landscape at last assumes an aspect entirely different in every way from that of Southern Ussuri. At the station of Bikin, on the river of that name, dense moist vegetation is to be seen on all sides. Many spots in this immediate neighbourhood have been settled by Orenburg Cossacks for a number of years past, and these communities are now held to be agriculturally the most successful settlements in the whole province. Too much importance cannot be attached to these Cossacks, who, because they hold their land on military tenure, are always available for military service. Already they are sufficiently numerous to provide a division of cavalry ; it is hoped to treble their numbers in ten years, and gradually to build up great reserves of

fighting men. The *taiga*, or primæval forest, which advances so menacingly on the railway, is being cleared away in huge patches, and steadily the area of the settled country is being extended. Ever and anon in the distance the outlying spurs of the Sikhoti-Alin range can be discerned, showing that this belt is as yet only an oasis in a desert. For miles and dozens of miles from here onwards dense forest land is ranged on both sides of the railway, and not until the third river of these three westward-flowing streams, the Khor, is reached, does the country open out once more. Settlements begin to appear, and although these have not the same growth as those farther to the south, it is quite evident that progress is at last being generally made. More and more passengers climb off and on the trains, and station-sidings show long lines of trucks loaded with merchandise. Beautiful meadows studded with oak-groves now lend variety to the landscape, and cattle grazing at ease wander over the broad stretches. Thus, with the country always broadening out only to be shut in again by the *taiga*, and with a constant animation and bustle at the stations, verst after verst is slowly laid behind. And at length, thirty-six hours' from Vladivostock, you see heavy clusters of houses which can scarcely be the conventional Cossack or peasant settlements. Then there is a glitter of distant water, a respectable-looking town rises up, and, as you slip into a large station, there are unaccustomed crowds of civilians and soldiery awaiting your arrival. It is Khabarovsk and the Amur—verst 716 by the iron-way from Vladivostock."

It is evident that Mr. Putnam Weale, who is a careful investigator, believes that there is a prosperous future for the Maritime Province. Nor is he alone in this belief. It is the settled conviction of all those who have visited this region, situated in the extreme East, that here awaits development one of the most fertile territories to be found in any part of the world. Yet were the views of the opponents of the Amur scheme to be accepted, Russia would be justified in abandoning not only Transbaikalia and Amur, but also Ussuri, and, in short, the whole of her vast Continental possessions in Eastern Asia. As I have again and again pointed out, the Amur railway is a far-reaching scheme the

realisation of which is necessary if Russia is to maintain her trade and prestige—nay, even her very possessions—on the Pacific. The temporary loss of the Kwantung Peninsula has merely removed the centre of her activities, commercial and strategical, farther east; that is, east instead of west of the Peninsula of Korea. The Maritime Province has therefore developed a strategical value of vital importance. To render that strategical value permanent and secure it is essential that the Province should also be developed in an economic direction. In order to attain this end it must be populated—thickly populated. And in turn it follows as a logical sequence that a railway—the Amur Railway—is needed as a means of communication. Surely no further justification than this were needed for its construction! Since the loss of Port Arthur and Dalny, Vladivostock, situated in the southern extremity of the Maritime Province, is the only port that can be kept open to navigation all year round, the only port that provides an outlet for a continent illimitable in its commercial possibilities. This southern extremity, more particularly that narrow belt of territory stretching out to the Korean frontier, bears practically the same relation to Russian policy as did the Kwantung Peninsula in Manchuria. In the event of war the Japanese would endeavour to advance through north-eastern Korea, and the Tumén River would offer a battle position similar to that which was presented by the Yalu. Nikolsk, situated inland seventy miles north of Vladivostock at the junction of the Ussuri and the Chinese Eastern railways, would play an important part in any military operations destined to keep open communications.

Mr. Putnam Weale has expressed the opinion that “the urban population of Nikolsk may in years to come grow rich as handlers of the proceeds of enormous harvests”; and there is no doubt that the surrounding territory offers ideal conditions for agricultural settlers. At present the town itself has a population of 20,000 inhabitants, and the hilly regions situated in the south are being fortified, and a military road is to be constructed to Kharbarovsk. Russian policy in the Far East must inevitably be directed towards one ultimate end—the retention of the great fortress and

Pacific outlet of Vladivostock. When the Amur Railway is completed this town will be the terminus of the all-Russian system from the Far West. Always, and from every point of view, an important centre, it has become a vitally important centre by reason of the lamentable termination of the war with Japan. The commercial development of Vladivostock was seriously retarded by the turmoil produced during the years when Russia was strenuously pursuing an ambitious policy in Manchuria. In those days the tendency was to direct activity towards the Kwantung Peninsula. Consequently, apart from being a military base, Vladivostock, comparatively speaking, was merely a place of local importance. The effect of the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty was the immediate concentration of Russian activity at Vladivostock. And here Russia found already in existence splendid foundations upon which she could, as it were, reconstruct the fabric of her policy in the Far East. A town with fine wide streets and pretentious buildings was already in being. Approached by a magnificent landlocked harbour, wherein it is calculated that apart from the naval anchorage sixty large steamers can be accommodated, it would be an ideal port but for one drawback. For nearly four months in the year the sea is frozen. This was one of the principal considerations which in former days had induced Russia to direct her activity towards Kwantung. By means of ice-breakers, however, Vladivostock has to a large extent been rendered accessible to shipping all the year round. As a commercial centre the prosperity of the port solely depends upon the successful exploitation of the Ussuri district. At present many classes of articles are imported which local enterprise could supply. With the added stimulus that the Amur link should give to these regions there is every reason to believe that Russian colonies in the extreme East will become self-supporting, at least in regard to staple products. In the matter of shipping the Japanese are at present predominant, but with the Volunteer Fleet aided by State subsidies Russia is making a bold bid to secure a strong maritime position in Far Eastern waters.

Whatever may be thought of the wisdom or otherwise of Russian policy in the Far East, it is impossible to lose sight

of the fact that in the main it is directed towards restricting the activities of Japan, and is therefore primarily aimed at making, as far as possible, communities and settlers not only self-supporting but also contributory to the external trade of the Empire. No pains are being spared to render Vladivostock a town worthy of the place which all patriotic Russians believe it is destined to hold as a great commercial emporium in the Far East. Indeed, there are not wanting those possessing sufficient belief in its future as to predict that some day there will have risen on the far shores of the Maritime Province a seaport city that will compare with those magnificent monuments of British enterprise in the Far East—Hong-kong and Shanghai. Yet the opponents of the Amur Railway scheme had been bold enough to suggest that Russia should abandon Vladivostock rather than seek to retain it at the enormous cost involved in the construction of the Amur line. Russia has, however, always contained statesmen who, apart from the domestic turmoil of the moment, have guided her destinies along imperial lines; statesmen who have seen beyond not one but many generations, and whose grand and far-reaching policy, in spite of grievous errors in local administration, has made the Russian Empire what it is to-day, and has paved the way for what the Russian Empire is destined to be in the future. Russia has devoted many years to the laying of her foundations of Empire in the Far East. She has only just begun, as it were, the great structure of her scheme. The Manchurian campaign was, after all, only an accident in its relation to the general idea. By this time, in fact, it is looked upon by Russians as merely an incident. The foundations are being strengthened; the building has recommenced. This time there will be no flaws in the material. Russia has learnt her lesson. The scheme, the grand scheme, has been begun anew. Russia believes that its realisation is her destiny, and this belief, backed as it is by determination and by enterprise, is shared by all those who are competent to set themselves up as impartial judges of the Far Eastern situation. Englishmen who have travelled support the statement that Russia is rapidly setting her house in order. They declare that at last honest endeavours are being made to obtain the full value for every *kopeck* of Government money expended.

From the details I have given concerning the economic possibilities of the territories to be served by the new Amur Railway, it will be seen that Vladivostock is the buttress of Russian policy in the Far East. In any future war to be fought in these regions it will be a deciding factor. As a fortress it occupies an altogether different position from Port Arthur ; Port Arthur, located at the extreme limit of a narrow peninsula, became a restricted area, achieving no other object than that of holding a Japanese force from participation in the main purpose of the grand army farther north. Vladivostock, however, is a central citadel of a far-reaching chain of forts extending to the shores on both the east and the west sides. To defend these adequately a force of at least a quarter of a million men would be required. In the opinion of a British naval officer who has recently returned from the scene, there are at least 200,000 soldiers in Eastern Siberia, 80,000 of which are stationed at Vladivostock and the surrounding neighbourhood. It is safe to assume—and in any calculation there is the precedent of Port Arthur—that in the event of the Japanese being able to choose their own battle-ground they could not dream of an attack upon the Vladivostock defences with an army mustering less than half a million men. When the siege of Port Arthur began the fortification scheme was incomplete, and it is a well-known fact that many of the works which held the Japanese in check for so many months were only hastily improvised. Should they attempt at any period to advance on Vladivostock they will not find similar conditions of unpreparedness. Here, again, Russia is profiting by the lessons she has so recently learnt. Indeed, while the war was still in progress she put forth prodigious efforts to prepare Vladivostock for eventualities, carrying the exterior line of defence nine miles from the town. At Port Arthur, it will be remembered, the Russian fortification scheme was held to be faulty inasmuch as it located the defences in too close proximity to the town, thus lessening the obstacles presented to any plan having for its object the bombardment of the arsenals, dockyards, and the ships in the harbour. The Vladivostock defences, however, represent the last word which can be said of military engineering in its relation to fortifications. "Its batteries are

to-day complete and bristle with guns," writes Mr. Putnam Weale, "and although it has passed through two distinct fortifying periods—first by the completion of the old fortification scheme made long ago; and, second, by the additional fortification scheme hurriedly knitted on during the last half-year of the war, with all the knowledge and experience which Port Arthur brought—the work of adding yet more chains of positions, and yet more dozens of heavy guns, is still methodically proceeding and will continue as methodically for at least ten years to come. The foolish idea expressed by some that Port Arthur was over-fortified, and that over-fortifying leads to weakness, finds no echo in Russian quarters. Over-fortifying! The word is absurd to those whose territorial title is insecure. If you have five hundred cannon, try to mount five hundred more and man them with another ten thousand soldiers—that is here the *mot d'ordre*. Thus the whole of that powerful island, Russia Island, which lies athwart the main entrance, is now a citadel in itself; and even at the present moment, when sincere efforts have been made to demobilise all the reserves and time-expired men and to leave the smallest number of troops consistent with safety, Russia Island alone is garrisoned by a whole division of troops at war strength. The fortress artillery of Vladivostock is reported, on the very best authority, to possess many pieces of the most modern and most powerful ordnance which can be turned out by the Russian military works, and which are furnished with all the latest French and German improvements. The Shkott and the Godolbin Peninsulas, as well as Russia Island, now mount the very heaviest guns in existence. The line of frowning batteries along the shores of the Amur has been continually and methodically extended until the fortification scheme may be said to embrace nearly the whole of the bay; whilst the other great inlet on the coast to the north of the harbour, Ussuri Bay, although ten miles away, is now also comprised in the grand scheme of defence. The total number of forts is given as seventy-six, mounting some five hundred and eighty cannon of various calibre; and when it is added that even with the constant home-going of troops there were at the last estimate thirty-eight thousand men actually included in the garrison (not including the extra

Tumên line of defence of Novokievsk and Possiet), and that the military and naval warehouses extending for thousands of feet along the naval basin are stocked with everything necessary for a three years' siege, it will be understood that Vladivostock is at last really a first-class fortress entitled to rank with the very strongest in the world. . . . It is impossible now to harm it, or to effect a rapid landing on the immediately adjacent coasts, by acting from the sea; it can be safely approached only from Korea. To the distant north there is a wild country; to the south, to the east, to the west, forts, forts, forts, spread out over a great distance." Moreover, other improvements are being undertaken which will render Vladivostock one of the first naval ports east of Suez. Modern machinery is being erected, and the construction of a graving-dock capable of accommodating battleships of the *Dreadnought* class has been completed.

Three years ago the Russian Government tried the experiment of closing the free ports under its control in the Far East. The fear was expressed by opponents of the change that in view of the existence of free trade within the 50-verst zone along the frontier the duties levied would not yield the expected results. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that articles of primary necessity, as well as those required for industrial development, were exempted, there was a gratifying increase in the Customs receipts. So soon as the first few months after the introduction of Protection several new industries were established, as, for example, cement works, rice cleaning, oil, timber, and flour mills, in the Ussuri region. The Government arrived at the conclusion that "the change was a timely act, inasmuch as it has reduced the drift of the population towards foreign markets, so detrimental to our own industries, whose development is guaranteed by the multifarious natural resources of these regions."

Having described the territories of Transbaikalia, Amur, and the Ussuri district of the Maritime Province, it would perhaps be well to give some idea of the enormous resources which await development in the regions lying still farther to the east. And here it must once more be emphasised that from a strategical point of view the Amur line is essential to the preservation of Russian territory in all parts of Eastern

Siberia. For it can well be imagined that a reverse in the neighbourhood of Vladivostock would speedily be followed by a Japanese activity in all directions. Again, the Amur Railway is needed as a means of transporting troops and supplies to outlying points in Siberia. In short, it will bring the whole of that region many days nearer to any base which may be determined upon, and will enable Russia to have in territory exclusively her own an unbroken chain of supply depôts, stretching far in the direction of the scene of operations. By means of branch systems and extensions there is no reason why promising tracts of country to the north should not be opened. Already there is a suggestion that the line should be extended from Khabarovsk to Nikolaievsk. A military road between these towns is now in course of construction, but at present the only means of communication is along the Amur. Well-appointed steamers of 1000 tons run twice weekly, and the voyage down the river generally occupies three days, while, owing to the strong current, two days more are required in journeying in the opposite direction. The few settlers scattered along the banks are principally engaged in making wooden casks and cases for the fishing industry. The mouth of the Amur is no less than fifteen miles wide. On the left bank, thirty miles inland, is situated Nikolaievsk, which, like all other prominent places in Eastern Siberia, has assumed a new importance in consequence of the events of the Russo-Japanese war. No wonder Russia resisted the demand of the Japanese for the cession of the whole of Saghalien, the northern portion of which lies athwart the mouth of the Amur. In winter it would be possible for an attack to be directed across the frozen Nevesky Straits, which in some places is only a few miles wide. At other times of the year when the mouth of the river is accessible troops could be landed under cover of a flotilla of gunboats. But the Russian plenipotentiaries at Portsmouth were possessed of statesman-like foresight, and they provided against these contingencies by insisting that Japanese aggression should be limited to the southern portion of the island. As it is, the presence of the Japanese as far as the 50th degree of north latitude is of itself a sufficient menace. As a port, Nikolaievsk is destined to be more of strategical than of commercial value. The records

of the past fifteen years show that the port is closed by ice on November 5, and that it does not reopen until May 22. In other words, compared with Vladivostock it is inaccessible a month earlier, and remains closed a month later. Moreover, at all times of the year the neighbouring waters present difficulties to navigation. At Nikolaievsk there are shipbuilding slips, and, in addition to vessels for the mercantile marine, a number of torpedo boats have been constructed. Apart from this undertaking, the commercial development of the port will, for some considerable time, be restricted principally to the fishing industry. It must not be forgotten, however, that the Amur Railway is destined to attract both capital and labour to Russian possessions in the extreme East. Goldfields are to be extended by British capital in the country north of Nikolaievsk. The development of the northern half of Saghalien will also receive attention. Owing to the fact that the island was used as a convict settlement, its resources have been sadly neglected in the past. Since the Russo-Japanese war it has ceased to be a penal colony, and thus this obstacle to its exploitation has been removed. One well-known authority who has lately made an extended tour throughout these regions has informed the writer that there is an abundant supply of coal, almost equal in quality to Cardiff coal, near Dui Harbour, on the west coast of Saghalien; that oil is plentiful and has been found in commercial quantities in the north-east.

In the event of the Amur Railway being continued to Nikolaievsk, as at present advocated, rapid transport facilities would be brought within a few miles of Saghalien. Nor will the realisation of this scheme mean that the utmost possibilities of the Amur project have been reached. Still farther to the east is the peninsula of Kamchatka, between the southern limits of which and Hokkaidō, the northern territory of Japan, stretch the chain of islands known as the Kuriles, which in 1875 were ceded to Japan by Russia in exchange for the sovereignty over the whole of Saghalien. In the opinion of many authorities Kamchatka is "the country of the future." It is a country which has been described by one writer as possessing a climate similar to that of Western Scandinavia, and offering a field of enterprise equal to that of Northern

Canada. But, as in the case of all other territories in the Far East, capital and labour are urgently needed for its development. The Amur Railway is destined to bring enterprise as far eastward as the sea-board of the Maritime Province. With the improved communications this enterprise will undoubtedly spread still farther eastwards to Kamchatka.

The intervening sea—the Sea of Okhotsk—is seven hundred miles wide and some nine hundred miles long, and is ice-free all the year round. At present steamers of the Volunteer Fleet make six trips between Vladivostock and Kamchatka in the summer, and this service is occasionally augmented. The peninsula of Kamchatka is in every respect one of the most interesting territories in Asia. It was discovered in the year 1695 by the Cossacks, under the leadership of Vladimir Atlassov, who entirely conquered the aboriginal inhabitants, and collected tributes of beaver and furs for presentation to the Czar. But it was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that Russian ascendancy was completely gained. To-day the native population does not exceed 15,000, consisting of Koryaks, Lamuts, Tunguses, and Kamchadales. The latter are a hardy race, living in the southern half of the peninsula under primitive conditions which, with little change, have survived the Stone Age. They dwell in caves or pits, are frank and generous in disposition, and it is said that the attitude of the men towards the women is one of submission. In the year 1727 the expedition sent out by Peter the Great under the leadership of Captain Behring explored the eastern coast. Efforts were made to interest the inhabitants in agriculture and other pursuits, but, owing to the lack of adequate means of communication and the invasion of Russia by Napoleon, these were unsuccessful. A century later the Government began to encourage whaling and sealing in the adjacent waters. The settlement of Petropavlovsk, situated on the shores of the Bay of Avatcha, was made the capital. During the Crimean War the combined French and British fleets attempted to capture the port, but, owing to the stubborn resistance offered by the Russians, the attack was repulsed. The incident led to the removal of the principal offices of the Government to

Nikolaievsk. In the recent war the Japanese also made an attack upon Petropavlovsk, and after suffering a brief bombardment the town surrendered. In view of the lessons of history, the wisdom of Russia in seeking by means of a far-reaching railway to protect her eastern possessions should no longer be a matter of doubt in the minds of all well-informed observers of the new situation. The retention of Kamchatka alone would be sufficient justification for an enterprise on such a grand scale as that of the Amur Railway. The peninsula and its neighbouring waters abound in everything that man can want and the world can supply. Like many other views held in regard to Russia, the popular notion that Kamchatka is merely a settlement for political exiles, walled in by the rigours of an Arctic climate, is an entirely mistaken one. Summer in these regions begins in May, and during this period rain falls on only four or five days in each month. The first night-frosts are experienced about the end of August, and throughout the winter the snowfall on the west coast is comparatively moderate. The physical features of the country are as wonderful as they are varied. "The interior of the peninsula, indeed," wrote Mr. John Geddie in "The Russian Empire," "is an almost unexplored wonderland of snowfields, glaciers, and lava-beds, sloping down to the deeply trenched gorges, where cataracts gleam in the shade of the pine forests, or to deep fiords overhung by precipices." Twenty-six extinct and twelve active volcanoes rise from the surface of the peninsula, culminating in the snow-capped cone of Klintchersk. Mineral springs of varying temperatures and saturated with carbonic acid gas are to be found in all parts; and some of these are said to contain therapeutic qualities of extraordinary efficacy. Official expeditions which have already explored the interior report the existence of gold, copper, iron, mica, sulphur, coal, graphite, and amber. At the mouth of the river Itcha excellent brown coal is obtained from the surface of the ground, and is often shipped direct from the banks. The country is by no means barren of aspect, for on all sides rich vegetation is frequently to be seen. There is a plentiful supply of timber, and thirty miles up the Bolshaya River large forests of willow and poplar and three kinds of birch and maple are to be found.

In the neighbouring seas there are unlimited quantities of cod, turbot, sole, and halibut; seals and whales are also plentiful, while the riverine waters abound in salmon and trout. It is the intention of the Government to convert the peninsula into a separate province, with its own governor and administrative staff. Special efforts are also being made to populate the country with emigrants from other parts of Siberia where climatic conditions are less favourable. Roads are in process of construction in all directions, and a system of wireless telegraphy is to be installed on the river Bolshaya for the transmission of messages to Nikolaievsk. Petropavlovsk, which has already made Russian history in these distant regions of the East, will one day become famous as the farthestmost Russian town of importance in Siberia. Situated in a latitude only a little north of London on one of the finest harbours in the world, encircled by lofty mountains, and the centre of a vast area of rich vegetation, it holds a unique situation. Already it contains a population of 4000 hardy settlers, who are constantly reminded of the heritage which has descended to them from Western civilisation by the existence in their midst of monuments to Behring, La Pérouse, and Clarke, the companion of Cook.

Apart from considerations of continental development, Russia's maritime interests in the Far East are sufficiently large as to warrant special measures being taken for their preservation. The fisheries in themselves are a tremendous asset which no progressive State could afford to neglect. Here again the results of the recent war have taught the Russians a serious lesson. The insistence of Japan upon the cession of fishery rights was not without its peculiar significance, and the presence to-day of the Japanese in large numbers along the Russian coast is barely tolerated. Lest it should be imagined that the Russians are unduly churlish in this respect, the fact should not be overlooked that Japanese fishermen are not by any means welcomed along the sea-boards of America or British Columbia. Wherever they go they gain an unenviable reputation for poaching, and more than one instance has occurred in which they have come into armed conflict with the officers of the law. As far as Russian waters are concerned, the position is briefly this :

Under the terms of the Russo-Japanese Fishing Convention, the coast-line of the Maritime Province, including the northern coast of the Okhotsk Sea and the east and west coasts of Kamchatka, are divided into sections of two versts each, a certain number of which are offered for sale by public auction every year. At the time that this supplementary agreement was under negotiation Japan claimed that the provision in the Portsmouth treaty which granted her fishery rights "along the coast" also implied the privilege of fishing in inlets. Her contention was, however, rejected by Russia, and consequently, under a penalty of £1000 and the confiscation of their vessels and all gear, the Japanese are not allowed to enter any of the rivers, bays, or inlets for the purpose of fishing. In order that a free passage may be kept for the entry of fish, the coast-line for two versts on either side of the mouths of all rivers is closed to foreigners. The activity of the Japanese in securing fishery rights along the coast is evidenced from the fact that of ninety-three sections leased by thirty-seven persons in 1907 no fewer than twenty-nine successful bidders were Japanese. Not only do the Japanese employ a large fleet for the purpose of exploiting the Russian fishing grounds, but, owing to the scarcity of suitable labour and ships, the Russians themselves are compelled to charter Japanese vessels, which are principally manned by Japanese fishermen. The fishing season begins in the middle of May, and lasts till the end of September. The value of the grounds is regarded as equal to that of the British Columbian fisheries. For instance, during a recent season one Japanese fisherman, whose enterprise was on a small scale, using one net, caught 75,000 large salmon and 110,000 salmon-trout in forty-four days. The total catch of salmon from the Maritime Province in 1907 amounted to 30,000 tons; and the Russian Consul at Hakodate estimated that in 1906—an average salmon season—the Japanese engaged along the coast of Kamchatka made net profits of 100 per cent. On the Amur one fishing station alone has landed approximately 1,500,000 fish annually for the past several years, the average weight being from seven to eight pounds. Towards the end of May and the first half of June it is no exaggeration to say that the rivers are practically choked with salmon, and it not infrequently

happens that bears and dogs hook the fish out of the river with their paws. In the following month the rivers are filled to such an extent that thousands of salmon, in their efforts to find free water, leap out upon the banks, where for miles they lie stranded in thick layers. In addition to salmon, trout is also plentiful in the rivers, and with every tide large quantities of turbot and sole are carried into the estuaries. Several miles out to sea there are rich cod banks, and along the coast shoals of herring are also to be found in abundance. The cod feeds on small fishes, and these latter are thrown up upon the shores in such numbers as to form mounds, often seven feet in height and several miles in extent. According to the report of an expert who has thoroughly investigated local conditions, frozen salmon from Kamchatka can be sold at such a price on the European market as to compete with the fresh product. As a matter of fact, it has already been successfully imported into Germany; and I hear that negotiations are in progress having in view the formation of an Anglo-Russian company for the working of a concession in connection with two of the most important rivers in the peninsula, the Bolshaya and the Itcha.

The adequate development of Eastern Siberia is a task which Russia cannot accomplish single-handed. In other words, in order to realise her resources she stands in urgent need of working capital. And here lies an opportunity of exceeding promise for the activity of British enterprise. With the cultivation of friendly relations between the two countries there is no reason why a commercial *rapprochement* should not be the immediate outcome. It cannot too clearly be understood that the capitalists of Great Britain can only gain a share in the resources of Siberia by frankly entering into partnership with the Russians. Our information concerning the conditions which prevail in this region has in the past been woefully meagre if not actually misleading. British capital is wanted and is welcomed. The same applies to the importation of goods of British manufacture. "Of formalities there are plenty," wrote Mr. H. Cooke, the special commissioner of the Board of Trade in 1905, "irritating at times, no doubt, but, as an English resident engineer of an eastern British concession remarked to me, 'easy enough and harmless enough, and we

keep a Russian staff to fulfil them.' In the report of this company's annual general meeting, held in London in February 1904, reference was made to the fact, both by the directors and the shareholders, that 'they had found, in dealing with Russian officials, as plain, honest, and straightforward treatment as would be found in dealing with their own Foreign Office.' Indeed, according to the Report, they obtained from the Imperial Cabinet additional reductions or remissions of revenue, taxation, &c., amounting to £25,000 in cash. Siberia is really far from having exhausted its stocks, and is but beginning to touch its reserves of gold, but capital and modern expensive mechanism are required, previous and existing systems having but skimmed without properly reaching the resources at hand. Foreign capital and enterprise are welcomed."

In another passage, Mr. Cooke, whose official report throughout is conspicuous for its lucidity and thoroughness, says that much is lost by not pushing English goods. "They have to be sought," he adds, "even when they are heard of at all. German goods pierce their way into every out-of-the-way Siberian town. Going the rounds with an English resident engineer of a big gold-mining concern in Eastern Siberia, who was buying a miscellaneous collection of tools in the nearest townlet, we came upon nothing British at all, his purchases being entirely German or American. Austrian sickles were noticeable everywhere, being exposed in all the market resorts of the peasants, who are the chief buyers. A Sheffield instrument, though enjoying a good reputation, was seen only in a few better class shops. In a word, British articles are neither accessible nor forthcoming, and in Siberia it is the article on the spot that is bought. British catalogues are not drawn up for Siberian customers, but such as appear in Siberia are looked upon as undecipherable puzzles. Among other things, the exact weight, gross and net, so important for calculating duty and freight, is seldom given, or is given in intricate figures and measures. It is a trite subject, but I can but relate what I everywhere heard. 'The English are too proud' was a favourite expression of opinion, though German rivals in some centres employed another term, implying inaction. It is only natural,

however, from the very nature of the country, its distances, and its population, that the articles which sell are those that are brought there, and not those that have to be first heard of, and then sought out and ordered through second or third hands."

Mr. Cooke sets forth the causes of German predominance as follows :—

"First and foremost, superior cheapness, an attribute indispensable in Siberia.

"Lightness and general correspondence of the goods with the requirements.

"Easier facilities offered, and especially easier credit terms.

"Superior accessibility on the part of German makers, greater pushing of their goods, and willingness to accept business, however small, as well as to meet all possible suggestions and adaptations.

"The presence of German resident firms or business men, whether Germans proper or Russo-Germans, at the bigger centres, and periodical visits of representatives, and consequent closer knowledge of the market and its conditions.

"The greater currency of their language in business circles, even in Siberia; the practical nature of their catalogues, price-lists and terms; the facilities they proffer; the initial risks they are willing to run in order to start business; and in general their undoubtedly superior knowledge of the country and its business customs and ways."

And finally, the following extract from Mr. Cooke's admirable survey will bear out in a striking manner the views which have been set forth in this chapter :—

"The American, the Dane, and the German are there already, and have captured some of the most fruitful fields it affords for enterprise. If what remains does not at present offer any vast opening for special branches of British energy, it is, at least, not a market to be passed by. These rich regions will be to Russia's increasing millions what our colonies are to the British Isles. They will harbour her surplus populations. Even now Russian immigrants into

Siberia, peasants though they be, are supplying the London market with butter, and, as they reap their crops with American harvesters, discuss with intelligence the rival preferences of machines from Milwaukee or Chicago."

The labour question is the most important of all the difficulties with which Russia will have to contend. At present there are large numbers of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean settlers in Siberia, and not only in the matter of efficient industry, but also in the still more important matter of cheap wages, their presence must eventually prove a distinct menace to Russian interests. In short, Russia will some day find herself face to face with a problem similar to that with which the Anglo-Saxon race is grappling in other parts of the Pacific. And if the statesmen of to-day are wise they will realise that the only barrier against Oriental aggression is the cultivation of friendly relations and the recognition of a community of interests among the white races. The Amur railway will assist Russia to realise her ambition—the colonisation of Eastern Siberia by her own people. In the meantime she is strenuously utilising her existing railway facilities for this purpose. Emigration has been organised on assisted lines. While in 1906 the funds allotted amounted to £260,000, the estimates in 1908 had reached nearly two millions sterling. During the same period the number of emigrants increased from 66,000 to over half a million annually. According to one account, the modern emigrants display a determination and faculty for system hitherto unknown, sending delegates before them to prospect, and obtaining all possible information before leaving European Russia. For the time being, therefore, the Government's policy is to keep peace between old and new settlers by preventing any alienation of land already occupied; but in no circumstances to discourage the migratory movement which, in general, it cannot but regard with approval. Nor must it be imagined that because there are penal settlements in Siberia the whole of the population of the country consists of desperadoes or discontented political exiles. Mr. S. Turner, F.R.G.S., who made a journey in Siberia in 1905, declared that "there were more people in favour of the existing system of government than against it, and that it is a very general opinion that if a census could be

taken of the views of the people the majority would be found to have voted for the Government. . . .

"The descendants of the ancient settlers in Siberia are a bold, free race. The Russian serf, when liberated, mixed with them in Siberia, and the descendants of this mixture are a self-reliant, strong-willed people, with a striking individuality, and afford a great contrast to the humble, man-fearing peasant of European Russia. The Siberians will, some day, become a great nation like America. At one time the Americans were made up of what might have been called adventurers, but that bold, fearless character was a good foundation for the future history of America, and it will be for Siberia. The people are very much more free in Siberia, and if politics are left alone the Siberian's life is the life of the brave and free."

On the whole it is clear that the construction of the Amur Railway is a scheme of world-wide importance ; and if international policies are directed wisely it is, moreover, a scheme destined to be of world-wide benefit. In its far-reaching aim it is thoroughly in accord with the measures which are being taken in the United States and in our Colonies to check the tide of Oriental immigration. Englishmen cannot criticise the scheme without being guilty of inconsistency. The better attitude would be frankly to admit that in the main the policies of Russia and the Anglo-Saxon race in the Pacific are identical.

BOOK IV

JAPAN—ADMINISTRATIVE AND SOCIAL

XIX

THE HOME POLITICS OF JAPAN

A BRIEF outline of the laws governing the two Houses of Parliament is necessary as a preliminary to the discussion of the domestic politics of Japan. The House of Peers consists of members of the Imperial family, who take their seats on reaching their majority; Princes and Marquises, who become members as soon as they attain the age of twenty-five years; Counts, Viscounts, and Barons, who, also having attained the age of twenty-five years, are elected by their respective orders for a term of seven years, but whose representation must not exceed one-fifth of the total number of Peers; men above thirty years of age nominated as life-members by the Emperor for their meritorious services or for erudition; and one member elected for a term of seven years from each city and prefecture by the fifteen male inhabitants paying the highest amount of direct national taxes on land, industry, or trade, but it is stipulated that these latter shall receive in addition the nomination of the Emperor, and that non-titled shall not exceed the aggregate strength of the titled members. The following table shows the composition of the House of Peers :—

Princes of the Blood	14 ¹
Princes	13 ¹
Marquises	30 ¹
Counts	17
Viscounts	70
Barons	56
Imperial Nominees	121
Representatives of Highest Taxpayers	43
Total	364

¹ All these sit by hereditary right.

Although the House of Peers in Japan is more representative than the House of Lords in Great Britain, inasmuch as it includes a limited number of members elected by the highest taxpayers, it is clear that it is pre-eminently a conservative institution, and that its composition is consistent with the strict maintenance of the doctrine of the supremacy of the Emperor. Many members of the higher orders of nobility were prominent clansmen in feudal days and are bitterly opposed to any extension of constitutional privileges. The additions which have been made to the ranks of the nobility in later times largely consist of public servants who were rewarded for their fidelity to the interests of the Throne and of the State. Apart from these elements of loyal strength, it will be observed that those members who owe their positions to the Imperial recognition of meritorious services or erudition constitute one-third of the members of the House of Peers, and that the representatives of the principal taxpayers cannot take their seats in that House without the Imperial nomination. Moreover, the President and Vice-President, whose terms of service are limited to seven years, are also nominated by the Emperor.

The House of Representatives originally consisted of 300 members, but this number was subsequently increased to 379. In the normal course of events a general election takes place every four years. The President and Vice-President are nominated by the Emperor from among three candidates selected by the House. A chief secretary with a staff of secretaries is appointed to each House. The Presidents and Vice-Presidents of the two Houses receive an annual allowance of *yen* 5000 (£500) and *yen* 3000 (£300) respectively. With the exception of those peers who occupy seats by right of birth, all members of the Upper House receive the same annual allowance as the members of the House of Representatives—*yen* 2000 (£200) annually, together with travelling expenses. Members who do not comply with the summons of convocation receive no allowance. Members of committees examining Bills when the Diet is not in session may be given an allowance not exceeding 5 *yen* (10s.) per day. The Law of the Houses stipulates that no debate shall be opened or resolution passed unless at least one-third of the members are present,

and the same applies both to standing and special committees. The process of three readings which is essential before a Bill can become law may be omitted when such a course is demanded by the Government, or by not less than ten members, and agreed to by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present. Although Ministers of State and the delegates of the Government are granted the privilege of addressing the House at any time, they cannot interrupt the speech of a member for this purpose, and unless they are members of the House are not permitted to vote.

The privilege of putting questions allowed British members of Parliament has not been emulated in Japan. A member desiring information must formulate his question in a concise memorandum, and before he is able to submit it to the responsible Minister is compelled to obtain the support of not less than thirty members. With the exception of the Budget the laws provide that Government Bills may be introduced to either one of the two Houses first, according to convenience. In view of the disagreements that have arisen between Liberal Administrations and the House of Lords in Great Britain, it will be of special interest to detail the procedure adopted in Japan on similar occasions. When either House makes an amendment to a Bill, the Bill is returned to the other Chamber, and if, in its amended form, it does not there meet with approval, a conference of the two Houses is demanded, and this by law cannot be refused. Both Houses elect an equal number of representatives, not exceeding ten. The voting at the conference is by secret ballot, and when the Bill has been adjusted it is discussed in that House which has either received it from the Government or has initiated it, and is then carried to the other House. Debates on these occasions would seem to be altogether futile, for it is clearly set forth that no motion for amendment can be made in connection with a Bill that has been adjusted in conference.

The laws are framed with a view to ensuring that Members of Parliament shall take their duties seriously. Although the President of either House has power to grant the members leave of absence, it is stipulated that the period shall not exceed one week. When an extension of leave is required, the permission of the whole House must first be obtained,

but no unlimited absentation is allowed. Should a member, regardless of the law, remain away without having been granted the necessary sanction, he is required to give the President adequate reasons for his action. It is laid down that if a peer does not comply with the Imperial convocation within seven days, or if he is absent without good reasons, having exceeded the period of his leave, and, after receiving the summons of the President, shall persist for one week in delaying his appearance, he shall be suspended from taking his seat, the matter meanwhile being reported to the Emperor. In the case of a member of the House of Representatives, he shall be summarily expelled. Any member who infringes the rules of debate can be prohibited from speaking during the remainder of the sitting, or ordered to leave. The President has full power to suspend a sitting or close it for the day if the House is in a state of excitement. In one clause it is stipulated that "In neither House shall utterances or the making of speeches implying disrespect to the Imperial House be allowed." According to the discretion of the Houses an offending member may be reprimanded, called upon to apologise, suspended, or expelled. In the event of the latter punishment, should the banished member be re-elected, he cannot be denied a seat. It is within the right of any member who has obtained the support of twenty members to propose, within three days of the committal of the offence, that disciplinary measures be taken. Disorderly scenes occur in the Japanese Diet on a scale similar to those witnessed in Western national assemblies, and on several occasions there have been free fights which, in the violence displayed, recall some memorable nights when the passions of the Irish members were aroused in the British House of Commons.

The Law of Elections provides that the expenses shall be defrayed out of the local taxes. Every male Japanese subject who has attained the age of twenty-five years and who has resided at a fixed address for one year is eligible to vote, providing that for at least one year previous to the making out of the electoral list he shall have paid direct national taxes of not less than 10 *yen* (£1). Every male Japanese subject who has attained the age of thirty years (with the

exception of teachers of religion), and who has not been deprived of civil rights in consequence of offences against the criminal law, is eligible for election to the Diet. Men in the army or navy cannot exercise the right to elect, nor can they be elected while on active service or in temporary retirement. Voting commences at 7 A.M. and closes at 6 P.M., and is conducted on the principle of the open ballot. An election committee, chosen by lot from among the voters, watch the proceedings, and the counting takes place in their presence. When candidates receive an equal number of votes the one senior in age is elected, and when they are of the same age a decision is arrived at by drawing lots. The following table is instructive as showing the limitations of the franchise privilege in Japan :—

Year.	Total Number of Voters.	Number of Franchise-holders to each Representative.	Number of Franchise-holders for every 1000 Inhabitants.
1890 . . .	453,474	1512	11.50
1891 . . .	452,156	1507	11.38
1892 . . .	460,914	1536	11.53
1893 . . .	457,309	1523	11.35
1894 . . .	464,278	1548	11.22
1895 . . .	467,887	1560	11.42
1896 . . .	467,607	1559	11.31
1897 . . .	467,401	1558	11.19
1898 . . .	501,459	1672	11.88
1902 (August) .	983,193 ¹	2615	22.22
1903 (March) .	951,860 ¹	2532	20.96
1904 (March) .	757,788 ²	1999	15.77

There are two kinds of electoral divisions—the incorporated cities, which must contain not less than 30,000 inhabitants, but which, in the case of larger cities, are privileged to return a plurality of representatives on the basis of one for every 130,000 persons; and the prefectural districts, corresponding with our county divisions, which return one member for, approximately, every 130,000 residents. As the financial qualification is an exceedingly low one, some indication of

¹ The sudden increase in the number of franchise-holders was due to the lowering of the property qualification.

² The decrease in 1904 was due to the restoration of the Land Tax from 3.3 per cent. to the original 2.5 per cent. of the assessed value.

the extreme poverty of the country may be derived from the fact that less than one-fiftieth of the population enjoy the franchise.¹ It cannot be said that representative government is conspicuously successful in a country like Japan, where Members of Parliament are elected with the low average of 2000 votes each. The rural constituencies possess an overwhelming majority of voters over the urban divisions, returning 304 members to the latter's 75. That in the matter of qualifying for the franchise they should have the advantage of the people who dwell in the centres of commerce, is not difficult to understand when it is borne in mind that the Land Tax constitutes a very large proportion of the direct national taxation, and that the great landowner is practically unknown in Japan. By placating the rural voters the Government is constantly able to secure support, and this is all the more readily given owing to the fact that the agricultural community is the last class in Japan to be affected by modern influences. They have little if any interest in the controversial questions of political life, and so long as they are left in peace to till their rice-fields they are content to subscribe an unquestioning loyalty to the bureaucratic administration which rules their destinies, believing that in this way they are best maintaining the supremacy of the Sovereign, and are doing all that is required of them in the fulfilment of the duties of true patriotism.

The history of political parties in Japan goes back as far as 1874, when three leading Japanese statesmen—Soyejima, Gotō, and Itagaki, who at a later date were created Counts—began to agitate for the granting of a Constitution. Their views were regarded as revolutionary in an age which had just emerged from feudalism, but their cause appealed to those classes of the community who, having been recently delivered from the bondage of serfdom, longed for a form of liberty that would carry with it some share in representative government. The three statesmen who led the movement and their supporters became known as Liberals. In 1882, another body,

¹ The most recent figures available since the above was written show that only 10 per cent. of the adult male population, or 12½ per cent. of the men over the age of twenty-five years, or 6 per cent. of the total adult population, possess the vote.

whose programme was almost identical with that of the Liberals, was organised by Count Ōkuma, and this formed the nucleus of the Progressist Party. The two parties were not opposed so much by reason of policy as by considerations of personal rivalries. At the time of their inauguration there was only one object to be obtained—the granting of the Constitution. When the first session of the Diet opened on November 29, 1890, the Liberals and the Progressists were the only two political parties in the country. Had they chosen to unite, they could have commanded an overwhelming majority. The Ministers of State, while recognising that representative government was inevitable, looked with marked disfavour upon the advent of party politicians in the Legislature. They held that the Cabinet should consist of non-party statesmen, and that as it was alone responsible to the Emperor the defeat of the Government in the House of Representatives should not necessarily involve resignation. As, from the very outset, the views of the Ministers were diametrically opposed to those of the party politicians, there were violent collisions between the Government and the Diet. The first assembly of the House of Representatives enjoyed an exceedingly short life. After thirteen months, Parliament was dissolved owing to its insistence that the Budget should be curtailed. Within three months of the Extraordinary General Election, the Diet reassembled on May 5, 1892, and in August of the same year Itō became Prime Minister. It was not long before he was compelled to realise that the party politicians were conducting an agitation which, in view of the fact that the foreign relations of the country were in a delicate state, was little short of suicidal. The Opposition insisted in very strong terms on the strict enforcement of the treaties with the Western Powers. While the Cabinet was looked upon as excessively weak in its foreign policy, it soon gave evidence of its ability to deal with the domestic situation, and within twenty months the Diet was dissolved. The third Diet assembled on May 15, 1894, but was dissolved eighteen days later on account of a renewal of the attempt to interfere with the foreign policy of the Government. At this period Itō, who had the assistance of one of the most brilliant Foreign Ministers Japan has ever possessed,

Count Mutsu, was endeavouring to bring about a revision of the treaties. He regarded the agitation of the party politicians as reactionary and provocative, and feared lest it might endanger the success of his efforts. As a matter of fact an agreement had almost been reached with Great Britain concerning a revised treaty, and Itō realised that the maintenance of smooth foreign relations was essential if this was to be completed and if other Powers were to be induced to reconsider their treaties with Japan. The attitude of the Diet at the time caused grave misgivings as to whether the country had yet reached a stage when it was fit to undertake the responsibilities of even a limited form of representative government. The first dissolution had not been altogether unexpected, for the Government was then composed largely of second-rate statesmen, and it was recognised that the conflict was not necessarily the fault of the Diet; but when Itō, the father of the Constitution, supported by a body of strong and trusted statesmen, assumed power, the Diet was given a trial under the most favourable circumstances. That it adopted an attitude which was inimical to the best interests of the State and which twice called for dissolution caused much disappointment. An anonymous contributor to the *Contemporary Review*, writing soon after the war with China and referring to the period immediately following the second dissolution, declared that: "In the beginning of July of last year Japan presented the spectacle of a house completely divided against itself. Some of the best friends of the country, and some of the most intelligent amongst her citizens—men, too, who had welcomed the advent of representative institutions with enthusiasm—were anxiously and moodily discussing the advisability of the suspension of the Constitution and a reversion to the time-honoured *régime* of despotism, tempered by assassination, to which the nation had been so long accustomed."

Three months elapsed before the third Extraordinary General Election took place, and the fourth Diet assembled on October 18, 1894. The outbreak of the Chino-Japanese War in the same year came at an opportune moment in the domestic affairs of the country, inasmuch as it united the various factions within the Empire against a common

enemy. The Diet loyally supported the Government in the two sessions that were held during the war, but it was understood that such support was merely the recognition of the duties of patriotism and would come to an end so soon as peace was restored. When the Government yielded to the demands of Russia, France, and Germany, and consented to the retrocession to China of the Kwantung Peninsula, there were not wanting ominous signs that a renewal of Parliamentary opposition was about to begin. Itō, who had negotiated the treaty of peace and who had realised that Japan could not possibly contest the demands of the combined Powers, saw clearly, with that profound foresight which always characterised his career, that if the Constitution was to be saved some effort must be made to obtain Parliamentary support for the Government. With as much secrecy as was possible under the circumstances, he approached, in December 1895, Count Itagaki, the leader of the Liberals, with whom he concluded an *entente*. This recognition of party politics was a wise concession by Itō to the spirit of the times. There was no doubt that he believed in his own heart that the ideal form of government was a Ministry responsible to the Emperor alone. The Constitution which he had framed bore on the face of it this interpretation. He became the ally of the Liberals, but not in any sense of the term a party statesman. Itagaki, on his side, was only too ready to welcome so powerful a confederate, for he realised that the prolongation of the conflict with the Administration might conceivably endanger the very existence of representative government itself. At that time party politicians were ill fitted by reason of inexperience, to say nothing of general incompetence, to undertake the control of the country; and rather than give way to their clamour Itō would no doubt have seriously considered whether he should not have advised the Emperor to suspend the Constitution. His *entente* with the Liberals was therefore astute. With their aid the Government carried most of their measures.

In May 1896 Count Itagaki was given a Cabinet portfolio as Home Minister. The appointment of a party leader to a position in the Government was a sign of the changing times. The alliance between Itō and the Liberals soon led to a

counter move on the part of the minor opposition parties who formed the Progressist Party, while Count Ōkuma, the leader of the Progressists, and Count Matsukata—now Marquis—the leader of the Kagoshima [Satsuma] statesmen, also arrived at an agreement. In spite of the fact that the Government had the support of the Liberals, the Opposition was exceedingly powerful, and there were many suggestions both from within and without the Cabinet that, as a compromise, a coalition government should be formed. Count Itagaki was a bitter opponent of coalition on the ground that it would not advance the principles of constitutional government and that it would ignore the essential elements of party politics. Rather than submit to any compromise he tendered his resignation, and Itō, as a mark of gratitude for the support which he had accorded him during his Ministry, also followed him into retirement. There was no dissolution.

A new Cabinet was formed in September 1896 with Marquis Matsukata as Prime Minister and Count Ōkuma as Foreign Minister. Considerable discontent existed in the nation owing not only to the foreign but also to the domestic policy of the previous Government. There was a loud demand for the final abolition of clan control, and the party politicians strenuously advocated that in its place should be substituted an Administration responsible to Parliament alone. It was felt throughout the length and breadth of the land that Japan had been deeply humiliated by the retrocession of the Kwantung Peninsula to China, and the members of the Diet, representing the sentiment of their constituents, urged the adoption of a strong, almost belligerent foreign policy. The nation confidently expected that the new Cabinet would prove amenable to the Parliamentary will; but unfortunately during their brief term of office they were largely occupied in settling dissensions among themselves.

Mr. Tokiwo Yokoi, the well-known Japanese publicist and politician, writing of the political events of this period, says: "The Satsuma elements and the Ōkuma elements no more mix together than oil and water. In their counsels there were always two wills, sometimes three, contending for mastery. The question of the balance

of power between these elements was always cropping up in connection with all questions of State policy. Able as some of those statesmen were, it was owing mainly to their intestine quarrels that the Ministry proved a failure. Before a year was out the nation was disappointed. Early in the fall Count Ōkuma resigned office, saying that he felt like a European physician in consultation over a case with Chinese doctors. Henceforth the ship of State, now in troubled waters, was entirely in the hands of the Kagoshima statesmen and their friends. Some heroic and extraordinary efforts were made to revive the fallen credit of the Administration—but all in vain. Ōkuma led away the majority of the Progressist Party, and the Government was left with but an insignificant number of supporters. As soon as the Diet met the spirit of opposition manifested was so strong that the Ministers asked the Emperor to issue an edict for dissolution. It was expected that the Government would at once appeal to the country with some strong programme. But to the astonishment of everybody the Ministry resigned the very next day." The fourth Diet, called into existence two years before the resignation of the Itō Ministry, lasted until the fall of the Matsukata-Ōkuma Administration (December 1897), and so enjoyed a longer life than any of its predecessors. Convened on five occasions over a period of three years and two months, it sat throughout three full sessions, each of three months' duration. Parliament met for the last time on December 24, 1897, dissolution taking place on the following day.

It was now generally recognised that Itō was the only statesman who could be entrusted with the task of attempting a reconciliation of the form of constitutional government that obtained in Japan with the active elements that had developed in consequence of the growth of party politics. In January 1898, he was called upon to form his third ministry and succeeded in the task.¹ Count Inouye—now Marquis—was given the portfolio of Finance, while Marquis Saionji, and Viscount Katsura—since created a Prince—both of whom were destined at a later date to become Premiers,

¹ The first Itō Ministry, 1885-1888, antedated the introduction of representative government.

were for the first time given Cabinet rank, the former being appointed Minister of Education, and the latter Minister of War. Writing at this time, Mr. Tokiwo Yokoi said that it was difficult to forecast how far Itō felt it expedient to go on the line of *rapprochement* with political parties. "There probably exists," he added, "a tacit understanding between him and his former friends the Liberals and the National Unionists. The parties themselves would doubtless wish the relation made more explicit, while he would rather have it remain as it is, at least for the time being. Evidently he does not feel that the condition of political parties warrants him in throwing himself with open arms into their fellowship, and they, on their part, seem to be quite restive and impatient of his reserve. The courtship has now lasted for some years, yet the expected wedding has not yet taken place, and no public announcement has been made even of the engagement."

All doubts were set at rest when, in June 1898, five months after he had formed his new Cabinet, Itō, unable to contend against the various parties combined in Opposition, tendered his resignation. Simultaneously with the retirement of the Ministry the Emperor dissolved the Diet, which, having assembled on May 19, after the Extraordinary General Election in March, had sat for only twenty-three days. On relinquishing power Itō adopted what was, under the circumstances, the extremely significant course of recommending his Majesty to consult the leaders of the Opposition with a view to their formation of a new Ministry. By this time Count Itagaki had become a convert to compromise. The Liberals and the Progressists consented to sink their differences, and they were merged under the title of the Constitutional Party. A coalition Cabinet was formed with Count Ōkuma as Premier and Count Itagaki as Home Minister. This arrangement was looked upon as a first experiment in party government and was therefore awaited by the whole nation with eager expectation. It was recognised that there must be a continuity of control at the War Office, and Viscount Katsura, who had been in charge of that department in the time of the late Ministry, was again appointed to the same position. Whether in recommending the Opposition

as successors to his Ministry, it was the intention of Itō to give the party politicians enough rope with which to hang themselves is not altogether clear. That they became tired of governmental life after only a brief experience, and that they did hang themselves, are undeniable facts. It could not be said that the Coalition Cabinet was hampered by a Diet in session, for it was in that brief period between the dissolution and the reassembling after the Extraordinary General Election of August 10 that the Government succumbed. As a matter of fact the experiment of a party Ministry was a pitiable fiasco. There were repeated quarrels over the spoils of office, and the supporters of the Cabinet showed little hesitation in claiming rewards as the price of their fidelity. Those who were appointed to the various positions under the Administration proved themselves hopelessly incapable of discharging their duties efficiently. Moreover, it was soon evident that the union of the parties had not been cemented. As the breach widened the Liberal and the Progressist sections freely indulged in wrangles, the cause of which was invariably dissatisfaction with Government appointments to office. After a stormy career, lasting only from June to November, the Ministry recognised the impossibility of conducting the affairs of State under the party system, and resigned. It was clear that the time was not ripe for the ascendancy of party politics in Japan. The military men, led by General Marquis Yamagata—now Field-Marshal and Prince—had been bitterly opposed from the very outset to representative government in any form whatever, and their attitude towards the Ōkuma-Itagaki coalition, which, in their opinion, involved an almost revolutionary development of representative government, was one of utter detestation. They realised, as soon as the Ministry fell, that the moment had arrived when they should increase their influence in the councils of State. It has been held that Yamagata was the only statesman who at this juncture could form a Cabinet with any prospect of a prolonged retention of office. This contention is based upon the fact that he was opposed to the recognition of party politics made by Itō when he commended the Opposition as his successors. But it is open to question whether

Itō was not animated by an early realisation of the fact that the results of the experiment would cure the nation, at least for a time, of its ardent desire for party government.

In November 1898 Yamagata became the head of a Cabinet which might have been described as reactionary had it not existed in a country where, in spite of drawbacks, considerable progress had already been made in consequence of the inauguration of a constitutional *régime*. Count Matsukata was given the portfolio of Finance; Admiral Kabayama, the hero of the battle of the Yalu in the war with China, was placed in charge of educational affairs; Viscount Katsura was reappointed Minister of War; and Admiral Yamamoto assumed the duties of Minister of Marine. On December 3 the sixth Diet was convened.

September of 1900 was memorable in the history of the domestic affairs of Japan. It was in that month that Itō came to the conclusion that the time had arrived when he could assume the rôle of a party leader. Instead of seeking an alliance with one or other of the organisations already in existence, he promptly proceeded to form his own party under the title of the *Seiyu-kai* or Political Association—now commonly known as the Unionists. As soon as he frankly entered the domain of party politics, men of prominence in the land, realising the value of his enormous influence to the cause which they had at heart, made haste to rally round him. The *Seiyu-kai* commanded a majority in the House of Representatives, and it was not long before they made the position of the Yamagata Ministry untenable. In October 1900 Itō, for the fourth time in his career, was called upon to form a Cabinet. Continuity in naval and military policies was secured by the reappointments of Viscount Katsura to the War Office and of Admiral Yamamoto to the Navy Department. The period that followed was of special interest to political students of the times, inasmuch as it marked the first conflict between the two Houses. While by reason of his creation of the *Seiyu-kai* Itō had secured an overwhelming majority for his policy in the House of Representatives, he lacked support in the House of Peers. Having regard to the differences of opinion which have repeatedly arisen in this country be-

tween the Lords and the Commons, the Japanese method of settling disagreements of a similar nature would appear to accentuate the improbability of any reconciliation of the points of view of East and West. When a deadlock was reached an Imperial rescript was issued inviting the Peers to reconsider their position, and in consequence they adopted, though, it must be confessed, with little if any conviction, a more conciliatory policy towards party government. For the second time since the Constitution had become operative abundant proof was forthcoming that the party politicians were not yet capable of conducting the Administration for any length of time. After being in office for seven months the Cabinet resigned, owing to their inability to agree among themselves on questions of finance. There was no immediate dissolution of the Diet.

With the passing of the Itō Administration it may be said that there came to be recognised as a factor of supreme importance in the affairs of the State a small group of men who, henceforth, were to be known to the world as the *Genro*, or Elder Statesmen. By the Japanese the term is also made to apply in an historic and more comprehensive sense, in that it embraces the names of those pioneers of modern statecraft, both dead and living, who guided the destinies of Japan during the early period of her transition. Not all of those who enjoy to-day, however, the title of Elder Statesmen can claim to have any influence in the councils of the Empire; and at the time of which I am writing—the Ministerial crisis of 1901—there were but four men whose wisdom, experience, and administrative ability gave them an unchallenged authority to proffer advice alike to the Throne and to the Cabinet of the day. These four were Itō, Inouye, Matsukata, and Yamagata. Of the four the late Prince Itō was undoubtedly the greatest. He was pre-eminently a constructive statesman, and a diplomatist of the first rank. Not only had he initiated historic changes, but he had proved himself adaptable to the altered times. Yamagata, frankly and consistently conservative, had ever been looked upon as the great rival of Itō, whose experiment in party government he had neither forgiven nor forgotten. First and foremost a soldier, his attitude towards party politics had always been, and is to this day, one of bitter

antagonism ; but it would be idle to deny that it has proved advantageous to the best interests of Japan, for it has served as a check upon the premature development of the party spirit. Inouye is still regarded as the highest financial expert in the land, and he is called the permanent guardian of the Treasury. Matsukata was perhaps the least prominent of the four Elder Statesmen. Like Inouye, he is an authority on finance. He has held the financial portfolio in seven Cabinets. His knowledge of educational affairs is considerable, and he is an honorary LL.D. of Oxford. Incidentally it may be mentioned that Count Ōkuma could have joined the Elder Statesmen had he so wished. He preferred, however, to remain in splendid isolation as the leader of the Progressist Party, a position which he resigned in 1907. He is regarded as the stormy petrel of the Japanese political world. Through all the mediums of publicity he is constantly attacking the policy of the Government of the day. Some Japanese writers have compared him to Mr. Chamberlain, and much has been made of the fact that not one of the least points of resemblance is that both statesmen are deeply interested in the cultivation of orchids. He is essentially a patriot, and has suffered in the interests of his country, for in the period of turmoil during the negotiations for the revision of the treaties his leg was blown off by a dynamite bomb thrown at him by a reactionary. Throughout his political career he has no doubt been at a disadvantage, owing to the fact that he did not belong to either of the two ruling clans, the Satsuma or the Chōshū. The prospect that he will ever again wield Ministerial power is exceedingly remote.

The Japanese have always found it exceedingly difficult to define the exact position of the Elder Statesmen in regard to affairs of State. They are not a legally constituted body. They are not, in any sense of the term, even a constituted body. For while the Emperor and the Cabinet frequently seek their advice collectively, they are on many occasions called upon as individuals to take a part in the councils of the Empire, and sometimes even in the deliberations of the Administrative Departments. It is generally admitted, however, that they stand between the Sovereign and the Ministers of State, and that consequently they are a power above the

Cabinet. Moreover, they possess in themselves all the essential qualifications requisite in a Cabinet. Their influence in the land, next that of the Throne, is paramount. They take the Cabinet, as it were, under their wing. Many of the Ministers have been their protégées, while the older generation of the high permanent officials, having for many years served under their administration, still look to them for guidance. For their services they receive no remuneration. While those who form this select coterie admit that sooner or later the advent of party government is inevitable, it is extremely doubtful whether, at the present time, any one of them can bear, without feelings of utter aversion and dismay, even the mere contemplation of its establishment. As the Cabinet is dependent for support upon the Elder Statesmen, and as the Elder Statesmen differ among themselves in their political views, it will be seen that there is considerable room for intrigue. In these circumstances it must be acknowledged that the Emperor has shown himself possessed of remarkable wisdom in accepting what has proved to be the best advice from among a multitude of counsellors.

When, in 1901, the Itō Ministry resigned, none of the Elder Statesmen would take upon himself the task of forming a new Government, and a younger man, Viscount Katsura, stepped into the breach. But the Emperor, who in the troubled days that preceded and followed the granting of constitutional government had depended for advice upon the Elder Statesmen, was not willing that their services should be even temporarily dispensed with. While he recognised that the active duties of administration called for the energies of the younger men, he placed at its true value the experience of former Ministers who had been largely responsible for bringing about the national transition. Nor was he slow to realise that their retention in high advisory capacities would lead the country along lines of progress that were consistent with the lessons of the past, and would act as a brake upon any excess of zeal that might be displayed by statesmen new to office. In other words, he sought to combine in his councils the experience of age with the energy of comparative youth.

Thus it came about that, in June 1901, Viscount Katsura formed the new Cabinet, included in which, as Minister of War, was the late General Count Kodama, who was Chief of the Staff in the Russo-Japanese War. In August of the following year the first ordinary General Election in the history of the Diet took place. In spite of the fact that since the previous election—that of August 10, 1898—the Cabinet had been changed three times, Parliament sat throughout four complete sessions. The first Katsura Ministry was for many reasons the most notable administration since the inception of constitutional government. In the first place the new Premier belonged essentially to the military school. As a general of division he had taken a prominent part in the war with China, and had occupied the position of Minister of War in no less than four successive Cabinets. Moreover, he was regarded as a disciple of Yamagata, and was not a believer in party government. There was no doubt that of all the Elder Statesmen Yamagata possessed the most influence with the Cabinet, and in this way he was largely consoled for his experience a year previously, when the Ministry under his Premiership was succeeded by one of Itō's formation. With a tenacity that was remarkable in Japan, the Government managed to retain office for more than four years. In the process, however, their personnel underwent many changes. The most notable of these occurred several months after they had assumed power when Baron Komura became Foreign Minister in place of Baron Sone, and General Terauchi—now a Count—succeeded General Kodama at the War Office. In January 1902 the position of the Government was strengthened by the conclusion of the first Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and as a mark of the Imperial appreciation Katsura was elevated to the rank of Count. On December 9 of the same year the seventh Diet assembled after the ordinary General Election. The Government proposed, by increasing the Land Tax, to raise the money necessary for the completion of a naval expansion scheme. The *Seiyu-kai* under the leadership of Itō strongly opposed this policy. Count Katsura and Itō were unable to come to an understanding, and eventually the *Seiyu-kai* was strengthened by the support of the Pro-

gressists under the leadership of Count Ōkuma. The Lower House was twice suspended to enable the subject to be reconsidered, and was finally dissolved after a session lasting only nineteen days. The Extraordinary General Election which followed took place on March 1, 1903, and two months later when the eighth Diet was convened the Prime Minister changed his tactics, withdrew the Land Tax Bill, and thus secured the support of the *Seiyu-kai*. On December 10th the House reassembled, but next day it was summarily dissolved in consequence of the action of its President who, in a reply to the Throne, sought to censure the policy of the Government towards Russia.

The Extraordinary General Election did not take place until March 1 of the following year, and nineteen days later the ninth Diet assembled. Meanwhile the negotiations with Russia in regard to Manchuria and Korea which had been in progress for some considerable time had reached an acute stage, and on February 10, in the period intervening between the dissolution and the assembling of the Diet and nearly a month before the General Election actually took place, the Emperor, acting under the advice of his Ministers, exercised his Imperial prerogative and declared war. In adopting this course, however, his Majesty acted strictly in accord with the national will. From the moment that the first shot was fired all political strife ceased, and the Diet when convened gave whole-hearted and unanimous support to the policy of the Ministry. In this respect it may well be said that Japan set a splendid example to the world. Her people were deserving of all the more credit for their patriotism, inasmuch as the Cabinet, which on two occasions had advised the Emperor to dissolve peremptorily the national assembly, was not in any sense of the term a popular one. To this circumstance must alone be ascribed the exceptionally long life enjoyed by the Katsura Ministry. A Cabinet in which military influence largely predominated was no doubt best suited to the needs of war. While General Kodama was the brain of the army in the field, General Terauchi proved himself to be the brain of the organisation at home. He confined his energies exclusively to his own department.

A Japanese writer intimately acquainted with the General

said of him that he was never anything more than a specialist, and in a sketch of his character added: "Owing to a bodily injury received thirty-one years ago, instead of leading troops in the field, General Terauchi has devoted his life to military administration and organisation, in which he has shown great talent. During the China-Japan War it was he who superintended the business of army transport and communications. In this work for the first time he showed his capabilities. He subsequently became the Commander of a Division—a post for which he was well adapted. After this he undertook the superintendence of military education (Kyōiku Sōkan), till eventually he rose to be Assistant-Chief of the Headquarter Staff, this being a stepping-stone to the post of Minister of War, to which he was appointed prior to the Russo-Japanese War. What the world sees is cold severity. General Sir Ian Hamilton rightly remarked that in General Terauchi's face is to be seen one of the most perfect types of a Japanese; but it is a military type, in which affection, attachment to subordinates, regard for old friends are all made subservient to the passionless character of the old-fashioned Japanese warrior. When attached to our Legation in Paris, though Terauchi had obtained a good knowledge of French, he used it in anything but a polite way. His manner of speaking was blunt and uncourteous and the tone he adopted was that of one giving orders to an inferior. His replies to questions were short and direct. To any kind of circumlocution he never resorted. But what is most remarkable about him is the clearness of his decisions, the rapidity with which he weighs the pros and cons of every question and sees where the balance lies. Wonderful indeed is the activity of his mind, and it is invariably accompanied by activity of body: feet and hands move with his lips. It is not his way to be still for a single moment. A chair is a superfluity in a waiting-room where he is, for he invariably paces to and fro as if on a journey. When conversing he is ever on the move. To be detained by people beyond what he considers the proper time he will not consent. To his public duties he subordinates all private calls. What leisure is he knows not. Yet he keeps in good health month in and month out. Though he owed his first start in life to

clan influence, he has no clan narrow-mindedness. In this he strongly resembles the late General Kawakami. The unhesitating manner in which he is wont to advance men of ability and reject weak men, according to some people, approaches to cruelty. There are those who represent General Terauchi to be a man of limited capacity, but nobody has ever doubted his sincerity or his public-spiritedness, and these qualities, together with what he has accomplished, suffice to account for the implicit confidence placed in him by the nation." Baron Yamamoto, the Minister of Marine, who had occupied the same position in two preceding Cabinets, was as successful in the control of his own department as was General Terauchi at the War Office. During the great campaign the influence of the Elder Statesmen continually made itself felt. Itō was constantly consulted both by the Emperor and the Cabinet, and no decision of serious moment was arrived at without his acquiescence. The advice of the other Elder Statesmen was also sought, though not to the same extent; for it was recognised that Yamagata was first and foremost a military expert, and that Inouye and Matsukata were specialists in national finance. The success of the Administration during the war was due in no small measure to the efforts of the Elder Statesmen, thus proving the foresight of the Emperor in retaining by his side what might be termed a select and supreme council of advisers whose wisdom experience had established. The publication of the Peace terms which were signed on September 5, 1905, brought discredit upon the Cabinet. These were looked upon as wholly inadequate by the great mass of the people, and angry demonstrations took place from end to end of the land. The Government, however, were determined to remain in office until their work was completed, and it was not until after December 22, when the Convention with China, which was a corollary to the Portsmouth Treaty, was concluded, that they tendered their resignations. That they acted wisely in making peace with Russia nobody who was acquainted with the condition of the military and financial resources of the country could doubt. That in doing so they resisted the pressure of the *chauvinist* section of the population was distinctly to their credit. At any rate

they were not alone in the responsibility of ending the war on the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, for the Elder Statesmen were present at the councils held before the Throne during the negotiations, and they certainly endorsed if they did not actually inspire the Ministerial policy. The tactics adopted by the Government in order to avoid public discussion of the Peace terms were, to say the least, adroit. Before the Diet, which had just reassembled for the session, had time to propose a resolution of censure, the Cabinet had passed away from the scene. Previously, however, in a variety of ways, particularly through the medium of communications to the press and replies to delegations from the people, they had hinted to the nation that financial and military considerations compelled the conclusion of peace. In effect the Premier said, "We had excellent reasons for ending the war, but we decline to give them to you in detail, because we do not think it wise that they should be noised abroad, where there are enemies as well as friends of Japan. We are quite content to abide by the endorsement of the Emperor and to leave our actions to the judgment of posterity."

But the country was far from satisfied. It loudly demanded detailed statements from the Ministers. When, however, Count Katsura, rather than give the information desired, evaded the issue by resignation, there ceased to be a point of attack, for the incoming Premier declined to be drawn into a declaration that he was in any way responsible for the actions of his predecessor. The people, who as soon as peace was concluded clamoured for the retirement of the Katsura Cabinet, were loud in their accusations, when the self-same Cabinet did retire, that it had shirked a most solemn obligation to the nation by not giving the Diet an opportunity to pass a vote of censure upon its policy. Nevertheless it was significant that the Ministers were unable to survive the opposition engendered by the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty, and that eventually they were compelled to bow to the will of the people. They could have remained in office only by dissolving the Diet again and again, a process that would have been altogether inadvisable in view of the importance of *post-bellum* affairs. For some time

Marquis Saionji had been marked out as the successor to Count Katsura, and certain *pourparlers* were conducted between the two statesmen before a change of Ministry took place. The retiring Premier insisted upon obtaining an assurance that the *post-bellum* measures which he had initiated would be continued, and it was not until Marquis Saionji had agreed to this condition that he was recommended to the Emperor as the statesman best fitted to the task of forming a new Government.

Marquis Saionji, realising the necessity for obtaining ample support in the Diet at this critical juncture in the nation's history, took steps before he accepted office to ensure an overwhelming majority. He had succeeded to the leadership of the powerful *Seiyu-kai* on the withdrawal of Itō in 1903 and could, of course, rely upon the allegiance of that party, which mustered 141 votes in a House of 379 representatives, not sufficient, however, to command a majority. There were two other parties to be considered. During the war the Progressists, who held 96 seats, had worked in harmony with the *Seiyu-kai*, but as soon as peace was concluded they considered themselves absolved from any patriotic obligation to maintain political unity. Then, with the passing of the Katsura Cabinet there suddenly came into existence an altogether new party which called itself the *Daido Club*, and which, consisting of 84 members of Parliament, introduced an important element in the struggle for the balance of power. It was clear that Marquis Saionji required support additional to that of the *Seiyu-kai*, and to obtain this he was compelled to choose between the two remaining parties, both of which appeared equally ready and willing to form a working alliance with the Government. He decided to leave the Progressists entirely out in the cold and accepted the help of the *Daido Club*. This action appeared inexplicable to many who were not well informed at the time; but rumour gradually spread that, on retiring from the Premiership, Count Katsura, with extraordinary secrecy, had induced a number of political nondescripts including discontented deserters from both the leading parties, few of whom were conspicuous for sincerity of purpose, to form that curiously heterogeneous combination known as the *Daido Club*. He bargained away the support

of this party in return for the inclusion of certain of his nominees in the new Cabinet and the promise of a continuance of the programme that he had inaugurated. An alliance between the *Seiyu-kai* and the Progressists—both holding advanced views on the question of party government—would in the long run have proved disastrous to the cause to which, by predilection as well as conviction, Count Katsura stood pledged. Owing allegiance to the old, stalwart military clique, he clung tenaciously to the conservative tenet that to the Emperor alone should a Cabinet acknowledge responsibility. Not, therefore, till he had rendered, by every means at his disposal, the possibility of so dangerous an alliance exceedingly remote, did he recommend Marquis Saionji to the Emperor as his successor.

The composition of the Administration formed by Marquis Saionji in January 1906 was as follows :—

<i>Prime Minister</i>	Marquis Saionji.
<i>Minister of Foreign Affairs</i>	Mr. T. Kato.
<i>Minister of Home Affairs</i>	Mr. K. Hara.
<i>Minister of Finance</i>	Baron Y. Sakatani.
<i>Minister of the Navy</i>	Vice-Admiral Saito.
<i>Minister of Justice</i>	Mr. M. Matsuda.
<i>Minister of Education</i>	Mr. M. Makino.
<i>Minister of Agriculture and Commerce</i>	Mr. K. Matsuoka.
<i>Minister of Communications</i>	Mr. I. Yamagata.
<i>Minister of War</i>	General Terauchi.

The new Cabinet was not in any sense of the term a party Cabinet. Although depending for its support in the Diet largely upon the *Seiyu-kai*, only three of the leaders of that party, Marquis Saionji, Mr. Matsuda, and Mr. Hara became Ministers. The acceptance of the situation by the *Seiyu-kai* practically amounted to a recognition by the chief political party in the State that the time was not ripe for party government in Japan. That they gave their support to a Ministry formed by their own leader and in which they had only three representatives was in itself a confession of the poverty of competent legislators in their ranks. The *Daido* Club had no representative in the Cabinet, but were amply compensated in other and more practical directions for their time-serving allegiance. Marquis Saionji was more con-

cerned in satisfying the requirements of the late Cabinet and of the Elder Statesmen than in rewarding his political supporters. Mr. Toyabe Shunkō, a Japanese publicist, writing of the new Cabinet, said: "But as Japan is situated to-day, it is far safer to rely on talent for the formation of Cabinets than on political parties. And if it be asked who has most talent, officials or members of political parties, the answer is, officials. Beyond a few office-holders in the *Seiyū-kai* and the *Shimpōto* [Progressists] there are no very talented men. And this is the chief reason why the formation of an efficient party Cabinet is at present impossible. . . . It is too soon to expect the organisation of a thoroughly representative national Cabinet. Non-party official Cabinets doubtless do harm, as the statesmen who compose them invariably regard political parties as their foes. Hence there arises injurious friction between the Executive and the Legislature. The blending of official and party elements in a Cabinet in such a way as to give the chief power to the leaders of the party that commands the highest majority in the Diet, is what is most desirable at the present time. But after all Cabinets like other governing bodies depend for their success on the characters of the men composing them. The notion that agreement as to the policy to be pursued is going to make government efficient is a great mistake. 'Men are governed by their characters rather than by maxims,' observed Disraeli. . . . It seems to us that the time has come for party politicians and non-party officials to regard each other with friendly eyes. Modern officials can no longer be justly denounced as the perpetuators of clanism. Most of them have no clan sympathy at all. The fact that they have long been in Government service should not be considered a disqualification for the occupation of seats in the Cabinet alongside of party politicians. And the two kinds of administrators, the temporary party politician and the permanent Government official, should recognise and appreciate each other's merits. The formation of the present Cabinet is a step in that direction."

The public sentiment in Japan in regard to party politics may best be illustrated by reference to the articles published in the leading newspapers on the occasion of the change of

Administration. The official organ of the former Katsura Government, the *Kokumin* (which translated means, The Nation's Friend), boldly congratulated the country that party politics were farther away than ever, and added, with a *naïveté* that would be difficult to surpass, that such form of government was behind the times. It admitted, however, "that perhaps our reasons for rejoicing are different from those of the general public." The *Jiji Shimpō*, which has been called *The Times* of Japan, appreciated "the disadvantages under which Marquis Saionji takes over the reins of government, especially as the nation is not yet ready for a purely party Ministry, even though the Marquis is himself the head of the strongest political party the country possesses."

The *Mainichi*, a newspaper conducted upon popular lines, styled the new Cabinet, "an aggregation of anomalies," and discussed its personnel in the following highly instructive, if not amusing passage: "Mr. Hara occupies a post of comparative importance, as Minister of Home Affairs; but he is not a man of weight, except that he forms a connecting link between the Cabinet and the clique of Elder Statesmen. Mr. Matsuda, as Minister of Justice, can afford to be independent; but his is not a position of much influence. The Foreign Minister, Mr. Kato, and Education Minister (that is to be), Mr. Makino, are both men of 'about three-fifths Itō extraction.' Mr. Matsuoka, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, is on friendly terms with the 'Yamagata coterie,' but not badly disposed towards the 'Itō men.' Mr. Sakatani was the preceding Cabinet's Vice-Minister of Finance, and will follow in the footsteps of Baron Sone. Mr. Yamagata, Minister of Communications (who is the adopted son of Marquis Yamagata), will be useful in manipulating 'Yamagata men' in the House of Peers. Vice-Admiral Saito, rising from the Vice-Ministership, succeeds Admiral Baron Yamamoto, and may be expected to be but the representative of his former chief. Lieut.-General Terauchi simply retains his old portfolio. A cabinet composed of such elements cannot formulate a policy of its own and map out a general overhaul of the State's affairs." This extract from the *Mainichi*, while interesting as a revelation of Japanese opinion, was not altogether as illuminating as it might have been.

A more elaborate analysis of the composition of the Cabinet affords a clear indication of the strenuous efforts made by Marquis Saionji to appease the Elder Statesmen and his Ministerial predecessors. Incidentally it illustrates in a striking manner the enormous growth in recent years of the influence of statesmen out of office. The career of Marquis Saionji had been varied in experience. He belonged to a noble house which claimed direct descent from Kamatari Fujiwara. "Contrary to the proverbial estimate of scions of nobility in Japan (and elsewhere)," says a Japanese writer, "he showed when young a high degree of precocity; and at an early age he came into favour with the late Prince Iwakura, then the loyal leader of the extreme Imperialist Party at the Kyōto Court." As Chief of the Staff of the Imperialist army he had taken a prominent part in subduing the supporters of the Tokugawa Shōgunate in 1867. Subsequently his leaders, recognising his remarkable ability, persuaded him to proceed to France for the purposes of study. He remained in that country for ten years, and while there allowed himself to come under the influence of the teachings of the republican school. Consequently from a stern Imperialist he became an ultra-Radical. On his return to Japan he founded a newspaper called the *Tōyō Jiyu Shim-bun*, and devoted himself to propagating the principles of liberty and democracy. From the point of view of popular appreciation the journal was a conspicuous success. The conduct of the Marquis, however, was made the subject of earnest discussion among the nobles, and Prince Iwakura, whose protégé he had been in the days of his militant Imperialism, prevailed upon his elder brother, the Marquis Tokudaiji, to advise him not only to abandon publication of his journal, but also to change his views. Marquis Saionji, however, firmly rejected the proffered counsel, whereupon the Emperor issued an Imperial Ordinance commanding his retirement from radical journalism. Apparently the republicanism of the Marquis was not sufficiently sturdy to withstand pressure from such a high quarter, and as he was not prepared to become a rebel in defence of his principles, he displayed a timely inconsistency and submitted with a gentleness that was only to be expected from one of such noble

birth. When the news of his retirement became known among the public, there was a widespread demand for the reason. The editors of the paper consequently issued a pamphlet, in which they gave the desired information, and added: "The Marquis is the very embodiment of liberty. Except him there is no one worthy to be president of our party." The publication came under the notice of the Metropolitan Police; the editors were imprisoned, and the newspaper, founded by the Marquis, was thus brought to a premature end. That he was soon forgiven his republican propaganda was evident from the fact that in the same year he secured a subordinate position on the *Sanji-in*, a board of councillors who were nominated by the Emperor, and who, in the days before Parliament, practically fulfilled the functions of a legislature. It was while serving in this capacity that he cultivated a close friendship with Itō, whom he accompanied to Europe when that statesman was entrusted with the mission to investigate the Parliamentary systems of foreign countries with a view to the preparation of a Constitution for Japan. When he returned home he was nominated a regular member of the *Sanji-in*. In 1885 he was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to Austria, and a year later became the representative of his country at Berlin. In the second Itō Cabinet he was Minister for Education, and also acted temporarily as Minister of Foreign Affairs during a period of the late Count Mutsu's illness. He was again appointed Minister of Education in the third Itō Ministry, but was compelled to resign owing to indisposition. Later he became President of the Privy Council. He had rendered Itō invaluable service in the formation of the *Seiyu-kai*, and when, in 1903, that statesman finally withdrew from active participation in politics to resume his former post of President of the Privy Council, the younger Marquis succeeded him as the acknowledged leader of the party. On several occasions he had acted temporarily as Prime Minister during times of political crisis, and was therefore well acquainted with the duties and responsibilities of this high office. His appointment as successor to Count Katsura was looked upon as a distinct triumph for the political influence of Itō, whose protégé he had been from the earliest days of his political career. In the selection of

certain of his nominees to office he showed, however, a studied regard for the views of other Elder Statesmen. Mr. Yamagata, who became Minister of Communications, was an adopted son of Marshal Yamagata. The support of the military element was looked upon as essential, and this was secured by the inclusion of General Terauchi who, after much persuasion from Marshal Yamagata, consented to reassume the office of Minister of War. Mr. Matsuoka, the Minister of Agriculture, was a follower of Count Inouye, while Baron Sakatani, who was appointed Minister of Finance, was intimately associated with the policy of the same statesman. The composition of the Cabinet was a striking revelation of the power wielded in the land by the Elder Statesmen. The *Yomiuri Shimbun*, which was the leading organ of the Progressist Party, made the following comment upon the situation: "The shadow of the Elder Statesmen broods over the whole political arena in Japan. They control everything, and accept no responsibility for anything. If there be any laudable feature about the new Ministry, that feature is its transition character. Marquis Saionji may at all events labour to remove the influence of the Elder Statesmen. If he does that his assumption of power will be a distinct step in the path of progress." I have mentioned before that the Ministry was not only a compromise with the Elder Statesmen, but also with the former Government. The inclusion of Admiral Saito as Minister of Marine, and of Baron Sakatani as Minister of Finance, both of whom had formerly been Vice-Ministers in their respective departments during Count Katsura's tenure of office, and the reappointment of General Terauchi to the War Office, secured a continuity in naval, military, and financial policies. The complaint that the leading clans had been given an unduly large share in the government of the country was no longer appropriate. General Terauchi was alone representative of the Chōshū, while Mr. Makino was the only Minister who was a clansman of the Satsuma. Not a single member of the Cabinet was above the age of sixty. This feature caused considerable comment at the time in Japan, a land where formerly age and experience counted for everything. Another feature of interest was the fact that, with

the exception of the Premier, all the Ministers were commoners.

Although Marquis Saionji assumed office at a critical period in the history of his country, a period of *post-bellum* readjustment, his prospects were on the surface more favourable than those which had attended the advent of any previous Administration. He had effectively compromised with all the warring elements of political life, and had succeeded in balancing the demands of constitutional government with the wishes of the Elder Statesmen. He possessed a large majority in the House of Representatives, and his party was satisfied in return for their support with meagre representation in the Cabinet. I purpose to deal at length with the career of the Saionji Ministry and the political events of the period, because in this way I will be able best to convey to the reader an idea of the condition of the country following the war with Russia, and of the difficulties which beset all parties in the State in dealing with *post-bellum* affairs. The period under review constitutes, in my opinion, a clearly defined transition, secondary only, in importance, to the changes that brought about the Restoration of the Monarchy. At the outset, the *Seiyu-kai* held a meeting at which the following manifesto was agreed upon :—

“This Empire having gone to war with Russia, with the object of ensuring the ultimate and permanent peace of the Far East, the Imperial forces did their duty gallantly and successfully, thus enhancing the military prestige of the nation in the eyes of all the world. This glorious result, which is due primarily to the illustrious virtues of his Majesty the Emperor, could not have been achieved but for the loyal and patriotic support of the whole nation.

“Our party during that critical period contributed its humble efforts to the service of the State, by giving expression to the wishes of the people, and doing all it could for the general welfare. The party is sensible of the honour which attached to this rôle.

“Now that the war is over, the time is ripe for laying down the lines of permanent national policy, calculated to consolidate the foundations of Constitutional Government, and promote the well-being of the State. The functions of

government have grown so great, complex, and diversified, that a very large expenditure will be required for their re-organisation and management. The task becomes more difficult than it was during the war, and it would be impossible to attain success without the support of the united nation, always ready to sacrifice individual interests for public welfare. Our party will make the utmost endeavours with the single object of promoting the national welfare. As for various State enterprises, our party will exercise the utmost caution in selection of undertakings, according to their importance and urgency, and so couple economy with the progressive development of the nation's resources in various directions. Thus we hope that the pressing requirements of the nation will be met with the best possible effect."

At the gathering the Premier made a speech, in the course of which he urged upon the members of the party the necessity for unity in view of the *post-bellum* programme. The war, he said, had brought about great changes in the aspect of many public matters. The relations of Japan with foreign countries were increasing in intimacy, but at the same time this implied more frequent possibility of conflict of interests. Moreover, since they had attained greater prominence in the eyes of the world, their every act was the more keenly observed by other countries. They must bear this in mind and be extremely circumspect in their dealings with other nations. "The Imperial Rescript issued at the Restoration," concluded the Marquis, "declared that all State affairs should be decided by the will of the people. The result was the enactment of the Constitution and the inauguration of representative government. For forty years following the Restoration, the Imperial prestige has grown year by year, until it has reached the glory of to-day. I believe that the present is a very opportune moment for placing the Constitutional *régime* on a thoroughly sound basis, and bequeathing it to posterity as a model. I hope that you will guide the people's opinions with singleness of aim, by judicious discourses and statesmanlike arguments, so that the important business of the *post-bellum* programme may be successfully carried out and the system of constitutional government may take a great step forward towards perfection. It is my sole

desire to follow, with your assistance, the established rules of constitutional government as far as possible, and to render our utmost services to the Empire."

At the time Count Ōkuma delivered a speech in the course of which he pointed out that considering the whole *post-bellum* situation there were many causes for rejoicing, but there were also causes for lamentation. For example, the Budget now elaborated showed that the national finance was on a very unstable basis. It was a question whether with such a system the *post-bellum* enterprises could be carried out. The Budget abounded in continuing expenditures but did not show any definite totals. It would be the business of the House of Representatives to ascertain if possible what were the limits of the responsibilities to which the State thus committed itself. It appeared that there was a deficit of £8,000,000 on the side of revenue in spite of continuing the war taxes. Germany with a debt of only £170,000,000 was much perturbed by finding a deficiency of 2 or 3 millions sterling in her revenue, but Japan with a debt verging on £240,000,000 and a revenue not even half of that of Germany, seemed quite complacent in the face of a deficit of £8,000,000. The fact was that the people had become accustomed during the war to talk and think of hundreds of millions, and to take an over-liberal view of financial questions generally. The speaker did not intend these remarks to be interpreted in the sense of insisting on a reduction of the Budget. He merely desired to suggest that room for retrenchment existed. The War Tax would have to be continued, and therefore the methods of taxation became a question of prime importance. This concerned the people's means of livelihood. The Government expressed apprehension of the growth of Socialism, but all experience showed that Socialism had its origin in heavy taxes. It was from that source that discontent sprang. Criticisms of this kind had been silenced during the war, since they would have suggested false impressions to the enemy, but the time had now come to lay aside reticence and to consider seriously what taxes were to be permanent. The policy must be to increase the revenue on the one hand and to abolish injurious taxes on the other. There was no reason to attach any moment to pessimistic predictions

that in a few years the country would be bankrupt and that by 1909 the era of inconvertible currency would re-open. But they could not close their eyes to the fact that the prices of commodities were rising and the purchasing power of money declining. It might very well be that the country would see its first socialists arise not in the ranks of the common people, but in those of petty officials and other persons with fixed incomes who found their revenues quite inadequate to defray the present cost of living. If it were asked why this appreciation of commodities had taken place, he would have no hesitation in replying, "because of defective finance." One serious mistake in financial policy might throw the country into a panic. They had an example of that in the case of even such a country as England where, in the sequel of a great war, the central bank had suspended the issue of notes. One effect of a war was to scatter great quantities of money among the people, and so long as this unusual store of cash lasted, the naturally impoverishing consequences of war were not felt. But time must inevitably remove this alleviating factor and then trouble became inevitable. The people, it was true, did not actually utter any complaints, but it might be alleged with assurance that they looked confidently to the Diet to do something for them this Session. They would soon have an opportunity of seeing an official version of the Budget. Doubtless the first question to arise would have reference to the appropriation of £11,000,000 for the service of the National Debt. The actual interest on the war debt did not exceed 5 or 6 millions. What then, asked the Count, was to be done with the surplus—the difference between 11 millions and 6 millions? Some £8,000,000 was to be obtained under another heading by domestic loans, and thus they had this strange method of financing that debts were defrayed with one hand and incurred with the other. If, on the contrary, the surplus was to accumulate for the purpose of forming a reserve to increase the country's credit, a grave and dangerous blunder would be committed. Five or six millions sterling would suffice to dispense with many obnoxious taxes, or would reduce by more than one-half the £8,000,000 that had to be raised, and further, out of a budget of 50 millions sterling, it should not be im-

possible to make a reduction of 1 or 2 millions. He greatly regretted that the Saionji Cabinet seemed disposed to follow in the footsteps of its predecessor. Probably the truth was that the new Ministry had not time to re-draft the Budget. The investigation committee of the *Seiyu-kai* had pronounced against this excessive appropriation of £11,000,000, and therefore if the question were raised in the Diet, the *Seiyu-kai* would probably support the policy of alteration. It was a question that concerned all, irrespective of parties. Passing to the problem of administrative reform, the Count noted that it was dictated not merely by financial considerations but also by administrative expediency. A domestic debt of £48,000,000 had been incurred during the war and something like £10,000,000 was now to be added to it. No principle of justice was consulted when the people alone were burdened without the Government bearing its share. The *Seiyu-kai* themselves had always advocated reform of the present system of bloated bureaucracies and doubtless they would now do something conclusive. Referring to the formula so often on men's lips, "a united nation," the Count denounced it as meaningless from an official point of view. A united nation meant merely a patriotic and loyal nation. It had nothing to do with the Government, whose sole duty was to adopt methods of increasing the people's prosperity. What they had to consider was the real character of those methods quite apart from any deceptive euphemisms.

The nationalisation of the railways caused the first crisis in the new Cabinet. Mr. Kato, the Foreign Minister (now Ambassador to Great Britain), found himself unable to agree with the principle of the Government measure, and he thereupon tendered his resignation. At the time unworthy suggestions were made that his action was the result of influence exercised by wealthy relatives, who desired to see the maintenance of the railways as private concerns, but on the whole it was looked upon as a notable departure in Japanese politics. The majority of the leading journals congratulated him on taking a praiseworthy initiative. The *Churwo* hoped that "his resolute conduct in this case will serve to end an undesirable custom of long standing in our system of government; usually any Minister has been indifferent, nay, has considered

himself quite free of responsibility for whatever measures might be adopted by the Government, so long as the question did not involve his own department. According to the Ministerial ethics of the past, Mr. Kato had no call to make such a stout opposition to a measure which really pertained to the Departments of Finance and Communications. But a constitutional statesman, as Mr. Kato claims to be, is quite right in being alive to his responsibility as a member of the Government, as well as the Chief of a Department. So much to his credit for the manner of his exit." The views expressed by this paper were representative of public opinion at the time. Early in March 1907 the *Daido* Club, who by this time had become generally known as "the nondescripts," began to show themselves in their true colours. When at an earlier date they had proposed to the *Seiyu-kai* that a frank alliance should be arranged between the two parties, their suggestion had been treated with derision. This circumstance affords some insight into the curious workings of Japanese politics, for it will be remembered that Marquis Saionji—the leader of the *Seiyu-kai*—had, on the formation of his Cabinet, accepted the support of the *Daido* Club, a support which was "arranged" by the retiring Prime Minister, Count Katsura, who had specially promoted the organisation to meet the political exigencies of the moment. The events that followed proved that the *Daido* was nothing more or less than a weapon in the hands of the Yamagata-Katsura clique, utilised when the occasion was opportune to upset the political balance in the Diet and to cause the Government embarrassment. A Bill was brought forward to abolish the *Gun* organisation, which had been in existence for twenty years, and which provided for autonomous bodies between the lower grade self-governing communities and the Prefectures. When a Special Committee met to consider the Bill, the members of the *Daido* Club, who were opposed to the measure, and who, although they had acted hitherto in unison with the *Seiyu-kai*, were dissatisfied with the treatment meted out to them by that party, unexpectedly supported the Progressists in the election of a Chairman. That the action of the *Daido* Club was prompted more by a spirit of revenge than a regard for principle was abundantly proved by the fact that their new ally, the Pro-

gressist party, had voted in favour of the *Gun* Bill at the previous session of the Diet. Before the session was over the Progressists were in bitter opposition to the Government on every point of policy. When, on December 28, 1907, the House met again for the twenty-fourth session, the strength of the parties was as follows :—

<i>Seiyu-kai</i>	180
Progressists	89
<i>Daido</i> Club	60
<i>Yuko-kai</i>	35
Independents	13

The *Yuko-kai*, which is mentioned for the first time in this chapter, was a club formed in 1906 by neutral members of Parliament, who to all intents and purposes might be classed as Independents. Since the formation of the Saionji Cabinet, the *Seiyu-kai* had increased by thirty-nine and the *Yuko-kai* by nine members, while the *Daido* Club had decreased by twenty-four, the Independents by seventeen, and the Progressists by seven members. Of the whole House, the *Seiyu-kai* were in a minority of seventeen. As the Independents, however, generally supported them, they were in a position to command a majority of nine. Nevertheless, it was clear that the withdrawal of the support of the *Daido* Club was a matter of serious moment to them. In short, the “nondescripts,” as they were called, had become a serious factor in the situation, inasmuch as they virtually held the balance of power. Early in 1908 the sanguine policy adopted by the Government in regard to finance produced all the elements that tended to the making of a Cabinet crisis. In order that the situation may be thoroughly understood, it is necessary to refer to some of the events of the preceding financial year.

The Budget for the period April 1907 to March 1908 was passed practically without opposition. This circumstance was ascribed to the false feeling of security that existed owing to the commercial and industrial “boom” that followed in the wake of the war. The country was pledged to a large programme both of productive and unproductive expenditure, including expansion of armaments, which for a term of years involved heavy appropriations over and above the

ordinary revenue. As a matter of fact, taking the most optimistic view of the nation's resources, it was evident that within two years new means of raising revenue would have to be found in order to meet the extraordinary expenditure. The Government, no doubt, anticipated that in the meantime there would be sufficient development to warrant the bold policy which they had inaugurated. At any rate, the Diet accepted the assurance that the situation would be met when it arose without recourse either to further foreign loans or to increased taxation. The absence of an indemnity from Russia together with the financial stringency that prevailed abroad, soon began to exert an unfavourable influence upon the economic conditions of the country. The "boom" that followed the war was brief, and a period of deep and widespread depression set in. The Minister of Finance found it necessary to utilise for productive works the money which he had imagined would be available for expansion of armaments and developments of an unproductive nature. Owing to the panic-stricken state of the market, he was unable to resort to any expedient having for its object the raising of additional funds. The Budget for 1908-9 presented serious difficulties, the only way out of which was retrenchment in regard to unproductive outlays. As soon as the Government programme for the forthcoming year was known, the business community were up in arms, and, for the first time since the Constitution was granted, displayed a lively interest in political affairs. In the representations submitted to the Government by the united Chambers of Commerce, it was urged that any deficiency should be made up by reductions in unproductive expenditures; while the members fully recognised the necessity of having a strong army and a strong navy, they insisted that armaments must not be developed to a degree out of proportion to the national resources. Therefore, they strongly urged that the existent scheme of increased taxation should be abandoned, that the imposts on salt, woven goods, and transit should be done away with, and that the taxes on business and incomes should be re-adjusted so as to ensure their fair incidence. They contended that if the Government's programme were carried out in its entirety, the nation would become involved in a vicious financial

circle—cause producing effect and effect cause—every year rendering it more difficult to find a satisfactory exit.

Moreover, the leaders of the business community inaugurated a movement with a view to rousing merchants and manufacturers to a sense of their political responsibility, and resolved that at the next election all support should be withheld from candidates who did not accept the business policy. The attitude of the authorities towards the commercial party was one of petty interference and childish irritability. The President of the Tōkyō Chamber of Commerce was peremptorily summoned to the Department of Agriculture and Commerce, where the Vice-Minister solemnly warned him that in passing a resolution urging members not to vote for any Parliamentary candidate who might support the principle of increased taxation, the Chambers were overstepping their legitimate functions and were intruding into the field of politics.

Nearly all the Elder Statesmen insisted that the appropriations for special military purposes should be reduced, or extended over a further period of years. The majority of the Cabinet Ministers were also in favour of a policy of retrenchment on these lines, but the military party offered strenuous opposition.

Finally, the good offices of the former Premier, Marquis Katsura, were requisitioned, and after a prolonged parley an agreement was arrived at on the lines that reduction should be made both on civil and military outlays, and that there should be an increase in indirect taxation. In spite of the compromise arranged, however, the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Communications subsequently decided to compile a supplementary Budget amounting to no less than thirteen and a half millions sterling for railway improvements, to be spread over a period of twelve years. Thereupon the Elder Statesmen, who from the first had realised the necessity for retrenchment, strongly objected, and a Cabinet crisis resulted. The whole Ministry tendered their resignations. These, however, the Emperor, acting upon the advice of Itō, declined to receive as a whole. He accepted the resignations of the Ministers of Finance and Communications, who, although the nominees of certain Elder Statesmen, were

singularly enough obliged to leave the Cabinet because they came into conflict with the policy of the Elder Statesmen. Mr. Matsuda, who was Minister of Justice at the time, became Minister of Finance. Two new appointments were made to the Cabinet, Baron Senge being given the portfolio of Minister of Justice and Viscount Hotta that of Minister of Communications. In making these changes the Prime Minister caused surprise by adopting an independent line, and did not consult the wishes of the Elder Statesmen. The advanced politicians in the nation were consequently jubilant. They regarded the action of Marquis Saionji as a distinct advance towards the realisation of the true principles of constitutional government. The appointment of two Peers to the Cabinet was made with the definite object of securing support for the Government policy in the Upper House. In effect, Marquis Saionji, who was a party leader, cemented an understanding that hitherto had only tacitly existed, and which in plain language had for its basis the following terms: On condition that the Peers upheld the policy of the Saionji Ministry, the *Seiyu-kai* party would give its support to any Conservative or non-party Ministry that might come into power. Curiously enough, however, the *Kokumin Shimbun*, which was the organ of the previous Government—essentially a non-party and Conservative Government—and which was inspired by Marquis Katsura, made political capital out of the occasion. It bitterly resented what it termed the incursion of the *Seiyu-kai* into the realm of the Peers, and taunted the party with lack of men capable of taking Ministerial rank. The political parties forming the Opposition were determined to drive the Government out of office, and, in order to render their attack as powerful as possible, they opened negotiations among each other, with a view to taking concerted action. The situation was admirably described by Mr. Ozaki—Mayor of Tōkyō and a leading politician. “The much-discussed amalgamation of the Opposition parties,” he said, “is mere child’s play, since it lacks in any sound principle and stable object, its sole purpose being the overthrow of the Cabinet now in power. Therefore the object of the union is purely destructive in nature, not constructive. It is indisputably true that the present Cabinet is

far from ideal and that the confidence of the people is not fully reposed in it, so that its destruction may not be entirely unadvisable ; but what is important is that we must consider the nature of the Cabinet which may spring up in the wake of the present Ministry. It is not difficult to predict that the new Cabinet will be formed by the remnant members of the old clan government. If this should turn out to be so, its own unsoundness and the general want of confidence in it would be still more apparent than is the case with the present Cabinet. Knowing as they do . . . that the present Cabinet, if destroyed, would only be succeeded by a Cabinet of still more undesirable a nature, the conduct of publicists who are endeavouring to effect the destruction of the Cabinet cannot but be deprecated as a foolhardy and irresponsible act, discreditable to the fame of upper-class politicians. The *Daido* Club delights in the clan government, while the Progressists and *Yuko-kai* are the advocates of constitutional government ; thus the principles of the three parties are radically antagonistic to one another, so that their satisfactory coalition is extremely doubtful. But if this should ever be realised, one of two things must necessarily occur. Either the Progressists and the *Yuko-kai* must forsake their constitutional principles and condescend to come down to the level of clan government, or the *Daido* Club must give up its clan government ideas to hug the views of constitutional government. But from the outlook of the present state of affairs this is extremely improbable."

It was agreed that the financial policy of the Government should constitute the main point of attack. The *Daido* Club found themselves, however, in a singularly anomalous position. It will be remembered that the Budget was finally decided upon as the result of the mediation of Marquis Katsura, who thus gave his assent to the financial policy adopted by the Cabinet. But it was this statesman who was the founder and leader of the *Daido* Club, a party which proposed to condemn the course of action to which he had given his fullest sanction and support. Reading between the lines, the whole proceeding seemed to be an unworthy attempt to stab the Government in the back. The *Yuko-kai* led the way in moving a vote of censure which clearly set forth that the increased

taxation was due to the inefficiency of the Government. The Progressists were only too willing to support any resolution having for its aim the embarrassment of the Ministry. Their attitude was at least logical, for they were frankly in opposition. The *Daido* Club, on the other hand, made a vain endeavour to reconcile their actions with the part played by their leader, promising to give their support to the resolution while reserving their ultimate right to vote for increased taxation. The combined though heterogeneous forces of the Opposition were defeated in a House of 345 members by only nine votes. The narrow majority made it clear that the days of the Government were numbered. Subsequently the *Daido* party published a report which as an instance of political effrontery would be hard to beat. They set forth that their policy had always been consistent with the welfare of the nation, while other parties had worked solely for their own interests. Such a virtuous rôle had only been rendered possible because they were conscious that the support of the country was with them. This unctuous document concluded: "On the eve of the General Election the party asks the nation to select between the parties working for their own interests and those working for the good of the State."

An indication of the feeling of the country had been afforded by the Prefectural elections in 1907, the year previous to the General Election. On this occasion the *Seiyu-kai* representatives were increased by 130, while the Progressists lost over eighty seats. There was a considerable display of political partisanship throughout the length and breadth of the land. In the Tochigi Prefecture the *Seiyu-kai* were in a minority of four seats, but they declined to accept the verdict of the people and forcibly abducted three of their opponents. The Progressists employed sixty *sōshi*, or hired political agitators. The other side promptly marshalled a similar force, and in the fierce conflict that ensued sixty-seven people were wounded and several police constables, who sought to interfere, were thrown into the river. In another prefecture twenty-one men, including four members of the Diet, were arrested as a result of violent conduct.

In the middle of May 1908 the General Election took

place. A brief *résumé* of the policies of the two leading parties in the State will afford some idea of the issues that were before the country. The Progressists contended that the *post-bellum* programme of the Government had been altogether a failure, that the plan for increased taxation must be strenuously opposed, that the Budget showed a lack of a sense of responsibility on the part of those who framed it, that the scheme of taxation readjustment was defective, and that the Government's action in regard to the railways had not been a success. They pointed out that the history of every country proved that material expansion always followed a great and victorious war, but that, in the case of Japan, a policy of isolation had been followed with the result that no satisfactory steps had been taken to recuperate the nation for the sacrifices made in the great campaign. Moreover, they charged the Ministry with having been responsible for the widespread financial depression. They set forth that by urging the people to subscribe for the shares of the South Manchurian Railway Company—a concern officially promoted to take over the Chinese Eastern Railway from Changchun to Port Arthur—the Government had created a “boom” which had led to the formation of innumerable “bubble” companies. The Progressists also accused the Government of having brought pressure to bear in connection with the local elections of the preceding autumn with a view to securing majorities in the Prefectural Assemblies and thus paving the way to victory in the General Election. They vigorously attacked the foreign policy of the Administration, severely condemning its inability to settle the outstanding questions with China. Furthermore, they represented that the Ministry had seriously injured the prestige which Japan had won at the cost of much bloodshed and treasure in the great campaign, and that it had endangered the peace of the Far East. They also declared that the policy in regard to the Californian immigration difficulties had been one of drift, and that, instead of taking strong measures to assert the country's position, the Cabinet had been content with a vague idea that, as the President of the United States had expressed his friendly intentions towards Japan he would not force an unwelcome settlement. Finally, they strongly protested that

in no circumstances should the outlay upon armaments exceed one-half of the nation's expenditure.

They contended that as Great Britain was the ally of Japan, and France and Russia were well disposed towards her, the time had arrived when a reduction in military and naval outlays could be safely made. In reply, the *Seiyun-kai* denied that the Government had been responsible for the financial depression, and urged that in this respect Japan was merely suffering in common with the whole economic world. Moreover, they alleged that the unduly pessimistic statements made from time to time by their opponents in regard to the financial condition of the country had exerted an unfavourable influence upon national credit, and had checked the investments of foreign capital. While they admitted that the nationalisation of the railways had increased the country's indebtedness by upwards of £48,000,000, they pointed out the value of the asset possessed in the railways by the nation, and the increased revenue to be derived from this source. With reference to foreign policy, they explained that the Ministry had concluded *ententes* with Russia and France, and had arranged a convention with Korea strengthening the position of Japan in the Kingdom. They urged that the maintenance of armaments on a large scale was essential to the retention of the prestige which Japan had alone won in the battlefield, and that the Government had merely followed the policy adopted by Germany after her war with France. Furthermore, they argued that as Japan had continental interests she must consider the possibilities of the increased requirements that would be necessary in the event of war under new conditions. According to their arithmetic, Japan only expended 31 per cent. of her gross income upon armaments as compared with the 42 per cent. devoted to this object by Great Britain and France. Probably the real motive for the expansion of armaments in Japan was unintentionally revealed—as much by what was left unsaid as by what was actually said—in an article written from Tōkyō on August 6, 1908, by *The Times* correspondent, whose friendship for the land of his adoption inclines him, on all occasions, to a sincere partiality. "Perhaps the safest statement," he says, "is that Japan regards European conditions with eyes of misgiving. She

sees factors at work which may at any moment precipitate a struggle, and, at the same time, her own relations with the Occident are such that, in the event of serious trouble, she could scarcely fail to be involved, directly or indirectly. Her ideas of an offensive and defensive alliance are not narrow. Then there is the Orient itself. No one can foretell what a day may bring forth in the vast regions of Eastern or Far Eastern Asia. The ambitions of the West have been scotched, not killed, and opportunity may easily revive them. Is there no reason to apprehend the occurrence of such opportunities? Time for their development will not be wanting, for China's progress towards self-defensive competence is slow. Yet again Japan sees all Western nations busily arming. They groan loudly under the weight of their armour, yet they add to the load perpetually. It might be dangerous to be an exception to this rule, especially at a time when the world's dislike seems to be accorded much more readily to Japan than its benevolence. On the whole, then, the outlook scarcely seems to justify confidence." It will be observed that the statesmen of Japan are credited with a proper realisation of their national and international obligations—home defence on the one hand, assistance to an ally on the other. But while responsibility for the increase in world armaments is conveniently laid at the door of the ambitious West, no allowance is made for Oriental Imperialism—that insatiable appetite for continental expansion which has possessed the rulers of Japan since the war with China, an appetite which accounts for the wide margin between what is strictly adequate for the purposes of national preservation and what is necessary for furthering the long arm of Imperial conquest.

"But these views," continued the correspondent quoted above, "have more weight with Japanese statesmen than with Japanese men of business. The latter decline to admit the broad fact that taxes imposed solely to meet the cost of war must be continued and even increased after peace has been restored. Sixteen millions sterling were added to the people's burdens during the contest with Russia, and instead of the load being lightened when the contest had been brought to a victorious conclusion, another increase of three millions was made.

People had no patience to discuss remote reasons in the presence of such insistent facts. A general sentiment of dissatisfaction was created. Then the Treasury itself was seen to be embarrassed. In spite of these great revenues it could not make ends meet."

The General Election was in many respects a notable one. Owing to the increased taxation there had been a large addition to the number of males possessing the property qualification. An interesting feature of the development of party politics in Japan was the increase which had gradually taken place in the cost of contested elections. It was estimated that a candidate in order to meet his expenses would require at least 5000 *yen* (£500), a large sum according to the standard of the country. Many members of the *Seiyu-kai* insisted upon the cost of their election campaign being defrayed out of party funds. Their reason for so doing was thoroughly in keeping with the Gilbertian character of party politics in Japan. In effect they said, "The increase in taxation is unpopular throughout the country. Although we have supported the Government, there is no denying the fact that many members of the *Seiyu-kai* are not in favour of increased taxation. Why should we be called upon to pay the expenses of a contest which, if we are elected, will necessitate our supporting an unpopular policy? Besides, there is a prospect that there will be a dissolution over the Budget, and we should be in Parliament only a very short time before we were called upon to face the expenses of another election. The official return of the results of the General Election was as follows:—

	Elected.	Former Represent- tation.	Gain or Loss.
<i>Seiyu-kai</i> . . .	190	181	+ 9
Progressists . . .	77	89	- 12
<i>Naido Club</i> . . .	32	58	- 26
<i>Yuko-kai</i> . . .	27	37	- 10
Independent . . .	52	14	+ 38

It will be seen that the *Seiyu-kai* improved their position

materially by converting a minority into a narrow majority. The Progressists' losses were ascribed to the fact that while the party criticised the policy of the Government they offered no alternative programme. If the returns were to be taken as any genuine indication of public opinion, it would appear that the corrupt opportunism of the members of the *Daido* Club received a well-merited censure. On the other hand, one is inclined to think that the election returns were not altogether a genuine expression of public opinion, for the *Yuko-kai*, a party which always tried to be above suspicion and whose chief plank was the purification of politics, shared a similar though a less disastrous fate. The victory of the Government was not so striking as would appear on the surface. Had it not been for the support accorded them in the rural districts where political ignorance prevailed, the *Seiyu-kai* would have found itself in a minority. It was significant that in fifty-five cities returning a total of seventy-five members, forty-one Independent candidates, largely representative of business interests opposed to the policy of the Government, secured election. Of the eleven members returned for the Capital, seven were pledged to oppose any attempt to increase taxation. A large proportion of the former members of the Diet were defeated, and it was also significant that many candidates without political influence of any kind, and dependent for support upon their positions in the community as publicists, writers, and persons of conspicuous probity, were returned as against party nominees who possessed a strong financial backing from the funds of their organisations. The success invariably achieved by Independent members when opposed to party politicians was looked upon as an indication that the enlightened section of the electorate was growing weary of the corrupt methods and vacillating policies of political factions. The opposition of the business community to the financial programme of the Government assumed a concrete form two months after the election, when a new party consisting of fifty-seven members of Parliament, most of them being the representatives of commercial interests, was formed, and at their preliminary meeting adopted the following resolution setting forth their aims :—

1. The readjustment of the national finances.
2. The adoption of a satisfactory method of repaying the national loans.
3. The adjustment of the system of taxation.
4. The promotion of industrial progress.
5. The improvement of Japan's foreign diplomacy.

The nation confidently expected that Marquis Saionji, aided by increased support in the House of Representatives, would continue the *post-bellum* programme which he had developed. On July 5, 1908, however, the Cabinet suddenly tendered their resignations. The ill-health of the Premier was given as the reason for this step, but there was no doubt that the collapse was due to a recognition of the Ministry's inability to deal with the extraordinary financial difficulties that beset the nation. Marquis Saionji recommended to the Emperor the recently created Marquis Katsura as his successor. Nine days later, after consulting the Elder Statesmen, his Majesty appointed the following new Ministry :—

<i>Premier and Minister of Finance</i> . . .	General Marquis Katsura.
<i>Minister of Foreign Affairs</i> . . .	Count Komura.
<i>Minister of War</i> . . .	General Terauchi.
<i>Minister of the Interior</i> . . .	Baron Hirata.
<i>Minister of Agriculture and Commerce</i> .	Baron K. Oura.
<i>Minister of Communications</i> . . .	Baron Goto.
<i>Minister of Justice</i> . . .	Viscount Okabe.
<i>Minister of Education</i> . . .	Mr. Y. Komatsubara.
<i>Minister of Marine</i> . . .	Vice-Admiral Saito.

The new Cabinet contained only one representative of a political party, Baron Oura, who had been the leader of the *Daido* Club. This fact was, indeed, cold comfort to the forces which had brought about the downfall of the preceding Administration, an Administration that had approached as near as it was possible to get to party government in Japan. The most remarkable feature of the new Cabinet was the large proportion of men it contained who were the protégés of Marshal Yamagata. The Premier himself was under the direct influence of that Elder Statesman, while General Terauchi, Baron Hirata, Mr. Komatsubara, and Baron Oura were all well known as disciples of the Marshal. The wisdom

of securing a continuity of naval and military policy was again recognised, and consequently General Terauchi and Admiral Saito were reappointed. The new Cabinet were opposed to party politics and were essentially bureaucratic. The Premier, after fighting on the Imperialist side, had studied military science in Germany. He commanded a division in the Chino-Japanese War and was Prime Minister at the time of the Russo-Japanese War and until after the conclusion of peace. All his training and experience had tended to produce in him a staunch conservatism. He had merely made use of the *Daido* Club because, like Itō before him in regard to the *Seiyu-kai*, he had recognised the inevitable—that while the day had not yet arrived when parties could dominate, they could at least be made of some value as pawns in the game of Japanese statecraft, and were a necessary evil in order that the pretence of Parliamentary government should be maintained.

The protégés of Yamagata were, of course, opposed to the development of constitutional *régime* on party lines. The careers of the rest of the Cabinet afforded ample indication of the staunchness of their conservatism. Mr. Komatsubara had, in consequence of his democratic agitation, suffered imprisonment in his younger days, but before he attained the age of thirty years he had fully repented and had accepted a lucrative Government position. He is to-day an untitled member of the House of Peers, and is described by one who is well acquainted with his views as an “ex-official of bureaucratic tendency.” Viscount Okabe was a former Daimyō, and, as one of the leaders of the largest political association in the Upper House, commanded considerable influence among the Peers. General Viscount Terauchi and Baron Saito, representing as they did the military and naval elements in the State, had a frank contempt for party politics and party politicians. The unpopularity of Count Komura, in consequence of his failure in the Peace negotiations at Portsmouth, had subsided sufficiently to enable him to return with safety to his own country from London, where he had occupied the post of Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s. He was no believer in the new diplomacy, and the atmosphere of reserve with which he surrounded himself made him

peculiarly fitted for a post of prominence in a Government that possessed not the least faith in the power of public opinion. The inclusion of Baron Goto in the Cabinet was received with general approval. The son of a doctor of medicine, he started life as a doctor. Owing to the similarity of his career to that of the Cape statesman, he is called the "Dr. Jamieson of Japan." He has risen to power by his own efforts. As a former director of the Civil Administration of Formosa he was largely responsible for the comparative success of Japan's first colonial venture; while, in more recent times, his admirable work in connection with the South Manchurian Railway gave him special qualifications for the portfolio of Minister of Communications. He is regarded as one of the most promising of the younger generation of Japanese statesmen, and in all probability will one day become Premier of the country. When the new Cabinet accepted office something approaching to a financial crisis threatened the country. Widespread depression existed throughout the industrial and commercial classes, and the national credit had almost disappeared from the markets of Europe and America. It was conceded on all sides that the immediate adoption of a rigorous but scientific policy of retrenchment could alone avert calamity.

The Premier lost no time in announcing his programme of reform. One of his first acts was to secure the support and co-operation of the leading financiers and men of business throughout the land, and to them he outlined the main features of his policy. He stated that with the object of placing the finances of the country on a sound basis the Government would adhere strictly to the practice of fixing all expenditure as against only reliably ascertained receipts, thus forsaking the former speculative policy of prearranging disbursements in anticipation of an increase in revenue; that they would abstain entirely from future recourse to loans; that unissued loans provided for in previous Budgets would be abandoned; that a curtailment in annual expenditure would be effected by means of extending the period over which the settled programme of productive and unproductive undertakings was to be carried out; that a sum of not less than five millions sterling would be devoted annually to the

redemption of the National Debt; and, finally, that the national Budget would in future be relieved of all finances in connection with the Government railways, which, it was hoped, would in time prove self-supporting.

It may be mentioned in passing that, curiously enough, this Spartan resolution to abstain from all future borrowing and at the same time to increase the amount set apart for the purposes of amortisation, synchronised with the appearance on the world's Bourses of an extreme nervousness in regard to Japanese bonds.

I do not propose to describe in detail the legislative history of Japan during the second Katsura Administration. The task that lay before the Government was confined almost solely to financial reconstruction, and a reference to Chapters XXXVI. and XXXVII. will reveal to the reader the main outlines of the policy that was adopted. The period under review saw three full sessions of the Diet—the twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh—the previous general election having taken place in May 1908. It afforded a striking and instructive illustration of the anomalous character of representative government in Japan.

When the new Cabinet came into power the semi-official press clearly intimated, almost in the form of an ultimatum, that anything in the nature of Parliamentary opposition to the governmental policy would, if necessary, be met with dissolution.

In an interview with a representative of the Liberal News Agency a high official attached to the Cabinet stated that "the present Ministry stands on its own feet and not on the basis of any political parties. The Government adopts the principle of 'equal treatment to all political parties,' as it is termed by the newspapers. The Government's only aim is to realise its policy, and it does not care whether it is supported by one party or the other in realising its policy." At the same time the *Seiyu-kai*, possessing a large majority of votes in the Lower House, announced their determination to press for certain reforms not included in the Ministerial programme, and declared that they would exercise to the full their power in opposition 'in the event of any high-handed proceedings on the part of the Government. When the Diet

met for the twenty-fifth session a clash between the bureaucracy and the party politicians seemed inevitable, and, indeed, it was not long before the latter took up a definitely aggressive line of action. Once more, however, Marquis Katsura proved himself equal to political exigency. For the second time in his career he approached Marquis Saionji—this time to sue for rather than to make terms of compromise. The exact nature of the understanding arrived at was not revealed; but it soon became clear that the *Seiyu-kai* had, in the light of their recent manifesto, developed an extraordinary docility to their leader, and an unaccountable complacency when they came to deal with Government measures. The legislative history of the Japanese Parliament during the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth sessions was a history of compromise—compromise between the Cabinet Ministers and the representatives of the *Seiyu-kai*; and in the series of negotiations that always preceded the passage of contentious Bills the latter showed themselves amenable to reason as expounded by their illustrious leader. In any other constitutional country the *Seiyu-kai*, by virtue of the principles upon which it is organised, would have proved itself, in opposition, so formidable to a bureaucratic Administration that a Cabinet crisis would almost inevitably have resulted. But in Japan no Ministry acknowledges a mandatory obligation to the elective Assembly, and among the comparatively few men possessing individual influence in the State there exists, irrespective of political conviction, a tacit agreement as to the doctrine first enunciated by Prince Itō—that national welfare being best served by ensuring the stability of Cabinets, it becomes the duty both of majorities and minorities to refrain from embarrassing the Government. It must not for one moment be imagined that the political conscience of the individual party politician is schooled to this nice degree of abnegation; but it is easy to understand that with the communalistic instinct still dominating the national character the various organisations are disciplined to obedience. Thus, following the conference between the two Marquises, the extraordinary phenomenon was witnessed of a militant bureaucracy and an opposition predisposed to be refractory calmly and effectively carrying on the business

of the country, while almost entirely ignoring all other sections in the Legislature.

When the Diet met for the twenty-sixth session (1909-10) the declared opposition of the party leaders to the programme enunciated by the Government seemed once more to threaten a legislative deadlock. The principal question which agitated the country was, as it is to this day, the question of taxation; but although the Budget for the year provided for a scheme of readjustment in relation to the national burdens, no measure of relief was to be accorded to the agricultural classes—by far the largest section of the population—by diminishing the tax upon land. For a time Marquis Katsura remained impervious alike to parliamentary interpellations and petitions from the country constituencies; but in the end he was obliged to make some slight concession to popular demands, and when the Diet rose it was able to record to its credit a victory in open conflict with the bureaucracy. An indication of the unanimity which prevailed throughout the country on this occasion was afforded by the fact that over three thousand petitions, praying for a reduction of the land tax, and signed by no less than 41,400,000 persons, were brought to the notice of the Government. Although there was general agreement in the Diet on this important question it must not be supposed that party cleavage was non-existent. Indeed, so strong was the antagonism of the minor groups towards the political predominance of the *Seiyu-kai*, that strenuous endeavours were made to form an effective opposition. The movement, which had gathered force in the closing days of 1909, culminated during the twenty-sixth session in a complete redistribution of parties which involved the dissolution of the four sections hitherto known as the Progressists, the *Daido Club*, the *Boshin Club*—a recently created organisation of business men—and the *Yushin-kai*—a group but lately formed as a result of the fusion of non-*Seiyu-kai* elements drawn largely from the *Yuko-kai*. Out of the universal upheaval the *Seiyu-kai*, or Unionists, as they were becoming known, received a slight accession of strength. Of the reconstructed parties the *Rikken Kokumin-to* (Constitutional Nationalist Party), mainly comprising the old Progressists and the members of the *Boshin*

Club, took the place of importance next to the Unionists. In a manifesto which was issued at the time the Nationalists pledged themselves to work for the establishment of party Cabinets and to ensure that economic development should not be subordinated to unproductive enterprise. The third party—the Central Club—including many adherents from the *Daido* Club and the *Yushin-kai*, gave frank support to the bureaucratic administration. The following tables will show at a glance the numerical strength of political parties during the two sessions under review, and their redistribution according to the new grouping :—

	XXV. Session.	XXVI. Session.
<i>Seiyu-kai</i>	193	201
Progressists	65	63
<i>Yushin-kai</i>	44	44
<i>Boshin</i> Club	40	35
<i>Daido</i> Club	29	28
Independents	8	8
Totals	379	379

Redistribution of Parties since March 1910.

<i>Seiyu-kai</i> (Unionists)	204
<i>Rikken Kokumin-to</i> (Constitutional Nationalist Party)	92
Central Club	50
Independents ¹	33
Total	379

The second Katsura Ministry will go down to history as the Administration responsible for having definitely pledged Japan to a policy of Protection. Anticipating the termination, in July 1911, of the international Treaties of Commerce and Navigation, together with their Supplementary Conventions, a Bill for the revision of the Customs Tariff was presented to the Legislature, and, before the close of the twenty-sixth session, had been placed on the statute books. Incidentally it may be mentioned that with a view to facilitating negotiations with the Powers in regard to the renewal of the Treaties

¹ This figure includes the 18 members of the section still known as the *Yushin-kai*, but which, for all practical purposes, cannot be considered as a political party.

the Government, during the twenty-sixth session, secured the passage of a Bill conferring upon foreign residents the right to possess landed property within the Japanese Empire.¹

When the Diet met for the twenty-seventh session (1910-11) it became abundantly clear that any popularity the Government might have enjoyed in the past had diminished to the point of vanishing. The explanation was to be found in the fact that, obsessed with the idea of carrying out in its entirety a policy of Imperial expansion, a policy which necessitated huge annual expenditures on armaments, no adequate measure of relief had been provided for, or even contemplated, in regard to the burden of national taxation. Faced with the growing hostility of the country, and realising that the Nationalists would offer a determined resistance in the Legislature, the Premier wisely decided to abandon once and for all his non-party principles and to seek an open alliance with the *Seiyu-kai*. Hitherto his relations with that group had never exceeded the bounds of compromise, but on this occasion he realised that something in the nature of a definite bargain must be struck if he was to obtain any degree of support during the forthcoming session. Thus the extraordinary anomaly was witnessed of the leader of the bureaucrats merging his identity with that of the strongest party in the State, a party whose official chief was none other than his great political antagonist, Marquis Saionji. Although by taking this step the Premier was enabled to carry his legislative programme into execution, it cannot be said that his prestige throughout the country was enhanced. On all sides it was admitted that so far from having gone through a process of genuine conversion he had merely suppressed his convictions at the dictates of dire necessity. It soon became apparent that a reconstruction of the Cabinet could not long be postponed, for it was obvious that the party to whom he had given his allegiance would insist upon some measure of representation in the Government. Moreover, even to the most optimistic among students of Japanese politics, it was at length beyond doubt that, for the Government to carry out, according to prearrangement, the grandiose undertakings involved in the programme of Imperial expansion while at the

¹ *Vide* Chapter XLI.

same time adhering strictly to the policy of contracting no further financial obligations, had become a matter of sheer impossibility. No surprise was occasioned, therefore, when in August 1911 the Premier, who, earlier in the year, had been elevated to the rank of Prince, tendered his resignation, and Marquis Saionji was called upon by the Emperor to form a Ministry. The constitution of the new Cabinet was as follows:—

<i>Premier</i>	Marquis Saionji.
<i>Minister of Finance</i>	Mr. Yamamoto (ex-Governor of the Bank of Japan).
<i>Minister of Foreign Affairs</i>	Baron Uchida.
<i>Minister of War</i>	General Ishimoto.
<i>Minister of the Interior</i>	Mr. Hara.
<i>Minister of Agriculture and Commerce</i>	Mr. Makino.
<i>Minister of Communications</i>	Count Hayashi.
<i>Minister of Justice</i>	Mr. Matsuda.
<i>Minister of Education</i>	Mr. Haseba.
<i>Minister of Marine</i>	Baron Saito.

That the constitution of the above Cabinet is a recognition of the party system is evident from the fact that it includes four leaders of the *Seiyu-kai*—the Prime Minister who is at the head of the party, his two principal lieutenants, Mr. Hara and Mr. Matsuda, and another distinguished member, Mr. Haseba. It should be added that in a House consisting of 379 members the *Seiyu-kai* musters to-day no less than 220 votes.

Although the Saionji Cabinet has been in power for only a brief period, there are already unmistakable indications that, whatever schemes may be contemplated in regard to ameliorating the unhappy lot of an over-taxed population, there is certainly no serious intention of abandoning the militant policy that was inaugurated during the early days of the *post-bellum* period. As is usual in the case of a new Government accepting office in Japan, pious declarations were made by the Ministers that rigid economies would be effected in all departments of State, and that the burden of taxation would speedily be lifted from the shoulders of the people. But any hopes that may have been entertained in credulous quarters were soon dispelled when it became known that one of the

first measures to be decided upon by the new Government was an additional programme of naval expansion involving the outlay, over six years, of no less a sum than nine and a quarter millions sterling.¹ Furthermore, the Budget, from which much had been expected, showed a considerable increase over those of the three preceding years. In Mr. Yamamoto the nation possesses a Finance Minister who, if he were given the opportunity, would doubtless do much to relieve Japan of her present economic embarrassment, and at the same time to deliver her people from the position of bondage which had been brought about by the retention of the war taxes; but it is to be feared that he will not succeed in carrying into operation any far-reaching reforms in these directions, for he will be met at every turn with the opposition of the militarists in the Cabinet, whose demands must be complied with unless there is to be an almost complete reversal of the traditional policy of Imperial expansion. Such a reversal of policy is certainly not contemplated by the Government as a whole, and, if they were obliged to resign power, would find no part in the programme of a Cabinet that might be formed under the leadership of Prince Katsura.

The political future of Japan, therefore, is wrapt in gloom. If she is to march side by side with the progressive nations of the earth, not only must her people be relieved of the financial deadweight which at present holds them in check, but the franchise must be extended so as to embrace a much larger proportion than merely 10 per cent. of the adult male population. For some time past there has been a growing agitation throughout the country in favour of Cabinets that shall be responsible to the representatives of the electorate, but so far this agitation has encountered nothing but stern disapproval in high quarters. Yet it is clear that until all these reforms are carried out Japan will remain in the toils of financial embarrassment, and will be faced with the danger of social disruption.

Before proceeding to make some general observations and to draw some general conclusions in reference to representative government in Japan, I would like to deal specifically with one lamentable feature only too prominent in political

¹ *Vide* Chapter XXI.

life. This is the evil of corruption which exists not only among the electorate but also among the members of the House of Representatives. The payment of members of Parliament has not made for the welfare of the country, inasmuch as it has led to the creation of a large class of professional, self-seeking politicians whose chief aim in life is to secure the Parliamentary stipend. Not content, however, with this remuneration, many of them make use of their public positions to benefit their own ends. Their votes are at the command of the party with the longest purse, a circumstance which largely accounts for the constant fluctuation in the numerical strength of the various parties. Not infrequently they are bought over by private concerns whose interests are assailed in measures presented to the Diet. It was notorious that when the nationalisation of the railways was proposed to Parliament there was keen competition between the railway companies and the supporters of the Government for the purchase of votes in the Lower House. As the foreign friends of Japan invariably allege that criticism against that country is not substantiated by facts, I propose to give some statements and views which will speak for themselves in the matter of corruption; and as many of these owe their origin to Japanese sources, they may be accepted as impartial. The following are the extracts to which I refer :—

“Unfortunately a great abuse of the electoral system had arisen in Japan. Men of moderate means could not bear the expense of elections, and even men of good means were crippled by it. The origin of this abuse was to be sought in official interference. This had been frequent, and now it had taken the form of secret purchase of votes. The only way to correct this was to abolish the system of large constituencies and the system of unsigned ballots. The Japanese people had made great progress in ability and knowledge, but they were still very defective in a sense of public morality. To educate the latter signed ballots would be a partially effective instrument.”—COUNT ŌKUMA *at a meeting of the Progressists in January 1906.*

“One point which must strike every observer of political conditions in this country is the openness with which the

corruption is carried on. For instance, Count Ōkuma does not find it at all an extraordinary thing to refer to the secret purchase of votes, a statement which in any other country where representative institutions obtain would have raised a storm of protest or denial. Here the statement is taken as a matter of course, a thing generally recognised and not causing any surprise or shame."—*A comment made in January 1906 by a European newspaper published in Japan.*

"The whole system of our Japanese politics is still in a terribly backward condition. The methods of selecting candidates for Diet membership, the methods of influencing and controlling the members after their election will not bear close scrutiny. Corruption abounds everywhere, and so it happens that the right kind of men are not chosen. The relation of municipal government to national government in this country is not what it ought to be. The influence of local officials is perpetually employed in the interests of the party in power in Tōkyō in an unfair manner. The members chosen are given to jobbery, egged on perpetually by their electors. Political parties in this country are gradually losing the respect of the enlightened and well-informed section of the nation. Taking the educated world to-day, it may be said, speaking roughly, that one half of the brightest young men seek office under the Government, and the other half turn to business of some kind or other. Those who possess votes place little value on them. To them the selection of a member of the Diet possesses no interest whatever. Much as we may regret this state of affairs as well-wishers of constitutional government, facts cannot be got rid of. Marquis Itō tried his best to clarify the political air, but that he failed nobody knows better than he. . . . There is a growing feeling of contempt for political parties, and not a few are beginning to feel that it is an honour not to belong to them."—MR. TOYABE SHUNTEI, *writing in March 1906.*

"Constitutional government is getting to be a perfect farce in this country, owing to the enormous amount of corruption prevailing in existing political parties. When first the corruptibility of members of the Diet was talked about some

years ago it created a certain amount of surprise in the country. But to-day everybody is accustomed to the spectacle of a big political party which is bereft of independence of spirit and which has got rid of the last vestige of self-respect, carrying out slavishly any policy that may be decided on by the Government. . . . There could be no greater contrast than the cold indifference which the political parties showed when dealing with the Budget, and the fever heat they displayed when discussing a large number of comparatively unimportant questions that had to be settled. The reason for this is known to everybody. The questions at issue were mostly of personal interest to the members and affected their pockets in various ways (*Sono yuye ta nashi, korera no mondai ni wa giin shoshi jiko rigai notomonau mono areba nari*). Such were the diverse taxation questions connected with the sugar trade and other industries, and the improvements to be made in Hokkaidō. It has come to this then that our Diet only excites itself when something affecting the pockets of members comes up for discussion. We know of no case in the history of constitutional government in which in time of peace a Budget so unprecedentedly big compared to all previous Budgets drawn up on a peace footing as was ours this year was quietly passed through a Lower House without a single alteration. The conduct of the House of Representatives in connection with the Bill for abolishing the Local District Government system, and the indulgent manner in which it treated the members who were known to have been corrupted, helped to lower its reputation to such an extent that unless it is radically reformed the nation will cease to expect anything good to come from it. . . . Each constituency should in the coming general election select men who are incapable of being bribed or of consulting their own interests rather than those of the State. . . . We have a constitutional form of government, but the requisite for putting it into operation, the existence of a large number of people who realise what their responsibilities as voters are, and are prepared to act up to them, is wanting. The cause of the present corruption in the Diet is to be found in the politically immature state of the minds of constituents throughout the country. The Government has not merely neglected to instruct their constituents, but on

several occasions it has actually helped to corrupt them during the carrying on of elections. All upright statesmen and politicians now have an opportunity for impressing on the minds of voters the importance of their selecting as their representatives next year men of undoubted integrity."—MR. SHIMADA SABURO, *a Japanese publicist, writing in June 1907.*

"Prince Yamagata is responsible for much of the existing corruption, as he habitually bribed members of the Diet (*Yamagata Kyō ga ippō de wa seitō wo dai-fuhai seshimete, shikōshite giin wo kondaku (mud) no uchi ni botsunyu seshime-tari*). Marquis Katsura during his tenure of office tried at first to act independently of political parties, having a natural dislike for them, but he eventually found it impossible to do so, and so, *nolens volens*, he had to resort to the tactics of his predecessors in office. These facts account for much of the existing corruption among political parties."—*The Tōkyō "Asahi," January 1908.*

"In the coming general election the prefectural governors should strictly abide by and act in entire conformity with the principles of the laws and regulations. No political parties should be in your eyes. Of late there are some candidates so base as to aspire for Parliamentary seats by means of bribery and other disgraceful measures. The local governors are specially requested to pay keen attention to this point. But it is not my intention to add to the number of culprits by urging the enforcement of the election law. I only wish to thereby prevent the crime before it is committed, and let the people fully reserve their liberty of election. Therefore I wish you all to bear this in mind, and strive to make the election free of crime or scandal as much as possible."—MR. HARA, *the Home Minister, addressing the Prefectural Governors' Council before the General Election, 1908.*

"In conclusion, I should like to call your attention to one more matter. I mean the election of the members of the Prefectural Assemblies and of Parliament. It is my sincere hope that you should take a fair attitude in the election. It is quite natural that the Government would like to have those members who support its policy elected. But this is a motive

not of the highest order. In the administration of the State, the authorities must not act upon any low political or personal motive. Therefore, you must not put any distinction between the members of one party and others. As to the details, I shall give you further instructions on another occasion."—*Ibid.*

"The Ōsaka Shimpō assert that the police authorities have discovered that 797 persons accepted bribes to vote for Mr. Kodera, of Kobe, the successful candidate at the late election for the Sanda division of Hiōgo Prefecture. It is alleged that the sums paid ranged from one to two *yen*."—*Incident reported in the "Kobe Herald."*

"It is reported from Maebashi that during the counting of the votes at the election there, it was found that fifty of them had been tampered with, the candidates' names written by the voters having been erased, and the name of Mr. Hinata Terutake, one of the other candidates, substituted for them. The headman of Iruno village, in whose charge the box containing the votes had remained during the night, is charged with having committed the offence."—*An incident at the General Election, 1908.*

"A return issued by the Home Department yesterday shows that the cases of violations of the Election Law discovered at the recent elections number 232, the persons implicated totalling no less than 1347. Most of the offences were the paying of bribes to voters, there being few instances of illicit entertaining or the giving of presents."—*Statement in the "Japan Times," a journal conducted by Japanese, with reference to the General Election, 1908.*

"There are some who are working for political reforms, but in the present circumstances it will not be easy for them to carry out their intentions. The political circle in these days is corrupted and degraded, as is well known to political observers; and accordingly the cry for reform is raised among members of the House as well as among those who are not members. It is unfortunate to have to state, however, that no one has sufficient self-confidence, courage, and zeal to undertake this arduous task of self-reform.

"Frankly speaking, the very men who loudly cry of the necessity for reforms in political circles are those who are in reality almost at the bottom of the abyss of depravity and corruption. The number of those members who are really and conscientiously thinking of the introduction of a new atmosphere is indeed small. The knowledge and character of the mass of the Japanese people stand too low to introduce political reforms.

"Unless general knowledge makes progress, it is next to impossible to introduce the intended reforms. The people must be educated up to a stage when they feel indignant at the mere name of corruption prevailing among the members.

"The condition of our political circles may be chiefly attributed to the ignorance and low characters of politicians and members of the Diet, but the Government must be held in a measure responsible for bringing about this degradation. It is a striking fact that the Government, in order to cover up defects in its policy, has constantly resorted to measures of corruption. At the time of the most recent elections the then-existing Cabinet, in order to increase the strength of the pro-governmental party, interfered with the voting, thus implanting the germs of corruption among members. Of late the number of members who shape their opinions and move about in accordance with the principles of the party to which they belong has been greatly decreased. With most of the members, considerations of self-interest are of primary importance. The sound character which our Diet might possess was witnessed in its first session. The degradation of members since then has been quite rapid, and the behaviour of the members of the twenty-third Session of the Diet impresses us with the idea that Parliament has now reached the acme of corrupt and indecent conduct. The moral side of our assembly has been degraded to such an extent, that the mode of political action has also shown a marked depreciation. Politicians in Japan seem to attach some importance to their debating power, but this power is used not for the furtherance of political interests, but for themselves only or for their own particular districts. The debating power of members mostly seems to be directed

towards an attack on individuals or bodies of men. We find very few who are really anxious to uphold the principles of their own party and to make it their duty to give instruction to the people at large. All my language fails me to express the degradation to which the members of the *Daido* Club recently sank. Even if we ignore their unprincipled conduct, the predominating party in the House of Representatives, the Constitutional Party, show that their movement in the twenty-third Session of the Diet was not very honourable."—MR. OZAKI, *the Mayor of Tōkyō, and a prominent politician.*

"The conduct of the *Daido Nondescripts* and the Progressists in relation to the *Gun* Bill is another theme that the electors should carry in their minds. It was a question of which no political stock should have been made, and yet they went the length of making it the cause for an unnecessary disturbance of an unsavoury nature. By their action they have shown themselves weak enough to be easily manipulated by a handful of scheming politicians, and therefore utterly devoid of the strength of conviction. Or take the bribery charge against some members and the way in which they were whitewashed as the result of a farcical proceeding. The affair did not add to the credit of the national body that should be jealous of its dignity and good name. The public could not but see that all was not right with some of the members accused and others, and the thought is painful to all who have at heart the interests of the country. To expect the conversion of the corrupt elements is more than useless, and it is in the power of electors only to purge the Legislature of men who, to get a few guilty hundred *yen*, would drag in the dirt the national Legislature. It is to be hoped that the constituencies will not find it too soon to set about selecting worthier representatives than they of the unpleasant odour, and make ready for the coming election."—"*Japan Times.*"

"The very prevarication, or even brazen cheating practised by the voters against the pressure of party influence or power of money applied on their votes is in the present state of

affairs the very means of evading these outside obstructions to the free exercise of voting capacity. It cannot be the convenience of the candidates themselves that the sponsors of the change primarily consult. The deciding point should be under which system the free exercise of the voters' conscience is best secured."—*The "Jiji Shimpō," commenting on a proposal to change from unsigned to signed ballot.*

"But in the actual working of the system, the moral degeneration caused in the voters is altogether too deep and extensive for us to defend the system as the most fitting to the present condition of the country. Making allowance then for the defects of the other system, we would advocate a change to the signed system that gives less chance of corruption."—*The "Yorodzu," commenting on the same subject.*

"The *Kokumin Shinbun* alleges that lobbying of the most barefaced character is being carried on by the Namboku Sekiyu (Company) among the members of the *Seiyu-kai*, and that although the party as a whole has refused to be bribed, its individual members are by no means so fastidious."—*Extract from the "Japan Mail."*

"Japanese politicians depend on the adoption of a suppliant and beseeching attitude to the electors for success. Their servility is quite despicable. They differ little from the beggars that sit by the roadside, except that they ask for votes instead of coppers. The methods they follow are so effeminate that it might be better for them to retire from the scene and entrust their interests to the weaker sex, who are 'greater experts in the use of devices for obtaining votes resorted to by our politicians.' Further, there is a lack of party newspapers. The sheets that are called party organs are no more than advertising media or means of circulating party notices among members. And the Japanese politician is mainly dependent on money spent at election times. The constituencies are corrupted, large sums of money being paid out for votes. That many of the electors regard their votes as articles of merchandise is an open secret. The expense of purchasing votes is greatly increased by the extortions of the

vote-buying commission agents, who are a despicable crew."
 —*The "Taiyo," a review.*

The above extracts from views expressed and accounts of incidents which have taken place during the past few years conclusively prove that the Japanese are as yet incapable of honestly discharging the duties and responsibilities of representative government. So far, all attempts to bring about a healthier state of affairs have signally failed. In March and April of 1907, the Saionji Cabinet, wishing to pass the *Gun* Bill, to which reference has previously been made in this chapter, adopted tactics that called for severe criticism. When the measure had passed the House of Representatives by an exceedingly small majority, a newspaper called the *Yamata Shimbun* published a list of bribes received by members, and gave a comprehensive account of the transactions that had taken place. A committee was appointed to investigate the matter, and by a resolution, passed by nine votes as against eight, decided that the charges of corruption were untrue. There was a general feeling that the inquiry had not been conducted with impartiality, and when the report of the committee was submitted, the members who had constituted the minority asked that the opinion of the whole House should be taken on the subject. As soon as the President proposed that an open ballot should be resorted to he was asked to order the eight members who were directly concerned to retire. Thereupon the Leader of the Government party protested, and his objection was upheld. In spite of the fact that it was represented to the eight, whose conduct was under discussion, that they were morally bound to abstain from voting, they declined to adopt this view. The whole of the 341 members present voted, and the result of the division was as follows :—

For the majority opinion	176
For the minority opinion	165
	<hr/>
Majority	11

Strictly speaking, the eight members were absolved from the charges of corruption by the narrow majority of three. In view of all the circumstances I have set forth, it is easy to

understand that the Diet attracts only a class of men of inferior ability and doubtful honesty. There are, of course, exceptions, but these at present constitute only a very meagre minority. This unhappy condition of affairs has a far wider and deeper significance than would appear at first glance. The fact cannot be overlooked that the members whose votes are "up for auction" in the Diet on every available opportunity are returned by electors whose votes are equally marketable.

It cannot be denied that here we get a singularly illuminating insight into the moral conception of the average Japanese. For it must be admitted that the individual whom the Constitution endows with a vote must be regarded in every sense of the term as an "average Japanese." Were it necessary to produce proof in favour of an argument the logic of which does not appear to be open to question, I would point to the prevalence of corruption in the Municipalities and Local Assemblies in Japan. As long as human nature is frail, corruption will exist among all peoples. In this connection, however, I wish to emphasise that the Japanese are more prone than any other race, with similar pretensions, to methods of political immorality. Were representative government, as in other countries, the pivot of the life of the nation, it would long ere this have been said of Japan that she was "rotten to the core." Nor is there evidence to show that the evil has been restricted. The Army, the Navy, and the Administrative Departments have not been without their unsavoury scandals, while the immorality of the commercial community is notorious the world over. Party government can never be attained in Japan so long as party politics are polluted. Ministries within recent times opposed to the principles of party power have sought to maintain themselves in office by pandering to the weaknesses of party politicians. Yet one would not be justified in boldly asserting that the Governments were corrupt. One would prefer to say, that they made convenient use of undesirable elements of corruption in order to prevent the control of the country falling into the hands of those self-same undesirable elements. And the party politicians were only too ready to abandon the prospect of power in order to gain the ready use of lucre. That the Diet in

a career which has now lasted twenty years should have been summarily dissolved seven times, and but twice in the ordinary course of events, is in itself sufficient indication of the manner of the application of constitutional government in Japan. No one who has followed the history of the domestic politics of the country can for a moment doubt that the ruling statesmen have been justified in the peremptory treatment which from time to time they have meted out to the House of Representatives. "It is an Assembly of the lowest types of men," said Mr. Ozaki, with refreshing candour. "Thus in attending the House," he added, "sober thinkers feel as if they were being conducted to a hell or assembly of devils. It is absolutely a mistake to imagine that one feels at home in the Japanese Parliament. Neither happiness nor any taste exists in the House. I console myself with the feeling that my duty in the House is to lead, instruct, and train other members. In meeting, therefore, the rough and uneducated members, I cannot keep from entertaining feelings of compassion. If any one attends the House with a view to learning anything there he would be greatly mistaken. Instead of improving himself, he would be made ill by coming into contact with conditions of corruption and degradation, and with the power of the Prince of Darkness ruling there." Not infrequently measures of the highest importance pass the House with almost lightning rapidity; and one of the most important Budgets in the history of the country was adopted after a debate lasting barely three hours. The members seem wholly incapable of realising their Parliamentary responsibilities, and their proceedings are often neither more nor less than a burlesque upon Western systems of representative government. It is little wonder, therefore, that their standing throughout the country is as low as it can possibly be. In the main they are looked upon as paid hirelings, possessing little conscience, and, from the Japanese point of view, considerable wealth. Moreover, as parties, they fail to convince the country of their utility. In the majority of cases the speeches delivered by the members reveal only a childish conception of national obligations. They are incapable of rousing enthusiasm, and in conducting their campaigns they prefer the intrigue of the tea-house and the solace of the *saké* cup to the frank declaration of the

public platform and the open confidence of their constituents. In view of these circumstances, it is difficult to appreciate fully the objections raised by a large section of the Japanese people to the influence of the Elder Statesmen. As soon as the Saionji Cabinet, which preceded the second Katsura Administration, came into power, that influence became paramount in the State. It was the Elder Statesmen who insisted upon a curtailment of the expenditure upon armaments. It was the Elder Statesmen who advised the Emperor in the Ministerial crises. Although Itō was Resident-General of Korea and spent a large part of his time in Seoul, he remained one of the dominating personalities in the political situation at home, and the Emperor, as before, continued to be guided largely by the wisdom of his ripe experience. Not only did the Cabinet consult the Elder Statesmen on all occasions of importance, but they sought the advice of other prominent though younger statesmen, among whom may be mentioned Marquis Katsura, Admiral Count Yamamoto, and the late Viscount Kodama, while the counsel of Baron Shibusawa, Japan's leading merchant, was frequently sought, and he came to be regarded as an "Elder." These circumstances gave rise to considerable adverse comments in the Press. It was asserted that the number of Elder Statesmen was being added to indefinitely, and that to all appearances this curious anomaly in constitutional government was assuming a permanent form. The history of Japan shows that the delegation of the real power is no new development of latter-day transition. The position which the Elder Statesmen occupy to-day is not inconsistent with the happenings of the past. So long as representative government is in its present imperfect form, the Emperor will insist upon having the constant advice of statesmen whose tried and trusted records are proof of competency and of disinterestedness. If party politicians wish to bring about party government in the near future, then they must aim at higher and nobler ideals. They must endeavour to gain some adequate conception, not only of the duties and responsibilities of political life, but also of statesmanship. They must oppose each other on the clearly defined platform of principle, and not the farcical stage of petty personalities and individual

recriminations. And, above all, they must cast out from their ranks the corrupt elements that at present sap the vigour of their being. Until all these things are accomplished, Parliaments may be dissolved at the will of the Emperor and the whim of the Premier, and in the interim the government of the country conducted by Imperial Ordinance.

The foundations of party government already exist in Japan. Whether party government will be in the best interests of the nation is altogether another question. Nevertheless, one cannot imagine that the machinery already in existence can for ever remain idle. In the meantime events are shaping themselves so as to ensure that when the time is opportune for party government the necessary elements of restraint will not be wanting. Precedent has already established that there shall be a continuity of naval and military policies, and the men who preside over the departments from which these policies emanate, guided by the traditions of their high offices, may be relied upon to insist that the national defences are maintained at an adequate standard.

Although since the death of Prince Itō their influence has shown signs of waning, the Elder Statesmen still fulfil a useful and a necessary part. They are a valuable link between the days of the Restoration and the days of the ascendancy of Japan to a place in the comity of nations. Their policy in the present is tempered by their knowledge of the past. The day will no doubt come when they may be dispensed with, and when the country, which under their tuition has overcome the dangers of transition, may be allowed, free of restraint, to step boldly out into a world of independent communities. That day will not come until the political conscience of the nation is fully awakened. Already there are faint signs that a change for the better is taking place. Education is raising the status of the people, and an agitation has commenced having for its object the extension of the suffrage so as to include men who are not necessarily property holders, but who are well qualified, by reason of ability and knowledge, to exercise the privilege of voting. In a country like Japan where the economic standard is low, the present property qualification imposes a hardship on a large section of a

deserving community. Whether the present political parties will take the lead in the progress of the people towards political freedom is a matter for them to decide. The first essential is reformation in their own ranks. If this is not quickly accomplished they may find themselves replaced by other and more able men. The people tolerate the bureaucracy because they have no faith in the parties; and the parties are subservient to the bureaucracy because they are at present little better than paid hirelings of the bureaucracy. In this condition of affairs no other form of government than that which exists to-day could safely be trusted with the destinies of the nation. As I have said, there are faint signs that the political conscience of the people is awakening. Perhaps the most important of these consists of a dawning realisation that corruption is iniquitous and must be punished. One can also detect a glimmer of the spirit of reform among the political parties themselves. There exists in the House a body of independent members whose wholesome conduct will in the future act more and more as a deterrent to malpractices. The return of business representatives to Parliament is also a healthy indication of political development; and although their identity has become merged in that of the *Kokumin-to* their scope of usefulness as practical legislators is not necessarily restricted. If, through party obligations, their special utility to the State should disappear, then it would be indeed a sad reflection on the moral and intellectual virility of a people for whom they stand as the representatives of commonsense and integrity. Hitherto men of progressive ideas have been kept out of office because their views were looked upon as dangerously extreme; but as time goes on and political warfare is conducted in the broad spirit of toleration and not, as in the past, in the bitterness of a personal rivalry fitted only to an age of feudal strife, these views will not excite suspicion, nor will they call for suppression. From out of the turmoil of political evolution there will assuredly come a demand that the Ministry shall be responsible to the Diet and not to the Emperor. When this demand is made, the Constitutional advisers of his Majesty will no doubt be a Cabinet composed of the representatives of the party system. Will other statesmen, the

survivors of the present form of bureaucratic government, advise his Majesty to refuse the demands of the people, or will they recognise the inevitable, and counsel acquiescence? And if they do advise resistance and his Majesty accepts, what will happen? Will the political development of the country undermine the loyalty of the people towards the Throne? It has always been the proud boast of the Japanese that their Constitution was granted under exceptional circumstances, inasmuch as it represented a voluntary act on the part of the Sovereign. They are now beginning to realise that the Constitution will be wholly inadequate to a country in full possession of its political vigour, and that their Diet as at present constructed is more in the nature of a debating chamber for the ventilation of the views of a limited section of the population than a Legislature entrusted with responsibilities of taking a genuine share in the government of a country. The struggle may yet come. Will it be a bloodless struggle similar to that which took place in the days of the Restoration? Or will it be—in view of the susceptibilities of the Japanese, one almost hesitates to write the word—revolution? Already one can detect certain elemental political passions arising in the nation—the passion of socialistic agitation on the one side, and of official repression on the other. In the meantime it can truly be said that Japan is governed by a bureaucracy that is more or less benevolent, but that, in its essence and in its aims, differs little from the bureaucracies that have ruled and have fallen in other lands.

XX

JAPAN'S ARMY

UNTIL the abolition of feudalism in Japan, the masses of the people were looked upon as unworthy of bearing arms, and only the Samurai class were permitted to engage in military service. The coming of the Restoration, however, led to the reorganisation of the forces of the Empire on the European model. In the first place it was realised that if pressure from the outside world were to be successfully resisted a strong army became essential. Yet the Samurai were not in sufficient numbers to meet the requirements of the age. Moreover, they had been accustomed to a style of hand-to-hand fighting that was little match for the scientific methods employed by Western countries. This much was proved by the encounters of the rebellious clans with the forces of the allied Powers. The spirit of the age decided the rest. The ordinary individual, who had long been regarded by the State as unfitted for any other occupation save that of toiling on the land or bartering in the bazaar, was burning with a desire to prove to his Monarch that, given opportunity, he was at least the equal in bravery of the favoured Samurai. Here, then, there was at hand ideal material from which could be built up a splendid army. The Samurai, by reason of their experience in the fields of feudalism, made excellent leaders. The masses, imbued with the spirit of emulation, supplied the rank and file. On December 28, 1872, an Imperial proclamation announcing the introduction of conscription was issued. Five years later the efficiency of the system was tested in a striking manner when the Imperial troops successfully encountered the Samurai of Satsuma, the most warlike of all the clans, who were fighting under the leadership of the renowned Saigō. The issue set at rest all doubts that had arisen concerning

the *morale* of the masses. The war with China, and later, the Boxer rebellion, provided additional proof of their competence to bear arms; while the Manchurian campaign clearly demonstrated their capacity to oppose European troops. Originally French officers were engaged as instructors, but eventually these were superseded by Germans, to whose zeal and intelligence Japan largely owes her military efficiency. At the same time there is no doubt that much of her progress in the art of warfare is due to the exceptional merit of the material at her disposal. This merit in turn is the outcome of the peculiar conditions that governed her rapid advance into the community of nations. The pressure of the Powers forced her into the world's arena; but in many important respects her mental attitude remains captive in the lingering toils of feudalism, and she has within herself a strong element of conservatism that is constantly coming into conflict with the demands of her new position. This conservatism finds expression, to a large extent, among her generals, who are the surviving representatives of the old fighting clans. Thus there exists within the nation a factor so strong as to be almost deciding, which has become known as the "military school." This coterie, consisting of military and naval officers of high rank, is opposed to the principles of party government. Its opposition arises largely from the belief that party government gives rein to popular clamour and unfits the masses for the discipline of military service; that the demands of party government, based as no doubt they frequently are upon the political expediency of the moment, deplete the national treasury of funds that should be expended upon military training and equipment; and that last, but by no means least, party government involves an excess of liberality in thought and tends to undermine the loyalty of the subject towards the Throne. There is in consequence an endless conflict of views between the civil and military sections of the Administration. On the one hand it is urged that all considerations of social reform should give way to the demands of a colossal army and a large navy; while on the other it is contended with equal force that the considerations of economy and the need for industrial expansion are of first

importance. Invariably a compromise is reached, but it is not a compromise which leads to any material limitation of Japan's armaments. As a matter of fact, both the army and navy are to-day more formidable than ever they were; and at the present rate of their progress it is safe to predict that in a future not far distant, and always providing that the *morale* of the nation does not seriously deteriorate, Japan will hold an incontestable position in the Far East. Her need for a strong army solely arises from her aspirations to the hegemony of Asia. "The Japanese Empire," said General Terauchi, when Minister for War, in a speech before the Budget Committee of the Diet, "extends now from Saghalien in the north to Formosa in the south, and Japan has also assumed large responsibilities in Korea and Manchuria. It is true that as an island country she resembles Great Britain, but the resemblance is only partial, for as a matter of fact Japan is concerned in the future of the whole region lying eastward of India and in the future of the regions on her north and west. If the situation be considered from that point of view, the need for a strong army cannot be disputed." Having fought and defeated both Russia and China, Japan has incurred the lasting enmity of those countries. She is committed to the maintenance of huge armaments by reason of the fact that her aggressive policy may lead not only to wars of revenge but also to a conflict with the United States. The military party in the nation possesses an overwhelming influence, one far greater than that exercised by any similar clique in Germany or in other European countries. This influence has for its origin a long series of splendid services rendered to the State during times of crisis. For, were it not for the achievements of her army and navy, Japan to-day might have been under Russian tutelage, or at least in the ranks of the second-class Powers. Many of the generals who distinguished themselves in the campaign against China fought in the Satsuma rebellion. The science of modern warfare they acquired comparatively late in their lives. Some of them studied in the military schools of Europe, but there were others whose knowledge was derived from instructors in the days before proper educational establishments were founded

in the country. The former chief of the General Staff, Count Oku, who gained all his experience in the field, is a notable example of the natural aptitude for the military profession possessed by the Samurai class.

The army of Japan is modelled closely upon the lines of that of Germany. As in France, Germany, and Austria, the system of compulsory universal service obtains, every able-bodied male between the ages of seventeen and forty being liable for enrolment in the Imperial forces. In practice, military service does not begin until the citizen has attained the age of twenty. Upwards of half a million young men reach this age annually, and on presenting themselves to the authorities are subjected to a rigorous medical examination which virtually results in their being classified under the headings "very good," "suitable," and "unsuitable." Among those conscripts who come into the first category a ballot is taken for the purpose of furnishing the contingent of recruits—fixed by Imperial Ordinance at 120,000—that passes annually into the Active Army. Of this contingent, men drafted to line regiments serve two years with the colours and then belong to the Army Reserve for a further period of five and one-third years; while men who are attached to other arms pass three years with the colours and four and one-third years represents their term in the Army Reserve. At the expiration of seven years and three months, therefore, a soldier completes his term of service, or of liability for service, with the colours. For the next ten years he belongs to the Reserve Army, and then, and until he reaches the age of forty, to the National Army. From among those youths who are not actually rejected at the annual examination a substantial contingent—probably numbering some 150,000—is drafted into what is known as the Conscript Reserve. To this arm of the service they are attached for the first seven and one-third years, during which period they belong nominally to the two branches of the Standing Army—the Active Army and the Army Reserve. For the purposes of expanding the active organisation and filling ordinary depletions in the colours the Conscript Reserve forms an admirable source of supply, as the men, who are all in their physical prime, undergo

Standing Army.		Reserve Army.		National Army.	Remarks.
Active Army.	Army Reserve.	2nd Reserve.			
Infantry, 2 years =	5½ years	=	10 years	2½ years	Fully trained men
Other Arms, 3 years =	4½ years				
(2 trainings, each 60 days)		(2 trainings, each 60 days)		(No training)	War strength : 115,000
War strength : 740,000		War strength : 780,000			
<i>Conscript Reserve.</i>		=		2½ years	Partly trained men
7½ years		(2 trainings, each 60 days)			
(3 trainings, 90, 60, and 60 days)		War strength : 445,000		War strength : 55,000	
War strength : 400,000					

a thorough training for periods of ninety, sixty, and sixty days. At the expiration of their term they pass automatically into the Reserve Army for a further period of ten years, and so into the National Army for the remaining two years and three months of their obligatory service. In the National Army are also included all youths between the ages of seventeen and twenty, the annual surplus of eligible young men who are not required either for the Active Army or the Conscript Reserve, and all men up to the age of forty who for reasons other than that of physical unfitness have been exempted from service. As this category, numbering in all some 3,000,000 men, is entirely untrained, it cannot be taken into consideration in any estimate of Japan's effective military strength.

The foregoing details will be more readily understood by reference to the table on the opposite page in which I have set forth in outline the general scheme of Japan's military organisation, the various terms of service, the periods of training, and the approximate war strength of her armies.

It should be mentioned that students attending a school of a status equal to a middle school are permitted to postpone the period of conscription. As soon as they leave school, however, they become eligible for service, and forfeit that prospect of exemption which other sections of the community possess in the annual drawing of lots. Should any man hold qualifications equal to those of a graduate of the middle school, he may volunteer for one year's service, at the end of which he is given a non-commissioned officer's rank in the Reserve Army. In these circumstances he is required to pay the expenses incidental to his life in barracks.

Some idea of the educational standing of conscripts may be gathered from the particulars tabulated on the following page, and which are based on data supplied in 1906 by the enlisting officers within the jurisdiction of the First to Twelfth Divisions.

Graduated High Schools or equal	1,209
Finished Middle Schools or equal	17,696
Finished higher grade primary school or equal	104,159
Finished ordinary grade primary school or equal	182,813
Fair knowledge of reading and counting	59,952
Illiterate	33,564
Total	399,393

The lessons of the war with Russia led to the introduction of a number of changes and reforms. Of these, the principal was the reduction in the term of line service from three to two years. Towards the end of the campaign in Manchuria considerable difficulty was experienced in obtaining reinforcements. At that time it was computed by various authorities that the Japanese army on active service consisted of one million men. Although no definite statistics are available, it is estimated by those best competent to judge, that the present system has raised the available strength to a total of upwards of a million and a half fully trained men.

Much has been written concerning the Japanese sense of patriotism. We have been led to believe that no matter how great the sacrifice, the whole nation to a man was imbued with a desire to serve the Emperor. Some enthusiastic writers have even gone the length of telling their British readers that universal service in Japan did not mean compulsion, and that every able-bodied man in the country being willing to volunteer for military employment, its introduction was only needed for the purposes of organisation. Unfortunately in this, as in many other instances, the actual facts fail to support their statements. In an article on the subject the semi-official organ of the Government, the *Kokumin*, declared that some authorities in the country urged that conscription should be more strictly enforced in order to realise fully the principle of national service. "These insist," added the journal, "on the narrowing of exceptions in enrolling conscripts, with a view to maintaining the principle up to the mark. If exceptions are largely allowed for the rich and learned classes, the army will come to be composed chiefly of sons of poorer classes and may become like one composed of hirelings. The complete returns of conscription for this year (1909) are still unavailable; but last year

41,504 out of 551,967 men of conscription age were allowed the postponement of conscription examination. Had they been enlisted without postponement, they would have now formed the flower of the army, in respect of intellectual and spiritual attainments. If they are actually enlisted in the midst of school-going it will be no loss for them, as military training will certainly benefit them from the physical and other standpoints. Some private schools in Japan endeavour to attract students by obtaining for them favours in military conscription. It is therefore advisable to revise the conscription law in Japan."

The population in Japan is increasing by three-quarters of a million annually, and, consequently, the number of men available for military service becomes larger each year. In 1908 no fewer than 551,967 youths attained the military age, an increase of 31,197 on the previous year. The men actually enrolled totalled over 254,000, or less than one-half the number of conscription age. A large proportion of those men annually examined fail to reach the required standard of physique, a circumstance due in a large measure to the fact that they belong to the poorer classes and in their school-days were insufficiently fed. It has recently been explained in the Japanese Press that another cause of this physical deterioration among the youth of the country is to be traced to a moral degeneration consequent upon the national tendency, since the success of the late war, to an excessive indulgence in luxury and idle pleasure. Apart, however, from this aspect of the question, Japan is already beginning to find that with the advent of commercial progress a large proportion of the educated people are showing a strong dislike for military service. Strenuous efforts are being made in all directions to maintain a high patriotic standard; but it is feared that sooner or later the fighting, no less than the frugal spirit, kindled in the strife of that feudalism which prevailed in the land but half a century ago, will not survive the materialistic tendencies of the present age. The opponents of compulsory military service in England and elsewhere not infrequently urge that its adoption in this country would spell commercial ruin. This, however, has not been the experience of Japan. On

the contrary, she has found that the period of training, given to youths at a time in their lives when discipline is desirable if not essential, renders them specially fitted for useful careers in the ordinary pursuits of the community. In other words, it improves the physique and the *morale* of the nation to such an extent as more than to compensate for any time expended in the process of training. Baron Suyematsu, in his book "The Risen Sun," sets forth in lucid style the advantages of universal training, and the following summary of these will not be out of place in the present work:—(1) Experience proves that men under the compulsory service system are capable of being made far more efficient as a compact body than were the Samurai under the older system wherein the effects of discipline were somewhat subservient to individual prowess ; (2) the obligatory system is superior to the volunteer system on points wherein uniformity is in many respects to be desired above all considerations ; (3) compulsory service puts the country to less expense ; (4) it tends to make every citizen in the land feel his responsibility to the State more keenly ; (5) the nation becomes more compact by reason of the recruits coming in contact with men hailing from all parts of the country and with men of all sorts belonging to different social grades or professions in life, and through realising that the great common cause of their mission or duty is above the particular interests of localities or classes ; (6) the physical development and personal discipline enables a man to be more punctual and regular in his habits and more enduring of hardships than he would otherwise be ; (7) universal service gives to the people at large, as well as the recruits themselves, little chance of looking down upon military occupation as an unelevated profession ; (8) the universal system dispenses with the necessity of employing all sorts of devices to induce men to enlist under the national flag for military service ; (9) men under the system of personal military service seem to be more animated with a sense of the duties devolving upon each individual than are those under the voluntary system, because the idea of being "on hire" never enters into their minds ; (10) the troops organised under this system seem to be more amen-

able to military discipline than those under voluntary systems ; (11) the system helps the spread of intelligence among the people at large ; (12) the part of our military instruction which we call spiritual education, to which the greatest attention is paid, and which really is an elevated ethical teaching, imbues the men with fine moral sentiments, especially on the lines of patriotism and loyalty ; (13) universal service makes the spread of the patriotic as well as the martial spirit more feasible in all the schools, because that system makes every boy expectant of becoming a soldier at some time or other ; (14) the fear that men returning from barracks to their rustic or urban homes might make themselves arrogant and detestable among their neighbours, and would be more or less unfitted to revert to their original occupations, has proved to be wholly groundless. The number of men similarly placed to themselves increased with time, and no one man in particular could venture to rank himself as the only hero ; (15) no material detriment in regard to the general economic condition of the country—at all events in any appreciable degree—is noticeable. Any drawback there may be appears to be fully compensated by subsequent advantages.

While provision has been made for a fifty per cent. increase in the infantry by means of a reduction in the period of service with the colours, the organisation of the entire strength has been expanded. At the beginning of the war the army consisted of thirteen divisions, including the Imperial Guards. During the progress of the campaign, three new divisions were created, and since the conclusion of peace three more have been added to the strength. The independent Cavalry, moreover, have been augmented by two brigades. The Japanese army of to-day consists of nineteen divisions, and it is generally understood that as soon as the finances of the country permit of the expenditure involved, yet another division will be brought into existence. The number of units, however, does not necessarily indicate the number of men available. On paper a Japanese division mobilised for war comprises approximately 20,000 men, and constitutes an expeditionary force complete in every detail. Whenever expediency dictates, however, brigades are added. For instance, it was estimated

that during the war with Russia some divisions mustered no less than 40,000 men.

In a recent issue of *The Times*, devoted exclusively to a comprehensive survey of Japan, an interesting article containing much valuable information was contributed by the Military Correspondent. This well-known authority explained that the division remains, as before, the largest unit of the war organisation. The division consists of headquarters, including staff and *adjutantur*; two brigades of Infantry, each of two regiments of three battalions; two squadrons of Cavalry; 36 field guns; 24 machine guns; three companies of Engineers; a bridging train; a telegraph section; medical corps; eight ammunition columns; four supply columns; four to six field hospitals; and a mobile remount dépôt. The mobilised active division has 18,875 men, 4938 horses, and 1765 carriages. In addition to the 19 divisions there are the Army troops. These number four brigades of Cavalry, each of three regiments of five squadrons; two newly formed batteries of horse artillery; three independent brigades of field artillery, forming six regiments, with 216 guns; three independent mountain battalions, with 54 guns; four regiments of heavy field artillery; siege parks; railway troops; wireless and other telegraph units; balloon company; searchlight detachments; bridging train; and field *gendarmérie*. There are also troops for lines of communication; twenty-four battalions of heavy artillery for coast defence, besides the garrisons outside Japan. Allowing a Reserve Army brigade to each division, the organ of the French General Staff calculates that the mobilised Active Army will number 570,000 men with 122,000 horses. In the opinion of the Military Correspondent of *The Times*, however, "the fast-growing military resources of Japan scarcely allow us to expect that this practice will in all cases be followed hereafter. Now that the contingent of the year is 120,000 men and that the Kobi (Reserve Army) will soon possess ten of these contingents, it is not open to us to suppose, even after allowing for waste, that this category of the Army will in future, or even now, only supply 19 brigades of some 6000 men each. It is much more probable that the Kobi (Reserve Army) will supply 19 complete

divisions at least, and it is possible that these 19 divisions may already be available, if the Hoju (Conscript Reserve) is drawn upon to complete them, although they may be 25 per cent. short in Cavalry, and 50 per cent. short in Artillery, compared with the standard of the Active Army."

Strenuous efforts are being made to remedy the defects in equipment which were discovered during the late war. In spite of the fact that the world was led to believe that the general efficiency of the Japanese Army was beyond question, these defects were of a very serious nature, and would have proved disastrous had it not been for the disadvantages under which Russia fought. On the outbreak of hostilities, machine guns were almost entirely lacking, and there was a lamentable insufficiency of guns in all branches of artillery. Moreover, the Japanese field guns were outranged by those of the Russians. The Murata rifle with which the troops were supplied was found to be ineffectual at long range. The number of men trained in that special or technical work rendered essential by the advanced science of modern warfare was quite inadequate, and the inefficiency of the cavalry was tersely described to me by a foreign military attaché when he termed this arm of the Japanese service, a "cavalry of position." The Japanese have not been slow to profit by their experience, and the two military arsenals at Tōkyō and Ōsaka are now busily turning out weapons which are believed to be the equal of those possessed by any European Power. Attention is being paid to the science of aeronautics, and several Japanese inventions have been brought to the notice of the authorities. Horse breeding is also encouraged in all parts of the country, and for this purpose race meetings are being popularised. Recently General Chanoine, a former instructor to the Japanese army and subsequently French Minister of War, gave his views of the Japanese Army as a result of his attendance at the manoeuvres. "The manoeuvres," he wrote, "were participated in by about fifty thousand men, divided off into two armies, who carried on their military operations in view of the Emperor. The impression of the foreign officers present was that the Japanese army had made vast progress since the last war. In an order of the day posted by the Mikado at the close of

the manoeuvres it was said: 'In an era of incessant advancement, it is not for the army to stand still. Your constant aim should be to win new successes and make preparation for new tests of your efficiency.' It is certainly in the spirit of this proclamation that the Japanese army has been improving. Among the numerous improvements introduced into the Japanese army since the last war we have particularly to notice their powerful and splendid field artillery. Their new rapid-fire guns, much superior to those employed in the Russo-Japanese War, are effective at a range of 4000 metres, a thing unknown in the battles of Manchuria. The artillerymen who serve these pieces, four to each gun, are completely protected by a shield of steel. These guns are entirely manufactured in Japan, and issue from the arsenal at Ōsaka. Each regiment of foot is also provided with four mitrailleuses, very superior to the old Hotchkiss guns as regards the simplification and improvement of their machinery. The Japanese cavalry is improving, especially in the horsemanship of the officers, and rivals the infantry in the exactitude of its tactics, its mobility, its readiness in seizing a position, and the individual enthusiasm and alacrity exhibited by soldiers and officers alike."

General Chanoine declared that the other arms of the service were equally perfect in their discipline, drill, and equipment, and added: "The engineer corps, divided into battalions, comprises also a troop of pontoniers equipped with materials for making bridges of extreme length. To the Japanese army of the East a balloon corps is attached, rendering that army really as efficient as any in the world."

The administration of the Japanese Army is modelled largely upon the German system. The Emperor is the Generalissimo, and is advised by a Supreme Council, consisting of distinguished naval and military officers of high rank. There is a General Staff and a War Department, and the War Minister is always a soldier of distinction. From time to time the various divisions and departments of the army are inspected by generals who are specially appointed for the purpose by the Sovereign. The commissioned ranks are open to all graduates from the military preparatory school and from the middle schools or recognised institutions

of equal standing, provided an entrance examination is passed. For the first period of his training the cadet is attached to a regiment, where he learns the ordinary duties of the non-commissioned officer and the private. Subsequently he is sent to the Officers' School, where his military education is completed, and promising young officers receive a special course of training at the Staff College. The commander of each company is made responsible for the efficiency and good behaviour of his junior officers. The spirit of independence is specially encouraged. For instance, within forty-eight hours of manœuvres or special practices, young officers submit reports with sketches, and the most meritorious of these are brought to the personal notice of the Emperor. The conditions of service are rigidly severe. In winter the officers are on duty in barracks from eight to four o'clock, and their physical fitness is maintained by a system of drill similar to that which the soldiers undergo, the principal features of which are gymnastics, sword exercise, and *jūjitsu*. Dinner is served at noon, and lasts only ten minutes. The meal provides an almost Spartan diet, consisting mainly of rice fare. The mess-rooms, though large and lofty, are barely furnished. In the garrison towns there is no social life as it exists in the great military centres of the West. The salary of a Japanese officer does not permit of lavish entertainment, for a full general receives no more than £600 per annum, while a subaltern finds it difficult to provide himself with the ordinary necessities of life on the meagre sum of £36 per annum.

In the training of Japanese officers and men earnest attention is given to what the Japanese, in the absence of any other more suitable term, call "spiritual education," and this branch in the preparation of the soldier consists of a series of discourses based upon an Imperial Rescript issued in 1882. The officers take the place of chaplains. The eloquent words of the Emperor, addressed to "Men of Arms," has passed into the classical literature of the country, and no description of the education of the Japanese soldier and sailor would be complete without their inclusion. The following is a translation of the five articles containing the historic document:—

“(1) Soldiers and sailors should regard it as their bounden duty to be loyal to the Sovereign and country. Any one born in this country can hardly be wanting in patriotism ; but for soldiers and sailors this is a primary virtue, for a man not strong in patriotism will be unfitted for the service. Disloyal men would be like dolls, however well-trained, however advanced in military art and in science ; and troops composed of such men would in the hour of need prove nothing more than mere rabble. You must remember that the defence of a country and the maintenance of its prestige depend upon its military and naval forces and that their efficiency determines the welfare of the country. You should therefore keep aloof from public discussions and political questions, and should strictly devote yourself to the discharge of your principal duty, always prepared to regard it heavier than a mountain and to look upon death in the discharge of duty as lighter than a feather. Be mindful not to invite disgrace by a violation of good faith.

“(2) Soldiers and sailors must be courteous. The service of the Army and Navy is graded by hierarchical ranks beginning with the marshal or admiral and ending with the private or bluejacket properly subordinated for purposes of command. Even in the same rank there are gradations as to seniority, and the junior must obey the senior. Those who occupy inferior positions must take orders from the superior, always regarding those orders as if they issued direct from me. The inferiors and juniors, too, must pay respect to the superiors and seniors, even when they do not come under their direct command. On the other hand, the superiors must never behave in a proud or haughty manner towards their inferiors, and, except in cases when duty demands severity, the superiors, in their treatment of those beneath them, should ever aim at kindness and especial clemency, to the end that both officers and men may unite as one man in the service of the country. If you do not observe courtesy of behaviour, if inferiors neglect to respect their superiors, or superiors treat their inferiors with harshness, and if harmonious relations are thus lost, you will prove a bane to the army. You will also commit unpardonable crimes against the country.

“(3) Valour should be an aim of soldiers and sailors.

This is the virtue which has in this country been always held in very high esteem, and an essential characteristic of my subjects. Especially should soldiers and sailors never forget this point even for one instant, seeing that their duty is to meet the enemy on the battle-field. At the same time they should carefully distinguish true bravery from false, for a hasty act of youth or bullying cannot be called true bravery. It is expected of a man of arms always to act with discretion, and to make his plans with presence of mind and prudence. It would never do to despise even a weak enemy. At the same time he must face a strong enemy with dauntless courage. In a word, true courage consists in properly discharging duty. Thus those who have true bravery uppermost in their mind always make it their aim to treat others with mildness and thus earn the respect of all men. A mere bravado and any propensity towards violence will make you hated by others as wild brutes. So be mindful of this point.

“(4) Soldiers and sailors must be faithful. Faithfulness is a cardinal virtue for ordinary men: a man of arms devoid of it can hardly associate with his comrades even for one day, for faithfulness means the keeping of one's word, and the accomplishment of duty. If you wish to be faithful you must therefore consider first of all whether, before giving your pledge, you are able to keep it or not. If you give promise to do something of which you are uncertain, and so commit yourself in a vague manner, you will be placed in an embarrassing situation. You will then be tortured by vain regrets. Before embarking on any action, you must first consider whether it is justifiable or unjustifiable and whether it is right or wrong. If you have reason to think that you cannot keep your word in regard to it, or it is too heavy to be fulfilled, it will be wise to refrain from committing yourself from the first. History gives us examples of the truth of this. Instances are not rare where even great men and heroes, out of their solicitude to be faithful in small things, have perished or dishonoured themselves by being misled into erring in fundamental principles of virtue or by observing personal faithfulness at the expense of public justice. You must take heed not to fail in this way.

“(5) Men of arms must be simple and frugal. If you

do not observe simplicity and frugality, you will lapse into effeminacy and levity, you will acquire luxurious habits leading to cupidity, and to manners which neither loyalty nor your bravery will avail to save you from the contempt and hatred of your fellow-men. You will be cursed by miserable existence through life. If once this baneful custom be allowed to affect officers and men it will promptly spread like an epidemic in the whole ranks, and all *esprit de corps* and discipline will be gone. Being deeply concerned about this, I have issued disciplinary regulations to prevent this evil, and out of my anxiety I again issue this instruction to give you double warning."

The object of the Imperial Rescript is to induce the men of the country to place the interests of State before all other considerations, even before those of home and of family. Here again, however, Japanese ethical teaching falls short, inasmuch as it relegates to a place of secondary importance the conduct of the individual in private life.

There can be no doubt that material progress is rapidly undermining the military *morale* of the nation. Major-General Iiguchi, head of the Military College, who is in a peculiarly favourable position to observe any change in the character of the higher *personnel* of the army, has expressed the opinion that young officers at the present time are not the equal in spirit of those of former days. "Twenty or twenty-five years ago," he said, "men who applied for commissions were already imbued with the *bushido* spirit, and there was consequently no occasion to pay special attention to their moral training. In that respect they were fully qualified, and all that was needed was to give them a suitable technical training. But things have gradually changed. . . . Nowadays, however, technical training occupies a place of too great an importance and *morale* is neglected." Among other things, the General alluded to the various devices resorted to by youths in order to avoid military service, and mentioned that in many instances medical certificates and even certificates from local officials were obtained without the slightest ground whatever. Probably no army in the world has been afflicted by so many scandals as that of Japan during the period that has intervened since the war with Russia. From time to time

the columns of the press have contained revelations which go to show that Russia is in possession of plans of all the principal fortresses, obtained by means of payments to traitorous Japanese. Treasonable transactions of a similar nature have also taken place with the agents of China. Of these the most remarkable was that in which a staff officer of distinction, who had been placed on the retired list of the army for misconduct, organised, with headquarters at Peking, a regular system which enabled him to obtain and sell military secrets to Chinese officers of high rank. In the spring of 1908 a Japanese gendarme proceeded to his residence for the ostensible purpose of conveying to him an order from the War Department that he should return to Tōkyō instantly and report himself. The Japanese version—and this was the only one available—of what ensued, declared that he attacked the gendarme and was shot dead, and that six packets found to contain Japanese military secrets were seized. Instances of theft, corruption, insubordination, and desertion in the army have also been reported with alarming frequency. Several cases of maltreatment of the men by their officers have also come to light. Of these the most serious related to the conduct of a lieutenant who administered corporal punishment in the classroom by means of a large fencing bamboo. As a result of his savage assaults, three privates were confined to the hospital for a week. Another instance was that of a sergeant who, desiring to extract a confession of theft from a private, violently assaulted him, knocking out one of his teeth and breaking two others, and in order to avoid punishment for this brutality he subsequently ordered the man to attend a civilian doctor instead of the regimental surgeon. The navy has also become tainted, though not to the same extent as the army. According to a Japanese newspaper, an incident occurred soon after the war which showed clearly how lightly the authorities administer justice when only common soldiers or sailors are the victims. A blue-jacket accused of theft was suspended from the ceiling of a barrack-room and whipped with wire ropes. His screams of agony were suppressed by means of a towel crammed down his throat, and when he convulsively swallowed about half a length of the gag a petty officer roughly drew it out,

causing the poor man to vomit large quantities of blood. When he was lowered from the ceiling he was insensible, and it was found that both his arms were dislocated. Although medical aid was summoned, all efforts were unavailing and he died the same day. The object of the torture was to extort a confession from the unfortunate man, and while the cruel proceedings were in progress a petty officer delivered to the assembled men an unctuous homily on the evils of dishonesty. The authorities were unsuccessful in keeping the matter secret, and a court-martial which was held sentenced five offenders to periods of hard labour ranging only from eight to twelve months. At the time another journal, published in Japan, made the following comment: "Reports are frequently current of the brutal manner in which non-commissioned and petty officers in the army and navy treat the young men under their charge, and it is about time the authorities took severe measures to bring these bullies to justice. Nothing is gained by hushing up such scandals. The greater publicity that is given to such affairs, and the severer the punishment meted out to offenders, when detected, the less danger will there be of such incidents becoming frequent." It should be remembered that the peculiar mental attitude of the Japanese, who claim as the primary and guiding motive of their lives the obligations of patriotism, tends directly to the cultivation of an almost abnormal reticence in regard to national imperfections, more especially when such imperfections involve the delicate matter of their *amour propre*. When General Kuropatkin's book was published criticising the administration of the Russian army, General Nogi, who led the Japanese forces at Port Arthur, declared that "the heads of Occidentals and of Japanese must be very differently furnished when the former permit the compilation and publication of such a work." It is therefore not difficult to realise that the outside world is able to obtain glimpses only of any shortcomings in the organisation or *personnel* of Japan's army and navy. Those already revealed, however, are in themselves sufficient to show that the Japanese can no longer boast of an incomparable and unsullied patriotism.

XXI

JAPAN'S NAVY

THE Navy of Japan holds a unique position among the navies of the world inasmuch as within the last twenty years it has been engaged in two victorious wars. The invaluable experience thus gained has enabled the Admiralty to introduce practical reforms in all directions, and has rendered their policy and organisation of peculiar interest to the expert observers of all countries. Great as have been Japan's achievements on sea, there is in some quarters a tendency to exaggerate their importance. Neither in the war with China nor in that with Russia was the efficiency of the Navy thoroughly tested. In both instances the opposing fleets were of heterogeneous composition and were manned by ill-trained and, not infrequently, mutinous crews. Apart from these considerations, however, the mere fact that within the last forty years, since the downfall of the Shōgunate, Japan has been able to build up a navy capable of vanquishing even the second-rate forces of China and Russia is in itself sufficiently remarkable to entitle her to a large measure of praise. Her progress appears to be all the more wonderful when it is remembered that during the period of the country's isolation from the rest of the world maritime enterprise was sternly suppressed, and it was not until the pressure of the Powers made itself felt, towards the end of the Tokugawa *régime*, that the Shōgun and several of the feudal princes purchased warships from abroad. Ancient records show, however, that at one time the Japanese possessed fleets of fighting galleys, and historic accounts have been preserved of two memorable sea battles—one between two clans in the twelfth century, and the other with the Koreans when Hideyoshi invaded the Peninsula Kingdom at the end of the sixteenth century.

The Japanese Navy had its origin in the ships that were transferred from the Shōgunate to the Monarchy at the

Restoration. While it differs from other navies in this respect, that it possesses no traditions in the dim past, it is conspicuous in so far as it has won its glory during the present generation. This last circumstance is one in which all Englishmen may take a pardonable pride, for it is no exaggeration to say that the British Navy is the parent of the Japanese Navy. In the declining days of the Shōgunate a party of British officers and men were engaged by the Government, and subsequently the Prince of Hizen employed Lieutenant Hawes of the Royal Marines, an officer whose zeal in all departments of naval organisation was instrumental in laying the foundations of an efficient system. When the Restoration was accomplished another party of thirty officers and men was lent to the Government, the first mission having returned home in consequence of the turmoil occasioned by the conflict of the Shōgun with the Monarchy. Under British auspices a naval school was established and an organisation on similar lines to those which obtained in the British Navy was introduced. After six years' work the second mission left the country, but from time to time British officers have been attached to the Japanese Navy for instructional purposes, while Japanese officers, notably Admiral Tōgō, have visited England in order to receive their training. In view of these circumstances it is clear that, in the main, the triumphs of Japan on sea constitute the triumph of British methods.

It is estimated that almost 10 per cent. of the population of this island empire depend upon the ocean for a livelihood, and consequently it is evident that as far as the *personnel* of the navy is concerned splendid material is available. The volunteer system supplements conscription, and the number of men who elect to enter the navy is always larger than the number whose services are compulsorily requisitioned. The term of active employment lasts four years, while that of the reserve, extending over seven years, is divided into first and second periods. On an average 5000 men are recruited annually, and the latest available returns show a total *personnel* of 50,000 officers and men. The character of the Japanese bluejacket is not unlike that of the British sailor. He is incomparably more amiable and frank in his manner than the soldier, and his voyages abroad have given him a respect

for the foreigner that is singularly lacking in the rest of his fellow-countrymen. The breezes of the sea have awakened a geniality in his nature, and, not infrequently, his boisterous conduct ashore indicates that the salt of the ocean has troubled his thirst.

During the war with Russia the writer visited the naval dockyards and training institutions throughout the country, and was thus able to form an opinion at first hand in regard to the Japanese method of making a naval officer. Originally established in Tōkyō, in 1869, the Cadet Academy was removed nineteen years later to Edajima, a place nestling beneath the mountains on the shores of the Inland Sea. Altogether 2000 cadets have been trained at the existing institution. For the education of staff officers there is a special naval academy at Tōkyō. Every youth in Japan who is able to pass a competitive examination at the middle schools becomes eligible for a naval education at the expense of the country. On the occasion of my visit to the college, I saw a parade of 570 sturdy youths, representative of all sections of the community from a prince of the royal blood to the sons of tradesmen. The system of training adopted at the present time cannot be compared to that which prevails in the British Navy. For whereas we believe that the process, in order to be thoroughly successful, must begin when boys are young, the Japanese admit cadets between the ages of sixteen and twenty years. The whole school, divided into three classes, is under the control of an admiral, and, in addition to the staff of naval instructors, there are twenty-two civil and three English teachers. As the course of education is limited to three years the cadets are compelled to study at high pressure, a circumstance which is in itself sufficient to render the Japanese system of naval training inferior to that of the British. During winter the working day consists of eight hours, while in summer the students rise at 5.30 in the morning, and study from 8 o'clock to 12 o'clock and from 1 o'clock to 2 o'clock, with one hour and a half subsequently allowed for the study of special subjects. The vacation lasts three weeks in winter, and double this period in summer time. Occasionally the cadets are taken for an instructional cruise. The general education includes the English language. Sea-

manship is taught from the first year, but the navigation course does not begin until the second year. At the end of the college term the cadets, fully qualified as midshipmen, go on board a training-ship for six months.

The following table will show at a glance the rapid growth of Japan's navy during the last forty years :—

Date.	Number, Tonnage, and Composition of Units.	Remarks.	
1871	17 Miscellaneous vessels Tons. 6,000		
1894 (War with China)	{ 33 Vessels, comprising 1 small battleship, cruisers, and torpedo craft } 61,000		
1904 (War with Russia)	<div><div><div>6 Battleships</div><div>4 Armoured cruisers</div><div>1 " cruiser</div><div>1 " "</div><div>2 " cruisers</div><div>62 Cruisers, destroyers, &c.</div><div>80 Torpedo-boats</div></div><div><div>Tons.</div><div>158,635</div><div>117,989</div><div>7,119</div></div></div>	283,743	Built in England " " " " " France " " Germany " " Italy
	Total, <u>156</u>		
	BUILT.		
	<div><div><div>6 Battleships</div><div>4 " "</div><div>7¹ " "</div><div>4 Armoured cruisers</div><div>1 " " "</div><div>1 " " "</div><div>2 " " "</div><div>4 " " "</div><div>1 " " "</div><div>25 Other cruisers</div><div>57 Destroyers</div><div>57 Torpedo-boats</div><div>12 Submarines</div></div><div><div>359,500</div><div>108,400</div></div></div>	625,300	Built in England " " Japan Captured from Russia Built in England " " France " " Germany " " Italy " " Japan Captured from Russia
1912	181		
	BUILDING.		
	<div><div><div>1 Battleship</div><div>3 Battle-cruisers</div><div>1 " "</div><div>3 Other cruisers</div><div>2 Ocean destroyers</div><div>1 Submarine</div></div><div><div>140,000</div><div>17,400</div></div></div>		Building in Japan " " " " " at Barrow " " in Japan " " " " " "
	Total, <u>192</u>		

Leaving altogether out of the question the underlying but ever present motive of an Imperial ambition—a motive

¹ Includes two ships classed as coast-defence vessels.

that, sooner or later, must inevitably have committed her to the creation of a sea force of first magnitude—it is to the lessons of the China war, and particularly to the corollary of that campaign whereby in regard to the Kwantung fortress Japan found herself dispossessed of the fruits of victory, that we must look for the determining point in her destiny as a naval power. During the period of ten years following the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki two separate programmes of expansion reached completion, and Japan's navy increased from 61,000 to upwards of 280,000 tons; so that on the outbreak of the recent hostilities she was able to command, exclusive of her torpedo flotilla, an effective fighting force of seventy-six vessels of all classes representing a total displacement of 275,000 tons. In the course of the campaign she lost in all twelve ships aggregating 46,000 tons, but of these only four vessels—two battleships, the *Hatsuse* and the *Yashima*, and two second-class cruisers—were of material fighting value. Against this loss, however, she was able to place seventeen ships with a total of 105,000 tons, some of which she had captured during engagements, and others she had raised from the harbour of Port Arthur, where they had been sunk by the Russians on the eve of the capitulation. These seventeen ships comprised eight battleships¹ and one armoured cruiser of various degrees of fighting efficiency, two first-class protected cruisers, one third-class protected cruiser, and five destroyers. Japan therefore emerged from the war with eighty-one warships representing a displacement of 334,000 tons. Bearing these last figures in mind, reference to the foregoing table will show that during the past half decade she has, in ships built and building, still further augmented her navy by 291,000 tons. Thus there have been two distinct periods in her recent history, each following the conclusion of a successful war, during which Japan has resolutely set herself the task of realising an ambitious scheme of naval armaments. In order to understand clearly the actual measures adopted by the Government in furtherance of their policy of expansion, it should be mentioned that at the present time five distinct programmes are in existence. The first was inaugurated in 1903; the second was

¹ This figure includes the *Imperator Nikolai*, now obsolete, which does not appear in table on opposite page.

brought into operation during the war; the third was the result of *post-bellum* deliberations; the fourth became law during the last session of the Diet (1911) held under the second Katsura Ministry; while the fifth programme constitutes one of the first of the legislative measures carried out by the existing Saionji Administration (1912).¹ I propose to deal with these programmes in the order of their inception. In 1903 the Diet authorised a measure known as the "Third Period Scheme of Naval Increment," which, at the cost of eleven millions sterling spread over a period of ten years, provided for the construction of three battleships, three armoured cruisers, two second-class cruisers and some smaller craft. Financial exigencies, however, necessitated the extension of the period stipulated to the year 1916. Of this programme two battleships, the *Katori* and the *Kashima*—both built at Elswick—and one armoured cruiser, the *Ibuki*, have been completed; the two second-class cruisers, one battleship, and two armoured cruisers are in course of construction.

During the progress of the late war the Government decided that the time had arrived when additional measures should be adopted to strengthen the naval forces. Doubtless the loss of the *Hatsuse* and *Yashima* to no small extent actuated their decision; but another determining factor was to be found in their possession of a spacious war-chest generously filled from the coffers of an ally. A new programme was immediately drawn up, arrangements being made for the construction of two first-class battleships, four armoured cruisers, three protected cruisers, and a number of other vessels including two small cruisers and a whole fleet of destroyers. This programme is known as the "Emergency Implementing Programme." Of the ships provided for under the scheme, the *Aki* and *Satsuma* (battleships), the *Tsukuba*, *Ikoma*, and *Kurama* (armoured cruisers), the *Tone* (protected cruiser), the two smaller cruisers, and twenty-nine destroyers have been completed; one armoured cruiser, one protected cruiser, and a number of destroyers and torpedo-boats are in process of construction in Japanese yards; and one protected cruiser has still to be laid down. The third scheme, which is

¹ At the moment of writing the actual adoption of this fifth programme requires official confirmation.

known as the "Emergency Adjustment Programme," was decided upon in the year 1906, and has been running concurrently with the foregoing programme. It was designed not only to provide for the construction of two first-class battleships, but also to furnish the necessary means for restoring and re-arming those vessels that had been captured from the Russians, and for repairing Japanese warships damaged in battle. The work in connection with this programme is practically completed, and the two battleships, the *Kawachi* and the *Settsu*, which are both of the improved *Dreadnought* type, will be commissioned during the present year (1912). To summarise the actual state of Japan's progress in naval construction under the three programmes set forth above, we obtain the following particulars in regard to ships of the first line :—

Programme.	Provided for.	Built.	Building. ¹
No. I.	{ 3 Battleships 3 Armoured cruisers	2 Battleships 1 Armoured cruiser	1 Battleship 2 Armoured cruisers
No. II.	{ 2 Battleships 4 Armoured cruisers	2 Battleships 3 Armoured cruisers 1 Armoured cruiser
No. III.	2 Battleships	2 Battleships

It is a striking commentary on the foresight and astuteness of Japan's statesmen that they should have been able to furnish the necessary funds—twenty millions sterling in all—for carrying out the two last-mentioned programmes of naval expansion. With the lapse of time and with all the facts available, it is now possible to pronounce finally upon the methods they adopted to procure this very considerable sum from the money markets of England and America. Ostensibly they negotiated the loans for the purpose of waging war against Russia; but it is beyond all reasonable doubt that the financiers of the West were hoodwinked into providing an additional twenty millions sterling which it was never the intention of Japan to utilise for any other object than the systematic construction of warships over a period she well knew must extend far beyond the latest possible date when

¹ These ships are of super-*Dreadnought* armament. The battleships and two of the battle-cruisers are being constructed in Japan, and one battle-cruiser is expected to leave the slips at Barrow early in 1912.

hostilities could have been brought to a close. It only remains to be added that neither in regard to the Emergency Implementing nor to the Emergency Adjustment programme was the Diet in any way consulted.

In 1910 the Government introduced yet another programme of expansion which received the approval of the Diet during the twenty-sixth session. The new scheme required that a sum of £8,500,000, spread over six years, should be provided out of the ordinary revenue, and, in the words of the Premier, the money so obtained was to be devoted to the object of bringing about efficiency of armament by effecting appropriate changes in the policy of constructing warships and manufacturing arms and ammunition. At this stage it will be perhaps as well to draw the reader's attention to a matter which, if not explained, may cause some confusion. It is, of course, common knowledge that since the advent of the *Dreadnought* era the all-big-gun principle has been applied both to battleships and armoured cruisers; but the so-called *Dreadnought* or super-*Dreadnought* type of cruiser, or battle-cruiser as she is now known, is still to be found in official lists under the arbitrary and inadequate designation of "armoured cruisers." In order to differentiate types more clearly I have in succeeding tables classified battle-cruisers separately, and in additional columns have shown a complete list of Japan's armoured cruisers, properly so-called, from the *Kurama* downwards. Now it will be seen from a reference to the table of programmes as set forth on the preceding page that Japan is at present constructing one battleship and two armoured cruisers under programme No. I., and one armoured cruiser under programme No. II. It is, of course, impossible to say what exactly were the intentions of the Admiralty when the ships were projected, but it is now beyond doubt that at least one of the objects of the scheme of naval expansion (the fourth programme) introduced by Prince Katsura in 1910 was to provide the necessary funds for building an improved type of warship under the programmes mentioned. In other words, the battleship was to be a super-*Dreadnought*, and the three armoured cruisers battle-cruisers of super-*Dreadnought* armament.

Towards the close of last year (1911) the *Jiji Shimpō*, which is usually well-informed on naval matters, intimated

that the Cabinet had consented to a fifth programme involving an expenditure of nine and a quarter millions sterling on the construction of one battleship and three battle-cruisers, the keels of which, according to an official of the Ministry of Marine who confirmed the announcement, were to be laid with all possible speed. Confirmation from this latter source was also forthcoming as to the manner in which this expenditure was to be employed. The Budget was to provide funds for the necessary annual disbursements over a period of six years as follows: In 1912, £250,000; in 1913, £1,000,000; in 1914, £1,000,000; in 1915, £2,000,000; in 1916, £4,500,000; and in 1917, £500,000.

To summarise the financial measures adopted by Japan during the past decade in order to develop her naval power, we obtain the following particulars:—

Programme.	Voted by the Diet.	Appropriated from Foreign Loans Subscribed for War Purposes.	Period over which Annual Grants to be Provided out of the Exchequer.	Date of Completion of Construction Programme.
1903 3rd period scheme of naval increment .	£ 11,000,000	£	1906-1916	1916
1906 Emergency implementing programme	} 20,000,000 }	...	1913
1906 Emergency adjustment programme	1912
1910 Programme for maintenance of high standard in ships .	8,500,000	. . .	1910-1916	1916
1912 Programme for providing 1 battleship and 3 battle-cruisers	9,250,000	1912-1917	1917

As far as annual grants from the national exchequer were concerned, the 1903 programme did not become operative until three years later; nor were any of the ships, provided for under this scheme, delivered until after the conclusion of peace. Therefore a reference to the above table will show that over a period of eleven years, terminating in 1917, the nation will have had to find a sum approximating thirty

millions sterling, about half of which has still to be provided. Incidentally it may be mentioned that while in connection with the latest measures adopted the opinion prevails in militarist circles that they are totally inadequate to the requirements of future expansion, and that recourse should be had either to loans or to further taxation, extreme dissatisfaction exists in other quarters at the decision of the Government to increase the total outlay on unproductive undertakings. In a British Parliamentary White Paper, published as recently as 1911, the annual sums voted by the Japanese Diet for new construction are set forth, as from the year 1906, in comparison with the expenditure of other Powers for similar purposes. But the information given is entirely misleading, inasmuch as no cognisance is taken of the fact that during the period in question Japan has utilised, or is utilising, the sum of twenty millions sterling which, as I have already pointed out, was subscribed by English and American bondholders with the object of financing her during what they held to be a righteous war, and was appropriated by the Government for the purposes of building up a formidable navy long after peace was assured.

As many years must of necessity elapse before Russia again becomes a naval Power in the Far East, it is apparent that Japan has framed her policy largely, if not exclusively, with a view to meeting the growing activities of the United States in the region of the Pacific. She has watched with some anxiety her rival's steady progress in the building of *Dreadnought* battleships, and she realises that the opening of the Panama Canal will extend American interests in the Far East, thus necessitating the presence in Asiatic waters of a strong fleet for the protection of those interests. Nor are her statesmen unmindful of the fact that in time of war, although obligations inseparable from adherence to the Monroe Doctrine would require that a considerable proportion of naval strength remain in the Atlantic, the United States would be in a favourable position to move powerful squadrons to bases that are within striking distance of Japan itself. And here it may be observed that if America purposes to carry out her traditional policy in both hemispheres she must so enlarge her naval programmes as to provide, at any given moment, not only for the retention of a sufficient

margin of sea-power in the Atlantic, but also for such reinforcement of her Asiatic fleet as to render it in fighting efficiency at least the equal of the maximum strength which Japan is able to bring against her.

Were proof wanting that Japan on her part is steadily preparing against all eventualities which may arise from American expansion in the Pacific, it is to be found in the number of battleships and battle-cruisers provided for within recent years. At the present moment she possesses four ships that rank among the world's *Dreadnoughts* already in commission, or about to be commissioned, namely, the battleships *Satsuma*, *Aki*, *Kawachi*, and *Settsu*. In vessels building there are, it will have been observed, one battleship and three battle-cruisers in course of construction under programmes Nos. I. and II., shown in the table on p. 583. It has recently transpired, however, that an additional battle-cruiser is being constructed in Japan the cost of which, it must be assumed, will be defrayed out of the funds provided by the programme of expansion introduced by Prince Katsura in 1910. Bearing these facts in mind, and having regard to the alleged Saionji programme as outlined by the *Jiji Shimpō*, we arrive at the following analysis in regard to ships of *Dreadnought* armament built, building, or projected for Japan in comparison with the present and potential *Dreadnought* strength of the American navy:—

JAPAN. ¹				AMERICA.			
		No.				No.	
Built . .	{ Kawachi (B.) completed 1912	4	{	Utah (B.) completed 1911	6	{	
	Settsu " " 1912			Florida " " 1911			
	Aki " " 1911			Delaware " " 1910			
	Satsuma " " 1910			North Dakota " " 1910			
				South Carolina " " 1909			
			Michigan " " 1909				
Building .	{ Kongo (B.C.) launched 1912	5	{	Arkansas (B.) launched 1911	6	{	
	Hiyei " " 1912			Wyoming " " 1911			
	Haruna " laid down 1911			New York " laid down 1911			
	Kirishima " " " 1911			Texas " " " 1911			
	Fuso (B.) " " " 1911			Nevada " " " 1912			
			Oklahoma " " " 1912				
Projected ²	{ 1 Battleship	4	{		—	{	
	3 Battle-cruisers						
Total 13				Total 12			

Note —B. = Battleship; B. C. = Battle-cruiser.

¹ Details of these ships appear on pages 590-592.


² The American programme for 1912 has not (at the time of writing) been made public.

It will be seen that in spite of financial embarrassments Japan has more than held her own in the ambitious rivalry which in recent years has characterised the naval policy of the great Powers. The above table illustrates her adherence to the theory that a nation's sea supremacy depends upon the margin of armoured efficiency it possesses in ships of the *Dreadnought* class. The fact that since the war with Russia she has so extended the facilities of her shipbuilding yards as to dispense, should it be deemed desirable, with all foreign assistance, is a circumstance highly creditable to the Administration. Two of the *Dreadnoughts* now in course of construction have been allotted to private yards where, previous to the war, only small cruisers were constructed. The policy of subsidising shipbuilding in Japan has gone a long way towards stimulating private enterprise to undertake Government work.

The following table shows the present position of the Japanese navy in comparison with the navies of the leading Powers of the world :—

Class of Ship.	Great Britain.	France.	Russia.	Germany.	Italy.	Austria.	United States.	Japan.
Battleships . . { Built .	56	23	10	35	9	12	31	15
{ Building	11	4	7	9	4	4	4	1
Armoured cruisers { Built .	39	21	6	11	10	3	15	13
{ Building	5	1		3	4
Protected cruisers { Built .	17	5	7	3	2
(1st class) { Building	1
Protected cruisers { Built .	39	5	2	21	2	3	16	11
(2nd class) { Building	9	6	..	3	.	3
Protected cruisers { Built .	16	7	2	11	11	3	.	6
(3rd class) { Building
Unprotected { Built .	5	8	..	3	3	6
cruisers { Building	2
Torpedo-boat { Built .	201	63	97	92	23	12	36	57
destroyers { Building	21	21	1	17	7	6	10	2
Torpedo-boats . . { Built .	110	191	44	80	82	73	28	57
{ Building	30
Submarines . . . { Built .	65	58	30	8	7	4	18	12
{ Building	18	23 ¹	13	2	17	1

¹ Number uncertain.



THE EXTREME EAST, THE AMERICAN CONTINENT AND AUSTRALASIA IN RELATION TO THE PACIFIC

It will be seen that in capital ships Japan takes fifth place among the Powers of the world. It should be added that in the matter of ships built and building of the so-called *Dreadnought* or super-*Dreadnought* armament she already ranks fourth in order of precedence. Statistics are, however, at the best an unsatisfactory way of comparing naval strength. Geographical situation, no less than the political considerations of the moment, dictates strategy and therefore decides requirements. Meanwhile it is important to bear in mind that Japan is to-day the only Power possessing a single *Dreadnought* in the Pacific. In a broad survey of world conditions it requires no effort of the imagination to see that Japan holds a position of supremacy in these waters. Indeed her position is unique. Her Empire is geographically compact and connected, and the territories over which she wields a political influence lie at her door. Outside the region of Eastern Asia she has, now, no grave national responsibilities, and it is unlikely for years to come that the strategical disposition of her fleets will take them far from home. Within a few days of their base her warships are able to show the flag in the coast and river-ports of her helpless neighbour, China, and to this natural advantage is to be attributed in a large measure Japan's growing influence in the capital and in the provinces of that great country. It has not been due entirely to coincidence that a conclusion, favourable to our ally, of protracted and troublesome negotiations with a patriotically stubborn *Wai-wu-pu* has frequently synchronised with the sudden and sinister appearance of a Japanese squadron in the waters of Pechili. The following lists, based on the British Parliamentary Return of May 1911, but amplified and corrected from special sources of information, will show in detail the composition of the Japanese Navy in regard to battleships and armoured cruisers. In an appendix to this chapter, which should prove useful for the purposes of reference, will be found additional tables containing full particulars in respect of cruisers, destroyers, torpedo-boats, and submarines.

BATTLESHIPS

Name		Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons).	Horse-power.	Armament
BUILT						
<i>Kawachi type</i>	{ Kawachi . Settsu .	1910 1911	1912 1912	20,800	26,500	12—12 inch 10—6 inch 10—4 7 inch 8 smaller light and machine guns 5 submerged tor- pedo tubes
<i>Satsuma type</i>	{ Aki	1907	1910	19,800	24,000 (Tur- bines)	4—12 inch 12—10 inch 8—6 inch 16 smaller light and machine guns 5 submerged tor- pedo tubes
	{ Satsuma .	1906	1910	19,350	18,507	4—12 inch 12—10 inch 12—4 7 inch 8 smaller light and machine guns 5 submerged tor- pedo tubes
<i>Katori type</i>	{ Kashima . Katori	1905 1905	1906 1906	16,400 15,975	17,280 17,400	4—12 inch 4—10 inch 12—6 inch 19 smaller light and machine guns 5 submerged tor- pedo tubes
—	Iwami (<i>late Orei</i>)	1902	1904	13,515	15,261	4—12 inch 6—8 inch 24 smaller light and machine guns 3 torpedo tubes (2 submerged)
—	Mikasa . . .	1900	1901	14,500	12,472	4—12 inch 14—6 inch 26 smaller light guns 4 submerged tor- pedo tubes

BATTLESHIPS—*continued*

Name		Date of Launch	Date of Completion.	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament
BUILT						
—	Hizen (<i>late Retvizan</i>)	1900	1902	12,275	14,700	4—12 inch 12—6 inch 20 smaller light guns 2 submerged torpedo tubes
<i>Suruo type</i> .	{ Suwo (<i>late Pobeda</i>)	1900	1902	12,997	14,094	4—10 inch 10—6 inch 22 smaller light and machine guns 2 submerged torpedo tubes
	{ Sagami (<i>late Persevyet</i>)	1898	1901	12,790	15,060	4—10 inch 10—6 inch 20 smaller light guns 2 submerged torpedo tubes
	{ Asahi .	1899	1900	15,200	16,000	4—12 inch 14—6 inch 26 smaller light guns 4 submerged torpedo tubes
<i>Shikishima type</i> .	{ Shikishima	1898	1900	14,850	15,000	4—12 inch 14—6 inch 26 smaller light guns 5 torpedo tubes (4 submerged)
	Fuji	1896	1897	12,450	14,100	4—12 inch 10—6 inch 24 smaller light and machine guns 5 torpedo tubes (4 submerged)
	— Okinoshima ¹ (<i>late General Admiral Apraxin</i>)	1896	1898	4,126	4,910	3—10 inch 4—4 7 inch 12 smaller light guns
—	Tango (<i>late Poltava</i>) .	1894	1900	10,960	11,250	4—12 inch 12—6 inch 12 smaller light guns

¹ These ships are rightly classed in Japanese lists as coast-defence vessels.

BATTLESHIPS—*continued*

Name	Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament
BUILT					
— Mishima ¹ (<i>late Admiral Senyavin</i>)	1894	1896	4,466	3,811	4—10 inch 4—4.7 inch 6 smaller light guns
BUILDING					
— Fuso (Kure dockyard)	1912		30,000		Main battery x—15 inch

BATTLE CRUISERS.

Name and Place of Construction.		Date of Laying Down	Date of Launch	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament
<i>Kongo type</i>	BUILDING					
	Kongo Barrow	Jan 1911	1912 (early)	27,500	64,000 (Turbines)	Main battery 8—14 inch
	Hiyei Yokosuka	Oct. 1911	1912 (late)			
	Haruna Kobe (Kawasaki Company)	1911	1913 (early)			Secondary battery, 16—6 inch
	Kirishima Nagasaki (Mitsubishi Company)	1911	1913 (early)			

¹ These ships are rightly classed in Japanese lists as coast-defence vessels.

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CRUISERS (ARMoured)

Name		Date of Launch.	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons).	Horse-power	Armament
BUILT						
<i>Kurama type</i>	Ibuki (Kure dockyard)	1907	1909	14,600	27,142 (Turbines)	4—12 inch 8—8 inch 14—4 7 inch 8 smaller light and machine guns 3 submerged torpedo tubes
	Kurama (Yokosuka dockyard)	1907	1910	14,600	22,500 (Turbines)	
<i>Tsukuba type</i>	{ Ikoma Tsukuba	1906	1908	13,750	22,670	4—12 inch 12—6 inch 12—4 7 inch 6 smaller light and machine guns 3 submerged torpedo tubes
		1905	1907	13,750	23,260	
<i>Kasuga type</i>	Nisshin	1903	1904	7,750	14,930	4—8 inch 14—6 inch 16 smaller light and machine guns 4 torpedo tubes
	Kasuga	1902	1904	7,750	14,900	1—10 inch 2—8 inch 14—6 inch 16 smaller light and machine guns 4 torpedo tubes
—	Aso (<i>late Bayan</i>)	1900	1903	7,312	17,128	2—8 inch 8—6 inch 22 smaller light and machine guns 2 submerged torpedo tubes
<i>Iwate type</i>	{ Iwate Idzumi	1900 1899	1901 1900	9,750	17,500	4—8 inch 14—6 inch 18 smaller light guns 4 submerged torpedo tubes

CRUISERS (ARMOURED)—*continued*

Name		Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament
<i>Asama type</i>	—	1899	1900	9,850	17,200	4—8 inch 12—6 inch 20 smaller light guns 5 torpedo tubes (4 submerged)
	Adzuma	1899	1900	9,436	17,000	
	{ Asama Fukiwa	1898	1899	9,700	20,550	4—8 inch 14—6 inch 18 smaller light guns 5 torpedo tubes (4 submerged)
		1898	1899			

Some explanatory observations will not be out of place in reference to the above lists. The *Satsuma*, launched in 1906, was the first battleship to be constructed in Japan. It was generally believed at the time, and the statement was loudly voiced throughout the country, that she represented the last word in the development of capital ships. Japanese naval constructors claimed that the lessons acquired in the war had enabled them to turn out the most powerful ship in the world. The launching of the *Dreadnought*, however, suddenly and effectually disposed of this claim; and it is common knowledge that the delay which ensued in the commissioning of the *Satsuma* is to be attributed to the decision of the Japanese Admiralty to bring her as nearly as possible to the standard of the British ship. A similar change in the armament of her sister ship, the *Aki*, was also decided upon. Although these ships carry only four 12-inch guns they possess a powerful battery of twelve 10-inch guns, together with an anti-torpedo armament of twelve 4.7-inch quickfirers; and owing to the leisurely manner in which their construction was carried out they combine, in many other respects, the most modern features of naval development. The new battleships, the *Kawachi*

and the *Settsu*, compare with the British *Neptune* and the German *Ostfriesland* type, as follows:—

	Tonnage	Armament
Neptune .	19,900	10—12 inch 16—4 inch
Ostfriesland type .	22,800	12—12 inch 14—5 9 inch 16—3.4 inch
Kawachi and Settsu	20,800	12—12 inch 10—6 inch 10—4 7 inch

The Japanese ships are more powerfully armed than the *Neptune*, and in this respect they approximate the German type. Of the battleships captured in the war the Japanese regard only two, the *Iwami* (late *Orel*) and the *Hizen* (late *Retvizan*), as of first-class fighting value.

At the same time efforts are being made to modernise all the captured vessels. The *Kokumin* newspaper, which is a semi-official organ, has announced that ships of the *Hizen* class are to be re-armed so as to carry four 12-inch and four 10-inch pieces, the latter being substituted for the 6-inch guns. The same journal also states that ships of the *Mikasa* type, which have hitherto been armed with four 12-inch and fourteen 6-inch guns, will henceforth carry four 10-inch instead of the 6-inch pieces.

In November 1910 an order was placed by the Japanese Government with Messrs. Vickers, Sons, & Maxim for the construction, at a cost of two and a half millions, of a battle-cruiser which was to have an approximate displacement of 27,000 tons. Until this contract was signed no order had been placed with a foreign shipyard since the delivery from Elswick, in 1906, of the battleships *Katori* and *Kashima*, and it had become recognised as the settled policy of Japan that she had ceased to go abroad for her warships. In a semi-official communication which appeared in the British Press, announcing the decision of the Japanese Government to depart from that policy, it was stated that the placing of the contract was to mark Japan's appreciation of British workmanship in shipbuilding and to give expression in practical form to the sincere feeling with which she regarded

the dual alliance. It was said further that "the extent of this feeling may be gauged from the fact that . . . Japan has now five yards standing idle where she can herself build *Dreadnoughts* in every detail"

In what must be taken as an equally authoritative statement which was given publicity in the columns of *The Times*, it was asserted that although there were "now five Government and private shipbuilding yards in Japan capable of constructing ships of this size, in view of their coming naval programme the Japanese Government have deemed it necessary to place an order for a *Dreadnought* abroad, and this order has been given to England because the greatest efficiency in shipbuilding is to be found in this country." That Japan has a thorough appreciation of the efficiency of British workmanship there can be no doubt, for without the genius and craft of Elswick and of Barrow the history of Tsushima had never been written. But there came a time when she realised that with the patterns at her disposal it was materially cheaper to construct vessels of war in her own shipyards than to order them from foreign countries. Japan commenced to build her own ships. The *Satsuma*, the *Aki*, the *Kawachi*, the *Settsu*, the *Ibuki*, and the *Kurama* have all been constructed in home shipyards. Commenting on the statement that appeared in *The Times*, and quoted above, the author wrote that it might "be accepted as a fair version of the actual intentions of the Japanese Government. The five slips capable of accommodating the *Dreadnoughts*, 'now lying idle in Japan,' will shortly be required for the purposes of carrying out her 'coming naval programme.' That the Admiralty should have departed from the policy of building only in home waters will be attributed by all those who possess knowledge of the actual truth to one main and dominating motive. The Japanese, incapable themselves of original development in naval construction, or for the matter of that in any branch of applied science, have found it necessary to come to this country for the latest and most perfect model of a fighting ship. By the time the hull of the cruiser-battleship has reached appreciable dimensions at Barrow, it is not improbable that signs of activity will be evident in the five idle shipyards in Japan. To speak with

strict regard to accuracy, the new contract does not denote a departure from the policy decided upon and which has been in operation since 1906. In other words, beyond the periodic placing of isolated orders with foreign shipyards—the only means by which she can hope to keep abreast with the advance of naval construction—it is highly improbable that Japan will turn to the contractors of Europe and America for the carrying out of any extensive scheme of armaments." Since the above was written, measures have been taken to employ at least three out of the five slips the idleness of which was advanced as a proof of Japan's friendliness in placing an order in this country. It would seem that she has thus availed herself of the observations made by her technical representatives at Barrow.

It is a striking tribute to British foresight that the Japanese should have thought it necessary to bring the *Satsuma* almost up to *Dreadnought* standard, and to imitate our most recent departure in the matter of battle-cruisers. The reports of British naval attachés—Captain Troubridge in the earlier and Captains Pakenham and Jackson in the later stages of the war, including the battle of the Japan Sea—are largely responsible for our initiative in this direction. That they gave advice the practical application of which in this country led to a remodelling of the policy of the Japanese, a policy, moreover, that was founded upon their own deductions from the war, was praiseworthy in the highest degree. Not only in the matter of battleships, but also in the construction of other types of warships the Japanese have followed British example. For instance, they are now building ocean-going destroyers. "Had our Navy been in possession of such destroyers during the war," wrote one of their authorities, "as those now to be built, our fleet might have cut off the retreat of the enemy and more closely pursued its vessels, as was the case in the battle off Ulsan. The construction of large destroyers as well as big battleships has become the fashion among the naval Powers the world over. As each squadron has its flagship carrying the officer in command, so a flag-destroyer is attached to each destroyer flotilla for the same purpose. In the case of naval manœuvres when the destroyers of each

naval station are organised into separate flotillas, a flagship is necessary for the commanding officers who act as umpires. In such cases hitherto ordinary cruisers have been used as the flagship of the commander of the destroyer flotilla; but considerable inconvenience has been felt as these could not fully discharge the function of a flagship owing to their inferior speed; and from various other view-points it has been felt a necessity to have in future the commanding umpire on a destroyer of superior capacity."

The fact that the majority of the ships with which the Japanese went into action in the wars with Russia and China were constructed in this country is in itself a striking tribute to the efficiency of British workmanship. In the days preceding the outbreak of hostilities with Russia not only were British mechanics and experts sent to Japan for the purpose of giving instruction in the art of naval shipbuilding, but Japanese were allowed free access to British yards, where they were afforded every facility for observation in all departments. In the absence, therefore, of substantial orders the only consolation left to British firms lies in the knowledge of the fact that their methods have provided the Japanese with a model for naval construction in all its branches. That, in spite of their own valuable experience, the Japanese should have thought it wise to adhere to British types of ships must be a source of peculiar gratification to our Admiralty. The progress of the Japanese in shipbuilding and the manufacture of guns and equipment has been no less remarkable than their advance in the science of naval warfare. Up to the time of the war with Russia twenty-eight warships, including protected cruisers, gunboats, and coast defence vessels, and excluding torpedo craft, were launched from home yards. The gunboat *Seiki*, 897 tons, launched at Yokosuka in 1875, was the first warship to be built in the country, and until 1890, when the cruiser *Hashidate*, 4210 tons, left the slips from the same yard, construction was limited to vessels of less than 2000 tons displacement. The war gave a stimulus to naval shipbuilding inasmuch as it impressed the authorities with the necessity of becoming wholly independent of foreign assistance. It was realised that during a period of hostilities the provisions of international

law rendered it impossible for losses to be replaced by ships constructed in foreign yards. To overcome the difficulty it was immediately decided to import all matériel required for the purpose of building ships of any size in home yards, and at the same time preparations were made for the laying down of manufacturing plant so as to obviate in the long run even this necessity. Large orders for armour plate were placed in America. On January 14, 1905, the work of constructing the armoured cruiser *Tsukuba*, 13,750 tons, was commenced, and eleven months later the ship was launched. The chief naval architect was Mr Yamada, who had twice visited England, once in the capacity of a student, and again to supervise the building of the *Asahi*, one of Japan's first battleships. The history of the undertaking is, perhaps, best related in his own words.

"Of course," observed Mr Yamada, "a certain portion of the materials had to be obtained from abroad, but as they all passed into the hands of our workmen it may be said that the ship was entirely constructed in Japan. In the matter of appliances and implements we experienced some incompleteness and imperfection owing to the great size of the vessel, but by degrees implements were fully furnished and the artificers acquired skill, so that subsequently we got on excellently. During the first two or three months of the building the workmen's inexperience told against them. Japanese workmen are extraordinarily expert in regard to wooden constructions, but they have had little practice in joining metal plates and in driving rivets, and their strength of arm is not great as compared with English workmen, so that some difficulty was encountered from time to time. At the outset this caused us some concern, but gradually as the men developed skill there ceased to be any sufficient cause for uneasiness. To launch a ship of over ten thousand tons in eleven months is a remarkable rate of speed, yet compared with English work it is still 20 or 30 per cent. too slow. Still, as our artificers are now expert, there will probably be no such difference hereafter. During the building the smallest number of men employed was 400 and the largest number 1200, more or less. At the time of our second naval expansion scheme, that is to say, when the *Hatsuse*, *Asahi*, *Izumo*

and *Iwate* were built in England, our people, whether as superintendents or as students, had witnessed the processes of construction, and, though they had not actually taken part in the work, the experience gained through the eye proved of great value to them."

Since the launching of the *Tsukuba* Japan has constructed four battleships and three armoured cruisers, details concerning which will be found in the following table:—

Name of Ship	Dockyard	Laid Down	Launched	Time Occupied
Tsukuba (A C)	Kure	Jan 14, 1905	Dec 1905	11 months
Ikoma (A C)	Kure	March 1905	April 1906	13 "
Satsuma (B)	Yokosuka	May 15, 1905	Oct 1906	17 "
Kurama (A C)	Yokosuka	Aug 23, 1905	Oct 20, 1907	26 "
Aki (B)	Kure	Sept 1906	May 1907	8 "
Ibuki (A C)	Kure	May 1907	Nov 1907	6 "
Kawachi (B)	Yokosuka	Jan 18, 1909	Oct 15, 1910	21 months
Settsu (B)	Kure	April 1, 1909	May 1911	25 months

A C =Armoured cruiser

B = Battleship

In regard to the building of the *Aki*, it should be explained that special efforts were made to test the maximum capabilities of Japanese yards, and an exceptionally large number of men were employed working both night and day. The launching of the armoured cruiser *Ibuki* six months after the date of laying down her keel was a more noteworthy achievement, inasmuch as work was carried on at a normal rate of progress. Moreover, the *Ibuki* was the first large ship the hull of which was alleged to have been built wholly of materials manufactured in Japan. There would appear to be no doubt that the speed with which Japanese yards can construct the hulls of large ships will compare favourably with the accomplishments of British yards. This fact is extremely significant, and should certainly not

be overlooked in any estimate of the naval potentialities of our allies. At present, however, a considerable delay elapses between the launching and the commissioning of ships, and, while the Japanese are rapidly acquiring knowledge and skill in the mounting of guns and in marine engineering, they have as yet much to learn in these departments. The efficiency of the Japanese yards for repairing work was thoroughly tested at the conclusion of the war with Russia. Large sums of money were spent on refitting and re-arming the captured warships, and several of these, notably the *Retvizan* and the *Orel*, were converted from battered hulls into ships of the fighting line. Another praiseworthy achievement about this time was the raising and repairing of Admiral Tōgō's flagship, the *Mikasa*, at a cost approaching half a million sterling. The cause of her sinking at the naval port of Sasebo was somewhat obscure. The writer received a letter from a correspondent at that place giving a circumstantial account of a mutiny on board followed by the incendiary act of blowing up the ship. Other sinister reports to the same effect were current. Although the ship was under water for such a considerable period that one would have imagined that all traces of the cause had disappeared, a naval inquiry did not hesitate to announce that the disaster was due to ignition brought about by chemical changes, and that every care had been taken by the crew.

The table on the next page gives details concerning the various Government works in connection with naval construction, equipment, and repair.

Altogether the Government yards possess six slips, each capable of taking a battleship of the *Dreadnought* class, and distributed as follows. Yokosuka two, Kure two, Sasebo one, and Maizuru one. In addition there are two private dockyards, the Mitsu-bishi at Nagasaki and the Kawasaki at Kobe, where facilities also exist for the building of this type of warship. The latter dockyard has not only constructed a large number of gunboats, torpedo-boat destroyers, and torpedo-boats for the Japanese Government, but has also executed many orders of a similar nature for the Chinese and the Siamese Governments. Its management is conducted upon an ambitious scale, and it is the aim of the

Locality	Description	Number of Employees	Average Wages per Day	Number of Working Days per Annum
Yokosuka ¹	Naval arsenal and dockyard	28,920	<i>s d</i> 1 3	335
Kure ¹ . .	" "	22,198	1 2	328
Sasebo ¹ .	" "	16,292	1 3	331
Maizuru ¹ .	" "	3,172	1 2	361
Tōkyō .	Naval arsenal	1,365	1 3	330
—	Shimose powder factory	118	1 0	331
Takeshiki .	Naval repair works	623	1 6	307
Ōminato	Naval repair works	865	1 2	329
Makō . .	Naval repair works	179	3 3	317
Wakamatsu .	Steel foundry	10,296	1 0	307

directors to make the concern the Elswick of Japan, where all warships required for Far Eastern countries may be built. Of the Government yards, Kure is perhaps the most important, inasmuch as it alone possesses a steel foundry that compares favourably with that to be found in any works of similar size throughout the world. Situated in the Inland Sea, and approached by three narrow channels only one of which will permit the passing of large steamers, it occupies a natural position of strategical value. It is planned upon the principle of the Elswick works, and covers a frontage of no less than twenty-one miles. The equipment includes a mill of 13,000 horse-power for rolling armour plate and a hydraulic press of 8000 tons. The plant is capable of manufacturing guns up to the calibre of 12 inch. Yokosuka, the next dockyard of importance in the Empire, is at the same time a first-class fortress commanding Tōkyō Bay. It

¹ Works at these places comprise shipbuilding, machine, and arms departments, whilst those at Kure include also a steelworks. According to the latest figures available there were, during 1911, some 10,000 workmen engaged in marine engineering in the Imperial dockyards.

is approached through two inlets connected by a narrow channel, and the fortification scheme is so admirably devised that Japanese experts regard it as impregnable as any fortress can be in these days of scientific warfare. In view of the events of the Russo-Japanese War, Sasebo, situated on the west coast of Kyūshū, is looked upon as possessing first value as a naval base. It was from Sasebo that Admiral Tōgō, in command of the combined fleets, sailed for Port Arthur to make his memorable attack on the night of February 9, 1904, and again at a later date when he crossed the Tsushima Straits to rendezvous on the southern coast of Korea in preparation for the coming of the Baltic Fleet.

Sasebo is used, however, rather as a *depôt* for the repairing and refitting of the fleet and the storing of supplies than as a dockyard for the construction of warships. The Government is credited with the intention of making it the largest naval base in the Pacific, and when, within the next few years, the works at present in progress are completed, it is expected that at low tide a depth of 32 feet will be available, and that there will be jetty accommodation for no less than ten battleships of the *Dreadnought* class. Maizuru, situated on the west coast of the mainland, is second in strategical importance only to Sasebo, and here the Government is constructing a dock which will be the largest in the Empire, and which, it is reported, will take several years to complete.

Since Japan gained ascendancy in Korea she has declared her intention of making Chin-hai, on the southern coast—the place which Admiral Tōgō used as his rendezvous while waiting for the coming of the Baltic Fleet—and Yong-heung, on the east coast, into naval bases. It is clear from her policy that she still regards the Japan Sea and the neighbouring waters as the scene of possible conflicts in the future, and her preparations can bear no other possible construction than that they are in the nature of an answer to the fortification on a large scale of Vladivostock in the north and of the Philippines in the south. It is equally clear that while the statesmen of Japan are professing their desire for enduring peace, and that while the country is in need of a period of calm in which to recuperate from the effects of the Manchurian campaign, the fact remains that whatever economy

may be practised in other departments of the Administration, there are no signs that the naval and military services are being stinted for want of money. No amount of official explanation or diplomatic evasion can render less apparent the real truth as it exists in the inexorable purpose of her leading statesmen that by the continual expansion of her navy Japan shall prepare herself for the ultimate command of the Pacific. It is due to the leisurely manner in which she has conducted the construction of her more recent warships that they are now equipped with the latest form of turbine machinery, and that they embody all the modern improvements in naval science. Now that the time has come for a further material expansion in her shipbuilding programme, Japan is actively engaged in building some of the most formidable fighting ships in the world. Already she possesses facilities for the simultaneous construction of eight battleships of the *Dreadnought* class, and as soon as keels are laid launching can take place within a period comparing favourably with that occupied in similar undertakings in Great Britain, where acceleration in shipbuilding has admittedly reached a high state of perfection. So far, any delay in actual construction in Japan has simply consisted in the time taken in preparation for the laying down of vessels, notably the manufacture of armour plate, and in the completion and armament of ships after launching. A nation, however, that six years ago was only capable of building cruisers of a small class, and that, in the period which has elapsed, has commissioned battleships and armoured cruisers of her own construction, may confidently be expected to make up all deficiencies which for the time being retard progress. The comparative failure of the Government iron foundry at Wakamatsu, together with the fact that Japan has no iron ore of her own—that used in her manufactures being supplied largely from China—has so far proved a drawback to naval construction. She has not been slow to realise this circumstance, and during the past few years the energies of the Admiralty have been directed towards remedying the defect. A steel foundry with an initial capital of 10,000,000 *yen* (£1,000,000), half of which is held by the Colliery and

Steamship Company, and the other half jointly by Sir W. G. Armstrong, Whitworth & Co. and Messrs. Vickers, has been established at Muroran on the shores of Volcano Bay in Hokkaidō. The grant of a site for the works was made by the Naval Authorities, and Vice-Admiral Yamanouchi, formerly Port Admiral at Kure, held the position of superintendent. A number of English experts are employed. It may also be observed that Messrs. Armstrong have erected an explosives factory covering 300 acres, and turning out 300 tons of explosives daily, at Hiratsuka in Sagami province, and that it is believed that an agreement exists providing that the Japanese Government shall take over the works within a stipulated number of years. It will be seen that British enterprise, which in the past taught the Japanese how to build warships, is now completing their technical instruction by transferring itself to Japan, where it is engaged in imparting to them the knowledge acquired by years of experience in the making of guns and explosives. The workmen at Elswick who only recently were congratulating themselves at the prospect of increased employment owing to a large order received from Japan for guns and gun-mountings will probably find that, as far as contracts with our allies are concerned, this was the last occasion on which they were to reap any material benefit.

In other directions Japan is taking measures to obtain the maximum degree of naval efficiency. Soon after the war no fewer than ninety-one officers, including three admirals and sixteen post captains, were superannuated. The educational institutions have also been enlarged and their equipment improved in accordance with the highest standard to be found in the world. In view of all these circumstances no less than the trend of political events, it is plain that Japan has made up her mind that in the struggle that is destined to come for the predominance in the Pacific she shall retain the command of the sea. The Panama Canal is approaching completion. Mr. Roosevelt and his successor in office, President Taft, have declared their adherence to a policy of watchfulness in China. The building of the Amur Railway by Russia, together with other indications of activity, is significant of her intention not to be left behind in the race.

Then, in his never-to-be-forgotten interview which appeared in the *Daily Telegraph*, the Kaiser hinted, if he did not plainly state, that whatever questions there might be at issue in other parts of the world between England and Germany, the day was not far distant when the fleets of these two countries might be found on the same side in the defence of their interests in the Pacific. And finally there is the reluctance of our Colonies to afford Japanese immigrants the treatment of equality. Clouds are again gathering on the Far Eastern horizon, and Japan, having elected to pursue a policy of militant aggression, is preparing for the contingencies which the future may hold?

APPENDIX

JAPAN'S NAVY

CRUISERS (PROTECTED)—1ST CLASS

Name		Date of Launch	Date of Completion.	Displacement (Tons).	Horse-power	Armament
—	BUILT Tsugaru (<i>late Pallada</i>)	1899	1901	6,594	13,100	10—6 inch 16 smaller light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes
—	Soya (<i>late Varzuga</i>)	1899	1900	6,550	17,125	12—6 inch 16 smaller light and machine guns 3 torpedo tubes

CRUISERS (PROTECTED)—2ND CLASS

Name		Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons).	Horse-power	Armament.
—	BUILT Tone	1907	1909	4,100	15,000	2—6 inch 10—4.7 inch 3 smaller light and machine guns 3 torpedo tubes
—	Otowa	1903	1904	3,082	10,000	2—6 inch 6—4.7 inch 6 smaller light and machine guns

CRUISERS (PROTECTED)—2ND CLASS (*continued*)

Name		Date of Launch.	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament.
BUILT						
<i>Tsushima type</i>	{ Tsushima Nataka }	1902	1904	3,365	9,400	6—6 inch 14 smaller light guns
—	Chitose	1898	1899	4,898	15,300	2—8 inch 10—4 7 inch 14 smaller light guns 4 torpedo tubes
—	Kasagi	1898	1898	4,784	15,500	2—8 inch 10—4 7 inch 14 smaller light guns 4 torpedo tubes
—	Akitsushima	1892	1894	3,100	8,510	4—6 inch 6—4 7 inch 10 smaller light guns 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Itsukushima type</i>	{ Hashidate Itsukushima }	1891 1889	1894 1891	4,210 4,210	5,400 5,400	1—12 6 inch 11—4 7 inch 10 smaller light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Naniwa type</i>	{ Naniwa Takachiho }	1885 1885	1886 1886	3,727 3,727	7,120 7,120	8—6 inch 12 smaller light and machine guns 4 torpedo tubes
BUILDING.						
—	{ Yahagi Chikuma Hirado }	1911		5,000	22,500 (Tur- bines) (Est)	2—6 inch 10—4 7 inch 2 torpedo tubes

CRUISERS (PROTECTED)—3RD CLASS

Name	Date of Launch.	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament
— BUILT					
— Sudzuya (<i>late Novik</i>)	1900	1901	2,490	4,568	2—4 7 inch 8 smaller light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Suma type</i> { Akashi	1897	1899	2,657	7,400	2—6 inch 6—4 7 inch 12 smaller light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes
{ Suma	1895	1896	2,657	8,500	2—6 inch 6—4 7 inch 16 smaller light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes
— Chiyoda ¹	1890	1891	2,450	7,000	10—4 7 inch 15 smaller light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes
— Idzumi	1883		2,920	6,080	2—6 inch 6—4 7 inch 7 smaller light and machine guns
— Hi-yu ²	1877	1878	2,248		3—6 7 inch 6—5 9 inch 8 smaller light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes

¹ This vessel has 4½ inches of armour along two-thirds of her length amidships² Surveying ship

CRUISERS (UNPROTECTED)

Name		Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament.
BUILT						
—	Chihaya	1900	1901	1,250	6,000	2—4.7 inch 4 smaller light guns 2 torpedo tubes
—	Yayeyama .	1889	1891	1,583	6,000	3—4 7 inch 7 smaller light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes
—	Takao	1888	1889	1,750	2,330	4—6 inch 1—4 7 inch 9 smaller light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes
<i>Yamato type</i>	{ Musashi	1886	1888	1,478	1,620	12 light and machine guns
	{ Katsuragi .	1885	1887			
	{ Yamato	1885	1887			

JAPAN'S NAVY

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TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS

Name			Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons).	Horse-power	Armament
BUILT							
Urukaze			1910	1911	1,150	20,500 (T) (Est)	2—4 7 inch 5—12 pr 3 torpedo tubes
Ayanami	} Maidzuru	{	1909	1909	375	6,000	6—12 pr. 2 torpedo tubes
Isonami			1908	1909			
Uranami	} Yokoska	{	1907	1908			
Hibiki			1906	1906			
Wakaba	} Nagasaki	{	1905	1906			
Matsukaze			1906	1907			
Shirotaye	} Nagasaki	{	1906	1907			
Minadzuki			1906	1907			
Shuatsuyu	} Kobe	{	1906	1906			
Shunayuki			1906	1906			
Udzuki	} Kobe	{	1906	1907			
Hatsuharu			1906	1907			
Shigure	} Kobe	{	1906	1906			
Harukaze			1905	1906			
Asakaze	} Sasebo	{	1905	1906			
Mikadzuki			1906	1907			
Yudachi	} Osaka	{	1906	1906			
Nowaki			1906	1906			
Yugure	} Osaka	{	1905	1906			
Hayate			1906	1907			
Asatsuyu	} Uraga	{	1906	1906			
Kikudzuki			1907	1907			
Nagatsuki	} Maidzuru	{	1906	1907			
Oite			1906	1906			
Yunagi	} Yokoska	{	1906	1906			
Hatsuyuki			1906	1906			
Kamikaze	} Kure	{	1905	1905			
Kisaragi			1905	1905			
Yayoi	} Japan	{	1905	1905			
Hatsushimo			1905	1905			
Nenohi	} Yokoska	{	1905	1905			
Ushiwo			1905	1905			
Fubuki	} Yokoska	{	1905	1905			
Ariake			1904	1905			
Arare	} Yokoska	{	1904	1905			
Asagiri			1903	1903			
Harusame	} Yokoska	{	1902	1903			
Murasame			1902	1903			
Satsuki (<i>late Byedovi</i>)	Nevski Works, St Petersburg	St	1902	1903	382	4,375	1—12 pr. 5—3 pr 2 torpedo tubes
Tamahiko (<i>late Ryeshitelni</i>)	Izhora Works, St Petersburg	St	1902	1902	271	3,220	2—12 pr. 4—3 pr 2 torpedo tubes
Kasumi	Yarrow, Poplar		1902	1902	363	6,500	2—12 pr 4—6 pr 2 torpedo tubes
Asashiwo	Thornycroft, Chiswick		1902	1902	372	7,000	

TORPEDO-BOAT DESTROYERS—*continued*

Name		Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament	
BUILT							
Fumidzuki (<i>Silni</i>)	(late Nevski Works, St Petersburg (put together at Port Arthur)	1901	1903	240	3,630	2—12 pr 4—3 pi 2 torpedo tubes	
Shirakumo	} Thornycroft, Chiswick	1901	1902	372	7,000	2—12 pi. 4—6 pi 2 torpedo tubes	
Usugumo		1899	1900	280	5,400		
Oboro		1899	1899				
Akebono	} Yarrow, Poplar	1899	1899	310	6,000		
Sasanami		1899	1899				
Ikadzuchi		1898	1899				
Kagero	} Thornycroft, Chiswick	1899	1899	280	5,400		
Shinanui		1899	1899				
Yugui		1899	1899	320			
Shinonome		1899	1899				
Murakumo		1898	1898				
Shikinami (<i>Gardamak</i>)	(late)	1893	1894	400	2,840	9 light and machine guns 2 torpedo tubes	
Makigumo (<i>Vsadnik</i>)							
BUILDING							
Yamakaze	Mitsu Bishi Dockyard	1911		1,150	20,500 (Turbines)	2—4 inch 5—12 pr 3 torpedo tubes	

TORPEDO VESSELS

Name		Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament.
BUILT						
—	Tatsuta	1894	1894	850	5,500	2—4.7 inch 4 smaller light and machine guns 5 torpedo tubes
SPECIAL VESSEL—BUILT.						
—	Toyohashi	1888	1888	4,120		2—4 7 inch 6 smaller guns

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TORPEDO-BOATS

Length	Number	Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power	Armament.
BUILT						
Divisional boats — 148 feet	15	1900 to 1905		137	4,200	1—12 pr 2—6 pr 3 torpedo tubes
153 feet	1	1900		132	2,600	1—12 pr 2—6 pr 3 torpedo tubes
1st Class boats — 118 to 152 feet	33	1892 to 1904		78 to 110	1,000 to 1,200	1 or 2—3 pr 3 torpedo tubes
2nd Class boats — 111 to 112 feet	8	1893 to 1900		53	660	1—3 pr 2 or 3 torpedo tubes

SUBMARINES

Name or Number	Date of Launch	Date of Completion	Displacement (Tons)	Horse-power (Surface)	Armament
BUILT.					
No 9.	1908	1908	290		2 torpedo tubes
No 8.			320		
No 7.	1905-6		79		1 torpedo tube
No 6.			86		
No 5.	1905-6		120		
No 4.					
No 3.					
No 2.					
No. 1					
BUILDING					
Three in number			314		2 torpedo tubes
One in number			278		2 torpedo tubes
			322		

XXII

CHRISTIANITY IN JAPAN

CHRISTIANITY in Japan had its origin in a request made by a Japanese. The story is told that a Japanese who voyaged to India in a Portuguese vessel met St. Francis Xavier at Goa, and was converted to the Roman Catholic faith by that famous Jesuit. The great missionary and the Japanese had many conversations relating to the religious state of Japan and the prospect of its conversion to Christianity. The Japanese predicted that after his countrymen had investigated the Christian religion and observed that the conduct of its adherents was in accord with their teachings, the Daimyōs, the nobility, and people would flock to Christ. St. Francis Xavier, encouraged by these words, set out for Japan, and in 1549 landed at Kagoshima, a port in the southern island of Kyūshū. Subsequently he made his way to Kyōtō, and Bishop Pakenham Walsh, in his book on "Heroes of the Mission Field," writes of this journey: "There is something heroic in the simple story of his privations and difficulties as, in the depth of winter, thinly clad and barefoot, he made his two months' journey to the capital through snow-drifts and mountain torrents."

After two years' labour St. Francis Xavier left the country for India in order to send more missionaries to Japan, and so fruitful was the seed which he sowed that thirty years after the date of his arrival in Japan there were no fewer than 150,000 Japanese Christians, a number that was brought up to half a million in another thirty years. The splendid ritual of Roman Catholicism appealed to the Japanese, whose Buddhism had accustomed them to altars, incense, and lights, vestments of purple and gold, and processions of pomp and circumstance. The Jesuits had also pictures which appealed strongly to the

Japanese. St. Francis Xavier, relating the circumstances of the first presentation of Christianity to the Japanese, wrote : " Paul, the converted Japanese (Anjiro), showed a beautiful picture he had brought from India of the Blessed Mary with the Child Jesus sitting in her lap. When the governor looked upon it he was overwhelmed with emotion, and falling on his knees he very devoutly worshipped it, and commanded all present to do the same." The image of Christ began to take the place of the image of Buddha in some parts of Japan, and in the wayside shrines which had been occupied for centuries by the goddess of Mercy the statue of the Madonna appeared. So long as the people were given carved symbols to gaze upon and worship, Christianity, although revolutionising the principles, was not entirely usurping the outward form of their ancient faith.

It must be conceded that after the initial difficulties had been overcome Christianity received a great deal of encouragement from the highest quarters in the land. Such encouragement, however, was not given on account of a genuine appreciation of the religion, but rather in recognition of the fact that it might foster forces which would combat troublesome conditions existing within the Empire. When, in 1574, Nobunaga deposed the last of the Ashikaga Shōguns, and assumed the supreme power of government himself, it is not expressing too sanguine a view of the prospects of Christianity to say that it was very nearly becoming the State religion. Had the country been more settled there is every reason to believe that Christianity would have combated the opposition of Buddhism successfully, and Japan might have been a Christian empire to-day. As it was, the life of Nobunaga was cut short in one of the feuds which disturbed the land at this time. During his rule he had displayed a bitter hatred of the Buddhists, and had openly favoured the missionaries with the object of winning them and their converts to his own side. While his motives were ulterior and his methods distinctly un-Christian, there is no doubt that Christianity made great headway during his rule; and had he lived longer some means might have been found of converting him and his retainers, in which case, doubtless, the greater part of the nation would have followed so

eminent a lead. Certainly Nobunaga persecuted the Buddhists with a vicious cruelty that was only to be equalled in after years by the persecution inflicted upon the Jesuits by other rulers. Priests were murdered, monasteries were burnt to the ground, and Buddhist adherents were ordered to become Christians. In 1577, writes the Jesuit Charlevoix, in a history of Christianity in Japan, "the lord of the island of Anakusa issued his proclamation, by which his subjects, the bonzes (priests), gentlemen, merchants, or tradesmen, were required either to turn Christians or to leave the country the very next day. They almost all submitted and received baptism, so that in a short time there were more than twenty churches in the kingdom." It is a pity that Nobunaga could not have been won over to the true spirit of Christianity, and that he could not have been induced to promote its cause by more worthy methods than those of an attempt to exterminate its rival, Buddhism, with fire and sword.

Nobunaga was killed in 1582, and was succeeded by his great general, Hideyoshi, known in Japanese history by the title of Taikō Sama. The Jesuit missions were now nearing their zenith, and were rapidly making converts among the highest classes in the land. In 1583 four nobles were sent to Rome by the Christian Daimyōs of Kyūshū to declare themselves vassals of the Holy See, and all the subjects of these Daimyōs were compelled either to become Christians or to go into exile. The nobles carried two letters, one of which was thus addressed, "A celui qui doit être adoré, et qui tient la place du Roi du Ciel, le grand et Très-Saint Pape." The other began, "J'adore le Très-Saint Pape, qui tient la place de Dieu sur la terre." They were received by the Pope, and returned with a party of new missionaries for Japan.

Christianity received its first great blow in Japan in 1587. Trade from Portugal had followed the missionaries, and suspicions founded upon this circumstance appear in a large measure to have inspired the attempts that were subsequently made to stamp out the faith. Hideyoshi, greedy for power, found the conversion of the nobles proceeding rapidly, and there were not lacking courtiers to point out to him that Buddhism, and not the new religion, would serve as the strongest bulwark of his ambitions. An

order was made for the banishment of the missionaries, but this was not effectively carried out, Hideyoshi wavering between his suspicions that the real object of the Jesuits was to capture the country and his desire to retain the trade which came with them. The Jesuits withdrew themselves from public notice by closing their churches, but they continued their missionary work, and their presence was tolerated tacitly until the ill-timed arrival in the country of a small party of Spanish friars from the Philippines who preached in open defiance of authority.

The swift sequel is recorded by Chamberlain : " A Spanish galleon called the *San Felipe* had been stranded on the Japanese coast, and her cargo, including 600,000 crowns in silver, had been confiscated. In the absence of the captain, the pilot endeavoured to overawe the local Japanese authorities. He produced a map of the world, and pointed out the vast extent of the Spanish monarch's dominions. On being asked how it was that so many countries had been subjected to a single ruler, he replied, ' Our kings begin by sending into the countries they wish to conquer priests to induce the people to embrace our religion, and when these have made considerable progress troops are despatched, who combine with the new Christians, and then our kings have not much trouble in accomplishing the rest.' " This speech was reported to Hideyoshi, whose fury knew no bounds. The immediate outcome was that six Spanish Franciscans, together with seventeen of the native converts and three Japanese Jesuit priests, were crucified at Nagasaki on February 8, 1597. Hideyoshi died in the following year, and then began a struggle for the succession of power between his son Hideyori, and Iyeyasu who was to become the first of the Tokugawa Shōguns.

Christianity was again the victim of civil strife. The Christian nobles took the side of the son of their former persecutor, and in this they may have been animated by political rather than by religious motives. In 1600 Hideyori found himself beaten all along the line. This conflict in Japanese history is especially interesting, as providing the first instance of the attitude of converts towards *hara-kiri*. Many of the leading generals, with the exception of those

who were Christians, did not hesitate to end their own lives rather than surrender. The Christians stoutly declined to commit suicide, and were consequently subjected to capital punishment.

Iyeyasu now became all-powerful, and he proceeded to revenge himself upon the Christians who had upheld his political rival. In the year 1614, only sixty-five years after the landing of St. Francis Xavier, more than one hundred Jesuit priests and Franciscan monks and several hundreds of the principal Japanese converts were forcibly shipped out of the country, not one known missionary being left behind. A number of the priests, however, found their way back again, and in 1615 Hideyori, who, despite his defeat in 1600, seems to have maintained friendly relations with the Jesuits, again opposed Iyeyasu who had become Shōgun. He was besieged at Ōsaka while entertaining some priests, and when the city fell a horrible massacre took place in which Hideyori was killed and his friends and forces practically exterminated.

Iyeyasu died in 1616, and his son, who succeeded him, considered it necessary to issue a decree imposing the penalty of death upon any foreign priest found in Japan. The early Shōguns of the Tokugawa *régime*, of which Iyeyasu was the first, inflicted terrible persecution upon the Christians, who were compelled to endure the most horrible tortures. The converts were buried alive, crucified, or burned at the stake. Christian historians record with pride that but few of them abandoned their faith, and it is therefore evident that the Christianity of that period had secured a firm hold upon its adherents and that nothing but extermination or banishment would drive them from the land. A story is told of a Jesuit priest who, after enduring terrible tortures, was at last hung by his feet in such a way that his head was in a hole in the ground from which light and air were excluded. His right hand was left loose so that with it he might make the prescribed sign of recantation. He hung for four hours and in this case yielded, but in many others punishments not less severe were endured until the release of death.

Iyemitsu, the grandson of the founder of the Tokugawa

réforme, administered the final blow to Christianity in Japan. In 1621 he issued a decree forbidding Japanese to leave the country, and three years later he ordered the expulsion of all foreigners except the Dutch and the Chinese, whose residence was limited, the former to Deshima, an insular area separated from the shores of Nagasaki by a narrow creek, and the latter to the town of Nagasaki. The country then remained closed for two hundred and thirty years, and the following blasphemous inscription appeared on the public notice-boards at every roadside and at every city gate in every village throughout the empire: "So long as the Sun shall warm the earth let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan, and let all know that the King of Spain himself, or the Christian's God, or the great God of all, if he violates this command shall pay for it with his head." Meanwhile, in 1637, the native Christians, having wearied of persecution, joined a peasant revolt which took place in Kyūshū. They fortified an old castle at Shimabara and after two months' siege submitted, but they were not allowed formally to surrender. It is said that 37,000 of them were cruelly butchered, and that no fewer than 17,000 heads were exposed as tokens of victory. The Dutch traders, who remained segregated, were subjected to various indignities, the chief among which was prohibition of burial of their dead in Japan, "because a Christian corpse is not worthy of burial in the earth." Those traders who died were interred in the sea four miles from the coast.

In 1854 Commodore Perry concluded the treaty which opened two ports to the residency and trade of the citizens of the United States. In the same year Lord Elgin, on behalf of Great Britain, and the representatives of other Powers concluded similar treaties. Roman Catholic missionaries again entered the country in 1864, and joyfully found near Nagasaki several communities of converts who, having survived the long years of persecution, still cherished the faith of their forefathers. For the first time it became known how terrible had been the ordeal undergone by these little bands of Christians and their ancestors, and how narrow the many escapes from martyrdom they experienced. After the foreigners had been excluded a

special police commission was organised, called "The Christian Inquiry," and every year the Buddhist priests were called upon to report to the commissioners concerning the fidelity of the people to the heathen religion. High rewards were offered to those who gave information concerning Christians, and frequently the belief of a village was tested by compelling all inhabitants to walk over crosses or crucifixes. In 1829 six men and an old woman were crucified at Ōsaka. Only forty years ago, in the year when the present Mikado was recognised as the supreme head of the country and the Shōgunate was abolished, the entire population of the village of Urakami, near Nagasaki, numbering some three thousand Roman Catholics, were torn away from their homes and banished, some to the interior, and others to the Gotō islands. On account of the cruelties inflicted upon them, Sir Harry Parkes, the second British Minister resident in Japan, made representations to the Government. In reply, a statement was received charging the natives of Urakami with disloyalty, denying persecution, and including the following statements. "The Japanese Government has been obliged to take this course from a conviction of its necessity, and particularly in consequence of a growing pressure of public opinion which arose from the memory of the deplorable events connected with the introduction of Christianity by Roman Catholic missionaries some centuries ago. Public opinion even now demands that the same seeds of discord should be removed which at that period so nearly succeeded in overthrowing the Government, and in endangering the independence of this country." In 1873 the Japanese Government, recognising the injustice they had done to the poor peasants, restored them to their homes. In 1869 the present Emperor gave his first State audience to the foreign Ministers, and a few days later, on January 23, the first English missionary, the Rev. George Ensor, landed in Japan. The Imperial Constitution, granted on February 11, 1889, opened wide the gates of the Japanese Empire to Christianity once again by the following clause :—

"Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief."

The story of early Christianity in Japan¹ affords a striking illustration of the similarity that characterises the history of nations. The rivalries of Roman Catholicism and Buddhism resulted in persecution on both sides, and in the end the foreign and newly imported faith secured the worst of the prolonged conflict. After St. Francis Xavier had overcome the initial difficulties, no fairer field in the whole world lay open for missionary effort than in Japan. Doubtless it was the genuine intention of the authorities of these early days to allow the Gospel of Christ to be preached without let or hindrance. Unfortunately, the Roman Catholic adherents became involved in the feudal struggles which at that time practically divided the country into armed military camps. It may be that in taking part in civil strife their aims were purely political—that their actions were dictated by patriotism and by what they conceived to be the national interests; but the Government was confident that the missionaries were fomenting the disturbing elements. For over thirty years, not only were they unmolested but were actually given some degree of encouragement. Even at the end of that period, when Hideyoshi, who was the first to persecute them, ordered their expulsion, they succeeded in carrying on their work by stealth, and subsequently converted no fewer than thirty thousand Japanese. When Hideyoshi died, both the disputants for power, his son and Iyeyasu, were at first inclined favourably towards the Christians. Iyeyasu was prepared to use the Spanish monks as a means of exchanging trade with the Philippines, but he found that Christian conversion made the Japanese self-conscious, independent, and in many cases positively disloyal. Moreover, the Christian nobles arrayed themselves against him in the struggle for power. The nobility were the support of the country, and Iyeyasu reasoned that if Christianity tended to weaken the nobility, then it was destructive and must be done away with. Before the missionaries could be driven out of the country finally, it was necessary to expel all foreigners. This extreme measure was only taken in consequence of the discovery that the Portuguese had set on foot an intrigue with the object of influencing their king to invade Japan; and the fact that the Dutch and the Chinese,

though closely watched and isolated, were permitted to remain, is in itself evidence that exclusion was merely aimed at the Roman Catholics. Dr. Griffiths thus describes the conditions that followed. "Christianity was remembered only as an awful scar on the national memory. No vestiges were supposed to be left of it, and no knowledge of its tenets was held, save by a few scholars in Yedo, trained experts who were kept as a sort of spiritual bloodhounds to scent out the adherents of the accursed creed." There is no doubt that the first attempt to introduce Christianity failed because it meddled with politics. Whether this mistaken policy was deliberate, or whether it was merely incidental, and, to a large extent, unavoidable on account of the feudal disturbances prevalent throughout the land, is a point which will ever remain contentious. Again, there will always be doubt as to whether the interference in domestic affairs was the authorised policy of the Jesuits, or simply the irresponsible action of individual members of the community of Christian nobles, whose fierce feuds knew no religion, and who had accepted the faith without absorbing the essential spirit. But, rightly or wrongly, the Jesuits are held chiefly to blame for the portals of Japan being closed to foreigners, and for the subsequent loss of two centuries of time during which Christianity and civilisation were despised and rejected. Whatever may have been the effect of their zeal, mistaken or otherwise, none have dared to deny that the Jesuits accomplished a great amount of good during their stay in the country, or that they sowed the first seeds of a harvest which is being reaped in Japan even to this day. And to the Jesuits must belong the everlasting credit of having been the pioneers of holiness, and the undying fame of martyrs of Christianity.

Modern Christianity.—The second invasion of Christianity into Japan was begun by the American churches in 1859, by the Roman Catholics in 1864, and by the Church of England in 1869. The decrees against Christianity had not yet been withdrawn; the missionaries merely availed themselves of the privilege of foreigners to reside at specified ports, which had been secured by the action of Commodore

Perry and Lord Elgin. Soon after the revolution of 1868, the laws of the Shōgun Government were torn from the notice-boards in every town and village, but those that were substituted by the new Imperial Government were not in the least degree more favourable to Christianity. Among the new enactments was the following: "The evil sect, called Christianity, is strictly prohibited. Suspicious persons should be reported to the proper officers, and rewards will be given" A few months later this was supplemented by a decree enforcing that, "with respect to the Christian creed, the existing prohibition must be strictly observed. Evil sects are strictly prohibited" And these remained on the notice-boards until 1873, so that the record of modern Christian propaganda in Japan cannot be said to have extended over a period of more than forty years. The Government, it is to be noted, had not repealed the law against the practice of Christianity, the continued discouragement of which appeared to be inevitable. The removal of the public notices, however, was sufficient incentive for the missionaries, who set about their evangelical work undeterred by opposition open or disguised. An instance of open opposition was the appointment of officers to warn the people against supposing that simply because the notices of prohibition were withdrawn this meant that the law was changed. Methods more subtle were taken, ostensibly in the interests of public order, to prevent the missionaries from preaching the Gospel. Every citizen had still to be registered as a Buddhist or a Shintōist, and, most of the burial-grounds being in the control of the Buddhist priesthood, difficulty arose in the matter of burial. In 1875 two Japanese were summoned before the court and severely reprimanded for taking part in the funeral of a convert. Not until 1884 were religious distinctions in registration and burial abolished, and provision was then made for the establishment of public cemeteries that should be open to all. The declaration of religious liberty for all Japanese subjects, as set forth in the Constitution of 1889, gave the missionaries an incentive to greater effort. Ten years later a law was passed by which all religions, indigenous and foreign, were placed on the same footing. Lands and buildings used for Christian propaganda were exempted from

taxation equally with Buddhist temples, and Christians were relieved from all disabilities under which they laboured. The following table shows what Christianity has accomplished in Japan under these changing conditions. The figures are the latest that can be procured from an official source. Those relating to ministers and churches were published by the Japanese Government in 1907, and the figures of membership were compiled by the Japanese Home Office in 1906.

	Number of Ministers		Total	Number of Churches, Chapels, &c	Membership
	Japanese	Foreign			
Roman Catholic Church	35	115	150	156	56,638
Orthodox Greek Church	185	1	186	118	14,643
Presbyterian Church of Japan (Nihon Kurisuto Kōkwai)	188	81	269	195	15,228
Congregational Church of Japan (Nihon Kumiai Kōkwai)	102	29	131	113	11,343
Episcopal Church of Japan (Nihon Sei Kōkwai)	215	93	308	215	12,586
Baptist Church	59	31	90	59	21,205
Methodist Episcopal Church	94	31	125	79	
South Methodist Church	19	17	36	27	
Methodist Protestant Church	16	7	23	19	
Methodist Church of Japan (Nihon Mu Kōkwai)	39	20	59	42	
Evangelical Church	19	1	20	18	
Salvation Army	16	10	26	16	78
Other denominations	82	62	144	78	
Totals	1069	498	1567	1135	131,643

In considering the position to-day, an increase must be allowed in all figures, not only because of the progress of the last half decade, but also in view of the fact that there is an official inclination to under-estimate rather than over-estimate the strength of Christianity in the country. As a matter of fact, there are probably 160,000 Christians in Japan to-day, including missionaries and missionary workers. This is not a large proportion out of a population of some fifty million souls, but it is a result which has been attained, as shown above, in thirty-five

years, and by a coincidence it reveals a corresponding progress to that of the Roman Catholic missionaries in the early days. The mission inaugurated by St. Francis Xavier secured 150,000 converts in thirty years, and, within the following thirty years, brought that total up to 500,000. The modern crusade has achieved a parallel for the first period; it remains to be seen whether or not the record of the Jesuit missionaries can be equalled or surpassed for the second. An outline may now be given of the work of the respective Christian Churches in Japan, their progress and their problems.

The Church of England in Japan.—Among the missionary agencies, the Church of England has accomplished valuable work in Japan. On its behalf, the Church Missionary Society entered the field in 1869 and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in 1873. Since the latter year, the workers of the two Societies have laboured in self-sacrificing co-operation. The initial movement of the Church Missionary Society was made possible by an anonymous donation in 1868 of £4000, and in January of the following year the first missionary from Christian England to the newly opened Empire in the Far East began his labours at Nagasaki. The name of this zealous worker, the Rev George Ensor, is held in affectionate remembrance. The American Protestant Episcopal Church was already represented in Japan, two of its members, the Rev. J. Liggins and the late Bishop (then the Rev C. M.) Williams, having been the actual pioneers of Protestant missionary effort in the country. The Church Missionary Society continued to open stations—at Ōsaka in 1873, at Tōkyō and at Hakodate in 1874, and at Nūgata in 1875. The first convert of the Society in Tōkyō was baptized in June 1876; and at Ōsaka, in 1903, there were 685 Christians associated with the Society, composing five small congregations, of which three were under the care of Japanese clergymen. In 1882, Archbishop Tait arranged for the foundation of an English bishopric in Japan, and the two Societies—the Church Missionary Society and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel—undertook to share the cost of maintenance. The first bishop was the Rev. A. W. Poole, who, owing to ill-health, remained in Japan but a short while. His

successor was the Rev. Edward Bickersteth, founder and first leader of the Cambridge Mission in Delhi. He was consecrated in 1886, and became an ardent fellow-worker with Bishop Williams, of the American Episcopal Church. After eleven years of devoted service, Bishop Bickersteth died in 1897, a period in which much headway was witnessed. The Church suffered another loss by the death of Archdeacon Shaw, who had laboured in the country for thirty years. On the morning of his funeral a messenger arrived from the Emperor with a gift of £100 to Mrs Shaw, in recognition of her husband's services in Japan. Bishop Bickersteth was most active in his visitation of all the mission outposts, and started two important stations in Tōkyō under his own immediate direction, St. Andrew's and St. Hilda's missions, these being associated bands of clergymen and women-workers respectively. A divinity school is connected with the former, and there are also a night school and a club attended by Government clerks and others. The women of St. Hilda's Mission undertake the training of Japanese women as mission-workers, and engage in evangelical work. They have also under their supervision a young women's school, an orphanage, a school of needlework (to enable Christian girls to earn their own living), and a small hospital connected with which are several branch dispensaries. Japan is now divided into six missionary jurisdictions, four of which are under the care of the Church of England, the remaining two being the charge of the American Church. The four Church of England dioceses and their bishops are as follow :—

Hokkaidō Jurisdiction,

The Right Rev. W. ANDREWS.

Kyūshū Jurisdiction,

The Right Rev. A. LEA.

Ōsaka Jurisdiction,

The Right Rev. HUGH JAMES FOSS.

South Tōkyō Jurisdiction,

The Right Rev. C. H. BOUTFLOWER.

The Church is ruled by a General Synod attended by the bishops and by delegates from the clergy and the laity, both

Japanese and foreign, who are elected at the local Synods held annually. The General Synod meets every three years. The missionaries of the Church Missionary Society and of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel have united with those of the American Episcopal Church in many good works, notably in the translation of the Prayer Book, the larger part of which was published in 1879 and the rest in 1882. In 1887, the Japanese Christians connected with the missions of the two British Societies and the American Church met at Ōsaka, under the joint presidency of Bishops Bickersteth and Williams, and formed themselves into the Nihon Sei Kōkwaï (the Church of Japan), framing for it a constitution and canons, and adopting, "for the present," the English Prayer Book and Articles. There were then 1300 Christians in the Nihon Sei Kōkwaï, and such were the advantages of union that by 1903 the number had risen to 12,102.

Difficulties of the Work.—This result was not achieved without much opposition, for instances of which, and for other information, the writer is indebted to an excellent little work on the Japan Mission published by the Church Missionary Society. In 1882-83 there was an organised attack on Christianity at Nagasaki by an anti-Christian society drawing its members from Buddhism, Shintō, Confucianism, and Agnosticism. The activity of missionaries of the Shin sect of Buddhism proved a serious obstacle to Christianity at Kagoshima in the period 1882-85. An instance of a somewhat common method of persecution by anti-Christian Japanese occurred at Fukuoka in 1898, where a landlord raised the rents of houses inhabited by Christians. Oyamada was looked upon at one time as one of the brightest spots in Japanese Christendom, but then occurred a characteristically Japanese incident. One Oyamada man, being dissatisfied with the efforts made to clear off a heavy law debt which had long been a burden to the village, went to three wealthy residents in the adjacent valley to suggest a general collection in aid of the villagers. These at once agreed to the proposal, on condition that the Christians gave up their faith. The initiator of the movement consented to do this, and eleven others were found willing, the twelve putting their seals to an

undertaking to give up Christianity on a promise that 10,000 *yen* should be collected, of which 1000 *yen* was to be devoted to rebuilding the Shintō shrine, 1500 *yen* to the construction of a public park, and the rest to the discharge of the debt. This money, however, was not forthcoming. Then there came a Buddhist preacher who offered the necessary financial assistance to the village, but naturally he threw out the proposition to rebuild the Shintō shrine, and made his gift conditional on the Christian seceders joining the Buddhists. The result of the Buddhist bargain is unknown, but many families withdrew from Christianity, the Christian church was destroyed in a storm, and Christian effort in Oyamada had to be suspended. Other difficulties are shown in some observations, made by the Rev. J. Hind in 1899, about the people of Kokura: "They are mostly engrossed in trade—chiefly in coal. I think I am right in saying that, low as commercial morality is in Japanese trade generally, it is worst in the coal trade. Vast numbers may be described as unwilling to come to the light lest their deeds should be reproved. In Kokura this holds true to a certain extent; but there are also other reasons. The place has a reputation of indifference to religion which dates back many generations, and the difficulty is consequently not merely opposition to Christianity. It is a town far behind others in enlightenment, and many crude ideas about Christian methods (such as using human eyes for medicine, &c.) are still held by the poorer people. There is also more antagonism to foreigners than is found in other parts." This is a little pen-picture of life in a Japanese town written, it must be remembered, only thirteen years ago. One of the converts in this place had been a Samurai, and bore on his back and chest many a scar from the deep sword-cuts he had received in the wars of the revolution. Even after he had become a patient and willing listener to the Gospel, he would not hear of abandoning his idols. "The idols," he said, "are in my heart. I believe in them, and I cannot give them up." Eventually, however, he was convinced of the folly of idolatry, his idol shelf was removed, and he was baptized in the Christian faith. Many stories are told of the self-sacrifice of Japanese Christians. In one village the people offered to provide for a very poor widow and her family if

they would give up their faith. This the widow would not do, and consequently she was compelled to withstand a great deal of persecution. One day she brought seventy *sen* (about $rs. 5\frac{1}{2}d$) to the missionary, asking him to spend it for God. She said that for the previous six years she had "stolen time" when she could, and by making rope and sandals with rice-straw she had been able to save two *rin* per week (one twentieth of a penny). A missionary, writing from the small town of Nobeoka, in 1897, said festivals were more to the taste of the people than the truths of Christianity. As an instance of this form of opposition to Christianity, not only in Nobeoka but all over Japan, the missionary's account of these festivals is informing: "Last month, the 300th anniversary of an old Daimyō, a deified ancestor of Viscount Naito, was held. The Shintō ceremony was conducted with much style for a place like this, and occupied three hours in pouring rain. The following day all the schools for miles round were marched in to do obeisance at his shrine. A handsome memorial stone and a pair of stone lanterns had been erected, while the whole place kept holiday for two days in his honour. Special dancing parties from the town, among them some anything but respectable characters, gave special performances, while two of the keepers of disreputable houses were appointed judges in the fencing competition—so lightly is vice regarded here. As I write, the festival of the town-god is being kept; his shrine has just been re-roofed with copper and otherwise set in order at a cost, I am told, of at least 2000 *yen* (£200). Revelry and feasting seem to form the chief part of this festival, and drunken men are in all the streets." At Hiroshima Christian work was found difficult because the place has always been a stronghold of Buddhism. A missionary tells of the visit of a high-priest to the town. On his return to the station the streets were lined with numbers of devout Buddhists, and the water in which the great man had bathed was sold at a good price to the crowd, who gladly paid for the privilege of being allowed to drink it, hoping thereby to gain a safe passage to the Buddhist heaven. At Tokushima, in 1890, a Buddhist Young Men's Club became the centre of an organised effort to oppose the teaching of Christianity, and the missionary's house was stoned and

Christians were molested. At Choshi a Shintō priest was baptized in 1898. His income of twenty *yen* a month ceased, and he found employment as head of a gang of coolies working on the railway.

The Future of the Church of Japan.—The question of the establishment of a Japanese bishopric in the Nihon Sei Kōkwaï has, of course, arisen. Towards the end of 1907 an article on the subject by Mr. Iida Eijiro appeared in the *Nichiyō Sōshu*, stating that as a result of thirty-four years' work there were only eight churches with a membership exceeding two hundred, and the converts belonging to these churches were mostly people connected with mission schools, hospitals, and the like. There were few business men among them, and the capacity for self-support was therefore poorly developed. Mr. Iida found fault with the action of the Seventh General Synod, when "bold resolutions" were passed, requiring churches to raise fixed sums of money within given periods, and asked how many members were there in those churches who were in a position to command large sums of money. "As a rule," he said, "in Japan it is only the heads of houses who have it in their power to give away money. Neither women, minors, nor dependants are able to do so. To lay down a law that any church shall be required to raise a certain sum within a given time is a mistake, and is certainly quite contrary to the teaching of St. Paul, who said 'Let every man do according as he is disposed in his heart, not grudgingly, or of necessity; for God loveth a cheerful giver.' The amount of thanksgiving donations to the church cannot profitably be fixed by those in authority." Mr. Iida was strongly of opinion that the slow rate at which the capital of the mission accumulated was very largely to be attributed to the action taken by the Seventh General Synod. The attempt to force the pace, he said, has tended to retard progress. The desire for a Japanese bishop had been frequently expressed by converts to the Nihon Sei Kōkwaï, who pointed out that as Bishop Williams was content to take a presbyter's salary when the American Episcopal Mission was founded, a Japanese bishop would require a salary only a little higher than is paid to an ordained

Japanese to-day To meet the situation the Church has recently adopted a canon which provides for the formation of a diocese on the application of six self-supporting congregations undertaking to find one-third of the bishop's stipend. This brief review of the Church of England's effort in Japan would be incomplete without a generous tribute to the men and women who have given and are giving their utmost strength and energy to the cause of Christianity in a country where the conditions, to say the least, are depressing. Opposed by the great force of the Buddhist priesthood, with their powerful influences of festivals and ornate ceremonies; by the gods of wood and of stone in every home; by the State encouragement of Shintō as the medium of national observances; by the superstitions of the people, and by a laxity of principles and of morals which is the natural result of the elastic codes of heathen faiths; and finally, by the almost overwhelming obstacles of tradition and of custom, the missionaries have gone forth willingly, as they were bidden, often to isolated places where their reception was of the most chilling description. They have accomplished as much by their example as by their work, and they have made Christianity respected for its sympathy with the weak and with the suffering, with the leper and with the blind, and, above all, with the neglected women among a nation of men who regard women lightly.

Methodism and its Japanese Bishop.—American and Canadian Methodists have done for Japan what John Wesley did for America. Methodism in Japan is now united, and the Methodist body has the distinction of having the first Japanese Christian bishop. The General Methodist Conference in Tōkyō in 1907, at which this development was reached, will have the same place in the history of Japanese Methodism that the American Conference of 1784 occupies in the history of American Methodism. From 1766 to 1784, American Methodism was conducted by superintendents sent from England by John Wesley, who afterwards recommended that the American Church be made an independent organisation with an episcopal form of government. Thomas Coke, having been con-

secrated by John Wesley, consecrated Francis Asbury in America; Japan has undergone somewhat the same process, and Yoichi Honda has become the Francis Asbury of Japan. The General Methodist Conference in Tōkyō began by passing a resolution that a bishop be elected, and that the bishop so chosen be required to give himself exclusively to the office. Dr. Lambuth, one of the special commissioners from America to superintend the union, then proposed that a few minutes should be spent in prayer before proceeding to the election. "It is one of the most solemn moments in the history of your Church," he said. After prayer, four tellers were appointed, and the ballot was taken without nomination or debate. The result was: Y. Yoshioka, 1; Y. Hiraiwa, 2; S. Ogata, 5; Y. Honda, 42. Dr. Y. Honda was thus duly elected, and the Conference cheered the result heartily. Yoichi Honda, D.D., the new Kantoku (bishop), was born at Hirosaki in 1848. He was converted at the age of twenty-four, and served the Church faithfully both as educator and as minister. At first it was his intention to enter upon a political career, but this purpose he abandoned in 1883 when he decided to devote himself entirely to Church work. He was elected President of the Aoyama Gakuin, the most important Christian college in Tōkyō, in 1890, and besides his duties in that connection, he served the Young Men's Christian Association and other organisations. The bishop has made a number of visits to America and Europe, and is a man of gentle disposition, sincere piety, and sound executive ability. On the Sunday following his election he was consecrated, the ceremony being witnessed by a distinguished company, some of whom were white-haired veterans in Christian service. The fact that Dr. Honda was the first native candidate in the history of Japanese missions, or in that of any part of the Far East, afforded the utmost gratification. The ceremony of consecration by the laying on of hands was performed by Bishop Earl Cranston, joined by the other commissioners and by representatives of the Methodist Churches now united in Japan. The consecration sermon was preached by Bishop A. W. Wilson, senior Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church South, then in the seventy-third year of his age and the fiftieth year of his ministry.

After hymn and prayer, the Bible was placed in the hands of Bishop Honda by Bishop Wilson, and the service closed. A few days later Kantoku Honda was formally presented to the General Conference by Bishop Earl Cranston. Bishop Honda spoke a few simple words expressive of his sense of responsibility, and added that he trusted their independence would show its power through their union. Hitherto they had been assisted by the Mother Churches, to whom they owed their unity. They must now realise the responsibility of a yoke. He concluded in the following words: "I, with you, have laboured with great anxiety at times to bring this about. But now that our aim is accomplished, we are not to rest from our labours. Our work really begins. Let us undertake it not as the work of a congregation, or an organisation, or a country, but as the work of the Lord." The conference proceeded to place on record an expression of unfeigned love in acknowledgment of the efforts of Bishop Harris, who had been responsible for organising the new Church in its new career under a Japanese Kantoku. The bishop, in reply, congratulated the Methodist Churches upon the creation of what he termed a national Nihon Methodist Kōkwai. "You have longed and prayed for this," he said, "and now it has come to pass. With you I reverently recognise the hand of God in this happy consummation. I believe in you, and pray that this youngest daughter of the great Methodist family may be a Church without fault or spot, the joy of God, and for the salvation of the Empire." Bishop Harris then congratulated Bishop Honda on being the first Japanese ever elevated to the Episcopacy in Japan. "That he is the truly called of God to the Holy office and service none will question," he observed. The Bishop concluded with the following striking passage: "By faith I see Japan a Christian nation enriched and sanctified through the Lord Jesus become incarnate in her life. All doors are open; all hearts welcome the Gospel messenger; all good prophecies concerning Japan are being fulfilled; all forebodings of evil come to nothing. Let us all be apostles, evangelists, teachers, witnesses, heralds of the everlasting Gospel to the people. To the Nihon Methodist Kōkwai, Banzai!" At this stage a happy little incident occurred

when Bishop Honda extended a hearty invitation to Bishop Harris to continue his work as before in co-operation with himself. At the next meeting of the General Conference, it was recommended that the Kantoku reside in Tōkyō, that his salary be 1800 *yen* (£180), that the rent of his residence amount to 400 *yen* (£40), and that the allowance for travelling expenses be fixed at 1800 *yen* (£180)—a total in English money of only £400. It is obvious, providing all other conditions are equal, that it is far more economical to appoint Japanese than European bishops. The Nihon Methodist Kōkwai has now to face the problem of securing for itself pecuniary independence, and in this connection there was a significant hint in an article in the *Gōkyō* (Methodist) by Mr. M. Matsumoto, M.A., who suggested that, while not neglecting the students, more attempts should be made to convert business men.

The American Methodist Mission have not yet decreased their grant to the Japanese branch of their Church, and it is improbable that other foreign societies will withdraw support for a time. The home Churches do not wish to see the newly formed Church embarrassed for want of money, and their attitude is one of patience and liberality. In the meantime, as an instance of the spirit in Japan, eleven Methodist evangelists some time ago informed the Church authorities that they would be content to receive salaries of only seven *yen* (14s.) a month.

United Presbyterians.—The Presbyterians are found in Japan as the Nihon Kirisuto Kōkwai, the American and Scottish branches having united into a strong body in 1877. There is a strong feeling among a section of the native ministers that the Church should now relieve the foreign missionary boards of all expense, and furthermore that the co-operation of foreign missionaries is not only no longer necessary but is in fact detrimental to progress. They do not ask the missionaries to withdraw altogether, but they appear to desire that the foreign missionary shall remain in the background. On the other hand, there is a native party which deplors the haste and discourtesy of the extremists. This moderate party believes that the in-

dependence will be reached sooner by co-operation, and that the Church is not yet able to rely upon its own resources. A third section is content to be neutral, finding in the agitation a feeling which spurs the native Christians to greater efforts. The Nihon Kirisuto Kōkwai confines itself to a simple confession of faith based mainly on the Apostles' Creed.

The Congregational Church of Japan.—Congregationalism, like Methodism, has become an independent Church in Japan under the title of the Nihon Kumiai Kōkwai (the Congregational Church of Japan). Foreign missionaries remain only as advisers and assistants, and all efforts have been directed for some time to making the Church self-supporting. The work has been facilitated by the fact that all Congregational propaganda has been conducted hitherto by one body—the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and from the first this board encouraged the churches that grew up under its guidance to aim at independence. All the fully organised churches that had been receiving financial aid from the Mission Board were transferred to the Japanese Missionary Society, the Board agreeing to pay the sum of 8700 *yen* (£870) in three annual instalments as a parting gift to the Society. The Society undertook in the three years to provide 6000 *yen* (£600) in aid of these churches, in addition to the sum ordinarily raised by the native Congregationalists, and was fortunate in receiving three special gifts of 1000 *yen*, amounting to half the total required. In accordance with this plan, thirty churches which cost the Mission Board in 1905 a grant of 5000 *yen* (£500) were transferred to the Missionary Society. Several of these churches have already undertaken to support themselves, others hope to be in a position to dispense with outside help in the near future, while the remainder will have to be assisted by the Central Congregational Body. There remain under the care of the Mission Board a number of *kōgisshō*, or preaching-places, which will not have the *status* of churches until they become self-supporting or are taken over by the Missionary Society. While this movement is making successful progress, Congregationalism

has another pressing problem. The state of the Church has been compared not inaptly to that of a republic without a constitution. The churches are steadily becoming self-supporting, but it is complained that local autonomy is exalted at the expense of union, and it is felt that if the Church is to make conquests the ecclesiastical system must be altered, and a central authority established to which all churches and people shall be subject. The churches must sacrifice a certain amount of liberty for the general good of the whole congregational body. The Congregationalists have more than one thousand converts in each of the following places : Ōsaka, Kōbe, and Okayama. There are, however, twenty prefectures where they are not represented at all.

The Greek Church.—The Greek Church has established itself chiefly in the north-eastern part of Japan, its natural field in view of the proximity of the Siberian mainland. It is, however, well represented in Tōkyō by the most ambitious sacred edifice in the capital. The Greek Church shares with the Church of Rome the advantage of an elaborate ceremonial which appeals to a people accustomed to the impressive ritual of Buddhism. It has been fortunate also in having the uninterrupted direction of so able an ecclesiastic as Archbishop Nicolai, who has been more than forty-five years in the country and is now over seventy years of age. The Archbishop's thoughts were directed to Japan when, as a young man at college in Russia, he read some books describing its people and its characteristics. Hearing some time later that a chaplain was needed for the Russian Consulate at Hakodate, he applied for the post and was successful in securing the appointment. His idea in going to Japan was primarily to spread Christianity among the people. He was disappointed upon arriving at the scene of his intended labours to find that Christianity was prohibited and that mission work was out of the question. Hoping for a more favourable turn, he devoted himself at once to the study of the language, over which eventually he secured an astonishing command. Nine years passed, during which the ardent young student read every work of Japanese history which he could find. He investi-

gated Buddhism in Japan, and from books on the lives of the most prominent Japanese statesmen and generals he secured a thorough knowledge of the characteristics of those among whom he lived. He found many good qualities in the people which were due to the influence of Buddhism or Shintō, but he found also, and he has never ceased emphasising the fact, that Japan's religions have not solved the world's great problems of the origin of evil, of the destiny of man, and of the relation of the Creator to the Universe. When the time came that he could preach the Gospel in Japan, his method differed from that of other missionaries who invaded the country. Other missionaries, too, generally aimed at Europeanising the Japanese while converting them. Archbishop Nicolai did not believe in the spread of foreign learning as a means of conversion. He tried to teach the Japanese Christianity and that alone, and he did not encourage Japanese of the class which flocked to other missions solely to learn Western manners and thought at a period when these had become suddenly fashionable in Japan. Whatever success the Greek Church has had is therefore attributed by Archbishop Nicolai and his co-workers to the sturdy character of the early converts. It is said of the men of the north-eastern part of Japan, as it is said of those of the north-eastern part of England, that they are noted for blunt honesty rather than for suavity of manner, and these were the men whom Archbishop Nicolai has rallied around him. The funds for the mission have hitherto come from Russians interested in mission work, but it is urged that the Greek Church in Japan should soon be strong enough to stand alone. The *Seikyō Shimpō* (Greek Church) points out that each separate church is so anxious at present to add to the bulk of its capital that when money is subscribed liberally the surplus, after paying current expenses, goes to increase the amount of the capital fund instead of being devoted to an extension of mission work. The writer contends that the duty of propagating the Gospel must supersede that of laying money aside, and that financial independence at the expense of crippling evangelistic work is a mistake. This is a question which is more or less agitating all the Churches in Japan.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF CHRISTIANS

With reference to the distribution of Christians in Japan, it is stated that there is not now a single prefecture in the Empire which has not Christians residing in it. The Church of Japan (Anglican) has most converts in Hokkaidō, Ōsaka, and Tōkyō, but there are seven prefectures in which it is not represented. There are no fewer than twenty prefectures where there are no Congregationalists, and in only three places—Ōsaka, Kōbe, and Okayama—have they more than one thousand converts. The Methodists confine their efforts to definite centres, and are not scattered all over the country as are the Roman Catholics, who are unrepresented in only six prefectures. The Roman Catholics have more than one thousand converts in the following provinces or places—Hokkaidō, Tōkyō, Ōsaka, Kanagawa-ken, Nagasaki, Fukuoka, Saga, Kumamoto, and Hiroshima. Nagasaki, indeed, has a body of just three thousand Roman Catholics. There are thirteen prefectures which have no Greek Church Christians, but more than one thousand converts are to be found in each of the following prefectures—Hokkaidō, Tōkyō, Miyagi-ken, and Iwate-ken. Nagasaki has the distinction of being the prefecture with most Christians, the number being 33,819; other prefectures are placed in the following order—Tōkyō-fu, with 28,119 Christians; Hokkaidō, 7105; Ōsaka, 6781; Kanagawa, 5377; Miyagi-ken, 5143. The prefecture of Fukui has not 200 converts in the whole province.

THE INFLUENCE OF CHRISTIANITY

While the country is thus being peacefully penetrated, it is satisfactory to know that the influence of Christianity is much greater than its numerical strength would seem to indicate. The *Missionary Review of the World* for March 1902 gave the following highly significant facts about the standing of Christianity in Japan: 1. The Christians have never had less than four times their proportional number of members in the successive Diets. 2. They had thirteen members, besides the Speaker, in the then existing Diet, one of them having been elected in a strongly Buddhist district by a majority of five to one. 3. Three per cent. of

the officers in the army are said to be Christians, and a goodly proportion of naval officers have similarly adopted Christianity. 4. Christians abound in abnormal numbers in the universities and Government colleges, both among students and instructors. 5. At least three of the great daily newspapers in Tōkyō are largely in Christian hands, and Christians are at the head of the editorial departments in several others. 6. A very large volume of charitable work and the most successful charitable institutions are under Christian management. In the last-mentioned respect, Christianity has achieved notable triumphs. Until quite recently, for instance, lepers have been at large in Japan. They gathered around the temples and crawled about the streets, displaying their sufferings to their countrymen and countrywomen; and although in some cases a trifle may have been bestowed upon them, generally speaking an utter indifference was shown to their appeals for charity. It might have been thought that even if the pitiful spectacles presented by the lepers of Japan, whose sufferings were the combination of poverty and disease, had not compelled the Government to take them under its protection, the general consideration of the public health would have spurred them to action long ago. But it was left for a Christian lady to reproach the authorities by her action. Miss H. Riddell, on her arrival in Japan in 1890, immediately championed the lepers' cause, and five years later, mainly through her efforts, a lepers' hospital was opened at Kumamoto, where about one hundred sufferers were received, while four hundred persons have been treated at branch establishments. Two other hospitals have since been established, and Miss Riddell's noble work had its crowning triumph when she succeeded in awakening the public to the necessity for the legal isolation of lepers. It seems incredible that a measure so essential to the interests of public safety and so obviously dictated by the most elementary rules of common humanity should not have been passed until 1907. It is only fair to add that the Government made public recognition of Miss Riddell's work, and this British lady was the first foreigner to receive the Blue-ribbon medal instituted in 1881 for distinguished deeds of public utility. Christianity has also endeavoured to bring a ray of light into the lives of

the blind, of whom it is estimated there are 50,000 in Japan. About 98 per cent. of these people contrived to obtain a livelihood as *amma*—practitioners in a kind of massage—and although to this day many of them continue to follow the occupation, the great majority were plunged into destitution by the advent of medical science. A Christian school for the blind has accomplished good work at Gifu. Other forms of Christian charity in Japan are orphanages, homes for discharged prisoners, maternity hospitals, schools for the deaf and dumb, and kindergartens. It is not questioned by the Japanese themselves that the part played by Buddhists in such good works is shamefully out of proportion to that of the Christians, and that Christian effort has set an example of mercy and charity in many directions where these saving qualities were hitherto unknown in the country.

XXIII

THE RELIGIONS OF JAPAN

SHINTŌ AND ITS ORIGIN

THE religions of Japan are Shintō and Buddhism, with the added influence of the Bushidō spirit (the philosophy of the Samurai) and the writings of Confucius. Shintō—literally “The Way of the Gods”—is the only indigenous faith. It is older than Japanese Buddhism, and is the nearest approach to a State religion that the country possesses. Its principles are limited practically to worship of the gods and of the Emperor and his Imperial ancestors, and its shrines are to be seen in every corner of the land. The chief shrine is that of Ise, where dwells Ama-terasu, goddess of the Sun and legendary ancestress of the long line of heaven-sent Mikados, and where twice every year festivals are held which are supposed to purify the nation from the sins of the previous six months. But there are “eight hundred myriad” deities in all. The gods and goddesses are the winds that blow, the flaming fire, the vast ocean, the eternal mountains, the rushing rivers, the bending trees; and in addition to these features of Nature there are innumerable warriors, poets, statesmen, and princes who have been deified both in ancient and modern times. No requirement of life is neglected by one or other of these deities, whose aid is invoked accordingly in every emergency. Nor is it to be assumed that the observance of Shintō is in any way limited by the prevalence of Buddhism. A house may have its Shintō shrine and its Buddhist god in the same apartment, and the two are perfectly reconciled in the minds and in the devotion of the occupants. Shintō has been described candidly by native scholars as “not a religion, but a system of Government regulations very good to keep alive patriotism among the people.” Sir Ernest Satow found it “nothing else

than an engine for reducing the people to a condition of mental slavery." The present Emperor gave it great impetus recently, when he went to the shrine of Ise to proclaim to the Imperial ancestors the successful termination of the war with Russia. Shintō has no code of morals, no sacred book, and its adherents are not bored by sermons. Indeed, Motoori, the Shintō revivalist, taught that morals were invented in China because the Chinese were an immoral people, but in Japan there was no necessity for any system of morals, as every Japanese acted aright if only he consulted his heart. The Shintō shrines are classified into twelve grades as to official status, and some of them have been attended by priests of the same family for generation after generation. The duties of the priests are limited to the presentation of offerings to the gods, of fish, wine, fruits, &c., with appropriate exhortations. There are virgin priestesses who dance before the shrines on occasions of festival. Like Buddhism, Shintō has numerous sects, the distinctive features of which are quaint. For example, cleanliness is the primary duty of one; the members of another find virtue in the healthy practice of respiration. Then there is a sect which believes that Mount Fuji is the Soul of the Globe, and another whose adherents claim special favour of long life and happiness in consideration of toilsome journeys to the summits of high mountains. Every village has its patron deity and its common temple, to which all infant children are brought for dedication to the god. Shintō had its great opportunity in recent times when, in 1868, Buddhism fell from its high place with the end of the Shōgun rule. In spite of court patronage, however, the elements of Shintō were not deep enough to enable it to secure a dominance over Buddhism in the country, and in 1884 the connection of both religions with a department of State was severed, each being enjoined to make provision for its own internal government and administration. But in all the vicissitudes of religious strife Shintō has always had the advantage of its purely native origin and growth; and that it is still an enormous force in the country is obvious from the following figures, the latest available from an official source :—

Year	Temples	Unen- closed Temples	Total	Heads of Sects	Priests ¹	Students		
						Male	Female	Total
1899	56,546	135,322	191,868	11	89,531	471	54	525
1900	58,071	138,287	196,358	12	89,507	655	32	687
1901	57,067	138,189	195,256	12	84,038	1,060	100	1,160
1902	56,701	139,698	196,399	12	83,471	1,102	123	1,225
1903	56,351	136,947	193,298	12	84,488	1,134	130	1,264
1904	56,090	136,139	192,829	12	83,371	985	115	1,100

¹ In this column are included the few priestesses of Shintō

Confucianism in Japan.—The ethical teachings of Confucius were introduced into Japan between three and four hundred years before Buddhism, but little headway was made until the coming of Buddhism in 552 A.D. The sacred books of Buddhism were all in the Chinese language, and this circumstance naturally gave stimulus to the study of the Chinese classics. Moreover, at this time Confucianism became the refuge of those who resented the domination of Hindoo speculation, and during the seventh century troops of eager young men braved the winds and waves of the Yellow Sea in order to learn the literature and the arts, the laws and the institutions, of the great T'ang epoch of Chinese history. It was through the efforts of these young men that the first systematic form of administration was established, and the first Japanese code was framed and promulgated. Thus is seen in Japanese history the influence of religion as a civilising force. At different periods in the past both Buddhism and Confucianism have brought Japan a measure of enlightenment, an enlightenment which is now being extended by the aid of Christianity. Confucianism, however, did not greatly increase its influence on the religious thought of the country. For centuries, indeed, it was barely sustained on the fringe of Buddhism. Then came the era of peace extending from the succession of Tokugawa Iyeyasu to the Shōgunate in 1603 A.D. to the restoration of the Mikado to his rightful authority in 1868 A.D., during which the arts and literature made their greatest stride in Japan. Confucianism spread rapidly in the

awakening, and in all parts of the country the "four books and five classics" were read. The moral teachings were formulated into the doctrine of the five relationships, which was readily understood by the people. The five relationships were: 1. Between father and son let there be love; 2. Between king and subject let there be duty; 3. Between husband and wife let there be proper distinctions; 4. Between the old and the young let there be orderliness; 5. Between friend and friend let there be faithfulness. The Confucian ethics underwent a change in Japan in one notable respect. Whereas Confucius emphasised filial piety, the Japanese laid the greatest stress on the principle of loyalty, and the claims of the ruler or of the State took precedence of all others. For the rest, the works of Confucius, read to the simple folk by some student of Chinese in almost every village, proved acceptable in their application to the ordinary events of life, and opened out a field of culture to the prince and the statesman. The Confucian and other Chinese classics are still read and officially encouraged.

THE ADVENT OF BUDDHISM

Buddhism has been subjected to so many processes of adaptation in Japan that it is altogether inferior to the original Buddhism of India. It is, as a matter of fact, a Japonicised version of the Chinese version which entered Japan by way of Korea in 552 A.D. Not only was it thus an alien religion to Japan, but it was already sect-riddled in China, and warring sects continued the conflict in the new field. In the progress of the centuries, Japan has literally absorbed Buddhism, with its teaching of birth and death as an evil through ages immeasurable for the Unenlightened, and of *Nirvana*, or non-existence—deliverance from the entanglement—for the Enlightened. Prince Shōtoku Taishi became an ardent patron and an illustrious exponent of the new doctrine, which made easy headway against Shintō, then in its first stage of nature-worship. The Buddhist priests astutely accepted the Shintō deities as manifestations of Buddha, and attempted to effect a fusion of Buddhism and Shintō. Early in the ninth century the powerful Tendai and Shingon sects were

introduced. The former was the first Buddhist sect in Japan to be based on the Scriptures of the *Mahāyāna*, or Greater Vehicle, and it imposed the practice of the cardinal virtues. Generous tribute must be paid here to the late Professor Arthur Lloyd, of Tōkyō, whose researches into Japanese Buddhism, set forth recently before the Asiatic Society of Japan, are destined to have far-reaching effect. Professor Lloyd showed how the Buddhism which we see to-day in Japan has its points of contact with Central Asia and Persia, with Babylon, Alexandria, and Jerusalem, and his latest writings are of supreme interest to students of Buddhism throughout the world. He came to the conclusion that the Shingon teaching, with its mystic rites and prayers, is simply Manichæism, and one of the strangest identifications which he found was from St. Augustine, at one time himself a Manichæan. Among other things in his anti-Manichæan treatises, St. Augustine tells us that the Manichæans had a threefold system of sacramental worship based on ethical rules of life and known as the *signacular* or *seals*, and there were three seals—of the hand, the mouth, and the heart. Strange to say, Shingon has the same—a threefold rule of life, with conduct for body, mouth, and heart, and, based on that, a threefold system of worship known as *san-mitsu*, “the three secrets.” When we come to inquire more particularly we find that these secrets are actually called *seals*, of the hand, the mouth, and the heart, the first consisting of certain ritual signs to be made with the hands during worship, the second of certain formulæ to be recited, and the third of certain acts of meditation to be performed.

The Sect of the Soldier.—The Zen sect, which made its appearance in the latter part of the eleventh century, claims special attention in view of its popularity among the soldiery and its consequent effect upon the recent campaign in Manchuria. This sect, above all others in Japan, produces that philosophic calm which enables men to face death fearlessly. Especially fascinating is Professor Lloyd's outline of the history of the Zen sect. Buddhism made its first official appearance in China in 67 A.D., when two priests brought Buddhist books, relics, and images from North-west India. The next band

of missionaries arrived in China in 147 A.D., and after that year the stream of translators began. By the year 730 A.D., as a result of missionary effort from every land that then contained a Buddhist—Afghanistan, Persia, Central Asia, and India—the Northern Buddhist Bible in China consisted of 5048 distinct works, with treatises on the cure of toothache in addition to those on abstruse metaphysics. The early sects in Japan were based on some selected *Sutra* or Commentary, and in the midst of the confusion which not unnaturally resulted, Dengyō Daishi was sent from Japan to China in order to bring something like a definite system from the astounding and perplexing chaos of the *Mahāyāna* Scriptures. This zealous emissary went to work with amazing energy, and formulated a comprehensive system, in which there was room for the whole 84,000 articles of the orthodox *Mahāyāna* faith. He endeavoured to gather all the sheep into one fold by means of a wide-expanding doctrine. As Professor Lloyd observes, if the Truth can be obtained by boundless comprehensiveness, Dengyō Daishi was on the way to attaining it, for it took a student some twenty years to graduate in theology in the university which he established in Japan. Dengyō Daishi's spacious Buddhism failed entirely to restore peace. The wrangling went on, and the Zen sect came into power as the protest of earnest spiritual teachers against the corruptions of the dominant school of thought. The Zen sect were based on the teachings of Daruma, or Bodhidharma, an Indian Buddhist, who made his appearance in China about the year 520 A.D. Daruma held with St. Paul that "the letter killeth." He did not trouble to select this or that book of the *Mahāyāna* Scriptures. He said that it was not by the Scriptures that a man could be saved. The way of Buddhism was simpler. The light was to be found in *Busshin*, the inmost heart of Buddha, and every man must follow the path which the Master had trodden. Men must reach the truth by their own exertions, by the purification of their own hearts, by a deep and constant contemplation of the most abstract kind. Daruma's system is the Buddhist counterpart of the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius Loyola, and the Zen sect has always been the faith of soldiers and of men of serious affairs. It was the faith of the manly Hōjō Regents at Kama-

kura, and it has been the popular Buddhism of the Samurai. When this enlightenment has been reached, then the believer may turn to the Scriptures, but the faithful need not confine themselves to these. The abiding wisdom of Confucius may be absorbed, and in modern days, says Professor Lloyd, Zen-shū priests and lay believers will turn to Epictetus, Tolstoi, Emerson, Goethe; they will try to find "sermons in stones and good in everything." The essence of Buddhism is the "Heart of Buddha," but what that heart is cannot be said. There is a carving at Nikko of Buddha with three monkeys holding their hands, one over the eyes of Buddha, one over the ears, and the third over the mouth, and there are here the words, "*Mizaru, kikazaru, iwazaru*—" "Eye hath not seen it, ear hath not heard it, tongue hath not spoken it." The truth lies too deep for any but a communication from mind to mind. But if transmission fails, the written word fails even more signally. This, then, is the Zen sect, the sect of the warrior, the sect of the modern general and the modern soldier, the sect of the serious man of affairs; and it may not be indulging in too wild a dream to suggest that among this sect will one day be found a fruitful field for some wide-visioned missionary who shall arise to sow upon it the seeds of Christianity.

The Shin Sect.—In the latter part of the twelfth century, Shinran and Nichiren began their great work in founding the only two sects of strictly Japanese Buddhism which exist—the Shin-shū and the Hokké-shū. Mr. James Troup, a former British Consul at Kobe, has specially studied the Shin-shū. Those Buddhist sects which follow the Holy Path seek deliverance from the cycle of birth and death by means of the practice of the moral and religious precepts and prohibitions of Buddhism. On the other hand, those of the Pure Land look upon this way of salvation, of attaining *Nirvana*, as utterly impossible for men in the present age of the world, this being, according to Buddhist doctrine, the "Period of the Latter days of the Law," when "the inferior capacities of men are dark and they cannot tread the Holy Path and rise to perfection." Consequently, they seek deliverance by birth into the Pure Land of Amida Buddha, resting their faith and hope on

the Original Vows of this Being. The eighteenth of these Vows, which embodies the conditions in which deliverance may be obtained, is as follows: "If, when I attain Buddhahood, any of the living beings in the ten regions, who with sincerity having faith and joy, and an ardent desire to be born into My Country, call [My Name] to remembrance ten times, should not [then] be born there, I shall not accept enlightenment. But from this the five classes of reprobate and revilers of the Right Law are excluded." This is interpreted by the Shin sect to mean that men of all classes and conditions, and in all ages of the world—whether priests or laymen, merchants or husbandmen; whether married or single, with or without families; whether abstaining from fish or wine or not—if they only put forth the believing heart and invoke Amida Buddha will be born in Heaven after this life; they will reach *Nirvana*. In connection with this way of salvation, three points of teaching of the Shin sect are to be noted: 1. They believe in and invoke Amida Buddha alone, "as a faithful servant does not serve two masters." 2. The believing heart is not "faith by one's own power, faith kept alive by means of religious observances," but "faith by the power of another"; that is, a believing heart conferred by the power of Amida Buddha. 3. The invocation of Amida, "the action of calling to remembrance with the living voice his sacred name," results from the possession of a believing heart; its object is not to obtain salvation as a reward, but to express gratitude for the "boundless great compassion" of Amida, and for the certainty of deliverance by being born into his Pure Land. But if the Shin sect ignores prohibitions and rules, it is not unmindful of social and relative duties. In the Greater *Sutra*, one of the three *Sutras* that constitute the Scriptures of the sect, it is written: "For a servant to betray his lord, for a child to deceive his father, for brothers and sisters, husbands and wives, to fail in their duty to each other, these are the actions violating the relations of life, which the venerated Shaka has denounced." This sect is the only one in Japan which allows its priests to marry and to eat meat.

The Life of Nichiren.—Nichiren, the founder of the

Nichiren or Hokké sect, is described by Professor Lloyd as the greatest and most striking personality in the whole of Japanese Buddhist literature. He was born in 1222, and in 1260, when the shadow of the Mongol was lying over the greater part of Asia, and the Empire, torn asunder by opposing factions, lay at the mercy of any invader with faith to venture on the enterprise, he published his patriotic essay, the *Ankokuron*, or Essay on the Tranquillisation of the Country, which he dedicated to the Hōjō regent Tokiyōri. Nichiren was banished to the peninsula Izu for his audacity, but his words took effect. When the dreaded Mongols came, they found Japan prepared. Nichiren began his monastic life as a student in a Shingon temple. He had then spent many years in study and in wanderings, had read all the *Sutras*, and had sat at the feet of many teachers of the different sects. Not only did he find that the results of Buddhism, as seen in the actual conditions of the country, were bad, but he came slowly to the further conclusion that the true meaning of Buddhism had not yet been set before the world. The time had now come to proclaim the perfect law of the Tathagata, and he was the man to establish the perfect religion, neither the Small Vehicle nor the Large, but the One, True Vehicle. As soon, therefore, as he was recalled from his banishment in Izu, he began an onslaught on the other sects for their worldliness and heresies. His condemnation of Buddhism brought him again into trouble. He was even condemned to death, and Japanese artists have often depicted the scene of his marvellous deliverance on the sands between Kamakura and Enoshima, when the raised sword of the executioner was stayed by a thunderbolt. But danger could not turn him from his purpose, and having exposed the failings of the old sects he proceeded to construct the new one. Five things are necessary, said Nichiren, for the promulgation of the true religion. There must be (1) Knowledge of the exact personal teachings of the man who founded it; (2) Knowledge of the nature of man and mankind; (3) The right time; (4) The right place; and (5) Knowledge of the past religious experience of the nations, as well as a clear foresight of the future. All these he found united in his own time and person. It had been made clear to him,

and he felt commissioned to proclaim it to all the world, that the whole of Shaka's personal teachings were to be found in the Hōkekyō, the Scripture which taught with perfect certainty the true nature of Buddha and the true nature of man. In the Hōkekyō, said Nichiren, is to be found the true Sakyamuni as revealed by himself before his death. He is not, as the Small Vehicle teaches in the *Agama Sutras*, a mere man born in Central India who went about doing good and teaching the simple elements of a simple faith to men and women entangled in mundane affairs. Neither is he the superhuman Buddha, sixteen feet in bodily stature, whose footprints may be seen on the great stone in front of the Zōjōji Temple in Shiba Park. Sakyamuni is more than this. He is the Great Self of the Universe—the Immanent God, if we may adopt the language of modern speculation. He is "above all, through all"; man in him is partaker of the Divine Nature, and not man alone—every rock, every sea, every planet, the sun, the moon, the most distant of constellations are all manifestations of the Buddha nature, all are parts and parcels of Sakyamuni. There have been many Buddhas and many Buddha-fields; these are but partial Buddhas, each exhibiting but a portion of the whole Truth. In Sakyamuni, unbounded, uncreated, self-enlightened, from all eternity, and in him alone, dwells the whole "fulness" of the Buddha nature. "The Christian theologian," says Professor Lloyd, "will gaze with astonishment when he realises the main thought underlying the teachings of Nichiren. 'These,' he will exclaim, 'are the speculations of the Alexandrian Gnostics, of Basilides and his crew. These are the problems which exercised the mind of St Paul when he wrote to the Colossians and Ephesians, and which prompted the author of the Fourth Gospel to pen (may we not say under Divine Guidance?) his great Prologue about the Word which is from the beginning and which is from God?'" Professor Lloyd thinks that the surprised exclamation of the theologian would not be so very far from the truth. He proceeds to deal with the Chinese translation of the Hōkekyō. The book is ushered in with apologies: It is a gospel which will meet with opposition in the world; it has been rejected in the lifetime of the *Tathagata*, 5000 monks had gone away from Sakyamuni's lecture when

first they heard it preached; the heretical monks of the Small Vehicle accused the writer of forgery and plagiarism; and the rejection would assuredly be greater after the *Tathagata* had gone to his rest. The book falls roughly into four parts:—

1. *Introductory*.—A statement of the gospel to be announced. Sakyamuni is the self-born Buddha, begotten before all worlds, and what he offers to man is not Nirvana, not extinction, but the endless life which consists in Perfect Enlightenment. The doctrine is defended by a series of parables. Here is the ancient parable of the potter and his clay, and, as Professor Lloyd says, to put the thing in Christian parlance, the potter has power to fashion the clay as he pleases; souls saved are as “brands plucked from the burning”; God’s rain comes on the just and the unjust, and each derives from it the blessing he needs; labourers in the vineyard each get their penny, and the prodigal is restored when he has come to himself.

2. *The Promises*.—The doctrine is here given a personal application, and to the faithful a promise is made of future Enlightenment and Perfection.

3. *The Presence*.—While Sakyamuni is speaking there descends from heaven a shrine not unlike the tabernacle which may be seen above the altar in Roman Catholic churches, and from the shrine a voice expressive of satisfaction and happiness is heard. “This is my body,” says the *Tathagata*, pointing to it, “and whenever this gospel of mine is preached my body will be present.” The shrine contains the remains of the Buddha Prabhutaratna who is “dead yet speaketh.” He had preached the higher Buddhism of the *Mahāyāna* doctors, those truths which were contemporary with, and not far different from, the teachings of Him whose words are recorded for us in the Synoptic Gospels; and now the self-born eternal Buddha, preaching the One Vehicle, promises his presence to his followers, and the eternal life which is the same thing as Perfect Enlightenment.

4. *The Concluding Vision*.—Preachers full of zeal and armed with Divine protection go forth to preach the new gospel. As a result of their labours, a multitude “which no man can number” gathers around the *Tathagata*, headed by

four *Bodhisattva* *Maha-sattva*, four "living creatures" who are the latter-day attendants of the Eternal and Everlasting Buddha.

Professor Lloyd finds that the underlying thought of this extraordinary book, whose imagery is all Indian, absolutely fantastical, and tediously prolix, is all Christian and Alexandrian. The thoughts are common to all the Alexandrian writers, to Philo, to Basilides, to Clement, to Origen. At every turn we are reminded of the New Testament, not in word coincidences but in ideas and underlying thoughts. He believes he has reason for identifying it as a book that was known to some, at least, of the Greek fathers of the second and third centuries A.D., and that it was the work of an Indian Buddhist residing at Alexandria towards the end of the first century A.D., or at least written by one who was acquainted with Alexandrian thought and by him brought to Alexandria. All internal evidence points to its having been composed during the first century of the Christian era, that century of confusion and decay which witnessed the birth-agonies of Christianity on the one hand and *Mahāyāna* Buddhism on the other. We can see that it is an attempt to bring about harmony between conflicting schools of Buddhism, by proclaiming the perfect Buddha and his Perfect Vehicle as against the teachings of the Smaller and Greater Vehicles, by means of elements borrowed from Christianity.

The Strength of Buddhism.—Since the labours of Shinran and Nichiren, no creative work has been done for Japanese Buddhism, either in the way of speculation or of founding new sects. The following are the latest official figures showing its position in the country :—

Year	Temples.		Total	Heads of Sects.	Preaching Priests.	Ordinary Priests ¹	Total	Students		
		Unenclosed Temples						Male.	Female	Total.
1899	71,977	38,035	110,012	38	61,558	45,192	106,788	8,148	291	8,439
1900	71,951	38,032	109,983	49	63,177	48,038	111,264	8,937	339	9,276
1901	71,988	38,033	110,021	49	69,684	47,582	117,315	8,717	305	9,022
1902	71,992	38,020	110,012	49	67,640	46,325	114,014	8,967	309	9,276
1903	72,268	37,602	109,870	50	73,270	43,537	116,857	9,065	314	9,379
1904	72,258	37,584	109,842	50	72,746	46,639	119,435	8,327	300	8,627

¹ Priestesses are included in this column.

There are twelve sects of Japanese Buddhism, and forty-nine sub-sects, the following being the most recent official figures showing the strength of the chief sects :—

Name of Sect	1899	1900	1901	1902.	1903	1904
Shin	19,213	19,608	19,630	19,639	19,451	19,447
Sodo	14,106	13,706	13,708	13,708	14,207	14,211
Shingon	12,818	12,965	12,973	12,973	12,769	12,758
Jodo	8,355	8,343	8,343	8,342	8,406	8,403
Kinzai	6,135	6,120	6,123	6,122	6,151	6,142
Nichiren, or Hokke	5,063	5,194	5,195	5,195	5,068	5,074
Tendai	4,805	4,602	4,603	4,600	4,711	4,711
Ji	877	857	857	857	875	876
Wobaku	605	556	556	556	570	569

Many of the temples in the towns are now so neglected that their ornaments have been sold by the priests. Some have been let as residences, and others, again, have been deserted and have fallen into decay. The temples in the country are more prosperous, for the simple country-folk of Japan, like the corresponding class of all nations, have a more abiding faith than the people of the towns. But alike in the towns and in the country Buddhism has been obliged to associate with itself all manner of superstitions, quite alien to the doctrines of any of its sects. Buddhism is particularly strong in the province of Idzumo, which is considered specially to belong to the gods of Japan. Here, at the principal town of Matsuye, they are supposed to assemble in the month of November to hold a consultation, and during that time the rest of the country is left without any gods. The precise relationship of the people to Buddhism is explained by an extract from a Buddhist journal in Japan. "Religion in Japan, as far as households are concerned, has become quite formal. The head of each house decides what religious ceremonies shall be performed on certain occasions. This does not imply that he himself believes in a creed or that any members of his family take the slightest interest in its teaching. It is one of the many family traditions that the heads of households still scrupulously follow, so that in most cases Buddhism, though the religion of families, is not the religion [? conviction] of the individuals composing a family. The connection of the priesthood with the laity is almost ex-

clusively that of the performers of ceremonies to those who, in obedience to custom, pay for their performance. Beyond its connection with customary ceremonies, what hold has Buddhism on the nation? None whatever." The priests tell fortunes and sell charms, and the original outlines of the great metaphysical teachings have been lost in the encompassing web of blind superstition and lamentable ignorance. The priests have become worldly and the people indifferent. The former, however, have been roused to some extent to the necessity of combating Christianity. How amazingly neglectful Japan is and has been of the higher study of Buddhism is proved by the astounding fact, pointed out by Chamberlain, that these people have not taken the trouble to translate the Buddhist canons into their own language. Priests use the Chinese version, and the laity have no version at all. Mr. Shimada Bankon, a well-known Buddhist priest, asks, "How many priests are there in the whole country who really believe in the religion? It is a case of 'like priest, like people.' Some of the priests are agitating for Government protection. What good could protection do them if they had it? No Government can put life into a dying creed. In times past, I did my very best to rouse men from their slumbers, but in recent years I have come to think that the case is hopeless. With such priests as we see to-day, there is no hope for Buddhism. Is it not a fact that some of them, in order to save themselves from utter extinction, are proposing to unite themselves with the Christians?" An editorial article in the *Japan Times* arrives at nearly the same conclusions by a different process. It observes that it is probably true that the average moral standard of Buddhist priests in the country is considerably lower than it was in the palmy days of the Tokugawa Shōgunate, and that the Order has forfeited much of the reverence with which it used to be looked upon by the masses of the people. "The fact is that Buddhism has never been a religion of soul to us; it has always been a religion of form to the generality of our nationals. . . . But why, it may be asked, has the change in the quality of Buddhist priesthood taken place? The change, we think, is ascribable to the same circumstances that evolved the new

Japan from the old in the early years of the present *régime*. . . . This politico-social upheaval resulted in the absolute dis-endowment of a vast number of Buddhist temples. The change had a very demoralising effect on the priest class, as they had thenceforth to depend solely upon their wits for their own sustenance and the support of their temples. Thus circumstanced, they were unable to maintain the same life of scholarly pursuits and educated decorum that characterised their predecessors. Reduced in their moral and material endowments, they began to sink gradually lower in the popular estimation. It is thus that our Buddhist priests ceased to be objects of reverence to the people in general. Hence we say that it is a mistake to assert that Buddhism is losing ground in Japan because it is competent no longer to meet the intellectual and spiritual needs of the people ; it has never met any—not, at least, of the thinking class, and it is among the thinking class that the need of a religion is beginning to be felt.”

XXIV

THE CRY FOR A NEW RELIGION

CHRISTIANITY in Japan is face to face with obstacles which it were folly to ignore. Such difficulties are here set forth not in the spirit of destructive criticism, but in the hope that their realisation may aid their solution. Nothing is to be gained by shirking the facts ; much, indeed, may be gained by an open-minded recognition of them. An outline has been given of the two crusades of Christianity in Japan, and the fact that with all its modern equipment the second has not yet reached the very moderate level of success attained by the first must be held to require some explanation. When the best possible view is taken of the present position of Christianity in Japan, there remains the fact that there is not the slightest sign of any general desire on the part of the people to accept it. The dream of Japan as the Christian Empire of the East is still a dream.

The problems of Christianity come very readily under distinct heads. The first concerns the supposed divinity of the Emperor. It might be thought that the process of adopting Western civilisation which has now been in operation for nearly fifty years would have weakened this appalling pretension ; that eminent men among the Japanese who have travelled far and wide with the determination to assimilate Western ways and knowledge would have lost this, among many other previously cherished beliefs, in their wanderings ; that the Japanese students of Western literature and of the literature of their own country would have realised how untenable is such a fantastical article of the national faith ; and that it would now have begun to dawn upon the common people, becoming more familiar with current affairs through the medium of a growing native press, that the very human acts of their Emperor betokened his existence as a human being and not

as a divinity. Although there is reason to believe that among those sections of the community where superstition has ceased to hold sway the doctrine of divinity is merely regarded as a polite but politic fiction, there is little likelihood of a radical change taking place in the mental outlook of the masses in this respect until the growing forces of rationalism shall compel an act of voluntary renunciation to a preposterous title on the part of the Sovereign himself. To the Japanese the Emperor is still a Celestial being, whose person, in the words of the Constitution recorded as recently as 1889, is "sacred and inviolable." When the missionary, with glowing zeal, speaks fervently of a God enthroned in heaven to whom all the rulers of the earth not less than their humblest subjects owe allegiance, a God who is in all and above all, the Japanese listen incredulously. They can comprehend no Being more exalted than the Emperor. It is he who is in all and above all. A Japanese is not permitted to stray near the royal palace. Japanese who come to England are lost in amazement at the fact that they can walk so close to Buckingham Palace or wander round the ramparts of Windsor Castle, and they are stricken with something akin to awe as they move. The freedom with which royal personages pass along the streets of London excites still deeper wonder. In Japan, people may be seen with their hands clasped in prayer as the Emperor passes, and they must uncover their heads and bow. They dare not take up any position from which they might look down upon his Majesty, nor dare they raise a sunshade along the line of route. So deeply sunk in them is this feeling, that the British residents in Tōkyō were not permitted to look down upon their own prince, Prince Arthur of Connaught, during the occasion of the Garter mission. This belief in the divinity of the Emperor is superstition in its worst form, the secret of its encouragement lying in the conviction that it strengthens the position of the Monarchy in the country and has a distinctly political value in substituting a blind loyalty for a reasoning one. It is difficult to see how the delusion can be dispelled from without. It can only be hoped that some day there may come to Japan an emperor who will be bold enough to relinquish an outrageous title and claim the

allegiance of his subjects as a man—as an earthly ruler with no other thought than the welfare of his people, owing allegiance on his part to the Source of all wisdom and of all authority. The present position exposes those who have embraced Christianity to grave embarrassment and to unavoidable inconsistency. Christian converts dare not stand aloof from the services conducted by the Emperor in honour of the Sun-Goddess and the spirits of the Imperial Ancestors. They bow their heads and burn incense before the shrines in company with the disciples of Shaka and of Shintō. Again, any Japanese, before going abroad on public business, must proceed to the Hall of Reverence and perform an act of homage or worship, and this observance also involves the Christian in conflict with his faith. Brinkley writes of how plainly Christians are differentiated from the rest of the nation by the absence of any representative on ceremonial occasions in the Hall of Reverence, and adds that until each Christian sect attends the ceremonials the Christian element of the population will continue to be marked as standing aloof from rites which in the eyes of patriotic Japanese are connected with the very basis of patriotism. How these difficulties were met in the early days of the Jesuit crusade cannot be ascertained. Certainly there were then persecutions on the ground of alleged disloyalty, a circumstance which seems to indicate that the missionaries of that period were confronted with problems similar to those which now beset their successors. But, on the other hand, it is to be noted that so completely was the Emperor isolated from his subjects that the question of his divinity may not have arisen in such an acute form as it exists to-day. The Government of the country revolved round the Shōguns, and the Emperor was kept in the background so effectually that his personality probably in no way affected either the missionaries or their work.

If we pass on to consider Christianity in relation to the martial spirit of the people, we find ourselves confronted with another difficulty. Broadly speaking, Christianity teaches the value of life; Buddhism, that life has no value. The Japanese are apt to confuse fatalism with bravery, and they fail to realise the fact that the laying down of a life that is cherished is an infinitely greater sacrifice than the surrender

of a life that has been subdued under the form of mere existence. A Japanese expressed the contrast in these words: "Buddhism preaches contentment and quietness of mind, as Christianity does; but there is this essential difference between the two creeds—Christianity makes much of the individual and insists on his or her importance in the scheme of the Universe, but Buddhism consigns each separate *ego* to an insignificant place in the vast worlds known to man. It warns man against exaggerating his importance in relation to the Universe." The disregard by the Japanese of the sanctity of human life is one of the characteristics with which Christianity finds itself instantly in collision. None can say that Japanese patriotism is not very marked; but, let the horrors and the necessities of war be what they may, Japanese generals will be greater men when they learn how to win battles with smaller cost of human life than that which was incurred in the recent conflict with Russia. In the meantime, the impression is certainly held by prominent Japanese that the Christian religion is opposed to the martial spirit which they desire so much to sustain. While true Christianity is certainly a Gospel of Peace, it is for the missionaries to point out that it is also a Gospel of Duty and of obedience to rightful superiors. The Japanese do not fail in this connection to draw significant conclusions from the fact that they were victorious so recently in a conflict with an essentially Christian nation. "Russia went to war with us as a Christian nation," observed a noted Japanese writer. "Her success was prayed for over a large portion of Christendom. But she suffered defeat at the hands of a non-Christian nation. While professing the Christian religion, the behaviour of her troops during the war was in every way worse than that of our soldiers." The last sentence may be disputed with confidence, but the fact that the defeat of Russia was very much against the interests of Christianity in Japan and among other Eastern nations is undeniable. Christianity is also opposed to the practice of *hara-kiri*, which is so much exalted by the Japanese. The approved way out of disgrace in Japan is suicide, and a man is held to have redeemed his honour by death; the Christian, on the other hand, is taught to face the consequences of his acts and bear his punishment.

Christianity has furthermore all the disadvantages of being associated with the imposition of a stricter code upon those who accept the faith than the one in operation in Japan at present. Indeed, it has been said by a Japanese Christian that the work of Christianity in Japan will be directed in the future not so much to doctrine, but to reform in such matters as morality, drunkenness, and Sunday observance. But the gravest problem is undoubtedly that relating to the position of women in the country. The status of women is dealt with fully in the succeeding chapters. For the present purposes it is sufficient to say that morality, as we understand it in England, does not exist in Japan. The Japanese have a standpoint altogether different from that which obtains in the West, and they are unable to appreciate the force of the least objection to practices which Western civilisation not only condemns but in some cases punishes with great severity. A learned Japanese not long ago made public statement of the fact that he could see nothing improper in the prostitution of women. And another Japanese writer put the matter naively in the following passage: "Taking the body of foreign missionaries as a whole, and the native churches as they are, there is one particular in which they have succeeded in impressing on the mind of the Japanese people a very important ethical truth. I refer to the principle of monogamy and personal purity. I do not mean to say that the Japanese people have been as a rule polygamous, or that womanhood among them, especially in the better classes, had not a very high ideal of faithfulness and chastity. But monogamy as the only true principle of social order, and purity as obligatory upon men as upon women, were never clearly understood." Nor, as a matter of fact, are such principles yet understood to any extent, and the social question remains one of the most difficult with which the missionaries have to deal. A true story illustrates the matter better than pages of argument, and the moral may be applied with equal relevancy to both sexes. A Japanese girl, brought up to Buddhism, was sent to a convent to receive a European education, and in the course of time she became a Christian. She learned all the prayers of the Roman Catholic faith, set up a little altar in her home upon which she placed a statue of the Saviour, and for a time

was most devout. Then the restrictions of Christianity became irksome to her, and one day she took down the statue of the Saviour and put a wooden god in its place, saying that the wooden god was more kind to her and more merciful than the god of the Christians. And she became once again a little heathen. A worker of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel raises another point in a report upon work among women in Tōkyō. "It is very difficult not to lose sight of our pupils on their marriage. Two began studying, became irregular in attendance, then stopped coming; and some time after we heard indirectly of the marriage of both. Girls receiving Christian instruction, and indeed many others, enter very reluctantly on their married life, and do not care to speak of the future. They have their marriages arranged as a matter of course, and a Christian girl whose duty it is to support herself if she is not prepared implicitly to obey orders, may any day have to choose between marrying a non-Christian or being considered a nuisance in the family. After marriage, if the husband's family do not even actually stop the bride from having Christian instruction, it is difficult to get opportunities for study, as it is against custom for the ladies to go out much for a considerable time after marriage." Obviously, the spread of a religion which is not only confronted by the long-established customs of the country but by an elastic code in which each person can satisfy his conscience readily on any detail of his conduct, must be slow.

Yet another difficulty is the language, which oftentimes proves a cumbrous and incongruous vehicle for Western teachings. Moreover not all the missionaries can speak Japanese. Their sermons are therefore interpreted, and lose in the process much of their force and argument; for the native interpreter simply declines to interpret anything unpleasant to his countrymen, and the missionary would frequently be very greatly surprised if he knew the complimentary turn that was given to his suggestion of the need for reform in any particular matter of conduct. Happily the churches have combined in the work of translating the Bible. The completion of the Japanese version of the New Testament was celebrated by a united meeting for thanksgiving held at

Tōkyō in 1880; the completion of the Old Testament was similarly celebrated at Yokohama in 1888. In this translation, however, grace and dignity had to be sacrificed to intelligibility for the sake of immediate utility, and there is now a strong desire for a translation which shall convey to the Japanese an adequate idea of the beauty of the text. There is at present, also, a bewildering variety in the presentation of Biblical names, the name of Jesus being rendered in *Kana* in several different ways

Christianity is also in conflict with the widespread agnosticism of Japan. When we find a man of the eminence of the late Prince Itō making the following startling statement, we are not encouraged in the hope that Japan will ever take a place among the Christian nations of the world: "I regard religion itself," said Prince Itō recently, "as quite unnecessary for a nation's life. Science is far above superstition; and what is religion, Buddhist or Christian, but superstition, and therefore a possible source of weakness to a nation? I do not regret the tendency to free-thought and atheism which is almost universal in Japan because I do not regard it as a source of danger to the community." However inconsistent may have been the act, it is to be recorded that Prince Itō made a contribution of 10,000 yen (£1000) towards the expenses of the World's Christian Student Federation, which met in Tōkyō early in 1907. Another notable anti-Christian pronouncement was made in 1907 by an eminent Japanese scholar, Dr. Katō Huiyuki, whose essay had a wide circulation and created a great sensation. Dr. Katō expressed the opinion that Christianity and Buddhism had in the past done more harm than good, since they had proved a constant hindrance to the spread of scientific knowledge. The cosmopolitan character of their teachings, he said, rendered them dangerous to the State. One of Dr. Katō's objections to Christianity in particular is that it places God above the Emperor. "We Japanese," he wrote, "know of no being who is higher than the Emperor." The spread of Christianity in Japan he declared to be the spread of superstition, "and what educated man is there," he asked, "who can look on with complacency while this goes on?" While these sentiments are being expressed in quarters which it is impos-

sible to ignore, other students are crying out for a Japanese Sir Oliver Lodge who will raise his voice and prove that Christianity and science are not incompatible. The Japanese have developed a passion for scientific investigation, and all that this seems to have done for them, combined with the influence of Buddhism and agnosticism, is to produce a national depression in mental outlook. "Japanese writers are becoming more and more pessimistic," says Mr. Hasegawa Tenkei, an expert on Japanese literature. "To-day, when both religion and philosophy have lost their authority, there is nothing that affects us more deeply than the sadness of disillusionment the distress attendant upon a discovery of the real state of things." Commenting on this statement, the *Kirisutokyō Sekai* observes: "The trouble is that our scholars, thinkers, and literary men fail altogether to take cognisance of the existence of spiritual cravings in man. They represent the ideal life as calculated to obscure rather than to reveal truth. They stickle for reality. Well, there is no greater reality than the spiritual nature of man which they have neglected to cultivate." The *Kirisutokyō Sekai* expresses its view very pointedly, but as a matter of fact the real trouble is twofold: Christianity has found Japan in an unfavourable mood for its reception, and Japan has found Christianity at a moment when it is being dissected by the very people whose mission it is to propagate it. Japan is found in an unfavourable mood because, firstly, it is Western knowledge and not Western religion that she wants; and because, secondly, she has, in a Titanic struggle, defeated a powerful Christian nation. She has used the Western religion as a means of securing the Western knowledge, and whether, in absorbing the latter, she will come to appreciate the former, time alone can tell; but the signs are not encouraging. Every missionary in Japan knows of a score of Japanese whose object in seeking the Gospel has been solely to learn the English language and all that it was possible to learn of Western ways and manners. The Japanese, furthermore, have only one mode of treatment for everything that comes from the West, and Christianity has not escaped the process. Their first act has been to pull it to pieces, as a child would a toy, in order to discover crudely what it is made of. There

have been periods, and these neither remote nor infrequent in history, when Christianity might have been dismembered with the most relentless malignity by sages of the East, and in each dismembered fragment would have been found the glowing spark of a living faith—the vital force which is triumphant, the ecstasy which impels the sacrifice of the martyr, the essence of an overwhelming trust that will not prevaricate from the truth even to the obliteration of one word from the Book of Life. It is to be feared that the Christianity of the present day falls somewhat short of this extreme test. Indifference and scepticism, if not actual agnosticism and atheism, prevail largely in Great Britain and in the United States of America—countries which have specially undertaken the introduction of Christianity into Japan; and missionary work in the Orient cannot escape the reflection of the doubts and questionings which find expression even within the Christian churches of Christian nations. There are, of course, earnest ambassadors of Christianity in Japan, but it must be confessed that there are those also who show a disposition to tamper with the faith they are deputed to propagate, and to adopt too readily the attitude of that section of Japanese Christians which holds that Japan, if she is to accept Christianity at all, must evolve her own form of it from the Western materials at her command. Furthermore, it is to be remembered in this connection that to-day is the age of organised religion, of religion directed on business principles; and it is for those interested keenly in missionary work to consider whether missionary effort is not deprived of some of its fruits by the fact that it bears little resemblance to that of the first apostles, and those of their successors, who did in truth leave all and follow Him. The modern missionary is the delegate of an organisation. He is to be found preaching not barefooted by the wayside but in a pleasant little church. He is well clad and well shod. He has his family and all his worldly goods with him, and instead of the humble hut he has for shelter a charming house, sometimes in the European instead of in the less expensive Japanese style, with a delightful flower-scented garden. If he is stationed in Tōkyō—and all the missionary organisations are represented in the capital—he takes part in the social life of the community of his nationality. The click of

he typewriter is often heard in his residence as he replies by report to communications from the headquarters of his organisation. He draws up balance-sheets ; he writes letters in the local foreign papers ; makes speeches at various social and charitable gatherings ; and his church announcements are printed in a methodical way and in an attractive style. There is no harm in all this ; there may be, indeed, much good. It is missionary work under modern conditions. Some of the missionaries in the interior lead very simple lives, but, generally speaking, in all matters of worldly comfort the missionary in Japan is as well off as most Europeans engaged in business and commercial enterprises in that country. How very business-like modern missionary work has become may be realised from the controversies which rage round such questions as the financial relations of churches established in Japan with the parent organisations abroad, the relations of churches in the Japanese provinces to parent churches in the capital or elsewhere, and the problem as to whether money should be accumulated for placing existing churches on a permanent basis instead of being devoted to an extension of missionary work. All this, admittedly, may be very well in its way, but there is ample evidence that missionary work in Japan is influenced not only by the spirit of doubt and questioning which finds expression at the fountain-source of missionary enterprise but also by the materialism of the age.

The period which has seen materialism grow to a height never reached before, which has seen organisation perfected not only in industry but in religion, and which has seen the upspringing of doubts and questionings in matters of faith, is, by a coincidence unfortunate for the spread of Christianity, the very period which has witnessed the invasion of the Japanese into the fields of Western thought and knowledge. It has found the Japanese not only devouring such sources of knowledge as were available in their own country, but wandering abroad, with a knowledge of languages which ten years ago they did not possess to anything like the same extent, in an endeavour to understand the principles of Western civilisation, and subjecting that civilisation to the most merciless, and, let us say with some reservation, the most unreliable of

all tests—judgment by results. We may use the word “unreliable” as applied to judgment by results with special reference, of course, to Christianity, because in this case, if the results are found to be less satisfactory than it might seem they should be, the fault must be held to lie, as doubtless it lies in many other matters than religion, not in the Christian doctrines themselves but in the manner of their observance. And this distinction the Japanese, with somewhat superficial outlook, have failed utterly to mark. The Japanese leave their own country with curiosity regarding Christianity among other things. They go to America, and they find commercialism a Creed. They come to England, and find—the Rev R. J. Campbell and the New Theology. They come to London, and they find Piccadilly Circus with its stale atmosphere in the morning like that of a restaurant from which the guests have fled, with its delusive glare of lights by night, its overflowing music-halls, its lounges and its neighbouring cafés with their motley and easy-bearing crowds of patrons, its midnight rush by hansom cabs into the darkness. And forgetting that if religion itself be the test, then their own Buddhism fails, and that if its fruits be the test their own country has its Yoshiwara, the City of Endless Night; forgetting the pitiable status of their own women; forgetting their own laws of easy divorce; forgetting that in their own country a wife may be supplemented by a concubine; forgetting that not alone the sadness of Piccadilly but all the scourges of the West engage the earnest, tireless efforts of whole communities to whom Christianity has taught the lesson of purity, and that these efforts, while they do not eradicate, at least tend to check and minimise the evils from which no country is entirely free—forgetting all these things they return to their own country to undo the work of the missionaries, or to say that if their teaching is accepted at all it must be revised; to condemn it altogether in some cases, and to proclaim in others that Japan may have a mission to teach Christianity to the Christians, and this a new Christianity, an adapted, a modified Christianity.

The result of all these influences is the cry for a new religion which is heard in Japan to-day. There is no complaint that the missionaries have failed in their work; there is no

charge of lack of harmony. The different branches of Methodism have united; the American Episcopal Church and the Church of England combined the result of their efforts into one church—the Church of Japan; Scottish and American Presbyterianism is in union; and Congregationalism is a solid body. The Christian sects, indeed, have set an example in this respect to Buddhism. There are those who predict that the process of unity will be carried still further, and that the next step will be the union of the Christian sects, so that there shall be only one Christian Church. But whether the sects remain as now constituted, or merge themselves into one church, there are signs that Japan will evoke a Christianity different from that which we know in the West—so different, that the result will be verily a new religion. In proof of this movement we may cite the words of Dr. Inouye Tetsujirō, who pursued philosophical studies in Germany and France, is the author of works on Buddhism, and has been Professor of Literature at the Imperial Tōkyō University since 1900: “The Christianity that has come to this country,” he writes, “has not so far been sufficiently Japonicised to take the place of the old faiths in the minds of the people generally. Japanese Christianity will doubtless yet undergo many transformations. Unless Christianity is altered greatly it cannot suit Japanese taste. It is certainly a great evil to have in this country various religions confronting each other without having a point of union. It is confusing to our young men to hear Buddhists saying one thing, Christians another, and Shintōists and Confucianists something different again. . . . I think it most desirable that there should be only one religion throughout the world, but as none of the historical creeds suits the modern world there is nothing for it but to construct a new creed by amalgamating all the best elements of Western and Eastern religions. The present is a very suitable time for attempting to do this. . . . It is no longer possible for this modern progressive world of ours to bind itself down to follow the teaching of traditional Christianity or traditional Buddhism. Religion can no longer be based on the authority of men who lived some two thousand years ago. It must rest on the convictions of our deepest thinkers and of our best informed scholars. The tendency of modern reli-

gious thought both in the East and the West is all in one direction. It is in favour of abolishing the element of race, the element of nationality, the elements of exclusiveness, narrowness, and prejudice, and of founding a religion that the devout and the reverential of all countries can accept and endeavour to live up to." Dr. Inouye goes on to say that there is one characteristic that the Japanese have which is not found to the same degree in any Western country, and that is a thorough absence of religious bigotry. How recent is this absence of bigotry so far as the State itself is concerned has been shown in the fact that not until 1899 was a law passed placing all religions on one footing; how recent it is, so far as the people are concerned, has been shown by examples of Buddhist opposition to Christianity. Dr. Inouye adds: "In religious matters we are open-minded, free to take what seems to us worthy of adoption." The danger of this process of adoption is emphasised by a writer quoted below, who points out that it has ever been Japan's habit to borrow the creeds of other countries, and to lower rather than raise the standards of such creeds. Dr. Inouye goes on: "Western countries are all so tied to one form of faith that none of them will ever originate a new religion. We Japanese alone can do that. We regard all religions impartially, and are wedded to none exclusively. It comes to this, then, that Japan's mission is to construct a cosmopolitan religion. If asked what is the prevailing tendency of the religious world to-day, I say it is the blending of ideas and doctrines derived from different sources. Buddhists are learning from Christians and Christians from Buddhists. The spirit of the age is in favour of religious union, and men are searching for a suitable basis for that union." Dr. Inouye's craving for a new religion is the outcome of his philosophy. A similar craving inspired by a process altogether different is expressed by the Rev. R. Minami, a highly educated pastor of one of the Japanese churches founded by German Protestants. He says nothing is more certain than that Christianity existed long before the doctrinal accretions which it received in the early centuries of the Christian era. To believe in Christ and to believe in the doctrines held by certain churches is radically different. The doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of sin, the doctrine

of the Atonement, the doctrine of the Divinity of Christ are supposed to be an essential part of Christianity, but belief in these is not really necessary for becoming a Christian. Christians can study the life of Christ and model their own by it. Theological discussions need not trouble them in any way. Arguments about the existence of God, the soul, and what not are of little use to devout minds. Having freed themselves from all the trammels which ages of church teaching have imposed on them, modern advanced Christians can attach to themselves all that is of value in modern science and modern thought. Practical devoutness and free thought need no longer stand apart in unnatural schism. The time is ripe for a religion that shall combine all that is best in Christianity with that activity of intellect, untiring pursuit of truth, and strict adherence to impartial principle which the schools of modern science embody. Other Japanese Christian ministers have expressed views somewhat similar to these. The writer of the Summary of the Religious Press in the *Japan Daily Mail* observes: "The Roman Catholics, the Greek Church Christians, and all orthodox Protestants of whatever sect maintain that belief in miracles is essential to the existence of Christianity as a distinct creed. To them, numbers of Protestant teachers in Japan to-day appear to be no Christians at all. Never a month passes but the irreconcilableness of the two opinions concerning what is essential and what non-essential in the Christian creed is emphasised by writers of rival schools of thought in this country." The Rev. D. Ebina, a Japanese Congregational minister, confesses that Pantheism has its spell upon him. The ethical part of religion is its most important part. To him, Confucianism appears to be a religion. The Rev. S. Uemura, a Presbyterian, says: "True Christianity has not come to this country yet. We are just where Rome was when she accepted Christianity. But the true faith will come later." An article in the *Seikyō Shimpō* (Greek Church) says the trouble seems to be that modern missionary work is run on too expensive a scale, and that more of the principles of the first apostles is required. Another article in this paper points out that in the past it has ever been Japan's habit to borrow religions and ethical systems of thought from other countries and to mould

borrowed doctrines into shapes that best suit her. But she has proved herself singularly wanting in the power of influencing other countries to the extent of inducing them to accept her teaching. . . . The religious teachers she has produced are not to be named in the same day with Shaka, Confucius, and Mencius. . . . And the changes she has made have not been for the better. The creeds have been secularised instead of being spiritualised. "Nobody can maintain," the writer proceeds, "that Japanese Buddhism and Japanese Confucianism are superior to the highest types of Buddhism and Confucianism in China and other countries. That standards have been lowered rather than raised here admits of no doubt." And this paper complains that even Christianity is being secularised in Japan. An article headed "The Religion of Future Japan," in the *Kirisutokyō Sekai*, contained the following interesting passage: "We are Christians, and we believe that Christianity in a thoroughly Japonicised form will be the religion of the Japanese people in the future. To-day this is how things stand: Shintō has the advantage of being practically, if not legally and formally, the State religion. Its connection with the Imperial House and with ancestral worship generally gives it great strength. Buddhism's *forte* is its position among the lower orders, its command of large numbers compared with other creeds. Christianity has its great energy, its connection with Western civilisation, and its readiness to adapt itself to the progress of the modern world to depend on. These qualities in Christianity will, in our opinion, secure its final success. But instead of exterminating existing creeds, it will certainly embody all that is best in them in its own form of belief. With the large importations that this will imply, Japanese Christianity in future will differ materially from any form of Christianity known to history. It will have borrowed from Confucianism much of its fine moral teaching. It will be indebted to Buddhism for ideas which it has done far more to elucidate, emphasise, and apply than Christianity has attempted, and from Shintō it will take such elements as are part and parcel of Japanese nationality. This new form of Christianity will have little resemblance to the European and American form originally introduced into this country." It can

readily be imagined, more especially by Western Christians, that the Christianity so evolved will indeed be changed beyond all recognition, a poor and lamentable ending for the missionary effort that has been lavished in the forms of human energy and material treasure. The writer quoted thus enlarges on his outline of the new religion : " All traces of the narrowness, the bigotry, the dogmatism, the intolerance of difference of opinion which stand out so prominently in the history of Western Christianity will have been removed, and for Christendom a new heaven and a new earth will have been created." It is naively conceded that time will be required for reaching " this grand consummation," but that it will be reached the writer entertains " no manner of doubt." He adds that in taking part in this movement the Japanese are following their natural national instincts, but at the same time they cannot but feel that by their action in this matter they may be able to render a service to religion from which the whole of Christendom will derive immense benefits. Not only is Christianity to be " Japonicised," but the form of Christianity thus evolved is to be offered to the world as the true Light. How ill-fitted the Japanese are to tamper with Christianity in any respect whatever may be judged by the backward state of Japanese Christian literature. A Japanese writer has complained that not only has Japan no Christian magazine of a thoroughly learned type, but no attempt has yet been made to supply the country with the great Christian literary masterpieces of Europe ; and he instances such works as Milton's " Paradise Lost," Klopstock's " Messiah," Dante's " Inferno," and Tennyson's " In Memoriam," a list which might be improved upon by substitution if not by addition. It is admitted that Japan is unable to produce itself anything to equal these works, and that it lacks even elementary Sunday-school text-books. The writer adds that what Japanese Christianity needs to-day are (1) Good translations of standard Christian works ; (2) High-class representative magazines ; (3) Original works on Christian thought ; and (4) Christian class-books. It might have been supposed that the Japanese would have postponed the Japonicisation of Christianity until these wants, at any rate, had been supplied. But as a sample of the process that is already in operation the efforts of Mr Itō Chōshin, a well-known Bud-

dhist priest, 'are worthy of mention. He has formed the *Mugayen no dōhō*, the Unselfish Brotherhood, and has about thirty young men studying at his school. "Many people," he says, "seem at a loss to comprehend exactly what is meant by the religion of unselfishness and love which I preach. Now, the central idea of Buddhism is unselfishness, and the central idea of Christianity is love for others. Though they use different terms, the two greatest religions of the world both try to lead men to live for others instead of for themselves. As for throwing light on the origin of the world, neither religion can do that. They both treat the world of things and mankind as they find it, and they teach us that all that is best in the great universe, as far as it is known to us, comes from self-sacrifice and devotion to others. I have been asked whether in setting up a new form of faith—a kind of semi-Christian and semi-Buddhism—I intend to make use of ceremonies. To this I reply that I fail to see the need of this. There are not a few people in the world to-day who, while liking religion, dislike ceremonies of all kinds. My teaching suits the like of these." This is a sample of Japonicised Christianity from the Buddhist side. A sample from the Christian side is the letter of a Methodist layman to the *Gokyo*, urging the importance of revising the Methodist creed, and "bringing it up to date." There are, he alleges, many articles in it which hardly anybody either believes in or practises, such, for instance, as an article enjoining fasting. (And yet, it may be observed, fasting is a not unimportant feature of Buddhism.) The new Japanese Church, he suggests, should start afresh, drawing up a creed such as expresses the sincere belief of Japanese Methodist Christians to-day. The majority of these care not one straw for the many "isms" that have sprung out of old controversies in Europe and America. They are, in point of fact, neither Wesleyans nor Calvinists, and are not at all interested in the predestination and free-will controversy. Methodist laymen, says the writer, look to the leaders of the new church to make use of the unique opportunity afforded them for getting rid of the fossilised parts of the Methodist creed which were imported into this country (Japan) from the West by the missionaries, but which no Japanese church acting independently should dream of retaining. The late

Bishop Awdry, for many years associated with the Church of Japan, was also concerned about the form which Christianity may take in Japan. While the missionaries are in power, he said, the Japanese pastors naturally refrain from making or suggesting alterations in doctrine, organisation, or ceremony. He quoted the remark of a Japanese, "Selection will begin after the missionaries have gone." Bishop Awdry thought that while the missionaries remained in the country each sect would go on proclaiming its "isms," but their departure would be the signal for a series of experiments. Change would follow change until the final stage was reached, and that which commended itself to the mind of the native Church as the fittest would survive. If this is to be the course of events, it is not difficult to perceive that a new system of theology which will aim at blending Oriental and Occidental thought will certainly be elaborated in Japan. Bishop Awdry held that, with the object of guiding the new movement in the best channels, a high-class theological seminary should be founded, and the project seems likely to materialise. It is proposed to have at least five chairs—one for lectures in fundamental Christian doctrine; one for lectures on the bearing of Christianity on current topics and human life; one for lectures on the Old Testament and the teaching of Hebrew; one for lectures on the New Testament and the teaching of Greek; and one for ecclesiastical history and church organisation; and it is proposed to invite the co-operation of Oxford and Cambridge as well as that of certain American and Canadian divinity halls in carrying out the scheme.

A review of the prospects of Christianity in Japan would be incomplete without reference to a movement which has arisen to attempt to bridge the gulf which prevails at present between Buddhism and Christianity, and thus make easier the way by which the Christian Gospel may reach the people. The basis of this movement is as yet too fragile for any prediction as to the effect it may have on religion in Japan, but the line upon which it is proceeding is indicated by two notable contributions which have made their appearance recently. One of these is a long article in the *Japan Mail* by a writer

who remains anonymous; the other is by Professor Lloyd, to whose Buddhist investigations reference has previously been made. The first is in the main an analytical summary of the Rev. S. Beal's translation of the *Sutra* known as the *Abhinishkramana Sutra*, which gives an account of Buddha's life singularly like the account of the life of Christ as we have it in the gospels, "with extra matter thrown in to suit the story to the necessities of the case." In his introduction the writer tells us how, according to Chinese Chronicles, the Emperor Ming-ti had a vision in the year 61 A.D., which his wise men told him meant that a great sage had been recently born into the world, and the Emperor in consequence sent an embassy to make inquiries. It was not the first embassy of the kind. The Chinese had already sent one which had reached the Persian Gulf, and the Scythian kings between the two grindstones of China and Rome were much interested in one who should be born as a "world-ruler." The ambassadors came to Peshawur, the capital of the Scythian kings, and the Scythians, instead of telling them that their sage Sakyamuni had been born some centuries before and so hardly came within the scope of the message, sent the ambassadors back to China with a white horse laden with manuscripts and with images of the Buddha, and thus by a piece of sharp practice got first on the field. Of the books thus taken, the *Abhinishkramana Sutra*, which the writer analyses, is said to have been one. Should all this be truth, and not fable, how easily might China and consequently Japan have been Christian empires to-day! In his analytical summary the writer points out that long before 61 A.D., when the Chinese Emperor's embassy was misled at Peshawur, the Christian gospel history must have reached Afghanistan by the crowded trade routes which connected India and China with the Roman Empire both by land and sea. He continues: "The primitive Buddhist story is simple, so is the corresponding Christian one; our writer's stories are always much more elaborate than either. It is not Christianity that has taken from Buddhism; it is the *Mahāyāna* that has taken the primitive elements of both and combined them for its own purpose." Professor Lloyd's contribution is associated with a tragic occurrence which has only to be mentioned to enlist the sympathy of all students of the

religions of the East. He lost the whole of the manuscripts of two books by a fire which unfortunately occurred at the printer's. With the enthusiasm of the true student, however, he wrote a summary of his works for the *Japan Weekly Mail* of March 7, 1908. In this he states that his book was intended as an attempt at the solution of certain important problems connected with the rival claims of Sakyamuni and Christ, a question which will have to be faced sooner or later by all those who take an interest in the religious problems of the Far East. "Sakyamuni," writes Professor Lloyd "is far too great a personage (I might almost call him a Being) to be made light of by any but the ignorant and flippant, and the man who can propound the true solution of the relation which Sakyamuni bears to Christ will have built a permanent bridge between the spiritual East and the religious West. And there is no telling how great and far-reaching might be the good results for the uplifting of the world arising from such a harmonisation of conflicting claims." Professor Lloyd places Shaka's birth about the middle of the sixth century B.C. and his death about 480 B.C. He is made the contemporary not only of the earliest Hindoo philosophers, but also of the Hebrew prophets of the Captivity, and we may well suppose that during the forty-five years of his ministry his teaching underwent very striking change. Professor Lloyd discusses the *Mahāyana* and *Hinayana* distinction which arose on the death of Sakyamuni, and says that during the last three centuries before our era there was a difference in the political circumstances of the two divisions of Buddhism which served to accentuate further the divergencies between them. Whilst the Indian Buddhists remained at home, confronted with purely Indian thoughts and beliefs, the extra-Indian, or Sakyan, Mahāyānist rubbed up against the Greek and Parthian (to say nothing of the half-Chinese peoples on the Western frontiers of the Celestial Empire) in a way that cannot have failed to modify his views in many respects. He proceeds: "I have spoken of Christianity and *Mahāyana* as two parallel faiths, originating in the same fruitful sixth century before Christ, in the Hebrew prophets of the Captivity, in the Indian reformer in the valley of the Ganges. I have spoken of them again as each experiencing

a new revival and expansion at a period fraught with the greatest issues for the human race, the period when the Buddhist said that 'the Buddha had appeared again in the lifetime of As'vaghosha,' and the Christian turned to worship at the cradle of Bethlehem. I have shown Buddhism working its way through the agnosticism of Sakyamuni, the polytheism of the 'Expansion,' the Henotheism of the Amidaist, to the Mandala, the *pleroma*, which comprises to itself all things divine, and is called the Eternal, self-originated Buddha. I have shown Christ in whom the whole *pleroma* of the Godhead dwells in human form. It is hard to resist the conclusion that the two—the Eternal Sakyamuni and the Eternal Christ—are meant to represent the same person, and that the last phase of the *Māhāyāna* received its developing influence from the manifestation of Christ to the Gentiles. I would not wish it to be understood that I advocate a fusion into one of Christianity and the *Māhāyāna*. But I can see that if what I have said be true, there may follow a gradual turning of Buddhism towards Christ in such a way that without abating one jot of the great respect which all religious men should have for Sakyamuni there shall be a further recognition of that higher reverence which we shall feel, and in conduct show, for Christ as the fulfiller of all that Sakyamuni taught and revealed, and which rightly belongs to Him as the only Being of whom it can be said that He was proved to be the Son of God with power by the Resurrection from the dead. It is on the Resurrection that St. Paul always lays his special stress. If the ghost of my dead book could speak it would say in German, 'alles auf Erden muss zu Aschen werden.' And then it would add, not with absolute confidence certainly, but with quiet hope, 'Resurgam,' not perhaps from the pen of the present writer, but certainly from the pen of some other. For what I have said is a seed for which I desire a better fate than that it should just fall by the wayside and be carried away."

In this general survey we find Japan with 160,000 Christians in a population of fifty million souls after thirty-five years' missionary work. We find this body hampered by the difficulty of reconciling the newly accepted faith with existing custom; extremely anxious to be independent of foreign

guidance and foreign financial assistance as soon as possible ; and eager to develop its constitution out of the materials to which the West has introduced it. We find the great mass of the people ill-disposed to accept Christianity freely because it imposes a stricter rule of life ; because it is opposed by a Buddhist priesthood fighting for its own existence ; because it is antagonistic to some national conceptions, and is the subject of grave misconceptions ; because some members of the one generation of scientists which the country can boast have told them that science and Christianity are incompatible ; and because the national temperament in all such matters is one of indifference and inexactitude. In these circumstances what is the future of Christianity in Japan ? No definite answer is possible. The future of Christianity in Japan depends upon conditions which have not developed. There are indications which might give some superficial ground for the fear that Japan may use Christianity in so far as it may aid her in the attainment of Western knowledge, and that when it ceases to be of service in this respect it will be flung aside. But such an impression would be formed without due regard to several important considerations. In the first place, Western civilisation is certain, in the process of time, to undermine the influence of Shintō. Another means must eventually be found of fostering loyalty to the throne, piety in the household, and patriotism among the people generally than the groundless traditions and superstitious observances of "The Way of the Gods." Secondly, Western civilisation must inevitably, in the course of time, weaken the silent power of the thousands of gods of wood and stone which are the outward and visible sign of Buddhism. Western civilisation will also conquer superstition. The day must assuredly come when business negotiations will not be liable to collapse at the dictates of a fortune-teller. And while Western civilisation is taking the sting out of Shintō and Buddhism with their attendant superstitions, only one of two things can happen—Christianity must progress or the Empire must sink still farther into the depths of agnosticism. Finally, it is to be remembered that Christianity is not to be so easily cast aside. Christianity is a stubborn tree. As history has shown us, the centuries of persecution which

followed the banishment of the early Jesuits could not stamp out the faith. The little bands of Christians that were discovered around Nagasaki in 1864 point the moral to those Japanese who would palter with a creed. Christianity, in the absence of such persecution and prohibition as followed the Jesuit invasion, must now be considered as a permanent element in the organic life of Japan. Its strength as an institution is another matter, depending upon the appeal which it is able to make to the sympathy of the people. But the essential fact is that it is there, and in a form that is substantial. Japan has its solid body of Christians, its native Christian ministers, its native bishop, and its Christian churches, schools, and hospitals. And Christianity has the influence of adherents in high places. Its development now rests upon conditions the nature of which has been outlined. The movement to adapt Christianity, to evolve a cosmopolitan religion, cannot be regarded without apprehension by Western Christians who have devoted energy and treasure to the propagation of the gospel in Japan. The movement is characteristic of the people, who adopt nothing that they do not subsequently adapt. The haste with which it has been initiated is not less characteristic. Sufficient has probably been written to show that Christianity's great need in Japan to-day is a statesman-missionary. The problems with which he would be confronted would not be unworthy of the finest and most far-seeing intellect. He would ascertain to what extent Christianity conflicts with custom, and he would endeavour to smooth the way to a more adequate official recognition. He would endeavour to reply to every objection which might be raised against Christianity. A theologian, he would endeavour to satisfy the scruples of the critical in matters of faith; acquainted with the progress of modern science, he would contest the argument that science is opposed to religion; a philosopher, he would enlarge the view of earnest students among the Japanese. He would be a dominating personality who would command the respect of the statesmen and the professors and the leaders of all movements in Japan. His words and his writings would be translated and would be widely read, and his eminence would

introduce him to the highest quarters. And he would deal with the Japonicised Christianity movement in a statesman-like manner. There is much talk about a cosmopolitan religion to be evolved, but no precise indication of the materials of which it should be composed. He would meet the spokesmen of the movement, and ask them frankly what is wrong with Christianity that it should be Japonicised. He would be the well-equipped opponent of the high-priests of Buddhism whose mental attainments are by no means to be disregarded. He would answer the question—Has Buddhism failed Japan that it should be supplanted? Buddhism must be held to have failed because it is not from within but from without that Japan attained her present power. It was the ambassadors of Christian nations, Commodore Perry and Lord Elgin, who opened the country to the forces of Western knowledge and civilisation. Japan claims a civilisation of her own, and this she did undoubtedly possess. But if it had been an adequate civilisation she would not have needed to tap the mental and material resources of the West. It was not an adequate civilisation. Christianity has already taught Japan to take care of the leper. It will have to teach her to give her women a higher place, to have regard even for the animals. It will have to give her a nobler and a wider outlook. It will have to reform those deficiencies in the character of the people which are pointed out elsewhere. It will have to teach Japan the virtues of faith, hope, and charity, and that the greatest of these is charity. It has much to teach that Buddhism has not taught, and a great Christian leader might point the way to enlightenment. But it is not easy to see how such a man could be placed in Japan to represent Christianity in its highest form. In order to accomplish his task with any measure of success he would have to be detached from the existing Christian bodies and yet be accepted as their spokesman in matters of the greatest import, and even if the man were at hand such an arrangement would be difficult to bring about. The next most practical step is on the lines of that suggested by the late Bishop Awdry in the passage we have quoted. It is for the Christian leaders on the spot to guide the new movement; and in the future a great man may rise to the

episcopacy among the Japanese themselves who will be able to accomplish what no foreigner can achieve. One thing is certain, Christianity is in Japan, and one can but say, "Lead, Kindly Light."¹

¹ Early this year (1912) the Vice-Minister of the Interior, with the support of many of the leading statesmen, was responsible for an ambitious scheme to bring the three religions, Christianity, Shintō, and Buddhism, into closer relationship with each other and with the State. In a circular issued to the press the following passage occurred:—

"Christianity ought to step out of the narrow circle within which it is confined, and endeavour to adapt itself to the national sentiments and customs, and to conform to the national polity, in order to ensure greater achievements. Japan has adopted a progressive policy in politics and economics in order to share in the blessings of Western civilisation. It is desirable to bring Western thought and faith into harmonious relationship with Japanese thought and faith in the spiritual world."

A scheme which disregards the irreconcilability of fundamental beliefs is destined to fail.

XXV

THE STATUS OF WOMEN

AT the present moment when the status of women in all countries throughout the world is attracting considerable attention, the position held by women in Japan, a nation admittedly in the van of Oriental progress, presents problems of the first importance to the students of sociology. The subject is clearly one of absorbing interest, and its discussion has already evolved many striking theories revealing a wide divergence of views. In the first place, the question has arisen as to what extent, if to any extent at all, the influence of the women of Japan has been responsible for the extraordinary transition that has been witnessed during the last fifty years in the national life of the country. It is not easy to imagine how a satisfactory answer can be forthcoming to such a question, involving as it must the mere expression of opinion rather than a reasoned judgment based on conclusive investigation. Indeed, were it possible to show by a reference to recent history that her women had contributed in a positive degree to Japan's phenomenal advancement, then nothing could bar the way to an experiment as novel as it would be elaborate—the emancipation of women. Japanese opinion itself is widely at variance on the subject; and it follows that the State, beyond providing ordinary educational facilities, has not been able to formulate a serious policy that is calculated to bring about an amelioration in the unhappy lot of women. Both State and individual are in a quandary in regard to this all-important matter. At present every indication points to the fact that the solution will find itself. Forces are at work which no human power can at this stage divert. True, Japan is not alone in grappling with the problem of women's proper status in the scheme of mankind; but no one will deny that, in a land fettered by

the still potent influence of centuries of Oriental usage, the problem must of necessity be more vital than it is elsewhere. It was inevitable that with the coming of Western civilisation women should derive some of its benefits; for it is inconceivable, even of a country like Japan, that the advantages gained by the rapid assimilation of certain features of Western enlightenment could have been monopolised in their entirety by one sex in a community of forty millions of people. The women themselves had something to say in the matter, and although, so far, they have only been able to make their voice heard in faint murmurings, these are gradually gathering force so that with little imagination it is already possible to see in the future the beginning of a movement that will inevitably lead to the shaping of new and better conditions. In this direction, as in other no less important spheres of progress, Japan will find that an experimental policy tending towards idealism will be defeated by circumstances over which she, as a State, cannot hope to have any effective control. In other words, that quality of adaptability which she is supposed to possess in a peculiarly marked degree and for which she has been so frequently and so warmly commended by Western observers, will have its strict limitations. Time alone will show that she cannot dissect Western civilisation, graft the chosen parts on to her own tree of knowledge, and wake to find aught but a crop of exceedingly bitter fruit. For the sake of her own existence, and with a none too willing grace, she sought the light of the West. She has chosen her course, and it can lead only to one end—the establishment for better or for worse of conditions similar to those that exist in Western countries. In this consideration the status of the mothers of the race occupies first place. The State is seeking to delay the improvement of that status for reasons which upon the surface appear to possess the merit of wisdom. A more critical examination of these reasons, however, will render it questionable whether or not the attitude of the State will in the end prove to have been altogether far-sighted, or whether it would not be wiser to recognise the inevitable and to pave the way not only by educating the women, but also by educating the men in their

treatment of the women, for the acceptance of that high standard in the relationship of the sexes which is the true and fundamental basis of real civilisation. The reluctance to interfere with the status of women as at present constituted arises from two primary motives. The first of these bears a relation to the individual, and is in its essence undeniably selfish. Woman, if not in the strict sense of the term the slave of man, is at least the drudge of the home. She is not allowed to interfere with the pleasures of her lord and master, no matter how irregular or even immoral these may be. In short, she is domesticated to a degree that is nothing more or less than serfdom. It is recognised that her emancipation might possibly lead to a diminution of man's comfort in the home, and to a restriction of his pleasures outside the home. The second motive has a direct bearing upon the interests of State. It cannot be too clearly understood that the status of women in Japan is to a far greater degree than that of the women of the Western countries bound up with the fabric of society. To bring about any drastic changes would therefore strike at the very foundations of the State itself. It would mean, in short, a re-shaping of the system of family life upon which the Japanese claim that their greatness as a nation has been largely built up. To appreciate thoroughly the significance of this aspect of the question it is essential that the advancement of the country, stage by stage from the period of remote history, should be fully borne in mind. Ancient records show that at one time women were not looked upon as the inferior of men. Mention is made of several empresses who reigned with distinction, and notable among these was the Empress Jingō, who undertook the conquest of Korea, and whose character appears to have resembled in many respects that of Queen Elizabeth; of authoresses and poetesses whose works are included in the classics of Eastern literature; and of innumerable women renowned for their wisdom and learning. The gradual spread of Buddhism which entered the country through the medium of Chinese evangelists created the belief that women were full of sin and impurity and placed them in a position of inferiority, inasmuch as it forbade their entry into holy places on the ground that their presence would defile the

sacred surroundings. The Hindu tenet of threefold obedience—when young, obey your parents; when married, obey your husband; when widowed, obey your son—was generally accepted, and to-day constitutes a fundamental definition of the status of Japanese women. Moreover, the seven reasons for divorce of Chinese origin were popularly accepted. These were: (1) disobedience to the husband's parents; (2) childlessness; (3) licentiousness; (4) over-jealousy; (5) leprosy and other kindred diseases; (6) over-talkativeness; (7) committing a theft. The teachings of Confucius set the seal upon the social system of Japan, inasmuch as they rendered filial piety, from which originated the doctrine of unquestioning loyalty to the sacred throne of the Mikados, the ruling principle not only of the family but also of the community. According to one school of Japanese sociologists the fundamental principle upon which the social system was based was not belief in the inferiority of women so much as the superior claims of the family or household. In other words, it was held that the family was a unit in the preservation of which no sacrifice was too great. If, therefore, a wife proved herself to be in any way hostile to the true interests of the household it was her duty "having come from another family into this," to leave. Moreover, under such circumstances her expulsion by others was deemed to be an obligation to the ancestral spirits. The wife obeyed the husband because he was the head of the household. In like manner a widow obeyed the eldest son, and a father who was leading a life of retirement subjected himself to similar authority. Instances not infrequently occurred in which young men felt it incumbent upon themselves to divorce their wives for no other reason than that they interfered with the peace of the household.

In his standard work, "Things Japanese," Chamberlain quotes a treatise by the celebrated moralist Kaibara, which, he adds, faithfully sums up the ideas hitherto prevalent in Japan concerning the relations between the two sexes. From this interesting document, entitled "The Whole Duty of Woman," the following extracts are taken:—

"Seeing that it is a girl's destiny, on reaching womanhood, to go to a new home, and live in submission to her father-in-

law and mother-in-law, it is even more incumbent upon her than it is on a boy to receive with all reverence her parents' instructions. Should her parents, through excess of tenderness, allow her to grow up self-willed, she will infallibly show herself capricious in her husband's house, and thus alienate his affection, while, if her father-in-law be a man of correct principles, the girl will find the yoke of these principles intolerable. She will hate and decry her father-in-law, and the end of these domestic dissensions will be her dismissal from her husband's house, and the covering of herself with ignominy. Her parents, forgetting the faulty education they gave her, may indeed lay all the blame on the father-in-law. But they will be in error; for the whole disaster should rightly be attributed to the faulty education the girl received from her parents.

"More precious in a woman is a virtuous heart than a face of beauty. The vicious woman's heart is ever excited; she glares wildly around her, she vents her anger on others, her words are harsh and her accent vulgar. When she speaks, it is to set herself above others, to upbraid others, to envy others, to be puffed up with individual pride, to jeer at others, to outdo others—all things at variance with the 'way' in which a woman should walk. The only qualities that befit a woman are gentle obedience, chastity, mercy, and quietness.

"From her earliest youth, a girl should observe the line of demarcation separating women from men; and never, even for an instant, should she be allowed to see or hear the slightest impropriety. . . . A woman going abroad at night must in all cases carry a lighted lantern, and (not to speak of strangers) she must observe a certain distance in her intercourse even with her husband and with her brothers. . . .

"In China, marriage is called *returning*, for the reason that a woman must consider her husband's home as her own, and that, when she marries, she is therefore returning to her own home. However humble and needy may be her husband's position, she must find no fault with him, but consider the poverty of the household which it has pleased Heaven to give her as the ordering of an unpropitious fate. The sage of old taught that, once married, she must never leave her husband's house. Should she forsake the 'way,'

and be divorced, shame shall cover her till her latest hour. .

“It is the chief duty of a girl living in the parental house to practise filial piety towards her father and mother. But after marriage, her chief duty is to honour her father-in-law and mother-in-law—to honour them beyond her own father and mother—to love and reverence them with all ardour, and to tend them with every practice of filial piety. While thou honourest thine own parents, think not lightly of thy father-in-law! Never should a woman fail, night and morning, to pay her respects to her father-in-law and mother-in-law. Never should she be remiss in performing any tasks they may require of her. With all reverence must she carry out, and never rebel against, her father-in-law’s commands. On every point must she inquire of her father-in-law and mother-in-law, and abandon herself to their direction. Even if thy father-in-law and mother-in-law be pleased to hate and vilify thee, be not angry with them, and murmur not! If thou carry piety towards them to its utmost limits, and minister to them in all sincerity, it cannot be but that they will end by becoming friendly to thee.

“A woman has no particular lord. She must look to her husband as her lord, and must serve him with all worship and reverence, not despising or thinking lightly of him. The great life-long duty of a woman is obedience. In her dealings with her husband, both the expression of her countenance and the style of her address should be courteous, humble, and conciliatory, never peevish and intractable, never rude and arrogant—that should be a woman’s first and chiefest care. When the husband issues his instructions, the wife must never disobey them. In doubtful cases, she should inquire of her husband, and obediently follow his commands. If ever her husband should inquire of her, she should answer to the point;—to answer in a careless fashion were a mark of rudeness. Should her husband be roused at any time to anger, she must obey him with fear and trembling, and not set herself up against him in anger and frowardness. A woman should look on her husband as if he were Heaven itself, and never weary of thinking how she may yield to her husband, and thus escape celestial castigation.

"As brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law are the brothers and sisters of a woman's husband, they deserve all her reverence. Should she lay herself open to the ridicule and dislike of her husband's kindred, she would offend her parents-in-law, and do harm even to herself, whereas, if she lives on good terms with them, she will likewise rejoice the hearts of her parents-in-law. Again, she should cherish, and be intimate with, the wife of her husband's elder brother—yea, with special warmth of affection should she reverence her husband's elder brother and her husband's elder brother's wife, esteeming them as she does her own elder brother and elder sister.

"Let her never even dream of jealousy. If her husband be dissolute, she must expostulate with him, but never either nurse or vent her anger . . . Should her husband act ill and unreasonably, she must compose her countenance and soften her voice to remonstrate with him; and if he be angry and listen not to the remonstrance, she must wait over a season, and then expostulate with him again when his heart is softened. Never set thyself up against thy husband with harsh features and a hoisterous voice!

"A woman should be circumspect and sparing in her use of words; and never, even for a passing moment, should she slander others or be guilty of untruthfulness; . . . for it is the retailing of calumny that disturbs the harmony of kinsmen and ruins the peace of families.

"A woman must be ever on the alert, and keep a strict watch over her own conduct. In the morning she must rise early, and at night go late to rest. Instead of sleeping in the middle of the day, she must be intent on the duties of her household, and must not weary of weaving, sewing, and spinning. Of tea and wine she must not drink overmuch, nor must she feed her eyes and ears with theatrical performances, ditties, and ballads. To temples (whether Shintō or Buddhist) and other like places, where there is a great concourse of people, she should go but sparingly till she has reached the age of forty.

"She must not let herself be led astray by mediums and divinresses and enter into an irreverent familiarity with the gods, neither should she be constantly occupied in praying. If only she satisfactorily perform her duties as a human being,

she may let prayer alone without ceasing to enjoy the divine protection.

"In her capacity of wife, she must keep her husband's household in proper order. . . .

". . . Her personal adornments and the colour and pattern of her garments should be unobtrusive. It suffices for her to be neat and cleanly in her person and in her wearing apparel. It is wrong in her, by an excess of care, to obtrude herself on the notice of others. . . .

". . . At New Year, on the Five Festivals, and on other like occasions, she should first pay her respects to those of her husband's house, and then to her own parents. Without her husband's permission, she must go nowhere, neither should she make any gifts on her own responsibility.

"As a woman rears up posterity, not to her own parents, but to her father-in-law and mother-in-law, she must value the latter even more than the former, and tend them with all filial piety. Her visits, also, to the paternal house should be rare after marriage . . .

"However many servants she may have in her employ, it is a woman's duty not to shirk the trouble of attending to everything herself. She must sew her father-in-law's and mother-in-law's garments, and make ready their food. Ever attentive to the requirements of her husband, she must fold his clothes and dust his rug, rear his children, wash what is dirty, be constantly in the midst of her household, and never go abroad but of necessity.

"Her treatment of her handmaidens will require circumspection. These low and aggravating girls have had no proper education; they are stupid, obstinate, and vulgar in their speech. When anything in the conduct of their mistress's husband or parents-in-law crosses their wishes, they fill her ears with their invectives, thinking thereby to render her a service. But any woman who should listen to this gossip must beware of the heart-burnings it will be sure to breed. Easy is it by reproaches and disobedience to lose the love of those, who, like a woman's marriage connections, were all originally strangers; and it were surely folly, by believing the prattle of a serving-maid, to diminish the affection of a precious father-in-law and mother-in-law.

If a serving-maid be altogether too loquacious and bad, she should speedily be dismissed ; for it is by the gossip of such persons that occasion is given for the troubling of harmony of kinsmen and the disordering of a household. Again, in her dealings with these low people, a woman will find many things to disapprove of. But if she be forever reproving and scolding, and spend her time in bustle and anger, her household will be in a continual state of disturbance. . . .

“The five worst maladies that afflict the female mind are : indolence, discontent, slander, jealousy, and silliness. Without any doubt, these five maladies infest seven or eight out of every ten women, and it is from these that arises the inferiority of women to men. A woman should cure them by self-inspection and self-reproach. The worst of them all, and the parent of the other four, is silliness. Woman’s nature is passive (lit *shade*). This passiveness, being of the nature of the night, is dark. Hence, as viewed from the standard of man’s nature, the foolishness of woman fails to understand the duties that lie before her very eyes, perceives not the actions that will bring down blame upon her own head, and comprehends not even the things that will bring down calamities on the heads of her husband and children. Neither when she blames and accuses and curses innocent persons, nor when, in her jealousy of others, she thinks to set up herself alone, does she see that she is her own enemy, estranging others and incurring their hatred. Lamentable errors ! Again, in the education of her children, her blind affection induces an erroneous system. Such is the stupidity of her character that it is incumbent on her, in every particular, to distrust herself and to obey her husband.

“We are told that it was the custom of the ancients, on the birth of a female child, to let it lie on the floor for the space of three days. Even in this may be seen the likening of the man to Heaven and of the woman to Earth ; and the custom should teach a woman how necessary it is for her in everything to yield to her husband the first, and to be herself content with the second, place ; to avoid pride, even if there be in her actions aught deserving praise ; and on the other hand, if she transgress in aught and incur blame, to wend her way through the difficulty and amend the fault, and so conduct

herself as not again to lay herself open to censure ; to endure without anger and indignation the jeers of others, suffering such things with patience and humility. If a woman act thus, her conjugal relations cannot but be harmonious and lasting, and her household a scene of peace and concord.

"Parents ! teach the foregoing maxims to your daughters from their tenderest years ! Copy them out from time to time, that they may read and never forget them ! . . ."

Japanese writers urge that the underlying principles of the system of family life were founded upon a sense of duty, devotion, and self-sacrifice inasmuch as on the death of a father the eldest son recognised that it devolved upon him to maintain the family as far as possible in that degree of comfort to which they had been accustomed. This view places the best possible complexion upon a social system, which, regarded from the Western standard of civilisation and compared with the conditions that now exist in Japan, is a failure inasmuch as, granting its beneficent conception, the fact remains that women in Japan are to-day looked upon as very much the inferior of men. As far back as the sixteenth century the dethronement of women from a position of equality with men was completed. The daughters of old Japan were denied the privilege of a liberal education. They were kept in the seclusion of the home, and were taught that the home and not the world was then proper sphere. Those among them who belonged to the higher orders of society were instructed in a simple curriculum consisting of reading, writing, poetry, and Japanese history, while their accomplishments were restricted to music, the tea ceremony, etiquette, and the arrangement of flowers. The law of the land made little provision for the sex, and marriage and divorce were regulated merely by custom. In short, women were looked upon as cyphers in the scheme of creation. Knights did not vie with each other for the favours of their mistresses ; chivalry, in its application to women, was a thing unknown. The Samurai gave their whole allegiance, and, when occasion demanded, their lives, to the lords of the lands, the Daimyōs. Pages of Western history are aglow with instances where women have inspired men to great achievements. In Japan the influence of women has been a passive

rather than an active one. Yet it cannot be denied that in some intangible way they have played a not inconsiderable part in shaping the destiny of the nation. Their devotion to the home, with its self-abnegation, was little short of a noble martyrdom. Their constant fidelity to man and their unerring obedience to his commands undoubtedly constituted the mainspring of that loyalty which the Samurai gave to the feudal chieftains, and as their reward they were satisfied with the knowledge that they were the mothers of a race of warriors who fought with a bravery unsurpassed in feudal history.

Although one frequently hears, it must be confessed with some justification, criticism levelled against the character of Japanese men, it is rarely if ever that fault is found with the women of the country. Centuries of training, rather than education conducted upon ethical lines has rendered them gentle and gracious to a degree that is almost without parallel among the women of any other country, and has given them a charm which is thoroughly in keeping with the picturesque surroundings of their homes. Although, as I have pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, they have not been altogether unaffected by the national transition, their advancement has not by any means kept pace with the progress of the country as a whole. The Japanese fear that if they are given a high standard of education and allowed to take an active part in affairs outside the sphere of domesticity they will eventually occupy a place similar to that held by women in European countries; that the principle of filial piety with its rigid discipline in the household will be weakened, and that this may in the long-run tend to undermine if not actually to destroy the reverence now felt for constituted authority and the religious sentiment of loyalty centred around the sacred throne. Consequently the tremendous upheaval which began amid the life of the nation, the instant that the gates of the country were opened to receive the progressive influences of the West, has left practically undisturbed the patriarchal system of control which had its origin in the remote days when Japan knew nothing of the outer world. Whether or not the perpetuation of this system in its present rigid form is in the

best interests of the nation is one of the greatest problems that await the solution of its statesmen to-day. So far no radical measures have been taken or decided upon. Action has been directed merely along the lines of adaptability, that is to say, efforts have been made to disseminate Western education in so limited a form as to preserve intact the ancient system of family life. Thus individualism is effectually repressed, and although the interests of the community as a whole may, and undoubtedly do, suffer owing to this circumstance, the Japanese have yet to be convinced that in the sphere of social organisation Western peoples are in a position to impart to them anything that will further the well-being of their masses. On the contrary, they are inclined to imagine that in this direction they themselves are entitled to reverse the customary order of things and to set an example to the West. And thus to-day, as in olden times when the country was a hermit among the nations of the earth, the obligations of society are as strong as ever. Women still meekly subscribe to the three obediences—obedience to a father, obedience after marriage to a husband and to parents-in-law, and, if a widow, obedience to the eldest son. When the eldest son marries he does not set up for himself a separate establishment, but lives with his wife under his parents' roof. He is expected to and invariably does contribute largely to the support of the household, and consequently when his father and mother grow old and are able to earn only a little money he becomes the mainstay of the family. It is in this recognition of the principles of filial piety that the problem of poverty in Japan finds a natural solution. No doubt thousands of children in other countries contribute to the support of relatives, but their action, although dictated by a sense of duty resembling that displayed in Japan, differs in this respect,—that it is the voluntary assistance of the individual and not, as in Japan, an act of conformity with an established principle of a social organisation based upon the patriarchal system of control. While it is obvious that there are many advantages in the life of the family as ordained in Japan, it is equally clear that the immediate if not the contemplated result is to reduce women to a state of complete

subjection. The problem uppermost at present is. Exactly to what extent is it advisable that women should be allowed to share in the general progress that is taking place in all spheres of activity throughout the country? To deny them facilities for education and self-betterment is clearly out of keeping with the spirit of the times. At present there is no demand such as exists in other countries for equality with men in the matter of political rights. The women of Japan have much headway to make before they can assert their individuality in the ordinary life of the community. Twenty years ago a veritable craze for women's education spread throughout the length and breadth of the land, and girls received a liberal education which included a knowledge of the English language. It was not long, however, before the discovery was made that learning unfitted them for the work of the home. In other words, the conclusion was forced upon the authorities that the education of women on the Western scale was irreconcilable with the Japanese social system, a system that exacted in the strictest possible sense of the term meek obedience from the mothers and daughters of the land. This result of what was, after all, something in the nature of an experiment might have been expected. All precedent goes to show that education only tends to give independence of character, and that if serfdom is to be perpetuated then it is essential that the flame of knowledge which brings with it enlightenment of mind should remain unkindled. It was little wonder then that those Japanese women who had received a liberal education should have become completely emancipated. No longer were they the willing slaves of custom; no longer were they content to submit in all humility to the behests of man, whether father or son. Realising that they were free-born individuals, possessed of a will to choose their own path in life, they aimed at becoming units in the great community of the State as a whole rather than, like their sisters in bondage before them, remaining merely instruments for contributing to domestic peace and household efficiency. At one time it seemed that the emancipation of the sex was really at hand. By emancipation is not meant its peculiar application to the sex as used by the suffrage agitators in the West. The true significance of the

word in this instance was rather that which is understood when reference is made to the freedom of slaves in the dark lands of the world. In such a comparison as implied the only difference would lie in the fact that, whereas the slaves of Africa were released from chains and torture, the women of Japan, who were never actually subjected to cruel treatment, were on the verge of gaining their intellectual freedom, and becoming factors instead of cyphers in the community of State. With as little delay as possible, an attempt was made to revert to former conditions. Parents withdrew their daughters from school in large numbers, and for a time the outcry against women's education gained a complete triumph. Again the progressive tendencies of the age reasserted themselves, and the authorities realised that they could not deny women a share in the advantages of national enlightenment. High schools were established in all parts of the country, and facilities for the training of teachers and the higher education of pupils, were provided. An endeavour was made to combine the teaching of domestic science with the ordinary subjects. For instance, history, geography, and mathematics were included in the curriculum, together with etiquette and dressmaking. This latter accomplishment is of first importance in the Japanese household, for the garments worn both by men and women are made at home. That there was a genuine and enthusiastic desire to take advantage of the facilities provided was evidenced by the fact that in six years, from 1902 to 1908, the number of pupils attending the higher schools increased from 17,540 to 42,273. Only recently, however, a controversy in regard to the wisdom or otherwise of women's education has again been revived. A leading organ of Japanese public opinion summarised in the following terms the reasons urged against the system, that it "threatens to destroy in women the traditional virtues of gentleness and obedience, thought indispensable to the sex; that the system, instead of helping to keep down, inclines to encourage in women the weakest of their characteristics, namely, vanity and vaingloriousness; that it tends to produce women with a disproportionate spirit of independence and selfish individualism; that the parents and guardians are beginning to

entertain doubts as to the fundamental problem that girls do really need a higher education ; and that young women themselves are disappointed at the fate of their sister graduates, many of whom fail to find any advantages derivable from education in earning their livelihood " Nevertheless, it was significant of the changing times that the same journal concluded that " There will always be a class of our daughters to whom a higher education is necessary, and with advance of society this circle will keep on growing. The present, as we take it, is only a passing phenomenon, and it will be unwise to brood over it as if it were a permanent tendency." It may be said, therefore, that Japan is at present wavering in regard to the wisdom or otherwise of educating her women. But it is important to remember that the machinery for disseminating knowledge has already been set up. Although the progress made in this direction has not kept pace with the general advancement of the country at large a distinct step forward has been taken during the last twenty years, and it would seem that the future has already been provided for, and that under no circumstances can it be controlled with the object of bringing about a set-back. The change in the status of woman is at present hardly perceptible. But the few indications that are forthcoming in the way of improvement are indeed noteworthy.

In Japan, more than in any other country of first-class pretensions, the need for economy is keenly felt. In the lighter occupations of life, therefore, women are finding an outlet for their activities. This circumstance alone affords a striking illustration of the way in which conditions inseparable from national transition are coming to their aid. Moreover, there are not wanting evidences that they are gradually making their influence felt in circles outside the home. Among other things these are shown in the simple fact that they are more than ever succeeding in getting their wants satisfied. The adoption of Western customs is no longer restricted to the men only. The women are beginning to take their place in society as hostesses. They are acquiring many of the elements of foreign culture. In some instances they are learning to play the piano or the violin, to dance in European style, and to take part in pastimes from which they have

hitherto been excluded. The writer has even seen women riding bicycles in the streets of Tōkyō, probably one of the most daring innovations of the many that have found their way into the life of modern Japan. The custom which ordains that the entertaining of guests shall be done at restaurants, and that only privileged and highly honoured persons shall be allowed to cross the threshold of the house, is gradually disappearing. When travelling abroad many Japanese men now take their wives and daughters with them, and it is no uncommon sight to see Japanese women in the capitals of Europe. Western fashions and attire are also being sought after by the women of Japan. Formerly the mere idea of a Japanese lady discarding her *kimono* for the costume of Parisienne creation was in itself abhorrent to the sentiment of the country. Now it is no exaggeration to say that hundreds of women attire themselves in European dress. In this respect, however, it must be confessed that the change is not one for the better. The diminutive size of Japanese women, and their lack of waist-lines due to the wearing of the *obi*, together with their ambling gait produced by the use of stilt-like foot-gear, renders them altogether grotesque when they don the fashioned garb of their Western sisters. In such circumstances their appearance is not improved by their ungraceful efforts to balance upon their heads large plumed and feathered hats, an undertaking in which they have had no experience, for women's hats are unknown in the scheme of native dress. In this particular instance, however, they are the victims, not the favoured, of the new conditions that obtain in the land. There is no more picturesque figure in the world than that of the Japanese woman attired in the dainty-coloured *kimono* and wrapped in the broad and oftentimes brilliantly tinted band of the *obi*, with its light and satchel-like burden of cleverly conceived folds carried on the back. It is a costume in keeping with the character of the lovely scenery, a costume with infinite possibilities of colour scheme that can be rendered appropriate at all seasons and changes of the year. It is, as it were, a costume that has its place in the landscape. When seen on the little bridges that span the lotus-ponds, on the balconies of doll-like houses, by the side of the waterfall, along the paths of rivers, in the

avenues of pink cherry blossoms, in the gardens against the smouldering dull red of the maple leaf, or again beneath the overspreading branches of the crooked pine, it stands out an exquisitely delicate design in the chaste scheme of Nature's mosaic. The *kimono* was certainly well adapted to old-world Japan. But transition has brought with it strenuous conditions, and in the midst of these the opinion is gradually gaining ground that the picturesque must if necessary be sacrificed to the practical, and that even where dress is concerned the European style, which in the matter of utility is held to possess advantages over the native garb, must slowly secure adoption. All these changes, in so far as they relate to women, are the result of tardy concession, the outcome of circumstances bound up with the turmoil of general transition. Women have thus gained some share in the beneficent influences of Western civilisation, and the primary gift of education having been granted to them, the time will assuredly come, if it is not already at hand, when they will not only realise their responsibilities, but also will claim the reward of individualistic recognition. In the process they will develop faculties that have long remained dormant. Whether or not this will be brought about at the expense of qualities which they already possess is a matter that time alone can decide.

The past experience of other countries would seem to show that at least some sacrifice must be made if the women of Japan are to be uplifted to the standard that finds acceptance in the conditions of modern civilisation. Japanese who belong to the conservative school, and who find their inspiration largely from the study of the Chinese classics, are alarmed when they contemplate the consequences that may be expected from woman's education. They fear that the rise of woman's influence will sap the virility of man's authority, and that becoming a positive factor not only in the home but also in spheres outside the home it can only tend to national deterioration. For they hold, and it must be admitted that in this view they are guided by reason and example, that as woman's ambition is in the main limited to social attainments, any concessions in the direction of equality would only help on a tendency that has already

made itself felt to an alarming extent, a tendency to be done with the Spartan ways of old and to seek out the luxuries of modern indulgence. That there is some ground for these apprehensions no one who is acquainted with Japanese character will deny. The women as well as the men possess the imitative faculty to an extraordinary degree, although in the case of the former the development of this faculty has been retarded by the restriction placed upon their liberties. During the few years that the country has been open to foreign access abundant proof has been forthcoming, as far as men are concerned, that little veneration is attached to the exterior evidences of manner and custom, and that the ways that have found favour throughout the ages of dark isolation are readily sacrificed for the innovations brought from strange lands. It is no exaggeration to say that in this respect the women of Japan are thirty years behind the men, or, in other words, that so far as they are concerned they have only been permitted to have access to foreign manners and customs during a comparatively brief period of twenty years. In spite of their travels abroad and their contact with foreigners at home the great mass of Japanese men have learnt little of chivalry as it is understood in the West. To this day they look upon their wives as little more than superior serving-maids who should be ever ready to bow obsequiously and to smile mechanically in their awe-inspiring presence. Whenever husband and wife go out together it is she who is relegated to the back place, and her rikisha follows in the wake of her lord and master. He does not treat her even with contempt. She is simply ignored. Chamberlain, who is perhaps the most impartial of all Japan's admirers, frankly refers to the lot of Japanese women as "this state of slavery." It is evident, therefore, that, apart from minor indications that their lives are undergoing a change tending towards increased happiness, much remains yet to be done in order that they should attain a proper status in society. This end can only be achieved through the means of educational influences not only as applied to the women but also in relation to the men.

As already pointed out, the principal and most reasonable objection to the emancipation of women lies in the certainty that it will bring about the collapse of the patriarchal system of

family life, bound up with which is the principle of filial piety, and upon which in turn is founded the loyalty of the subject to the sacred throne of the Mikados. As a matter of fact the patriarchal system of family life is fundamentally opposed to the existence of a great State. So soon as Japan sought those influences of the West which gave her entry into the comity of nations her social system was doomed. It is an accepted principle of modern civilisation that the uplifting of man cannot be accomplished without a corresponding improvement in the status of woman. That the former, while aiming at a high ideal, should succeed in relegating the latter to circumstances and surroundings from which he himself, though in a different sphere, has been only too willing to escape, is altogether inconceivable. Therefore the Japanese cannot, even if they should desire to do so, expect women to remain contentedly in this, the twentieth century, amid conditions that belong to feudal if not barbaric ages, while they themselves enjoy, with an almost abnormal avidity, not only the blessings but also many of the evils of a newly acquired civilisation. Nor is it for a moment to be imagined that the emancipation of woman will necessarily be followed by the downfall of man and therefore of the State. Such has certainly not been the experience of Western countries. Not only in the days of knight-errantry, but also in later and even recent times women have inspired the leaders of thought and activity in Europe to glorious achievement. The character of Japanese men will certainly not suffer from the influence of Japanese women. On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that it will be materially improved by the introduction of a chastening influence, to say nothing of the benefit to be derived from the better recognition of a sex (I speak merely of Japan) that of the two is undeniably more conspicuous for its honesty and integrity.

As far as the collapse of the patriarchal system affects the interests of State, several important and inevitable considerations must be taken into account. Paradoxical as it may seem, it is nevertheless true that Japan cannot preserve the god-like sanctity of the throne and at the same time become an empire of first magnitude. The doctrine that the Emperor, descended from the deities of mythology, was the in-

fallible Head of the State was a logical development of the patriarchal system. The Daimyōs, the Samurai, and the other clearly defined divisions in the community were also strictly in keeping with the system of patriarchal control, a system which, with its wide though rigid ramifications, beginning with home life, imposed pious obedience throughout all grades of the social organisation and finally centred around the Throne. When Japan flung wide the gates to foreign entry, and to a still greater degree, when her sons crossed the seas in search of commerce and territorial aggrandisement, she was instantly faced with a set of circumstances destined to revolutionise the whole order of her social system, and which, having a beginning in the life of the individual, cannot in the fulness of time fail to affect the constitution of State. Settling in foreign lands where as pioneers they are compelled to accustom themselves to new conditions, her people will ultimately grow strange to the principles which govern the lives of their fathers at home and which are at present the fundamental basis of the constitution of the community and of the communities within the community. Were this prophecy not to be fulfilled, then the Imperial aspirations of the Japan of to-day would be unattainable. It would be idle to deny that the social system has already done much for Japan. It welded the nation together as one man. It has enabled her on two occasions to strike the enemy with, as it were, one crushing blow. But it has served its purpose; for it is no longer useful because it is no longer practicable. It has enabled Japan to acquire territories beyond the seas, but it is still a question of some doubt, a question that can only be settled by the speedy collapse of the patriarchal system through the emancipation of women, whether or not she will be able to hold those territories. In short, the patriarchal system which gave her her early successes is now retarding her progress. It is an accepted fact that her children make indifferent colonists. Their residence abroad is only temporary. They do not settle on the soil. They have only one home, the home in Japan. To this they transmit a large proportion of their earnings. To this they return as soon as circumstances permit. They do not assimilate with other races, nor do

other races having any knowledge of their character wish to assimilate with them. Consequently as pioneers of empire they cannot compare with the hardy colonists of other countries, and as citizens of the world they are found wanting. The Japanese abroad, whether in the colonial possessions of his own country or in foreign climes, is the victim of chronic home-sickness. His conception of loyalty and of devotion to his own land is incapable of expansion so as to embrace the requirements of an Imperial policy, and for the same reason he is unable to adapt himself to that atmosphere of reciprocity which in the world's communities tends to produce equality of membership. For this he is not to blame. He has been reared under the patriarchal system, a system which binds him in a peculiar sense to his home-land and which, in the light of that modern progression that has seized upon his own country, exacts a stern duty, not in conflict with the highest sentiment of loyalty, but nevertheless opposed to the realisation of the true ideals of Imperial ambition.

Mr. Sumi Myakawa, a Japanese who visited England as recently as 1908, explained the position in simple language when he wrote: "This mode of living is the most fundamental cause of difference between Oriental and Occidental civilisation, and I think the most powerful one of all causes. The advantages of the English custom of a separate home are—it is easy to live, do what you like according to your own taste, and you can carry your home to any part of the world you wish, thus helping colonisation. Again, this custom makes people work and get money to have a proper home. I tried the English way of living, but after a few years I began to think, 'I do not want to live exactly like this.' In the separate home there is too much individualism, too much egoism. I am afraid you are losing respect due to old parents, also the mutual help to your family." Mr. Myakawa would appear to forget that unless the Japanese are prepared to establish "separate homes" they cannot hope to realise their cherished dreams of Empire. The emancipation of women is destined to strike deep at the root of a system that has ceased to help and now only hinders true progression.

That emancipation cannot possibly be achieved without disturbing the foundations of filial piety and of loyalty. Indi-

vidualism will assert itself, and women will no longer, as in many instances at present, owe obedience to the parents of their husbands or to the sons of their birth. Viewed in the light of reason, their present position is purely an artificial one. It arises from an unnatural and arbitrary insistence on a wrongful conception of duty, and is the outcome of centuries of imposition during which human emotion and desire have been suppressed to the dictates of a domestic peace, a peace from which the men of the community have derived nearly all the benefit and certainly all the licence. An improvement in the lot of women will therefore not only make for imperial interests, but, instead of the present rigid and unnatural suppression of sentiment demanded by social usage, it will implant in the hearts of the people, women no less than men, a sensible realisation of the duties and privileges of filial piety and of loyalty, not unmingled with genuine affection, and the more elastic though none the less sincere desire to contribute to, as well as to share in, the well-being of the community as a whole. The advance of Japan as an Empire will be retarded until she has substantially improved the status of her women. Along these lines there is still abundant room for reform. That she has succeeded at all in entering the comity of nations is no doubt largely due to the fact that although in the treatment of her daughters she has been sparing of intellectual development, she has not, like other Oriental nations, subjected them to the rigour of veiled isolation or to the indignities of the harem. Until the women of the East are released from bondage, the nations of the East, although they may aspire to equality with the nations of the West, will only achieve a limited success

XXVI

THE STATUS OF WOMEN THEIR PLACE IN THE FAMILY SYSTEM

THE position occupied by women in Japan in relation to the State, together with the part they fulfil in the scheme of family life, having been fully dealt with in the previous chapter, another important aspect in regard to their status in society remains to be considered. This, briefly, refers to the relations between the sexes. So far, the introduction of Western enlightenment has effected little, if any, improvement in this vital matter. Yet it is here more than in any other direction that there is abundant room for reform. It is here that Japan stands forth, in what is undeniably the most important sphere in human life, as a nation that cannot reasonably lay claim to civilisation as it is understood in Christian countries. The laws that govern the relations between man and woman are still those of an Oriental country. From our point of view they are still essentially barbaric. It cannot be altogether a happy reflection to Englishmen, and more especially to Englishwomen, when they remember that their Allies whose virtues have been extolled to the skies, whose praises have been sung in the poetry and prose of cultured language, and whose example has been held up as a standard of perfection for our children to emulate, not only practise vice, but give to vice a legal and a recognised place. Therein lies the difference between East and West. Therein is to be found the secret that inspired the prophecy, "Never the twain shall meet." If the religion of the white man cannot eradicate vice, at least it does not condone vice. It gives to vice its proper name. It brands it as a sin and prescribes a penalty for those who give way to its indulgence. In short, while Christianity may be seeking to attain an impossible ideal, it has accomplished much in so far as it has enlisted in its

mission the law and force of nations. In Japan, however, as I have pointed out, vice is sanctioned, and in certain circumstances is to all intents and purposes state-aided.

The Japanese conscience in this matter is lost amid the generalities of an ethical teaching which is as mythical in origin as it is unreal in practice. In the absence of any moral code such as that provided in Christianity, a true conception of their moral standard can only be derived by reference to their statute books combined with the knowledge of the habits of the community. Upon this basis alone they must be judged. And it is upon this basis that their claim to civilisation as it is accepted in the Western sense must inevitably rest. For the moment there is no alternative consideration. To one acquainted with the conditions of the country it would appear that there can be only one outcome, one verdict, after an investigation conducted upon the lines indicated. In that most important of all the elements that constitute morality, the relationship between the sexes, the Japanese are certainly not civilised. To suggest otherwise would be at once to admit that our own social system is wrong from beginning to end, that Christianity as taught in the churches and accepted by the congregations of the community is mistaken in its mission, and that the conception of purity as it has ever been wholesomely interpreted in the West is nothing more or less than a prudish fallacy. As a matter of fact the Japanese are little more enlightened in their ideas of womanhood than are the races of other Oriental countries the customs of which have from time to time been severely condemned in England and elsewhere. This fact is not sufficiently realised. It has indeed been almost completely lost sight of in the deluge of flattery called forth by the heroic achievements of soldiers on the battlefields of Manchuria, and sustained by picturesque descriptions from the pens of writers who, in search of romantic material, have overlooked what is in reality the essence of life as it is lived in the Japan of to-day. The popular imagination thought of Japan only as the land of the chrysanthemum, the land of bamboo houses with paper walls, of smiling, happy people, and of eternal sunshine. It was not realised that beneath this delightful picture were social problems as complex and

as heart-rending in the human scheme as any of those which await solution in the darkest corners of Europe. The relation between the sexes is not regulated by individual conception of love or chivalry. It is a corporate part of the family system—mechanical and uniform. The husband chooses a wife because he recognises that he owes a duty not only to his parents, but also to his ancestors. In other words, his primary object in getting married springs not from love, but from a stern, cold realisation of his obligation to perpetuate his line. The woman, therefore, becomes merely an instrument of man's design. She is not, in the strict sense of the term, an individual. Her identity as such is lost in the family of her husband. It is claimed that as affection is inseparable from the recognition of duty, Japanese marriages, although not directly the outcome of sentiment, are nevertheless inspired by genuine devotion, a devotion that makes itself manifest to a marked degree in after life. Incidentally, it may be observed that this theory is not altogether borne out by the divorce statistics.

Japanese girls are taught that the aim of their existence, and the only one to which they should look forward, is matrimony. In school it is instilled into them that as far as they are concerned education is merely intended to make them "good mothers and wise wives." With the consent of parents or guardians a man may marry when he has reached his seventeenth year, and a girl as soon as she has attained her fifteenth year. The consent of parents or guardians, or, in the absence of the latter, of the family council, cannot be dispensed with until the man has reached his thirtieth and the girl her twenty-fifth year. In a country like Japan, however, where the economic conditions are low and where the family system is the foundation of society, it may readily be understood that, in a peculiar degree, parents have an interest in arranging marriages for their children, and consequently early unions are invariably the rule. As a matter of fact most girls marry as soon as their course of education is completed. The procedure adopted has little regard for the persons immediately concerned, the primary object, as already explained, being centred in the perpetuation of the family line. So soon as children reach a marriageable age

the parents enlist the services of a middleman, who voluntarily accepts the duty of finding a suitable partner, and who in after life acts as a sort of sponsor to husband and wife, and not infrequently renders valuable assistance by using his influence in the interests of domestic peace. The matter is arranged in a business-like way, and negotiations are conducted solely through the chosen medium, who is to all intents and purposes a matrimonial plenipotentiary. The parties are only allowed to see each other on one occasion. This is called the "mutual seeing," and is, more often than not, purely a formal matter. Theoretically the parties may make use of the opportunity to terminate the negotiations; but the proceeding having been given the sanction of parents to whom obedience is obligatory it rarely happens that a wedding is not the sequel. In the comparatively few cases where objections are taken these invariably originate with the man. For it would indeed be a bold woman in Japan who would oppose the wishes of her father or who would show any signs of independence in the selection of a husband. In cases where there is no son and heir in a family the practice of adopting the son-in-law as the son sometimes finds favour and is given legal sanction. In these instances the order of custom is reversed, and the husband takes the wife's name. The underlying principle of a union in such circumstances is consistency with the rule that no woman can be the head of a family. In the event of the death of the girl's father, therefore, her mother is obliged to submit to the indignity of obeying the "son," who is not a blood relation. As, however, men are, naturally enough, reluctant to sink their names in that of another family, it is only in cases where pecuniary necessity compels that adoption precedes marriage.

The wedding ceremony itself is illustrative of woman's position in the social scheme. The bride, escorted by the middleman and his wife, leaves her home after sunset. Her dress is made of white material, and as such is an emblem of mourning and not of rejoicing. As soon as she has departed, the house is clean swept. Henceforth she is dead to her own family, and belongs, in the strictest sense of the term, body and soul to her husband. Chamberlain

records that in former days a bonfire was lighted at the gate, and adds that this, as well as the sweeping of the house in modern times, was indicative of the purification necessary after the removal of a dead body. In the feudal ages, providing that she belonged to a Samurai family, she was presented with a dagger, to be used upon herself as a last resort when her matrimonial duty could only be fulfilled by the accomplishment of her own death. The marriage is more in the nature of a celebration than a ceremony. There is no recital of wifely duty. The Japanese bride is not asked at the altar of religion, "Wilt thou obey him, and serve him, love, honour, and keep him in sickness and in health?" An interrogatory of this kind would be altogether superfluous in her case as, implying the possession of right of election, it would be opposed to the basic principle which in Japan determines that she should be submissive to a man for no other reason than that he is a man. The occasion is exclusively social in character, and resembles the Western custom only inasmuch as it consists of a wedding banquet and health-pledging. The principal feature of the feast is called *san-san ku-do*. The bride and bridegroom alternately raise to their lips, three times, three cups of *saké*. To give validity to a marriage the law of Japan merely requires registration. But it must be confessed that in regard to conformity with legal conditions society is somewhat lax, not only in its practice but also in its views. Failure to register, which frequently occurs, implies not the least stigma. On the contrary, society recognises a marriage which has alone received the sanction of social procedure. It is obvious—at least it would appear to be obvious from the Western point of view—that a system due to the prevalence of loose ideas on a subject of first importance to the community presents dangers by no means trivial. The Japanese claim, however, that in regard to the higher classes the sanctity of the marriage tie is guarded as closely as in any other country. Yet it must be confessed that it is difficult to find concrete proof in support of this statement. For it is clear that when the law bearing upon registration is disregarded by a large proportion of the people no complete and, therefore,

no reliable statistics can be forthcoming. A just statement of the case would appear to be that while many Japanese are married in the eyes of a tolerant community their union possesses no legal recognition. Therein lies one of the primary differences between the social systems of East and West. It cannot be denied that in the West the union between the sexes is not infrequently conducted upon irregular lines. But in the West society places its stigma upon such irregularity. Not only does it shun, whenever possible, the persons concerned, but it seeks to exact a toll of vengeance from innocent posterity by placing crude and cruel disabilities upon what it chooses to term illegitimacy. Whatever may be thought of the justice or otherwise of its attitude, there can be no doubt that in withholding consent from unions not legally contracted society has chosen the only means of preserving inviolate the state of monogamy.

Before proceeding farther, and in fairness to the Japanese, one is bound to admit that while no reliable data can possibly be forthcoming, observation goes to show that at least on one side among the better classes of the country the sanctity of the marriage tie is in the main strictly observed. This side, it need hardly be added, is the side of the woman. In this respect the Japanese woman is undeniably the superior of her Western sister. Here again, however, a psychological explanation is to be found. The women of the better classes are principally the descendants of the Samurai order. Responsible for their training, their mothers were but fifty years ago the wives of two-sworded knights who were not slow to punish any lapses from virtue with a severity that can well be imagined. The general status of women, which is, of course, more strictly defined in the upper classes, also enters largely into consideration. Thus it follows that, in a land where women are not permitted the indulgence of a will of their own; where they are merely the instrument of man's design; where their sphere of usefulness or of pleasure rarely extends beyond the narrow limits of domesticity in its most slavish form; and where, though desire exist, a course of infidelity is difficult to pursue because opportunity is

lacking, virtue has assumed the cold negative qualities of an ingrained habit, and married chastity, jealously guarded as it is, cannot be prized to the same extent as in the West because in Japan it is merely a manifestation of the blind, unreasoning—I had almost said awestricken—loyalty of a simple-minded, untutored woman to her overbearing lord and master. While the emancipation of woman may ultimately tend in some cases to diminish that rigid regard for the sanctity of marriage at present felt and practised among the women of the upper classes, it is destined to produce one important and highly beneficial effect that will considerably outweigh any incidental disadvantages. So soon as she is permitted to exercise a will of her own, her moral influence will extend to the male members of the family. In other words, her husband and her son, instead of exacting implicit obedience from her, will in turn find that her counsel, supported as it must be by all the authority of a free and wisely expressed will, is on the side of a morality that imposes obligations not on one but on both sexes in the community.

The praises of the family system in Japan have been sung with an enthusiasm no less fervid than that bestowed upon other and, if anything, still more superficial evidences of what has been termed so infelicitously the ancient civilisation of the Island Empire in the East. Yet it is surely made manifest to any conscientious observer that a system so loose in its construction that it permits men their own standard of morality while insisting that women shall recognise man's right to unbridled freedom of action—a right that is opposed to all pure ideas of womanhood—is far from perfect, and lacks the least degree of stability inasmuch as it stultifies effort towards idealism, and is therefore poisonous to the very life of the nation. At present the man in Japan has no censor above him, and consequently he is not deterred by any fear that society will place a stigma upon his actions. He conducts his life much as he pleases ; and the law of the land, based as it is upon loose principles of society, condones his lapses for the simple reason that in these it recognises nothing in the nature of sin. The emancipation of women in Japan, therefore, should lead to the establishment of a strict moral code, the observance of which, supported as it

inevitably must be by the sanction of society, will command widespread recognition.

So far I have dealt principally with the status of women belonging exclusively to the better classes. Among the lower orders—and it must be confessed a very large section of the community—the marriage tie possesses but little significance. The wedding rite itself is reduced to a simplicity largely centred round the picturesque custom, previously referred to, of *san-san ku-do*, and legal registration is frequently dispensed with. Moreover the easy facilities available for obtaining divorces give the contract little sanctity and in fact reduce the meaning of the word marriage to nothing more or less than a *saké*-drinking observance. "Amongst the lower classes," writes Chamberlain, "ceremonies and considerations of all kinds are often honoured only in the breach, many of the so-called marriages of plebeians being mere cohabitation founded on mutual convenience. This accounts for the 'boy' and the cook—to their foreign master's increasing astonishment—being found to bring home a new wife almost as often as they bring home a new saucepan. Such laxity would never be tolerated in well-bred circles." Divorce is chiefly restricted to the lower classes for the very simple reason that in the upper classes such a proceeding is considered altogether superfluous. The truth of this statement may the more readily be understood when attention is again drawn to certain aspects of woman's status in the better circles of the community. Chamberlain finds the true explanation when he says, "Why, indeed, should a man take the trouble to get separated from an uncongenial wife, when *any* wife occupies too inferior a position to be able to make herself a serious nuisance, and when society has no objection to his keeping any number of mistresses?"

While no State law can hope to regulate satisfactorily the relation between the two sexes, there is no doubt that legislation would go a long way towards raising the standard of morals among the masses were it to insist upon the strict enforcement of registration in the matter of marriages, and sternly to discountenance dissolution on terms that at present are so easy as to permit of the existence of what can only be

called licensed cohabitation. At present a divorce can be obtained on any one of the following grounds : (1) bigamy ; (2) when the wife has committed adultery ; (3) when the husband has been punished for adultery with another man's wife ; (4) when she or he is sentenced to more than three years' imprisonment ; (5) when one of the parties has received "unbearable cruelty or serious insult from the other" ; (6) when one of the parties "has been subjected to cruel treatment or serious insult from the other's lineal ascendant" ; (7) when a lineal ascendant is "treated with cruelty or insulted seriously" by the wife or husband ; (8) wilful desertion on either side ; (9) when a man adopted into a family to marry the heiress afterwards becomes heir in his own family and wishes the matrimonial tie with the daughter of the adopted family to be dissolved. Finally it should be explained that the divorce of a married couple can be effected either by their mutual consent or by the decree of a law-court. The mere fact that the parents or near relatives consider that a woman is not suitable to remain in the family is held to be sufficient ground for insistence upon matrimonial separation. The question of her suitability as a partner to the husband does not enter into the question. Even mutual attachment is lightly sacrificed in the interests of the family, and the sanctity of the marriage tie holds no place in the consideration of family councils. Strictly speaking, the law does not uphold divorces of this kind ; but as the family system is all-powerful, and the woman is not counted as an individual, there are few cases where recourse is had to legal procedure. The latest statistics in regard to divorce show that for the five years ending 1907 there was an annual average of 63,000 dissolutions, a percentage of 16.5 of the total number of marriages. Such figures are in themselves sufficiently indicative of the loose state of morality in the country. But even these are by no means complete, for they only apply to State registered marriages, and therefore do not take into account the enormous number of separations of couples whose union was celebrated rather than cemented in the social custom of the *saké* cup. Where conditions like these exist it can easily be imagined that the term illegitimacy in relation to the children of a union has neither special

significance nor stigma, and involves little if any tangible disqualification in the matter of legal rights or even of social privileges. It will be equally apparent that in a country where the facilities for divorce are so readily accessible to all classes of the community, surreptitious infidelity, in so far as it relates to the man, would savour somewhat of the irrational. Should he grow tired of his wife he can rid himself of the burden by coercing her into mutual acquiescence in divorce. Indeed the matter can be arranged with a simplicity that is altogether appalling. Even his relatives may come to his assistance by objecting to her presence in the family circle. And as the law at present stands she may undergo this unpleasant experience many times in life. She is simply at the mercy of the idle whim and selfish will of her husband and his relatives, and she has less security of tenure than any *rikisha* coolie hired by the day or by the hour. It is in the lower circles, where economic conditions dictate that one man shall have only one wife—that is only one wife at a time—that divorce largely finds favour. It is used as a means of shirking what in the West are looked upon as the sacred obligations of life, and the ease with which it can be obtained gives rein to the worst passions inherent in man. In the upper classes, as Chamberlain points out, divorce is unnecessary, because the low status of women generally, strange as it may seem, precludes the possibility of her being considered even to that dubious extent, and because society—and let it be understood that by society in Japan is meant the aggregation of men only—has no objection to the maintenance of mistresses, and in such circumstances places no stigma upon either or any of the parties. Polygamy, theoretically, is not accepted in Japan. For centuries past the custom of one man, one wife, has been a nominal rule of society. But at the same time the custom of one man, one wife, and—providing financial resources will allow—many mistresses, has been adopted to such an extent as to render polygamy a social though not a legally sanctioned practice. To all intents and purposes, therefore, polygamy does exist in Japan. As far back as authentic history can be traced concubinage found favour in the land. Its origin in early times was due to a far higher motive than that which has characterised its per-

petuation. Formerly it was accepted as consistent with man's conception of high duty to his family, a conception that found embodiment in the maintenance of the ancestral line. The proud boast that the Emperors of Japan have descended in one long and unbroken line throughout the ages would have been impossible had it not been for the existence of royal concubinage and the non-existence of illegitimacy in preserving succession to the throne. A system, however, that had originally a utilitarian object in the scheme of human life rapidly developed into an excuse for incontinence, and as such eventually secured a place as an established custom of society. Deprived of its original motive it has become neither more nor less than brazen immorality. To cloak it underneath any other name would be to shirk the truth. The doctrine of woman's inferiority, upheld in olden times as a means of maintaining the lofty ideal of ancestral glory, has thus in later times found a different and an altogether degrading application. For it is clear that where concubinage exists merely for the sake of indulgence, and where its practice involves no real stigma, woman is not only looked upon as inferior, but is treated to all the heart-aching indignities which render this inferiority a hopeless bondage. The law of the land in regard to the subject of illegitimacy is framed on altogether liberal lines. Its object, however, is not due to the existence of any consideration for the children. It arises solely from the universal desire to maintain the family system at all costs, and incidentally it affords another instance where the inferiority of woman is emphasised almost to the last degree of indignity. Thus the wife of a man is held to be the legal mother not only of her own children, but also of any children that may result from her husband's concubinage. On the death of the legal mother the children of illegitimacy go into mourning for a stipulated period. In the words of the Rev. J. T. Imai, the Japanese Principal of the Divinity School established in connection with the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel, "while the law does not recognise concubinage, provisions are made for children by such women, and they occupy an intermediate position between the children by legal wives and illegitimate ones. They are also given possibilities of becoming heirs." In the

term "legal mother" is to be found a singularly concise definition of the status of wives in Japan. A wife, therefore, is simply a legal mother. For were she to be childless it would not be long before her lord availed himself of the divorce laws.

As to what extent the introduction of Western civilisation and the teachings of Christianity have exerted an influence towards the attainment of a high moral standard in the country is a matter at present open to question. The Rev. J. T. Imai, who naturally enough approaches his subject with the optimism of an enthusiastic worker in the field of missionary enterprise, declares that concubinage is in reality disapproved by the social conscience—but, he adds, not strongly enough to sweep it away, and that as a result it is still not uncommon. He cannot help being convinced that the truth of the Christian revelation has its great mission for the land where, in his own words, "old religions, moral philosophies, and its peculiar spirit of *Bushido*, have totally failed to elevate matrimonial sanctity and to raise womanhood to its proper position." It must now be conceded, more especially when taken in conjunction with other aspects of life in Japan as dealt with in this book, that the fulsome admiration which the West bestowed upon *Bushido*, and which it conceived to be the root of all Japanese success, had its foundation in ignorance. For an ethical teaching that permits of the treatment of woman as something less than a human being and little more than an animal cannot tend to the true elevation of mankind. The Rev. J. T. Imai perhaps represents the most optimistic section of educated public opinion. In the following passage, as a student of the social conditions of his own country no less than as a firm believer in the efficacy of Christianity as the one and only means of reform, he gives us the benefit of some striking views:—

"It is a matter of no slight interest to notice that nowadays some marriages are celebrated at shrines or temples with a religious ceremony. The leading non-Christian Japanese are beginning to realise that the sanctity of marriage cannot be properly emphasised unless religion comes into it. And many are ready to acknowledge that there can be no better

religion than Christianity in this respect. I now pass on to difficulties and problems for the Church in Japan. And I should like to say at once that Christianity, which is the *domestic* religion of all the creeds in the world, has in Japan come into special contact with the strong natural idea of family. The revealed name of 'Heavenly Father' finds intelligible echo in people's minds, however their ideas of 'God' are confused by polytheistic habits of thought. Now it is obvious that marriage between Christians must be lifelong. But must we therefore destroy the idea of family duty connected with it? Can we not rather consecrate it in the name of Christ? The present marriage service of the Japanese Church is simply a translation from the English Book of Common Prayer, completely individualistic in its form. Could not the highest and noblest ideas of family and of the duty owing to it be somewhat emphasised in the Japanese Service from the revealed truth of the Fatherhood of God over the whole Universe of His Creation? Yet it is extremely difficult to suggest the details of such alterations. Marriage, and even divorce, carried out in Japan from the family basis cannot be so easily condemned as would appear at first sight, and yet we cannot acquiesce in applications of its principle as far as divorce is concerned, if we are to be faithful to the truth we are to witness and preach. The Nippon Sei Kokwai has debated a Canon on Marriage through several triennial General Synods. But each time heated debates in the Synod or careful consideration at special committee meetings have ended in throwing out the drafts laid before the House. The real difficulty is in the undercurrent which runs strong in Japanese minds, influenced for generations by their national family idea, and which Western minds cannot quite enter into. And I feel that till the family side of the Christian truth can be more drawn out, built up, and consecrated, we shall not be able to come to any satisfactory conclusion. Till then it may be best to leave the Canon as it is. Another of our practical difficulties is the question of marriage between Christians and non-Christians. It is sadly frequent, owing to the fact that Christians are so few in number in proportion to the whole population. The difficulty is greatest in the case of Christian girls belonging

to non-Christian families of the higher classes, and it is unavoidable while marriage is considered a matter of duty in which personal choice is expected to be sacrificed. And in Japan, even if personal choice is granted, to live unmarried would cause serious scandal. A girl would have no provision for her livelihood even in good class families, where daughters are not generally provided with special property of their own. The cases of Christian and non-Christian marriages are considered to be cases for discipline, and to be referred to the judgment of the Diocesan. But many cases are not brought to his notice, and the judgments vary in different dioceses. I need say nothing on the side of the opinion which would have all such cases put under discipline, as I trust it is the common opinion in the West, but it will be of some interest to say a few words on the other side. The opinions of those who would not bring these cases under discipline may be represented as follows. They think the so-called heathens are not the same as those of past ages. Though not Christian they are sympathetic and favourable to Christianity, neither definitely atheistic nor believers in a heathen religion. They are often willing to have the marriage in church, but the Church cannot, of course, consent to this, and therefore the marriage is celebrated according to old custom. They are only inspired with antagonistic feelings when they find the Church taking so much trouble to prevent the marriage, and, when it is carried out, putting discipline upon their daughter or their bride. Other Christian Protestant bodies generally show sympathy and goodwill to such marriages, and as a result they make converts of the non-Christian partner and other members of the family. Again, such marriage, though it cannot receive the benediction of the Church, is honourable and sacred. Why should it be made to offend those favourably inclined to Christianity, and shut the gate of salvation before them? Or why should it cause many girls to put off their baptism in order to avoid the pains and troubles over their marriage, as to which they have no choice? Is it so essential a part of Christianity that we must ignore this inevitable necessity, or the opportunity of salvation of many and the socially honourable contract? These points may not appeal to some minds,

but I think I have represented the general opinion of Japanese Christians. Another most difficult matter at present is to receive the table of prohibited degrees as it is in the young Church of Japan. The question of the deceased wife's sister is not clear even in Christian countries. It is asked whether it is one of the essential parts of Catholic doctrine or tradition, without which the Church in Japan cannot enjoy full communion. Here again I am telling you the general opinion in Japan. The marriage difficulties lie chiefly in the divided opinions and practices among Christians in Japan. Christians have no unanimous voice in which to speak out the Christian idea of marriage and divorce. The subject really ought to be discussed and decided upon by all the existing Christian bodies, if the Church of Christ is to renew and reform human society."

While, admittedly, the family system in Japan is not without its advantages, it possesses at the same time innumerable obstacles to civilised progress. It not only marks down woman as the slave of man, but also gives pretext for the practice of concubinage. In these circumstances it is difficult to see how there can be a reconciliation between Christianity and family government until the latter has been thoroughly cleansed of its objectionable features. As a matter of fact, the indications that the social conscience is being awakened are but slight; and in the opinion of those best able to judge, no adequate reforms will be accomplished until an example is set by the highest in the land. When concubinage is practised within the walls of the palace at Tōkyō it is difficult to see how the community at large is to escape its evil influence. It is stated that when the Crown Prince ascends the throne, he will once and for all put an end to a system which, if it has done nothing else, has at least enabled the Japanese to boast that their Imperial line has been an unbroken one throughout the centuries not only of history, but also of mythology. Moreover, the private lives of many of the statesmen and members of the official classes in the country will not, at least from the Western point of view, bear investigation. During the peace riots which followed the recent war with Russia, when Ministers were in ill repute throughout the land, the news-

papers, with a candour that almost amounted to indecency, published elaborate details concerning the private lives of members of the Cabinet. Photographs of their mistresses and of the houses where they lived, were reproduced and circulated widespread, with the result that popular anger was inflamed to such an extent that these unfortunate ladies were compelled to go into hiding. Even the Premier himself was not spared. Nor, as far as could be ascertained, was the feeling of the masses inspired by a scrupulous objection to a social evil. It was directed against all individuals having relations of any kind with the Ministers, but to a certain extent it arose from a democratic spirit of envy which manifested itself in a protest against privileged indulgence. In other words, the poorer classes, compelled to have recourse to divorce should they desire a change in wife, were righteously indignant when they reflected that Ministers whom the State paid, and whose policy in not insisting on an indemnity provided no remission of a grievous burden of taxation, need not resort to any such irritating formality as a means to gratification, but were able to maintain, principally out of their stipends, separate establishments. As recently as the year 1908, an interpellation was introduced in the Diet, in which the conduct of the then Minister of the Imperial Household, Count Tanaka, who proposed to marry a bookseller's daughter fifty years his junior, was severely commented upon. The attack was led by Mr. Hattori, one of nine Christian members in the Diet, and a despatch which appeared in the *Daily Mail* describing the incident stated among other things that: "It was already widely known that this woman was on intimate terms with Count Tanaka, but nothing would have been said of this if the Minister had not indiscreetly desired to elevate her to the dignity of wife and countess. The Press was scandalised at this proposed insult to the throne, for in this light the matter is regarded by the Japanese people. Mr. Hattori, in his speech attacking Count Tanaka, declared that the national morality was declining day by day. The dissipated conduct of Count Tanaka defiled the sanctity of the Court. Yet no one in the Cabinet rebuked the Household Minister for serious offences against the dignity of the Crown. Would no one uphold the dignity

of the Imperial Family? If such offences were allowed to go unpunished some patriot would take upon himself the task of cleansing the Court of this 'objectionable personage.' Count Tanaka, however, is but the scapegoat of a social evil all too common. Other Ministers are notorious for practices similar in kind though different in degree, inasmuch as they are not of the character to offend the Imperial dignity or the nation's susceptibilities. One Minister's offence consists in proposing marriage to a woman who is already wife in everything but in name, while other Ministers' offences are as yet a breach of no law and are sanctioned 'generally by custom.'

It would seem that Count Tanaka's offence was his intention to make his mistress his wife, and that it was her social status which, rendering her unfit to appear in Court circles, made this offence appear heinous. Thus the Imperial dignity and the nation's susceptibilities received something in the nature of a shock. It should be added that the safeguarding of the Imperial dignity is the peculiar province of the Minister of the Household. In regard to the affairs of other high officers of State no similar scrupulosity is entertained. More than one instance is on record where a *Geisha* has become the wife of a foremost statesman of the time. Chamberlain describes these romances in his own inimitable style. "A poor student," he says, "becomes enamoured. His friends, hearing of what they deem evil courses, stop supplies. The singing girl supports her lover, who thereupon passes brilliant examinations, and obtains an official post. They are married, and he rises to be one of the leading men in the Empire, while she, of course, is a great lady with her carriage and her weekly reception days." Apparently society is not concerned with the means that enable the brilliant statesman to rise to fame and fortune, and it does not make any too close an investigation into the life of the *Geisha* who was able to amass sufficient funds to pay for the education of her ambitious lover. In these particular instances that Samurai pride of which we have heard so much is, to say the least, not conspicuous. Stories of this kind, or, as the Japanese prefer to call them, romances, are, from the point of view of Western enlightenment, recitals of abomination, and

from the point of view of Western law the incidents which they narrate are in certain circumstances criminal offences. That in spite of whatever may be said to the contrary no stigma is attached to dubious relationships, is evident from the fact that many Ministers who were attacked after the recent war were allowed to remain in office for some considerable time, that their resignation was brought about by reasons of political expediency rather than by revelations concerning their private lives, and that many of these Ministers, although not altering their ways, have returned to power, and enjoy the confidence of their Sovereign. Frequently during my residence in Tōkyō, a Japanese companion, often a man of some position in the community, would take a pride in pointing out to me various little houses, saying, "That is where So-and-so's concubine lives." When it is remembered that, allowing for the difference in the economic conditions of East and West, establishments of this kind can be maintained at the outside cost of four or five pounds per month, it will be seen that wealth is able to support vice in abundance. The Japanese claim that they are not one whit the less moral than the people of England. But where can they point to an instance, at least in recent times, when the verdict of public opinion permitted a British minister of Cabinet rank whose life was not above reproach to remain in office? And where can they point in any period of our history to a statesman who has risen to fame on the earnings of a mistress? The Japanese, in their own defence, are not slow to make capital out of the loose lives led by sections of the foreign communities who reside in the treaty ports. But in this respect they show a singular lack of knowledge in regard to the tendencies of human nature. For where facilities are only too ready at hand, and where vice is to all intents and purposes sanctioned, the frailties of mankind must always be in evidence. Thus it is undeniable that certain Europeans lead questionable lives in Japan; but they do so under a system of sanction which differs from the conditions controlling society in the West. In the West, the community of its own accord condemns and penalises the practice of open vice. But the laxity of the Japanese social system presents a temptation which the individual, irrespective of nationality, finds it difficult

to resist. In short, it wields an influence that not only retards civilisation, but tends to undo the good work already accomplished by civilisation. Viewed from this aspect, therefore, it is a blot upon the world and upon the age.

The general looseness of the Japanese social structure is apparent, not only in specific immorality, but also in what may perhaps best be described as a state of unmorality. A story is told, that when it was represented to the authorities that the provision of separate facilities in public bath-houses was advisable in the interests of morality, a simple cord was suspended across the bath as a dividing line. Not long ago a man who appeared in a state of nudity in the streets of Nagasaki, and who offered a violent resistance to arrest, was acquitted, and the local English journal, commenting upon the case, said: "We were under the impression that the primitive habit of bathing in the streets in front of houses had been suppressed, but we hear that it is still practised in some of the principal thoroughfares of the city." Some writers in their ill-considered admiration for all sides of Japanese life, have endeavoured to prove that the fact that little notice is taken of the nude is evidence of the existence of healthy, sensible minds free alike from prudery and prurience, and due to a high state of culture rather than to a primal lack of imagination. In their attitude of indifference let it be clearly understood, however, that the Japanese do not inherit lofty conceptions, nor on the other hand are they, like the sculptor, influenced to any extraordinary degree by an æsthetic outlook. As a matter of fact they are a cold-blooded race, unmoved by anything in the nature of suggestion, though none the less prone to contemplated indulgence. Assuming that the best possible interpretation is put upon their attitude in this respect, surely no civilised individual can offer an excuse for the many objectionable practices that mark the ordinary life of the community in Japan to-day. In the capital, and in other large cities throughout the land, there is an absence of those conditions which in the West are considered essential to the requirements of decency or propriety; and incidents are frequently witnessed which would bring the blush to the cheek of any European woman

irrespective of her status in society. In the out-of-the-way country districts matters are still worse : hotels and inns, to say nothing of tea-houses, are conducted with a laxity that is appalling, and the menial state to which the woman-servant has been reduced presents a phase of gross impropriety too disgusting for description. These obnoxious features, opposed as they are to the spread of culture, will disappear as soon as it is fully realised that Western civilisation means not only progress in relation to things material, but also advancement in the moral well-being of the community, and that it is upon this basis alone that the lasting structure of a great State can be founded. It is imperative that the Japanese change their whole attitude in regard to women, though in the process they sacrifice to a large extent the traditions of their family system. A system that is dependent upon the theoretical view that woman is a nonentity cannot last in an age that is essentially one of enlightenment. In short, if Japan is to retain her position in the comity of nations, then she is bound, sooner or later, to subscribe to those ethical teachings which have led to greatness among the nations. It has been conclusively shown that at present the social structure of Japan rests upon loose foundations ; that woman, though not subjected to physical ill-treatment, is precluded from exercising a will of her own ; and that the prince no less than the peasant is not slow to take advantage of a system that gives rein to the passions.

XXVII

THE STATUS OF WOMEN: THE SANCTION OF INFAMY

THERE is yet another important aspect of social conditions as they prevail in Japan to-day, an aspect that is rendered all the more deplorable by reason of the low status occupied by women generally throughout the land. The authorities have made an attempt to combat the so-called social evil by methods of segregation. To any one possessed of the least tithe of respect for womanhood, this attempt is neither more nor less than a pitiful exhibition of national depravity. The attempt has failed. And, moreover, the Japanese Government know that it has failed. Yet they perpetuate, within the great centres of population throughout the Empire, that atrocious custom which sets apart large areas where vice is licensed with all the authority of State, where, in effect, vice is practised under the patronage of the State, and, where, from the proceeds of vice, the State exacts its toll in the form of a taxation that is devoted to furthering the interests of the community as a whole, and incidentally of defraying the expenses that are attendant upon the maintenance of vice. There is, I believe, no other system like this in the world. Certainly there is none that compares with it in any country laying claim to civilisation. It is, in fact, one of the wonders of the world—a wonder that excites all the more amazement to-day in view of the claim to enlightenment which Japan, as a result of her political ascendancy, has put forward, and which the untutored masses of the West have accepted with a simplicity amounting almost to gullibility. The writer proposes to take one notorious instance, that of the *Yoshiwara* or, as it is called in English, the Nightless City. This is only one of several quarters in the capital given over exclusively

to the practice of vice. In describing this pest spot it is my intention not to mince words. For I hold that it is in the interests of civilisation as a whole that an exposure of the Japanese in regard to their moral delinquencies should be made known in the plainest possible terms of which the English language is capable. I do not think that this altogether deplorable aspect in the life of our allies is sufficiently known. It is not realised that in the midst of a country which, perhaps, more than any other part of the world, has been endowed with the glorious beauties of nature, thousands of women, and even little girls, are enslaved in a condition of moral degradation that has no parallel in lands where the teachings of Christianity are accepted. As I have stated, Japan's claim to enlightenment has been accepted; Japan is our ally. But in view of the facts that will here be revealed it must be admitted that, judged by all the standards which make for purity, Japan's claim is based upon false pretences, and is accepted in consequence of the ignorance that prevails in regard to the actual conditions obtaining in that country. Were it otherwise, then the men and women of our race would be lacking in the most elementary conception of simple morality. It is high time, therefore, that we paused and asked ourselves the question, What manner of people are these whom we have taken under our wing? Is their friendship consistent with the best traditions of our race? Is it, in fact, worth having? Viewed strictly from the standpoint of political expediency, the answer is in the affirmative. Viewed from almost any other standpoint, the question is a debateable one. In order to be as explicit as possible, and to present no charges which facts will not substantiate, it is my aim to take my readers as much as possible into my confidence.

Imagine, then, that for the brief space of one single night you are transported across the seas to the city of Tōkyō. You will there proceed from the heart of the city to the quarter of the *Yoshiwara*, a *rikisha* ride of some miles to the outskirts of the capital. As you approach the quarter where vice is enthroned, you will see from a distance the reflection of thousands of lanterns. The way lies through narrow, crooked streets, lined with neat, well-kept houses,

whose occupants prey upon the evil that finds its centre in their midst. These establishments are known as introducing houses. Their peculiar function is to make the "guest" acquainted with the victim. Altogether there are no fewer than 1054 of such places without the gates, and 50 within. Picture albums, wherein are displayed, highly-coloured portraits of the courtesans, are kept ready for inspection, and from these a selection is invariably made. On her side the unhappy girl has little, if any, choice. Above the great gates that open the way into an enormous area of enclosed ground are to be seen Japanese characters, penned by a celebrated author, whose abilities might have been the better employed in a purer cause. These characters are singularly indicative of the light-hearted way in which the Japanese treat a problem that, in the West, is regarded as the saddest and most serious in the whole sphere of human life. Their literal translation gives the following picturesque phraseology: "A dream of spring-tide when the streets are full of the cherry blossoms. Tidings of the autumn, when the streets are lined on either side with lighted lanterns." Surely it is not saying too much that in Japan vice is enthroned! The words inscribed upon the gates of the Nightless City are a mockery of the misery within, and are an inducement to the tempted without to pass beyond. The scene inside the enclosure is one of heartrending fascination. The eye first catches a glimpse of lines of dancing lights, set in gaily-coloured lanterns, lines on either side, one above the other. These are the adornment of the houses, of which there are no fewer than 150. As one passes idly along the streets, wending one's way through a varied throng, not unmingled with those sinister ghosts of human beings, whose occupation it is to haunt and to prey upon vice, one glances to either side of the roadway, and for a time the vision is almost confused by the scene of blazing colour. Seated in the open front of the houses, behind frail wooden bars that convey the idea of a cage, are rows of girls, dressed in gaudy costumes of costly silks, with faces powdered and rouged, lips reddened, eyebrows blackened, and hair adorned with ornaments of coral and tortoiseshell; the interior of

their prison is made up to present to the untutored eye a spectacle of gorgeous attraction. The matting is covered in places with a crimson carpet, picturesque screens are in place, and the whole setting is more often than not accentuated with an aggressive profusion of cheap gilt. The unhappy occupants are seated upon cushions, in a fashion that enables them to rest back on their heels. By their side is the charcoal brazier—a never-omitted feature of the Japanese room. Occasionally they fill the little bowls of their long, red bamboo pipes with the mildest of tobacco, and after a few puffs knock the ashes into the brazier, and again fill the bowl with a precision which is mechanical. Upon their faces there rests what appears to be an expression of an almost enduring ogle, and at intervals they thrust their thin arms through the bars, and with an appealing glance, and, as a sign of invitation, offer their pipes to the passers-by, who, in light-hearted groups, either chaffing or chatting gaily, cluster round the human prison much in the same way as do spectators around the cages of wild animals in the Zoological Gardens. A grin is exchanged for a gape, and so the evil contract is sealed, and a place becomes vacant in the cage. By the side of each house there is a spacious entrance, and here stands a little compartment, with a tiny aperture resembling that which is to be seen in the booking offices of railway stations. Seated on the single stepway that leads into an entrance-hall are a number of men, whose garb and appearance are as repulsive as their occupation is despicable. These are apparently the minor officials of the establishment, and they spend their time shouting solicitations to the passing crowds at the doorway. In establishments that lay claim to better-class pretensions, the girls are not exhibited, but, instead, rows of flattering photographs of the occupants are suspended outside. Such is a description of what is perhaps the most elaborate attempt to organise vice that the world has ever witnessed. In order to obtain an adequate idea of the viciousness of the system, it is necessary to take a peep behind the scenes, and to inquire into the conditions that govern the unhappy lot of the poor girl. In the first place, it should be explained that in the Tōkyō Yoshiwara, which is only one out of

several segregated districts in the city, there are no fewer than 3000 inmates, while carefully compiled statistics showed that in the year 1898 nearly a million and a half persons visited the establishments in this particular quarter. Other statistics relating to the whole country, compiled in 1898, were as follows:—Number of courtesans, 40,208; number of singing girls (adults), 24,261; number of singing girls (children), 513; number of segregated quarters, 546; number of establishments, 10,172. These figures are in themselves evidence of an alarming state of immorality. When, however, the conditions under which the girls are obtained are examined, it will instantly be realised that slavery in its vilest form is openly practised in Japan. Strictly speaking, the law places itself on the right side. Theoretically the girls are free to choose their own way in life. In reality, however, they are bound hand and foot just as much as though they wore chains and manacles. In these circumstances the instructions that are given to the keepers of dubious establishments are a revelation of hypocrisy that would be hard to surpass. They are told, among other things, that they must treat the girls fairly, that they must do all in their power to reform them, that they shall not cause them to squander money recklessly, and that they must advise them to forsake the paths of vice, and to lead virtuous lives. It may well be imagined how indifferently these instructions are obeyed by a class of men whose sole object and interest in life it is to exploit vice, and who in any civilised country would be the outcasts of society. A girl may enter the house of bondage as soon as she has attained the age of sixteen. Invariably her term expires at the age of twenty-five, but usually she is compelled to prolong her stay for several years in consequence of the monetary obligations she has contracted, and which must be paid to the last farthing before she passes through the great gate into a pure world. Much capital is not infrequently made out of the fact that sometimes a girl has elected to sell herself to the *Yoshiwara* as a means of supporting her relatives or friends. We are told by the admirers of Japan that in these instances we have a striking illustration of the peculiar, and to us often inexplicable, working of the

Japanese mind in its most lofty mood. But it will be difficult to convince Englishmen and Englishwomen that parents who are content to live on the earnings of their daughters, no matter how dire the circumstances of their poverty may be, are fit members for human society. Here let us frankly confess that our faculty of reason has its limitations, and that the Oriental point of view is altogether a strange and incomprehensible one. For it is already within knowledge that the woman in Japan is permitted no will of her own. It is a matter beyond dispute that she has no choice in marriage, and it is equally clear that in certain circumstances she has no choice in the matter of morals. In plain language, some parents are not slow to bring all the pressure of that family system of authority which has been so inconsiderately extolled, to bear upon their daughters in order to induce them to quit a life of virtue for a bondage of vice, from which they themselves may receive the ill-gotten proceeds. A country where not only parental sanction is given, but parental persuasion is made use of as a means to vice, has not yet attained true and lasting greatness. It may be urged that cases of this kind are rare. Certainly it is difficult, owing to the privacy naturally enough maintained, to form a reliable estimate as to the extent of the evil. That it does exist, however, and in no small measure, is undeniable. Moreover, it is notorious; and, in addition, there are thousands of instances where, if the relatives are not actually parties to the evil contract, they are at least constant receivers of the resultant earnings. The Japanese, in their romances, would have us believe that the girl is a heroine in the transaction, that she is a daughter of Samurai pride, who undergoes all that is repellent in the name of her ancestry, and for the glory of her family line. Doubtless the experience is repellent to her, for human nature sets out on its career with a pure and wholesome mind. Her case is not that of the gradual descent from virtue to vice. While the youthful days of innocence are still with her, she is plunged into the midst of the very vortex of vice, and she is under a contract that, whatever its legal effect may be, works out in practice in this way, that it compels her

to remain there many years. She is not so much a heroine as she is a hapless victim.

Should any doubt be cast upon the facts that I have narrated, a reference to that admirable work "The Nightless City"¹ will afford substantial confirmation. Its pages disclose a copy of what is a typical contract, the clauses of which are too revolting to appear in a book that is intended to be of general utility. It is sufficient to say here that the period covered is from December 20, 1895, to October 9, 1900; the parents of the girl received an advance of money; the major portion of the girl's earnings were devoted to liquidating such debt; she was allowed the paltry sum of three farthings per week for pocket-money, principally expended in tobacco; temporary loans were added to the capital loans; clothes were provided on a mortgage with the only security it was possible to give; and the girl undertook not to leave until she had completed payment of interest and redemption on all debt. The agreement bore the signature of a guarantor and was witnessed by a Government official, while a further agreement in respect of a mortgage that provided for the supplying of clothes bore the signatures, as guarantors, of the father and mother. It is clear that the Government not only has knowledge of this infamous traffic in human souls but that it lends its aid and authority to negotiations that, plainly put, enable parents to thrive on the ruin of their own children. To any one who gives the matter a moment's reflection, the effect of a contract such as that outlined is nothing more or less than the recognition of a state of soul-slavery. Nominally the consent of a daughter is required, but this is a formality which, in the phraseology of the Chinese, is in the nature of "saving the face" of the parents, and is regulated by that custom of unquestioning obedience to family authority that has obtained in Japan throughout the ages. The girl, then, enters upon her bondage weighted down with a load of debt from which she as an individual has not derived the slightest benefit. Facilities are granted her for incurring further obligations in the way of temporary loans. Finery

¹ A copy of this work is deposited in the British Museum, and it may be seen there when the usual conditions have been complied with.

is an essential part of her stock in trade, and here again the obliging keeper of the cage is only too willing to supply her wants on his own terms. She has no security to offer save the security of her own body and soul. The keeper cheerfully accepts the mortgage, and the bonds of vicious slavery are bound more tightly than ever. It may be urged, however, that the law, which always endeavours to put itself in the right, provides that any girl who so desires may of her own free will leave the establishment; but at the same time the law is also emphatic upon the point that debt must be paid, and the legal officers of the State bear witness to a contract wherein the human soul is offered and accepted as a mortgage. How is it possible for a girl to make good her escape when her father and mother, at whose behest she has embarked upon a career of vice, are the guarantors of her debt? When the best years of her life are wrecked; when her moral sense has been dulled by all the pains and torments of iniquity; when, in short, and for reasons that are transparent, vice has little further use for her; then her fetters are released and she may go forth into the outer world. In the years that remain this consolation alone is hers, that she has played her part in that social system which certain publicists have the audacity to tell us is largely responsible for the election of Japan into the comity of nations. Unless some relative or friend, or as sometimes happens, a lover, pays down hard cash and thus effects her release, the lapse of time will alone permit her to escape. And while she is within the four walls that isolate her from a community amid which she has been deprived the right of living, what manner of life does she lead? "The Nightless City" relates that these daughters of degradation are not allowed to pass without the gates except for the purpose of visiting the graves of their grandfathers, fathers, mothers, uncles, aunts or brothers, or except when there is an occasion for mourning or rejoicing in connection with such relatives. Further, the regulations provide that whenever they go out they must first obtain the sanction of the director through the medium of the keeper, and must be accompanied by a person from the house in which they are enslaved. When a girl is released, either as a result of the expiry of her term or

the payment of her debt, a token is given to the headman at the gate which amounts to a pass-out certificate recording the fact that she is at last free to go at will. The organisation of the quarters is conducted upon cold, business-like lines. The keepers have brought the preservation of infamy to a highly lucrative commercial undertaking. Guilds have been founded, and, from the members of these, directors and sub-directors are elected. An elaborate system of book-keeping is insisted upon. As far as can be ascertained the only advantage claimed from this attempt to solve the social evil are those attendant upon segregation and upon authoritative supervision. Even though it be conceded that success in this direction has been achieved, the conduct of a Government that permits and legalises a system of social slavery in the midst of a community that it seeks to guide is still a matter for the severest censure. As a matter of fact the social conscience of Japan has still to be awakened. Japan as yet is not civilised in the true sense of the term.¹

¹ In 1911 the *Yoshiwara* was destroyed by fire. A description of the occurrence stated that the flames swept an area four miles long and a mile wide, consuming 7000 houses and rendering homeless 40,000 people. It has since been reported that the quarter is to be re-established.

END OF VOL. I.